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                                  "[...] the orator that we look for, and who we want to make 
                                   the chief of the State council, [will be] the author of the resolutions 
                                   to be taken by the government, and either in the senate or in the  
                                   assemblies, will always make his opinions prevail by the force of  
                                 wisdom and eloquence." 
Cicero (106-43 B.C.)1 
                                                 
1
 "Entre celles-ci, la secte qui combat pour la volupté, quand même ses principes auraient quelque 
apparence de vérité, ne peut convenir en rien à l'orateur que nous cherchons, et dont nous voulons faire le 
chef du conseil de l'État, l'auteur des résolutions à prendre pour le gouvernement, et celui qui, dans le 
sénat comme dans les assemblées, fera toujours prévaloir ses avis à force de sagesse et d'éloquence." 
"Ex illis autem, quae remanent, ea philosophia, quae suscepit patrocinium voluptatis, etsi cui vera 
videatur, procul abest tamen ab eo viro quem quaerimus, et quem auctorem publici consilii, et regendae 
civitatis ducem, et sententiae atque eloquentiae principem in senatu, in populo, in causis publicis esse 
volumus." 
Cicero, De Oratore, III, XVII 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur, III, XVII; dans Oeuvres Complètes de Cicéron, Traduction de S. Andrieux, Revue 
avec le Plus Grand Soin par M. Charpentier, Garnier Frères, Libraires Éditeurs, Tome Troisème, Paris, 
1906, p. 346. 
 
 In memory of Alfredo Colmo, Argentine jurist of international fame 
(1876-1934)2 
                                                 
2
 Born  on August 21st 1876, he was baptized “Juan Alfredo Colmo“, but did not use his first name. 
 
  
                           "[...] law does have compulsive power, and it is reason proceeding from a kind of  
                           practical wisdom and intellect." 
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)3 
 
                        "Besides, though ruler and master of all things, it exercises its authority without the use 
                           of arms and force on the contrary, law itself does away with force; nay, it rules by 
                           persuasion and governs willing subjects. For it is because it first persuades men and 
                           secures their approval that law comes into being and acquires its own power." 
                         
Dio Chrisostom (c 40 – c 120)4 
 
                        ‘VI.5 FORMULA OF APPOINTMENT TO THE QUAESTORSHIP. [...] 
                       3. [...] Think of the honour and responsibility you have in equal measure. If I am in any 
                         doubt, I ask the Qaestor, who is a treasure of public reputation, a store-room of the laws, 
                    ever ready for the unexpected; and as Tully [Cicero], the master of eloquence puts it, 
                           nothing "seems more remarkable than the ability, by speech, to hold men's minds, to 
                           attract their inclinations, to drive them whither, or to lead them whence he wills" [De 
                           Oratore I.30]. For, if it is the proper part of the orator to speak with gravity and style that 
                           he may move the minds of the judges, how much more eloquent must be who is known 
                           to admonish the people with their prince's mouth that they should love the right, hate the 
                           wrong, praise good men without ceasing, and zealously denounce the evil. So,  
                           punishment may be given holiday where the power of eloquence prevails. He must 
                           imitate the ancients with intelligence; he must correct the morals of others, and preserve 
                           his own with due integrity.’                      
                         
Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator (c 490-583)5 
                                                 
3
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 9, 1180a20. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 9, 1180a, Translated and Edited by Roger Crisp, Cambridge 
University Press, First published in printed format, 2000, ebook (net library), 2004, p. 201, text 
reproduced above. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 9, 1180a20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, Second Printing 1985, 
Volume II, p. 1865. 
The text of two versions is accompanied also, one in English and the other in Spanish: 
"[...] law does have the power to compel, and law is reasoned speech that proceeds from prudence and 
intellect of some sort." 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a20, The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction 
Analysis and Notes by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 
and London, 1997, p. 3. 
“[...] la ley tiene fuerza obligatoria, y es la expresión de cierta prudencia o inteligencia.” 
Aristóteles, Ética a Nicómaco, Libro X, 9, 1180a20, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo y 
Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1981, p. 171.  
4
 Dio Chrysostom, The Seventy-fifth Discourse: On Law, 4; in Dio Chrysostom, with an English 
Translation by H. Lamar Crosby, in Five Volumes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
William Heinemann Ltd, London, 1985, Volume V, pp. 242-245. 
5
 The Questor (Quaestor) had then two functions: to write laws and to answer petitions. 
The Variae of Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator, Book VI. 5, 3. The Right Honourable and 
Illustrious Ex-Quaestor of the Palace, Ex-Ordinary Consul, Ex-Master of the Offices, Praetorian Prefect 
and Patrician, Being Documents of the Kingdom of the Ostrogoths in Italy, Chosen to Illustrate the Life 
of the Author and the History of his Family and Translated with Notes and Introduction by S.J.B. 
Barnish, Liverpool University Press, 1992, p. 96. 
The text is accompanied also in the original language: 
                     "FORMULA QUA[E]STURA V [...] 
                       Considerate quid ponderis habeatis pariter & decoris. 
Quaestore       Si quid dubitamus, a Quaestore requerimos: qui est 
officium.        thesaurus famae pubilicae, armarium legum, paratus  
                       semper ad subitum, & (ut ait Tullius magister 
  
                                  "Which must be the art of making laws 
 
                                  We must provide healthy help for making laws, prepare us to 
                                  make good works, as the ancient did, and we want to teach in what way 
                                  to make statutes, and in what way he who makes laws must have 
                                  learned the art of making laws.” 
Fuero Juzgo (649 ó 653)6 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
                       eloquentiae) Nihil praestabilius videtur, quam posse 
                       dicendo tenere hominum mentes, allicere voluntates, 
                       impellere quo velit, unde autem velit deducere. Nam  
orator.            si oratoris est proprium, grauiter & ornare dicere,  
                       ut possit animos iudicu commouere: quanto facundior  
                       debet esse, qui ore principis populos noscitur 
                       admonere? ut recta diligant, peruersa contemnant,  
                       bonus sine fine laudent pessimos vehementer accusent. 
                       Ut pene feriata sit distinctio, vbi praeualet 
                       eloquentiae fortitudo. Sit imitator prudentissimus  
                       Antiquorum, mores alienos corrigat, & suos debita 
                       integritate custodiat." 
Magni Aurelii Cassiodori Senatoris V.C., Variarum libri XII, Apud Sebastianum Niuellium, sub Ciconis, 
via Iacobae, Parisiis, 1589, pp. 129-130. 
6
 "Qual deve ser el arte de fazer las leyes 
Nos que devemos dar ayuda de salud por el fazemiento de las leyes, apareiamos nos de fazer 
buena huevra, cuemo fizieron  los antigos, é queremos ensennar en qual manera se deve fazer la 
ley, y en qual manera el qui la faze deve aver ensennamiento ó arte de la fazer.” 
Fuero Juzgo, Libro Primero, Título I, Del Facedor de la Ley; Los Códigos Españoles Concordados y 
Anotados, Imprenta de la Publicidad, a cargo de M. Rivadeneyra, Tomo Primero, Madrid, 1847, p. 105. 
Ayuda de salud: auxilio, ayuda saludable. Apareiar: disponerse, preparar; aparejarse, prepararse. 
Huevra: obra. 
Víctor Fernández Llera, Gramática y Vocabulario del Fuero Juzgo, Real Academia Española, Madrid, 
1929, pp. 118, 107 y 201. 
  
Warnings to the reader 
 
 
    A great number of notes with quotes has been introduced to invite the reader to drink from 
the best fountains, far from any pedantic style.Thus, there is not always a complete identity 
between the opinion sustained by the author of this work and those of the authors quoted in 
every note,7 not even between the opinion sustained by the said authors and the cites of their 
works here. Those works, more than testimonies of arcane and infallible oracles, may be read as 
store-rooms of tradition, since sometimes the opinions of others exposed or quoted by the 
authors to criticize them, are, perhaps, more important than the own ones, since they may 
generate different and valuable opinions and concerns. Plato was opposed to rhetoric in his 
Gorgias dialogue,8 but then he  accepted a philosophical rhetoric in his Phaedrus,9 to educate or 
govern the souls by means of speech (psychagogy10). The opinions opposite to his, which he 
                                                 
7
 As becomes clear from the beginning of the Notice of the Civil Code of Chile, written by the eminent 
grammarian, legislator and humanist Andrés Bello, author of the project: 
"It must be warned that there is not always a complete identity between a provision of the Code and the 
statute or doctrine quoted; since these are sometimes adapted with some enlargement, restriction or 
explanation, or alleged by way of resemblance or of analogy." ("Debe advertirse que no siempre hai una 
completa identidad entre la disposición del Código i la lei o doctrina que se cita; adaptándose a veces 
éstas con alguna ampliación, restricción o esplicación, o alegándose por vía de semejanza o de analojía"). 
Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, 
Santiago de Chile, julio de 1858, p. 359. 
8
 Diogenes Laertius, Life, Doctrines and Judgments of Illustrious Philosophers, Book  III, Plato. 
Diogenes Laertius quotes the work as “Gorgias or of the Rhetoric”, and qualifies it as a refutation type of 
dialogue. 
Diogène Laërce, Vie, Doctrines et Sentences des Philosophes Illustres, Traduction, Notice et Notes par 
Robert Genaille, Garnier-Flammarion, Tome I, Livre III, Platon, Paris, 1965, p. 181 and n. 303.    
Plato, Gorgias, 464d-465a. 
Plato denied that the rhetoric was an art, because it cannot account for the nature of things and indicate 
the cause of each one, and reduced it to an empiricism, like a species of flattery, which tries to achieve the 
pleasant without worrying for the good. 
Plato, Gorgias, 464d-465a, Translated with Notes by Terence Irwin, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 
33. 
Platón, Gorgias, 464d-465a, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Ángel Cappelletti, Eudeba, Buenos 
Aires, 1967, p. 143.   
Platon, Gorgias, 464d-465a, Texte Établi pair Alfred Croiset avec the Collaboration of Louis Bodin, dans 
Platon, Oeuvres Completes (sic), Tome III, 2e Partie, Gorgias-Ménon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles 
Lettres", Paris, 1923, pp. 133-134. 
Platon, Gorgias, 464d-465a; dans Oeuvres Complètes of Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon 
Robin, Librairie Gallimard, Tome I, Paris, 1950, p. 400. 
Platone, Gorgia, XIX, 464d-465a, a Cura di N. Sabbatucci, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1956, pp. 60.  
9
 Plato, Phaedrus, 277b. 
Philosophical rhetoric needs: a) the knowledge of the truth about the things on which one speaks or 
writes; b) the definition and division of the things up to the indivisible species; c) the definition and 
division of the soul up to the indivisible species; d) the discovery of the species of speech that adapts 
itself to each soul species. 
Platón, Fedro, 277b, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, pp. 79-80. 
Platon, Phédre, 277b, Texte Traduit pair Léon Robin; dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tomo IV, 3e 
Partie, Phédre, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 92. 
Platon, Phédre, 277b; dans Oeuvres Complètes of Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes pair Léon Robin 
avec the Collaboration of M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Takes II, Paris, 1942, 
p. 63. 
Platone, Fedro, 277b, Testo Critico, Introduzione e Commento di Giuseppe Ammendola, Casa Editrice 
Carlo Signorelli S.p.a., Milan, pp. 261-262.  
10
 Plato, Phaedrus, 261a. 
 expressed or quoted with the view to criticize them, far from disappearing, were perpetuated, 
since their texts were turned into essential documents to reconstruct the history of Greek 
rhetoric, and have inspired, inspire and will inspire many people, including those who have 
assumed, assume and will assume positions different from the ones held by the outstanding 
Greek philosopher. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations in the text and notes are by the author of this 
book.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Platón, Fedro, 261a, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, p. 54. 
Platon, Phédre, 261a, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin; dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tomes IV, 3e 
Partie, Phédre, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 63. 
Platon, Phédre, 261a; dans Oeuvres Complètes of Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin 
avec the Collaboration of M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Tome II, Paris, 1942, 
p. 55. 
Platone, Fedro, 261a, Testo Critico Introduzione e Commento di Giuseppe Ammendola, Casa Editrice 
Carlo Signorelli S.p.a., Milan, pp. 185-186. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Prologue 
 
 
     Busy reader: any human activity of certain social importance is the object of a 
specific art, founded on a determined method, which provide a system of observations, 
principles, rules and examples designed for its well performance. Nevertheless, the  
legislative activity, despite its importance, has not been provided with a model 
explaining it with the dignity of a genuine source of law,11 and has remained freed at 
random or subjected to the empiricism of mere practice, since the art of legislation does 
not exist today as a true doctrine body, because it has not been incorporated into a 
fundamental system, into an acknowledged methodical base on which a well assembled 
construction may be erected.12   
     The legislative activity presents a multiplicity that chance exaggerates, a routine 
practice that falsifies the unit, or a mixture of both, without a specific art having 
managed to reduce it to a true unit, by means of a theory making its problems more 
understandable and its solutions more understandable and realizable.13   
     The true art of legislation, that had been lost, is reconstructed here from classical 
tradition, which conceives laws as wise and eloquent civic speeches and rhetoric, the art 
of persuading with wise and eloquent civic speeches, as its methodical base recognized 
for almost two thousand and five hundred years. The above mentioned theoretical 
hypothesis and its respective methodical base enrich the art to speak well (ars bene 
dicere) and found the art to legislate well (ars bene legislandi), as it will be proved in 
this book, in such a way, that the return to ancient rhetoric will be a progress for the art 
of legislation.14 
     The art of legislation reconstructed as a system of observations, principles, rules15 
and examples,16 founded on rhetoric, makes it possible to overcome the stages of mere 
                                                 
11
 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 1. 
12
 Robert Walter, "Die Lehre von der Gesetztechnik", Österreischische Juristen-Zeitung, 18 Jahrgang, 
Heft Nr. 4, 26 Februar 1963, II, p. 84.  
13
 On the realization of the law, see: 
R. Von  Ihering, L’Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur 
la 3e. Édition avec l’Autorisation de l’Auteur par O. de Meulenaere, A. Maresq Ainé, Éditeur, Tome III, 
Paris, 1877, p. 15. 
14
 Giuseppe Verdi, Letter from Genoa, of 1/5/1871, to Francesco Florimo, librarian of the R. Collegio Di  
Musica of Naples, whom they had offered him the Direction of the above mentioned School; there he 
recommends him, about the art of education of young pupils: "Return to the ancient and it will be a 
progress.” 
“Tornate all'antico e sará un progresso", Giuseppe Fumagalli, Chi l'Ha Detto?, Tesoro di Citazioni, Ulrico 
Hoepli, Editore-Libraio della Real Casa, Milano, 1934, Ristampa Anastatica, 1951, pp. 117-118. 
15
 Rules on the art of legislation are also included on these two works: 
Jérémie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet de Législation, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, 
par Ét. Dumont, Société Belge de Librairie, Troisième Édition, Tome Premier, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 341. 
Jeremy Bentham, Nomography or the Art of Inditing Laws; in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published 
under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., Volume III, 
London, 1848, pp. 230-295. 
It makes interesting comments about the Bentham’s Nomography: 
Courtenay Ilbert, The Mechanics of Law Making, Columbia University Press, New York, 1914, pp. 91-
122 
16
 For numerous rules and examples, see: 
G. C. Thorton, Legislative Drafting, Butterworths, First Edition, London, 1970; Second Edition, 1979; 
Third Edition, 1987; Fourth Edition, 1996; Fourth Edition Reprinted by Tottel Publishing Ltd., West 
Sussex, 2005, Reprinted 2006 (Twice), 2008 (Twice).  
 practices without giving reasons and of isolated answers about a heap of problems. It 
may be applied both in Common Law and Civil Law systems, and also in any other 
positive law, historical, current or future, previous adaptation of the legislation to the 
multiplicity of languages and juridical systems, which knowledge is presupposed, as it 
happens with rhetoric. It may also be learned without teachers' help, as it will be proved 
in the development of this book and by those who follow the same model, as it has been 
proved by the large number of publications that have kept the rhetorical tradition alive. 
     This book will be of immediate utility for the readers who, on account of their legal 
education or in their capacity as specialists in other disciplines, when asked to give their 
opinions or designated to collaborate in legislative tasks, will be able to grasp in just a 
short time, such knowledge as the author was able to acquire only after more than thirty 
years of study and seven of experience as legislative adviser. It will likewise be of 
immediate utility for the State, because the improved quality of the laws will diminish 
the complexity and number of the judicial cases and administrative proceedings, since it 
will encourage the spontaneous compliance of the law, which is the normal conduct, 
since compulsory execution is a therapy to cure non-performance, which is a 
pathological conduct. 
     The author cannot conclude this prologue without confessing that had he chosen a 
subject-matter proportioned to his strenghts, pondered the burden that his shoulders 
would carry,17 he would not have even attempted to write this book. But, since he chose 
an elevated topic and flew off with it,18 after a long time and much effort, he managed 
to capture it. Now, frightened, he publishes it with the hope that, if it will be read with 
recurrent fervour and loyalty,19 it will be a light for the soul20 against chance and 
                                                 
17
 Horace, Ars Poetica, 38. 
Horace, Ars Poetica, 38; Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica, with an English Translation by H. Rushton 
Fairclough, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University-William Heinemann Ltd., Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, 1961,  pp. 452-453. 
Quinto Horacio Flaco, Arte Poética, 38, Introducción, versión rítmica y notas de Tarsicio Herrera Zapién, 
Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Mexicana, Universidad Autónoma de México, 
México, 1970, p. 2. 
Horace, Art Poétique, 38; Traduit et Annoté par E. Taillefert, Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1920, p. 6. 
18
 Montesquieu, Pensées, pensée 1450; Pensées [et] Le Spicilège, Édition Établie par Louis Desgraves, 
Ed. Robert Laffont, Paris, 1991, p. 477. 
19
 Jorge Luis Borges, Sobre los Clásicos, Otras Inquisiciones, Obras Completas, Tomo I, Volumen II, 
1952-1972, Emecé Editores, 20 edición, Buenos Aires, 1994, p. 151.  
20
 “[...] que no me dexa tiempo para hazer alguna recompensa, leyendo otros que sean luz del alma.” 
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Parte Segunda, Cap. 
LXXIV, Obras Completas de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Edición Publicada por Rodolfo Schevill y 
Adolfo Bonilla, Gráficas Reunidas S.A., Tomo IV, Madrid, 1941, p. 398, línes 7-9. 
“[...] que no me deja tiempo para hacer alguna recompensa, leyendo otros que sean luz del alma.” 
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Parte Segunda, Cap. 
LXXIV, Nueva Edición Crítica por Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Ediciones Atlas, Tomo VIII, Madrid, 
1948, p. 253, línes 4-6. 
“[...] que no me deja tiempo para hacer alguna recompensa leyendo otros que sean luz del alma.” 
Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quijote de la Mancha, Segunda Parte, Cap. LXXIIII, , Edición del Instituto 
Cervantes, 1605-2005, Dirigida por Francisco Rico, con la Colaboración de Joaquín Forradellas, Galaxia 
Gutenberg, Círculo de Lectores, Centro para la Edición de los Clásicos Españoles, Navarra, 2004, p. 
1330, líneas 10-12  
The source of the preceding quote from Don Quixote, in different editions, was the book:  
´["Luz del alma cristiana contra la ceguedad é ignorancia", por Fr. Felipe de Meneses, dominico, 
Catedrático de Alcalá, y Rector del Colegio de S. Gregorio de Valladolid, Salamanca, 1556, Medina del 
Campo 1567, y otras tres ediciones, la última en Valencia 1594.]´ 
 empiricism, for those who may be looking for initiation or improvement in the secrets 
of the true art of legislation. 
 
Luis Alberto Marchili 
                                                                                                                                               
Julio Cejador y Frauca, La Lengua de Cervantes, Gramática y Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana en El 
Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Tomo II, Diccionario y Comentario, Establecimiento 
Gráfico de Jaime Ratés, Madrid, 1905, p. 671, columna 2. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
      
     This Chapter deals with several notions previous to the development of the art of 
legislation: object, method, denominations, definition and expository plan.  
    
1.  Object 
 
     Every art requires, at least, to prove what its object is and through what method we 
can make it ours.21  
     The law is a "decree of prudent men" (decretum vero prudentiam hominum), 
according to Justinian's Digest (I.3.2), the source of which is Martian, who took the 
formula from Demosthenes´s First Speech Against Aristogiton.22 The above mentioned 
precedents allow to see other of the speeches of the "Counsellor of the People", as the 
great orator was usually called, to better understand the meaning of "prudent men": 
those capable of "giving better counsels than the others in the deliberations"23.  
                                                 
21
 Longino, On the Sublime, I.1. 
Dyonisius or Longinus, On the Sublime, I.1, With an English Translation by W. Hamilton Fyfe; in 
Aristotle, The Poetics, "Longinus", On the Sublime, [and] Demetrius, On Style, The Loeb Classical 
Library, First Published 1927, Revised and Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, William Heinemann Ltd., 
London, [and] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1939, pp. 122-123. 
"Longino", Sobre lo Sublime, 1, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de José García López; en Demetrio, 
Sobre el Estilo [y] "Longino", Sobre lo Sublime, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1979, pp. 147-148. 
[Anonyme] Du Sublime, I.1, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Lebègue, Société d'Édition "Les Belles 
Lettres", Paris, 1939, p. 2.  
Pseudo-Longino, Del Sublime, I.1, Traduzione, Introduzione e Note a Cura di Giuseppe Martano, Casa 
Editrice Gius. Laterza & Figli, Bari, 1965, p. 1.   
22
 Digesta, I.3.2. 
Digesta, I.3.2, in Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Institutiones, 
Recognovit Paulus Krueger, [et] Digesta, Recognovit Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, 
Berolini, 1899, n. 19, p. 5. 
El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, I.3.2, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado Don Agustín 
Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y 
Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón 
Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo I, p. 41. 
Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, I.16. 
Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, I.16, "[...] every law is an invention and gift of the gods, a tenet of 
wise men [...], in Demosthenes, With an English Translation by J. H. Vince, The Loeb Classical Library, 
William Heineman Ltd., London, [and] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1935, p. 
525. Vince believes that this speech is false, p. 515. 
Demóstenes, Contra Aristogitón, I.1.6., "[...] toda ley es una invención y regalo de los dioses, una 
decisión de hombres sabios [...]"; en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y Notas 
de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos, Tomo III, Madrid, 1985, p. 232. The First Speech Against 
Aristogiton, unlike the Second, considered false, is generally regarded authentic. López Eire supports its 
authenticity and remembers that they doubted neither Pseudo Longino, Plutarch, Hermógenes nor 
Libanio, pp. 221-222.  
23
 Demosthenes, Navyboards, 8. 
“dar mejores consejos que los demás en las deliberaciones”, Acerca de Las Agrupaciones, 8, en Manuel 
Fernández Galiano, Nueva Versión Directa, Demóstenes, Editorial Labor S.A., Barcelona, 1947, p. 46. 
From here comes my English translation between inverted commas in the main text.  
Demosthenes, Navyboards, 8, in Demosthenes, Minor Public Speeches, With an English Translation by J. 
H. Vince, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, [and] G. Putnam Sons, New York, 1930, 
pp. 386-87.  
       In Athens, the previous opinion of the Council (Boulé) was requiered on any matter, 
even for legislation, before the debate in the Assembly of the People.24 In Rome, during 
the Republic, the Senate was usually consulted before the presentation of any bill before 
the people gathered in assemblies (Comitia centuriata, Comitia tributa and, after the 
law Hortensia, Concilia Plebis), but the romanists argue about whether or not was a 
legal obligation.25 
      The law is the solution recommended in the consultation, the answer given by 
"prudent men" to the problems that usually happen in certain circumstances to its 
multiple recipients. The emphasis placed on the political decision of those who exercise 
power upon the approval of such answers since it is the most important act of 
government in peace times26 has darkened the wise and eloquent counsel instrumented 
by legislation. 
      The consuls of the Roman Republic received this denomination because they were 
"those that take consultation".27 The senatusconsultum was the result of a process of 
advisory nature, as its own name reveals in a transparent way. The consul who had 
requested a meeting of the High Body, in the respective session asked: "What is the 
convenient decision to take on this matter?", or required to directly vote on it. In the 
latter case the senators could demand that counsel be asked from each of them by using 
the formula: "Consul, consults" (Consul, consule). The text of the senatusconsultum was 
written after the voting, in the language proper of a consultation, not in an imperative 
form, since it was not a command.28 The senatusconsultum, during the Republic, did not 
have in theory any binding force, but in practice enjoyed such an authority that, except 
when vetoed, they were always complied with, thus acquiring legal force. In times of 
                                                                                                                                               
Demóstenes, Sobre Las Sinmorías, 8, en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y 
Notas de A. López Eire, Madrid, Tomo I, Gredos, 1980, p. 306. 
24
 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 45.4. 
Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 45.4; in Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts, 
Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, Hafner Publishing 
Company, New York, 1950, p. 119. 
Aristóteles, La Constitución de Atenas, 45.4, Edición, Traducción y Notas, con un Estudio Preliminar por 
Antonio Tovar, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1948, pp. 160-161. 
Aristote, Constitution d'Athénes, XLV.4, Texte Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Bernard Haussoullier, 
Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1922, p. 48. 
25
 He supports that it was not a legal obligation and, in the note 4, quotes Mommsen and Lange for it, and 
Peter, Marquardt and Schwegler against it, P. Willems, Le Droit Public Romain, depuis l'Origine de 
Rome jusqu'à Constantin Le Grand, ou Les Antiquités Romaines Envisagées au Point de vue des 
Institutions Politiques, Seconde Édition, Louvain, 1872, p. 179.   
26
 Bacon, History of King Henry VII; in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, Based on the 
Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis and Heath, [Tome] II, Literary and Religious Works, Houghton, 
Mifflin, and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, s.d., pp. 147-148. 
Bacon, History of the Reign of Henry VII; in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by 
James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. VI, Literary and Professional 
Works, Vol. I, Longmans & Co. [etc.], London, 1861, p. 97, The Works of Francis Bacon, Faksimile-
Neudruck, Der Ausgabe von Spedding, Ellis, und Heath, London, 1857-1874; in Vierzehn Bänden, 
Sechster Band, Friedrich Fromman, Verlag Günther Holzbooc, Stuttgart-Bad Constatt, 1963.  
27
 H. Stuart Jones, "Administration"; in The Legacy of Rome, Edited by Cyril Bailey, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1923, reprinted 1936, p. 96. 
28
 J. B. Mispoulet, La Vie Parlementaire à Rome sous la République, Essai de Reconstruction des 
Séances Historiques du Sénat Romain, Albert Fontemoig, Éditeur, Paris, 1899; Chapitre II (De la Forme 
des Déliberations), Chapitre III (La Rédaction des Sénatus-Consultes), pp. 67-68; p. 88. 
 the Empire they become binding on account of their inclusion in a clause of the pretor´s 
edict; after Adriano, certain senatusconsultum were given immediate legal force.29 
      Laws usually comprise two discourses: one that persuades to take the reasonable 
decision and other that prescribes the reasonable conduct.30 Sometimes a consideration 
of the persuasive discourse is omitted, since not all laws are published with explanatory 
preambles, previous arguments an such other precedents as may have led to take the 
adopted decisions. The prescriptive discourse, which consists only of the 
instrumentation of the counsel, without being accompanied by the persuasive discourse, 
has perhaps facilitated the positivist conception of the law as a mere set of imperatives 
or coercive norms, leaving aside the eloquence that persuades to behave with wisdom, 
forgetting that, in Cicero´s words, the laws are "the rational criterion of a prudent 
man".31 
      One of the secrets of politics, perhaps the most occult mystery of the State for the 
inexpert, consists in knowing that to rule means to make one obeyed, not just to give 
commands; that power is persuasion, not force. Pericles, the greatest Athenian 
politician, held that all that men force others to do without persuasion, whether or not by 
means of a law, is not law, but force.32 This must not be interpreted as an attack against 
democracy, which would be a blasphemy against one of its illustrious founders, author 
of one of its most beautiful praises,33 but rather as statement  fostering that 
reasonableness should be preserved against the arbitrary exercise of power. 
                                                 
29
 Arnoldo Momigliano, Tim J. Cornell, senatus consultum; The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third 
Edition, Edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New 
York, 1996, p. 1388. 
30
 Plato, The Laws, 723c-d. 
Plato, The Laws, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, First 
Published in this Translation 1970, Reprinted 1972, London, 1972, p. 186. 
Platón, Leyes, 723c-d, en Platón, Diálogos VIII, Leyes (Libros I-VI), Introducción, Traducción y Notas 
de Francisco Lisi, Editorial Gredos S.A. Madrid, 1999, p. 390. 
Platón, Las Leyes, 723c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Miguel 
Pabón y Manuel Fernández Galiano, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Tomo I, Madrid, 1960, p. 157.. 
Platon, Les Lois, 723c-d; dans Oeuvres Complétes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon 
Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, [Tome] II, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, 1942, p. 774. 
Platone, Le Leggi, 723c-d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. 
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, printed 1780, published 
1789 and 1823; in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Edited by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, With 
a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996; Preface by Bentham, p. 9.  
31
 Cicero, The Laws, I.6.19. 
Cicerón, Las Leyes, 1.6 19, “el criterio racional del hombre prudente”, Marco Tulio Cicerón, Las Leyes, 
Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Introducción y Notas por Álvaro d'Ors, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 
Madrid, 1970, pp. 66-67. From here comes my English translation between inverted commas in the main 
text. 
Cicero, De Legibus, I.vi.19, “...it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man...”, Cicero, De Legibus, 
With an English Translation by Clinton Walker Reyes; in Cicero, De Re Publica [and] De Legibus, 
William Heinemann Ltd., London, [and] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, first 
published 1928, reprinted 1943, 1948, 1952, 1959, 1961, 1966, pp. 318-319. 
32
 Xenophon, Memorabilia, I.ii.45. 
Xenophon, Memorabilia, I.ii.45, With an English Translation by E. C. Marchant; in Xenophon, 
Memorabilia and Oeconomics, Loeb, William Heinemann Ltd., London, [and] G.P. Putnam's Sons, New 
York, 1923, p. 35. 
Xenophon, Entretiens Mémorables de Socrate, I.ii, Expliqués Littéralment, Traduits en Francais et 
Anonotés par E. Sommer, Librairie Hachette, Onzième Édition, Paris, s.d., p. 57.  
33
 Donald Kagan, Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, The Free Press, a Division of 
Macmillan, Inc., New York, Collier Macmillan Canada, Toronto, Maxwell Macmillan Canada, New 
York, Oxford, Singapore, Sydney, 1991, pp. 46-64. 
      The true complex nature of laws is best comprehended, when they are not studied as 
pure acts of power, since they are also wise and eloquent civic speeches. This must not 
be interpreted as a merely lyric or principle-based position, but as a deeply political and 
practical viewpoint, since otherwise laws could not last, being that experience shows the 
validity of a control of natural reasonableness: the custom opposite to the law 
(desuetudo), the existence of which, even if some positive laws insist on not to 
recognize it, is an invisible potency by means of which, without any agitation or stir, 
peoples do justice to themselves against bad laws, as Portalis said.34 
 
PRINCIPLE: The true nature of the laws is complex, since they are acts of government 
(politics) as well as wise and eloquent civic speeches (rhetoric). 
 
     Few rulers can legislate for themselves. Many understand those who counsel and 
discounsel them. But, regrettably, there are also rulers who do not understand those who 
counsel and discounsel them, and there are counsellors who do not know how to 
counsel or discounsel rulers. In the determination of the object of the art of legislation 
both the activities to counsel and discounsel are included, so that the rulers may 
understand their counsellors and the counsellors may knowhow to counsel and 
discounsel rulers.  
     In the Common Law system, the composition of the laws is not a task merely 
inherent to lawyers, but rather to officers expert in legislative writing (legislative 
drafting). In the Civil Law system, it is believed that knowledge of the law and of the 
national language is enough, and the lawyers specialized in each branch of law 
constitutionalists, criminal lawyers, experts in private law, etc., limit themselves to 
criticizing the legislative work, in the production of which, in general, they have not 
been directly involved.35 The activities of composition and criticism are also 
                                                                                                                                               
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, II.37. 
“We have a form of government which does not emulate the practice of our neighbours: we are more an 
example to others than an imitation of them. Our constitution is called a democracy because we govern in 
the interest of the majority, nor just for the few. Our laws give equal rights to all in private disputes, but 
public preferement depend on individual distinction and is determined largely by merit rather than 
rotation: and poverty is no barrier for office, if a man despite his humble condition has the ability to do 
some good to the city. We are open and free in the conduct of our public affairs and  in the uncensorious 
way we observe the habits of each other’s daily lives: we are not angry with our neighbour if he indulges 
his own pleasure, nor do we put on the disapproving look which falls short of punishment but can still 
hurt. We are tolerant in our private dealings with one another, but in all public matters we abide by the 
law: it is fair above all which keeps us obedient to the authorities of the day and to the laws, especially 
those laws established for the protection of the injured and those unwritten laws whose contravention 
brings acknowledged disgrace.” 
Partial transcription of the famous funeral prayer of year 431 b.C. to war fallens, attributed to Pericles by 
Thucydides. English translation from: 
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Translated by Martin Hammond, With an Introduction and Notes 
by P.J. Rhodes, Oxford World’s Classics, OUP, New York, 2009, p. 91. 
Tucídides, Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Traducción de Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, Libro 
II.37, Editorial Hernando, Madrid, reimpresión 1984, Tomo I, pp. 255-256.  
34
 Portalis, Discours Préliminaire, Code Civil; La Legislation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la 
France ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Francais, par Le Baron Locré, Treutel et Wurtz 
Libraires, Strasbourg et Londres, Tome I, Paris, 1827, pp. 269-70. 
35
 Legislative criticism allows lawyers to take part sometimes in the composition of legislation. The 
above mentioned criticism will shift from passive to active, from negative to positive, from indirect to 
direct, when taken into consideration by the new law. It is not ephemeral, then, on having joined the 
system of positive law, although the name of the lawyer who formulated it may not be revealed, he may 
reach immortality, like the writer whose use of the language happens to be a part of common speech. 
 contemplated in the determination of the object of the art of legislation, to include not 
only the active position but also the passive one.36 
     When the enactment of a law is under debate, two types of legislation are discussed: 
the current one and the projected one. In the Athenian procedure, five official defenders 
of the current legislation were appointed, the accusation was in charge of those who 
fostered the projected law, and a special jury (nomothetes) had to decide on the matter.37 
In Rome, the vote against the proposed legislation was cast with a slat marked with an  
"A" (from the initial antiquare: "ancient" or "current"), whereas the vote supporting the 
enactment of the bill was cast with a slat with a "U" (from uti rogas: "as you ask").38 
     The one who proposes a bill counsels that the one that he has composed must be 
enacted and discounsels and criticizes the current legislation or other bills. The one who 
discounsels the proposed bill criticizes it, and counsels the current legislation or another 
bill -already composed or to be composed- be enacted. 
     In the present work "legislation" means all juridical norms of any of the Powers of 
the State, provided always that they are general, that is to say, prescribed to classes of 
acts, activities or persons. 
     The object of the art of legislation having been determined, let us now deal with the 
method through which we can make it ours. 
 
2.  Method 
      
     One might object that the method of legislation does not exist; if it exists, it is 
impossible to find; if it is possible to find, it is impossible to know; if it is possible to 
know, it is impossible to teach; and, finally, if it is taught, it is impossible to apply. To 
raise the achievement of any human activity to the category of an art, the above 
mentioned affirmations must be previously refuted. 
     The activity that consists of composing and criticizing, counselling and 
discounselling the enactment of general juridical norms, is of a clear existence. The 
argument is subtler: it affirms that hardly it is reduced to the formulae and rules of an 
art.39 Some legislate occasionally, at random; others, on the merits of a capacity 
acquired through experience. The former, if right, do it by chance; the latter, as a matter 
of habit, but they can neither give reasons nor teach others except with the example. 
                                                 
36
 Kelsen is an exception, since he criticizes every text and composes the texts proposes by him. See: 
Hans Kelsen, Legal Technique in International Law, Geneva Studies, A Textual Critique of the League, 
Geneva Studies, Volume X, No. 6, Dec. 1939, 178 pp.   
Another exception is: 
Gustave Rousset, Science Nouvelle des Lois, Tome Second, Troisième Partie, Analyse critique et 
Rédaction Nouvelle des 228 Premiers Articles du Code Civil, Durand & Pédone, Marchal & Cie., Paris, 
1871, 365 pp. 
37
 Demosthenes, Against Timócrates, 23. 
Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 23; in Demosthenes, With an English Translation by J. H. Vince, 
Loeb, William Heineman, Ltd, London, [and] G. Putnam Sons, New York, 1935, p. 387. 
Demóstenes, Contra Timócrates, 23; en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y 
Notas de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, Tomo III, 1985, p. 131. 
38
 Cicero, The Laws, 3.38. 
Marco Tulio Cicerón, Las Leyes, 3.38 y nota 851, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Introducción y Notas 
por Álvaro d'Ors, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 233. 
39
 It refers in general to the art, the juridical skills, the legislative skills and, especially, to the art of 
formulating a law:  
Filippo Vassali, La Missione del Giurista nella Elaborazione delle Leggi; in Scritti Giuridici in Onore di 
Franceso Carnelutti, Volume Primo, Filosofia e Teoria Generale del Diritto, Cedam, Padova, 1950, p. 
496.  
 Since it turns out to be feasible to observe the causes for which those who legislate 
occasionally as well as those who do it for habit only sometimes are successful, nobody 
can deny that it is possible to follow a method and to establish a teacheable system of 
observations, principles, rules and examples, born out of experience and founded on 
reason, as Aristotle did with his Rhetoric for civic speech in general.40 The art of 
legislation does exist. 
     Where may the art of legislation be found? It is not in the books of moral, politics, 
history, law, etc., i.e., of humanities, although all of them provide materials for the 
observations that make possible to reconstruct it. The idea of logos or speech, which 
includes reason (ratio) and speech (oratio), differentiates men from animals, since, as it 
has allowed us to persuade one another, has made it possible for human beings to live in 
society, found cities and make laws on just and unjust things,41 civic speeches that 
perpetuate the wisdom and eloquence of rulers and counsellors. 
     The word "rhetoric", from the Greek rhetoriké, means the art of a rhetorical person 
or rhétor. The latter term, in its origin, designated such politician as was capable of 
formulating a bill or rhétra, in the ancient Dorian-speaking Hellenic peoples, like the 
famous Great Retra of Lycurgus. Rhetér, in Ionian language, designated the orator, but 
the Dorian term rhétor, together with the lessons taught by Corax and Tisias authors of 
the first Western rhetorical art, both from Syracuse, a Dorian- speakig city, spread out 
all over Greece.42 When Syracuse was democratized, in 467 B.C., Corax, who was still 
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 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1,1354a. 
Aristotle on Rhetoric, I.1,1354a, Newly Translated, With Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by George 
Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 29. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1,1354a; in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, 
Second Printing 1985, p. 2152. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, I.1,1354a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 162. 
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 active, developed the tripartite systematics of deliberative speech (prologue, agon -that 
included narration- and epilogue), to help the citizens who had to speak out in the 
Assembly meetings;43 and Tisias, his disciple, taught rhetoric and wrote judicial 
speeches for others (logographer). The origin of the aforesaid first art of rhetoric usually 
links it with the judicial genre, since it appeared after the fall of the tyranny in Sicily, 
when the controversies between individuals, after a long interval, were submitted once 
again to the authority of the courts.44 Since people had to sue and defend themselves on 
their own behalf, they all needed to learn how to speak in public, either reciting 
speeches bought from a logographer or composing and delivering their own. But it is 
not less true that, once the tyranny was eliminated and democracy established or 
restablished, the preparation and the debate of bills shifted from the restricted circle of 
the tyrant to that of the Council, formed by a group of elected citizens, and then to the 
crowed Assembly, where any citizen could have a say and a vote. Democracy generated 
a demand for education in political oratory, whether for legislative matters or not, in 
addition to the judicial oratory, a situation that should be remembered when we study 
the origin of Western rhetoric.45                                  
     Laws are literary works.46 "Making laws" is said leges scribere in Latin; a 
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 “legislator” –not the one who proposes a law, but the author of the bill- communicates 
with the following expressions: qui leges scribit, legum scriptor or legum inventor,47 a 
terminology proper of rhetoric. Laws includes two speeches: the prescriptive speech, 
which obliges, prohibits, permits, rewards and punishes conducts; and the persuasive 
speech which explains the prescriptive one, justifies and tries that it is approved, 
interpreted and applied, in accordance with the pursued purpose. Being literary and 
political works, both speeches are subject to rhetoric, the art of persuading with wise 
and eloquent civic speeches. As all speeches subject to rhetoric, laws should also teach 
(docere), please (delectare) and motivate (movere) the audience.48 The prescriptive 
speech should teach what wise conduct models to follow and to avoid, pleasing and 
motivating with eloquence so that such models are spontaneously fulfilled in order to 
obtain rewards and avoid punishment. The persuasive speech should teach with wise 
explanations the content and justification of the prescriptive speech, and please and 
motivate with eloquence so that it is approved, interpreted and applied in accordance 
with the pursued purpose. The art of legislation is found in the books on rhetoric. 
     According to Aristotle's rhetoric, there are three speeches genres: deliberative, 
judicial and demonstrative.49 A speech is demonstrative, when an orator, in a ceremony, 
speaking in present tense, praises or vituperates, and the audience, as mere spectator, 
limits itself to evaluate the orator´s skills. A speech is judicial, when an orator, before a 
court, speaking in past tense, accuses or defends, and the audience must absolve or 
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 condemn. A speech is deliberative, when an orator, before the Council or the Assembly 
of the People, speaking in future tense, counsels or discounsels, and the audience must 
accept or reject the political measure under debate. Legislation was one out of the five 
most important topics of deliberations; the other four were: the acquisition of resources, 
war and peace, defense of the territory and imports and exports.50 "To persuade [so that 
laws are approved]" is said legum suadere in Latin ; "to dissuade [the approval] of 
laws", legum dissuadere,51 a terminology that also belongs to rhetoric. The art of 
legislation may be known by considering laws as a species of the deliberative genre of 
rhetoric. 
     It has been said that the art of legislation is difficult to teach,52 and only learned by 
practice.53 Practice is one of the essential requisites to learn not only the art of 
legislation, but also rhetoric and any other art. The practical exercise of the respective 
art, if constant, allows that the maker acquires such a habit as will facilitate the 
application of the knowledge previously acquired by him and reach excellence: 
 
      “[...] since what we need to learn before doing, we learn by doing, for example we become 
        builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; [...]”.54 
 
     Rhetoric has been the teaching and learning model followed by Western education 
for almost two thousand and five hundred years, with some interruptions.55 It is possible 
to teach and learn the art of legislation by considering laws as a species of the 
deliberative genre of rhetoric. 
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      To the last objection of the imposibility to apply the art of legislation, the answer is:  
the art of legislation may be applied to any positive law, historical, current or future, 
previous adaptation to the multiplicity of languages and juridical systems, the 
knowledge of which is presupposed, as in rhetoric. The art of legislation may be applied 
in universal form, by considering laws as a species of the deliberative genre of rhetoric.  
     The art of legislation reencounters its method in rhetoric, but this does not mean to 
put new wine in old wineskins or to follow a temporary fashion, merely speaking in the 
"rhetorical way". It allows that knowledge of a millennial art is used to reconstruct other 
knowledge that had been lost. The rhetorical art will be enriched with all the 
possibilities that the legislative species offers within the deliberative genre. The art of 
legislation will recover a knowledge system rhetoric, which will substitute the 
personal remarks that, with more or less talent and fortune, have been formulated by 
those who tackled the problems before the author of the present work, forgetting the 
historical precedents of legislative activity. 
     In the future, if the rhetorical model of the art of legislation is adopted, the quality of 
the laws will not depend on occasionally inspired individuals, but on common effort, 
because it will be possible to be rely on a reasonable knowledge, born out of experience, 
which, transmitted from generation to generation, will allow for the methodical 
continuity of the struggle to govern and be governed in civilized form, by means of wise 
and eloquent laws. 
     The lost art of legislation will be reconstructed as such, identifying the applicable 
parts of the rhetorical tradition, developing the insufficient and creating others. Since 
this art has received numerous denominations, here follows the most widely known and 
the justification for the choice of the selected one. 
 
3.  Denominations 
 
     In Common Law countries, the following denominations have been used: mechanics 
of law making, nomography or the art of inditing laws, practical legislation, legislative 
technic, legal writing style, legal drafting, legislative drafting, bill drafting, composition 
of legislation, art of the statute, art of legislation.56 
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      In Civil Law countries, the following denominations have been used: pratica 
legislativa (legislative practice), science nouvelle des lois (new science of the laws), 
nomotécnica, nomothesia, técnica legislativa (in Spanish, Portuguese and Italian), 
technique legislative (legislative technic), gesetzgebungstechnik (technic of legislation), 
tecnica delle leggi (technic of the laws), legislative technik (legislative technic), 
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composition des lois (composition of the laws), método legislativo (legislative method), 
art de faire les lois (art of law making), art législatif (legislative art), kunst der 
gesetzgebung (art of legislation), legisprudence  (legisprudence)57 
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      The word "technique", of Greek origin, was translated into Latin as ars and from 
there it was transfered to English as "art", which means, objectively: the method to do 
some thing, the manual in which it is taught, the work produced according to its rules; 
and, subjectively, the skills of the artist who possesses the art. It will not be difficult, 
according to the context, to identify what the pertinent meaning is; in the present work  
“legislation" was added, to refer to the activity to which it is applied, as well as the 
medicine is the art of health, rhetoric the art of persuasion, etc. This follows the 
meaning of “legislation” as “the process of making or enacting laws"58 and the 
conceptual line of an ancient Hispanic precedent –Fuero Juzgo-, which reads in its Book 
I, Title I, “What must be the art of statute law making”.59  
 
4.  Definition 
  
     After having determined the object, the method and the denomination of the art of 
legislation, now this art will be defined with a formula that synthesizes the preceding 
exposition. 
     The art of legislation is a teacheable system of  observations, principles, rules and 
examples, to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel general juridical norms, 
founded on the rhetorical tradition. 
 
5.  Expository plan 
 
     The expository plan consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, includes 
several notions previous to the development of the art of legislation: Purpose, Object, 
Method, Denominations, Definition and Expository plan. The rest of the book is divided 
in two parts: History and System. 
     Part I History: Chapter II, Ancient and Medieval History; and Chapter III Modern 
and Contemporary History. 
     Part II System: Chapter IV, Legislative Genres, establishes the basic types of general 
juridical norms to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel. The last three: 
Chapter V, Investigation (what to say); Chapter VI, Systematics (where to say it); and 
Chapter VII, Style (how to say it), develop the algorithm that, after completion of the 
succesive rhetorical operations, will result in obtain a work produced in accordance with 
the rules of the art: a law.   
     The following Part I: History, includes Chapter IVAncient and Medieval History and 
Chapter V Modern and Contemporary History. 
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Part I: History 
  
Chapter II 
Ancient and Medieval History 
    
      It would have proved of great utility to have a history of the lost art of legislation, 
from Ancient times to our days, to continue the efforts made by the predecessors of the 
rhetorical model that is reconstructed in this work. Despite an extensive research which 
turned out fruitless, the author had to feel satisfied with the following outline, which 
point out moments, places, authors and works that could serve as precedents, and will 
say something new about old things and will prove how certain old things taken for 
modern are. 
     The precedents obtained will only be mentioned in this part of the book. They will be 
used further on upon developing each topic, for the purposes of avoiding useless 
repetitions. 
     Furthermore, it would be very satisfactory if others could be led to carry out a search 
of the forgotten texts of the lost art of legislation, as Renaissance humanists did back 
then with Greek and Latin classic texts.60 
     This Chapter addresses the art of legislation in ancient and medieval history. 
 
1.  Ancient history 
 
     According to a traditional division, ancient history includes Orient, Greece and 
Rome. 
  
     a.  Orient 
 
               Mesopotamian codes 
 
     The Code of Ur-Nammu,61 the first king of the third dynasty of Ur (Sumer), who 
ruled c 2112-2095 B.C.,62 seems to be the oldest organic legal text,63 the authorship of 
which is also attributed to his son Shulgi (2093-2046 B.C.).64 Since there are more than 
five hundred thousand documents collected, between tablets and stones, waiting to be 
studied by experts in cuneiform law, other even older organic legal texts could be finded 
in so numerous set of documents. Following the Code of Ur-Nammu, there appeared, in 
chronological order: the Laws of Eshnunna65 (according to some authors c 1950 B.C., 
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 and according to others c 1840 B.C. or 1790 B.C.);66 the Code of Lipit-Ishtar,67 who 
ruled Sumeria (c 1934-1924 B.C.); and the Code of Hamurabi, Hammurabi or 
Hammurapi,68 who reigned over Babylonia (c 1798-1750 B.C.). 
     Their complete texts comprised three parts: the prologue (preamble), the main body 
(law sections) and the epilogue; that is to say, a complete discourse from the rhetorical 
point of view. In them, the persuasion (prologue and epilogue) and the prescription (law 
sections) coexisted, without intermingling or hindering themselves, because they had 
been assigned a respective place in the systematic adopted method. The epilogue, now 
outdated in modern legislation, was curiously addressed to the succeeding legislators, 
exhorting them to keep the codes unchanged, and blessing or cursing them depending 
on their compliance or non compliance with such wish. 
 
     The Code of Lipit-Ishtar reads as follows: 
 
          "(4) When I established the Law in Sumer and in Akkad, I erected this stele. 
            (5) May the man who neither commits any degradation with regard to her, destroys my  
            work, deletes my inscription, nor writes his name on top of it, be granted a long life, be  
            raised very high in the Ekur; may the brilliant forehead of Enlil turns towards him from  
            the sky. 
            (6) May the man who commits a degradation with regard to her, destroys my work,  
            enters the sanctuary (and) changes (the stele’s) pedestal, erases my inscription and writes  
            [his name] above it, and makes another comit (this bad action) because of these curses,  
            be a king], be [a in] −, [...], tear up (and, even), if [in his house] (a child) is born, may be  
            deprived of a hereditary successor. 
            (7) May Ashnan (and) Sumuqan, masters of abundance, take away [...], which he may  
            have obtained by way of gift, may he suppress. 
            (8) May god Utu, judge of heavens and earth [...] tear up [...] his foundation [...]. May he  
            turns his villages into ruins; may he turn unstable the foundations of his country, not be  
            a king."69  
 
     The Code of Hammurabi reads as follows: 
 
           “If this man has kept under custody the decrees that I have written on my stele, (if) he 
            has not departed from my legislation, (if) he has not revoked my decrees, (if) he has  
            not destroyed my writings, this man will be like me, a king of justice. May Shamash  
            lengthen his reign, may he guide his people in equity. (But) if this man has not kept  
            under custody the decrees that I have written on my stele, and (if) he has despised my 
            curses, and (if) he has repealed the law that I have promulgated, (if) he has revoked my  
            decrees, (if) he has destroyed my writings, (if) he has deleted my written name in order  
            to write his own (or if) because of these curses, he has commissioned other man  
            to do so, may the great Anum, father of the gods that my government has proclaimed,  
            take away this man, whether a king, a lord, a ruler (or any other person) who  
            is called by a name, the splendor of royalty, break his scepter (and) curses his destiny.”70 
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     Hammurabi also adds the people as the addressee of his discourse, when he says: 
 
          “May the oppressed man who is involved in a legal proceeding come before my statue  
           as "King of Justice" and may my written stele be read to him so that he may listen to my 
           beautiful words. May my stele show him his proceedings, may my stele show him his  
           case, may his heart calm down (and proclaims): "Hammurabi is a lord, he is like a real  
           father to his people".”71 
 
     He introduces himself as a wise man, when he says: 
 
          “I (am) a very wise ruler, the one who has reached the source of wisdom; the  
           one who has saved the people of Malgum from catastrophe; the one who has solidly  
           placed his people in abundance; [...].”72 
 
     It might be the first time that, in a legislative work, the union of wisdom and  
eloquence with the ideal of the reputation of the legislator is expressed, as he says: 
 
          “I am Hammurabi, king of justice, to whom Shamash has conferred the truth. My 
           words are the most selected, my works are like no others. It is only for the 
           foolish for whom they are vain; for the prudent, they are destined to glory.”73 
 
     Those laws, like so many other already discovered and others yet to be discovered, 
were not made by amateurs, but by professionals, known as “scribes”, who enjoyed the 
protection of gods: Nabû in the Mesopotamia, son of Ea, god of wisdom; and Thoth in 
Egypt, god of writing and wisdom, who composed the sacred books of the law. To the 
Mesopotamian, Syrian or Egyptian scribes dominating the written language was 
technically very difficult, since in the Mesopotamia there were three different languages 
(Sumerian, Acadian and, later, Aramaic) and, in Egypt, three different writing systems 
(hieroglyphic, hieratic and, later, demotic).74 The oriental scribe, the official who put his 
writing to the service of the administration, composed and criticized, counselled and 
discounselled Laws. 
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                Ptahhotep and Merikare 
 
     In Egypt, at the beginning, the Pharaoh prepared the general juridical norms together 
with his chiefs of secrets or secretaries (heri sesheta) of each department. Later on, with 
he did so with the help of specialized officials: the secretaries of the royal commands 
(heri sesheta n audj medou). During the V dynasty (2750-2625 B.C.), the Pharaoh was 
assisted by a true legislative council formed by the chiefs of secrets of all the royal 
decrees (heri sesheta n oudj medou neb n nisout), however through this historical 
evolution, he never stopped consulting with the chiefs of each department, according to 
their respective specific competence.75 
     The technical ability of writing, reading and filing documents was not eough for the 
scribes to serve as effective and efficient officers who, to climb to a higher positions in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy and live between the powerful and the humble, tried to avoid 
the anger of their superiors, the envy of their peers and the malice of their subordinates. 
Therefore, it was necessary to acquire a higher education based on the union of wisdom 
and eloquence transmitted by the spoken and written word, by rules and examples, from 
parents to children, from teachers to disciples, from superiors to subordinates, from 
authors to readers. 
     Ptahhotep, an old Egyptian Vizier for King Issi or Assa, belonged to a family of 
officers, and was the author of The Instructions (or Maxims) that took his name (c 2877, 
or 2675, or c 2400 B.C.). It is, perhaps, the most ancient book of the world, the first 
code of ethics for scribes and an example proposed for literary imitation, which still 
moves readers for its wisdom and eloquence. It is based on the practice of certain 
virtues: self-control, moderation, kindness, generosity, justice and veracity moderated 
by discretion, which had to be practised equally before all the people. The military 
virtues are not mentioned, since the ideal was a peaceful man, not a warrior.76 It consists 
of a prologue, thirty seven maxims and an epilogue, in such a way that it also 
constitutes a complete discourse from the rhetorical point of view. The paragraph 
preceding the enunciation of the maxims, which sums up the content and the purpose of 
the work in full, is perhaps the most remote precedent of an exhortation to the scribes 
from them to pursue the ideal of the union of wisdom and eloquence. It reads as 
follows:  
 
             "Beginning of the formulations of the excellent discourse spoken by the Prince,  
           Count, God's Father, God's beloved, Eldest Son of the King, of his body, Mayor 
           of the city and Vizier, Ptahhotep, in instructing the ignorant in knowledge and in 
           the standard of excellent discourse, as profit for him who will hear, (50) as woe  
           to him who would neglect them."77 
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      The prologue, a concrete example of wisdom and eloquence, in accordance with 
human nature, describes the effects of old age, introduces the wisdom literature in the 
form of counsels of a wise father to his son,78 and shows how an aged officer prepares 
his retirement upon requesting that his son be appointed to succed him: 
 
             “O king, my lord! 
              Age is here, old age arrived, 
              Feebleness came, weakness grows, 
              [Childlike] one sleeps all day, 
              Eyes are dim, ears deaf, 
              Strength is waning through weariness, 
              The mouth, silenced, speaks not, 
              The heart, void, recalls not the past, 
              The bones ache throughout. 
              Good has become evil, all taste is gone, 
              (20 =5, 2) What age does to people is evil in everything. 
              The nose, clogged, breathes not, 
              [Painful] are standing and sitting. 
 
              May this servant be ordered to make a staff of old age, 
              (30) So as to tell him the words of those who heard, 
             The ways of the ancestors, 
              Who have listened to the gods. 
              May such be made for you, 
              So that strife may be banned from the people, 
              And the Two Shores may serve you! 
              Said his majesty of this god: 
              Instruct him then in the sayings of the past, 
              May he become a model for the children of the great, 
              (40) May obedience enter him, 
              And the devotion of him who speaks to him, 
              No one is born wise."79 
              
     Ptahhotep’s grave is still kept in Saqqarah,80 a city that today represents a great 
tourist attraction.    
     The Instructions to Merikare deal with a Pharaoh who receives wisdom and 
eloquence from his father, another Pharaoh, one of the many rulers that took the name 
of Khety (Akhtoi), of the ninth or tenth dynasty, whose identity could not be determined 
with certainty. It is a royal testament, the oldest of the texts that have come to us,81 
although it was not the first one of the above mentioned literary genre (speculum 
regum), since another one from a predecessor is known by reference. A fragment 
thereof, evidencing the value given to wisdom and eloquence, is transcribed below: 
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              "[THE VALUE OF SPEAKING WELL AND OF WISDOM] 
                 Be a crasftsman in speech, so that thou mayest prevail, for the power of (a man) is the  
                 tongue, and speech is mightier than any fighting.----He that is clever, him the learned  
                 attack not, if he is learned, and no (harm) happened where he is. Truth cometh to him  
                 fully kneaded, after the manner of that which the forefathers spoke. 
                 Copy thy fathers, them that have gone before thee----. Behold, their words endure in  
                 writing. Open (the book) and read and copy the knowledge, so that the craftsman too 
                 may become a wise man (?)."82 
 
     If we leave Egypt and go to China, the doctrines of Confucius and those of the 
school of legists must be taken into consideration. 
 
               Confucius    
 
     Confucius (551-479 B.C.), an aristocrat of a long-established ancestry and scarce 
fortune, after having two menial public jobs, keeper of the grain and of pastures, and  
upon realizing that the rulers’ purpose was to govern for their own benefit, at the age of 
twenty-two opened a private school in which he only admitted students based on the 
intellectual and moral merit of each one, to educate perfect officers who could provide 
the people with happiness from their high-ranking positions in the administration. He 
persuaded rulers from different administrations to appoint his graduates and, on 
reaching full maturity, he traveled with his disciples for thirteen years; however, he 
could not get that any leader to entrusted him with the highest positions for enough time 
to make lasting changes. Nevertheless, some centuries later his lessons became the 
Chinese official thought as regards government affairs, during the Han dynasty (206 
BC.-220 A.D.) and, since then, such lessons remain the foundation of the culture of 
Chinese officers.83 The rigorous examination system open to all candidates and their 
selection in accordance with the merit of each one of them was applied from 622 to 
1905, without interruption. The synthesis and comments of the outstanding figures of 
the Chu Hsi Confucianism have been since the year1200 his basic bibliography, later on  
known as The Four Books.84  
      Confucius affirmed that he was not innovating, that he was limiting himself to the 
study of classsical figures. Although it is true that he relied more on custom (li) than on 
law (fa), he deserves to be remembered here for the high level to which he raised the 
morals of civil servants. Li Ki, the book of "Memories on the Uses for Respecting and 
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 the Ceremonies", composed by his seventy-two disciples, after the death of the Master, 
got lost until hundreds of years later it was found in the demolition of his house. The 
current text dates back to the II century A.D. and, in Chapter XXVIII, Jou Hing ("The 
Conduct of the Learned"), in a dialogue between the old Master and Ngai, Prince of 
Lou, the ethical code of the Learned Chinese, disciple of wisdom, is formulated along 
nineteen eloquent paragraphs. The end reflects the persuasion obtained by Confucius: 
 
          “This Prince, after listening to the explanations of the philosopher, gives to the word 
           learned its true meaning and recognizes that the conduct of a true learned is  
           irreproachable. "Never, during the rest of my life [he says], I will let myself to apply the 
           learned's title by derision".” 
 
               The School of the Legists 
 
      Due to the preponderant importance they gave to the law as an instrument to rule, a 
group of four Chinese authors, known as "the school of the legists or legalists" may 
come to our minds: The Master of Shang, Shen Buhai, Shen Dao and Han Fei Tzu, all 
of them from the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.).85 Han Fei Tzu should be given 
special consideration since, among other things, he taught about the dangers of the 
discourse and rhetorical persuasion86 and also established rules concerning the 
relationship between cousellors and politicians, which still today proves to be useful. 
      If we leave Confucius and the school of the legists, but continue along the lines of 
wisdom and eloquence in ancient India, we find the Laws of Manu, the Arthasastra or 
Kautiliya´s Arthasastra and the Edicts of King Asoka. 
 
                Manu, Kautiliya and Asoka 
 
     The 2685 verses that compose the Laws of Manu continue the tradition of wisdom 
and eloquence. They are called like that because the name of his author, "Manu", means 
"he who is wise", but it also designates the king who was the mythological ancestor of 
the human race, the Indian "Adam". It is a sharp denomination, which refers to the one 
who is wise and belongs to the human race.87 With regard to eloquence, it possesses 
unquestionable literary values, which have contributed to its preservation and universal 
transcendence, in addition to the historical and religious ones, among others.  
     Kautiliya or Kautalaya, also known as Canakya or Visnugupta (c 321 B.C.), who 
according to the tradition was an adviser to Candragupta or Chandragupta, whom he 
helped to defeat the Nandas and found the Empire of the Mauryan dynasty, is the author 
of a manual on the art of politics which, considered from the practical point of view of  
ruling, is the most complete and oldest known to date.This work, which takes its title 
after the name of the genre to which it belongs, Artashastra, had been lost for centuries, 
and was published in 1909 by R. Shama Sastry. It systematically organizes the works of 
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 previous authors which went missing, as it usually happens after a masterly synthesis. 
Book 2 (The Activity of the Heads of Departments), Chapter Ten, Section 28 ("The 
Topic of Edicts"), contains sixty three rules on the art of legislation.88 
     The ambitious and cruel king Asoka (c. 274 -250 B.C.), Chandragupta’s grandson, 
took power by force and by committing fratricide. After a painful battle, sickened by the 
brutality of war, he decided to rule with persuasion, proclaiming righteous conduct 
Edicts published through inscriptions all over his kingdom, in which he adopted and 
spread Buddhism, which Third Council he sponsored.89 
    
     b.  Greece 
 
     In this section the contributions made by Onomacritus, the Seven Wise Men, foreign 
Legislators, Orators and sophists, Protagoras, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Callimacus 
will be considered. 
 
               Onomacritus 
    
     If we leave the East and move to Occident, to ancient Greece, we find Onomacritus. 
It has been said that he was the first expert in legislation, a specialty that he practised in 
Crete, although he was from Locri.90 So far there are no precisions about his legislative 
work or his aptitude to justify in writing his rational skill to make laws, since we have 
not come across any laws or art of legislation produced by him, not even in fragments or 
titles that may let us infer they have existed. 
 
              Seven Wise Men 
    
     In accordance with an established Greek practice, when a new city was founded, an 
old one was re-founded or serious crises took place, a new complete constitution and the 
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 most important laws had to be passed. If the common procedure was not suitable due to 
the circumstances, an eminent citizen would then draft the bills and, should a local 
citizen not be available, a foreigner −also eminent− would be summoned to such end.  
     As for the citizen legislators, it is worth remembering  the Seven Wise Men of  
Greece.91 They were neither always the same individuals nor the same number, since in 
the oldest enumeration Plato included Myson instead of the usual Periander; some 
authors would add three or four idividuals (Myson, Pherecydes, Epimenides and even 
Pisystratus) and some lists included twenty-three names. Nevertheless, an agreement 
was reached on at last four of them: Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon. Thales and Bias 
had a political activity; Pittacus legislated on drunkenness as an aggravating 
circumstance of crimes, which doubled the punishment. Solon (c. 630-560 B.C.) was 
the most famous Athenian legislator and his name still remains in Occident’s memory 
as the legislator’s paradigm. He personifies the virtue of moderation, since, when he had 
to legislate in a divided society, he did not want to be a dictator and drafted the laws 
without fully admitting that any of the conflicting parties was right, and immediately 
travelled abroad for ten years so that he would avoid interpreting them personally and, 
thus, he let the norms be imposed by wisdom and eloquence. Curiously, in order to 
defend them, he used poetry, since he was skillful both in prose and verse. 
     We should not forget to mention Pythagoras, who was a legislator and opened a 
school for legislators,92 and his oral lessons, from which his followers formed the 
Biblion, a "Book of Moral and Political Laws."93 
 
               Foreign legislators 
    
     From the school of Pythagoras, and also from the Academy of Plato, many disciples 
exited to act as legislators in different Greek cities, of which they were not natives. 
     In relation to the foreigners summoned to legislate, it is also worth remembering the 
case of Pericles who, upon founding the Athenian Thurii colony, (444 B.C.), entrusted 
the drafting of its legislation to his friend, the sophist Protagoras of Abdera 94 (c 485-
411 B.C.), a wise and eloquent man, a figure of importance for the art of legislation, as 
we will study next. 
 
              Orators and sophists 
 
     In normal times, and in accordance with the procedure established by Solon, bills 
had to be submitted in writing to the Council (Boulé) and be set out in public places for 
the citizens’ consideration, before being discussed by the Council and by the Assembly. 
In theory, any Athenian citizen who had not been subject to a judicial condemnation 
could speak at the Assembly; but, in practice, out of the regular five thousand 
attendants, on averageon the important occasions, of a whole of twenty, thirty or forty 
thousand citizens of classic Athens, thirty or, at most, fifty of them, had the habit of 
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 speaking from the tribune.95 The most eloquent ones, who would always play the 
leading roles and would catch everyone’s attention, were never more than ten. Each 
orator was accustomed to taking certain matters: one, foreign policy, other, finance, etc.; 
they acted like our current Ministers or Secretaries of State, each one with his own 
specific portfolio. Those interested in composing and criticizing, counselling and 
discounselling general juridical norms had to contact them. 
     It is widely known that there were no lawyers in Athens. Each one had to defend or 
accuse in court on his own behalf, therefore the logographers come into existence who, 
confidentially or not, wrote speeches so that others could deliver them in the courts. The 
orators would also take part in bills, since the interested parties used to make sure to 
have for themselves the most eloquent voices speak for them; which gave rise to the 
spreading of rumours on the moral and political integrity of Demosthenes and others 
famous orators of those times.96 A legal action was available against the authors of bills 
passed in violation of the procedure or when the opposite laws had not been previously 
repealed. In those cases, in addition to the respective penal condemnations, another 
legal action was available to render the illegal norm innefective, as did Demosthenes in 
his speech Against the Law of Leptines, in which he criticized it in detail and advised 
the enactment of another bill to replace it, which he promised to promote.97 
     The wisdom and eloquence of the orators were judged by their fellow citizens who, 
due to their natural admiration for words and thoughts, educated their taste on the 
frequent occasions when they could listen to the good speeches, that civic life was 
providing them, delivered in Courts, at the Assembly or the Council, and in funerals and 
holidays. The habit of appreciating speeches was widely spread, and the demand levels 
were so high that even Demosthenes could not make himself be heard during his first 
attempt before the Assembly, because of the mockery and the noise provoked by his 
style and pronunciation, despite his reputation as recognized judicial orator by then.98 
     The first great Greek political orators were educated by the example and the exercise 
of the affairs of the State. Pericles, who represents a period of transition, received 
Damon’s teachings, the wisest man of the time as regards music, which include the 
culture of the soul, even poetry, in contrast with that of the body, which was dealt by 
gymnastics. He also received the teachings of Anaxagoras,the philosopher, from whom 
he learned to remain calm while delivering his speeches, imperturbable before the fury 
of the crowd.99 After Pericles, nobody could reach success without a rigorous rhetorical 
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 education the art of wise and eloquent civic speeches, in addition to the necessary 
familiarity with the affairs of the State. 
     Since Homer100 there existed the ideal of a man skillful in words and actions, an 
orator and a warrior. The education of young people was provided by certain men, 
mature and experienced in the struggles of speeches and weapons, not by professional 
teachers: it was for honour, not for money. This aristocratic education turned out 
insufficient upon the rise of democracy, in the context of which the votes of the people 
had to be obtained by means of speeches.101 Then there appeared the sophists, itinerant 
teachers of wisdom and eloquence, educators who, looking for a remuneration in 
money, travelled in search of disciples through different Greek cities, delivering public 
speeches and private talks, satisfying the pedagogic demands of those who, being 
wealthy enough, had political aspirations.102 
 
              Protagoras 
 
     Protagoras of Abdera (c. 485 B.C.), nicknamed Logos, was one of the most famous 
sophists. Democritus, known as “Wisdom", was his teacher. Protagoras developed in his 
disciples the faculty of a good advice or eubolia: 
 
       "[...] capacity to give a good advise to onself as regards family property, for the 
        purpose of administering their own home in the best way, and as regards the business 
        of the city, for the purpose of being more effective in deeds and words [...]."103  
 
     He had legislative experience, since he was commissioned by Pericles to write the 
Constitution of the new colony Thurii, and he also had a theoretical knowledge which 
he included in a work that went lost, Antilogic, which in its third section, had several 
chapters concerning the laws and the polis,104 where, perhaps, an art of legislation was 
included, but which today is missing. 
 
              Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle 
 
     Isocrates (436-338 B.C),105 was the first to establish, as a teacher, a fixed and 
permanent school, perhaps earlier in Quios, certainly in Athens (c. 390 B.C.), which 
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 was next to the gymnasium named "Lyceum". He was paid significant sums of money 
to train efficient citizens, wise and eloquent men. He criticized both the sophists and the 
philosophers, and placed rhetoric as the dominant, architectural discipline, under the 
denomination of "philosophy", the culmination of the education provided by him. 
     Plato (c. 427-348 B.C.), later on, competed against Isocrates and set up another 
school, the "Academy" (c. 385 B.C.), also near a Athenian gymnasium, named 
“Academy“ in memory of the hero Academus or Hecademus, but located in the opposite 
side of the city. Education was not available for everyone and no fees were paid, since 
the Academy was sort of a non-profit association, where both democracy and the 
education by the sophists, especially rhetoric, were criticized, raising philosophy, with 
its dialectical method, to the architectural category, as a superior discipline to which the 
others had to subordinate. 
     Isocrates did not devote himself directly to the political activity, because he had a 
weak voice and was extremely shy.106 Plato felt disappointed in regard to politics, on 
account of his juvenile collaboration with the aristocratic government of the 
Dictatorship of the Thirties, formed by relatives and friends of the philosopher, and on 
account of his later character of governed during the restoration of the Athenian 
democracy, during which Socrates was condemned to death and, above all, on account 
of the outcome of his first visit to Syracuse, in his capacity as adviser, invited by the 
tyrant Dionysius I, whom he failed to instill his ideal of the king - philosopher.107 In 
their respective Athenian establishments, Isocrates and Plato coincided, in fact, to 
educate the politicians of the whole Greece. The shock was inevitable.108 
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      Although Plato was Socrates’ undeniable disciple, Isocrates also introduces himself 
as one, to such an extent that rumour has it that the day after the death of the Master, he 
went in mourning throughout Athens.109 Isocrates did not consider appropriate that the 
education offered by Plato, which neither helped the discourse nor the action, was 
named "philosophy", for which reason he considered it to be an intellectual gymnastics 
and a propaedeutics of philosophy.110 He used to say that, since it is not in a man’s 
nature to reach a science with which we could know what we should do or say, he called 
a "wise man" to the one whom, because of his powers to surmise, was capable of 
generally arriving at the best decision, and a "philosopher" to the one whom deal with 
studies by which this capacity could be faster obtainable. He called "philosophy"111 to 
the higher education that he provided: a study on the wise and eloquent speech to reach 
social preeminence,112 aimed at having his disciples learn to behave in practical life, and 
to rule in their own house as well as the public affairs of the city, as Protagoras had 
earlier taught.113 Isocrates was different from the sophists of those times since he taught 
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 at a fixed place, and lived with a few disciples for years, to transmit them a general 
culture and the art of speech as a harmonic whole. The method consisted of having 
students receive theoretical explanations and carry out practical composition exercises 
and criticism of speeches of the Master, their class mates, those made by themselves, 
and also present analysis and reports on the visits made to courts, hearings and public 
acts.114 They had to study the "Hellenic and political" speeches of the Master, as he 
called them, that taught "good things" to think, to speak and to act well. These "good 
thoughts and words", that served to them as examples, were so familiar to them that, 
through imitation, they were led to behave well. Moreover, in order to persuade by 
means of speech, they had to appear themselves like "good men".115 
     Plato considered that "philosophy" was the application of his dialectical method, that 
is to say, the use of definition, division and classification of concepts, which culminated 
in the study of mathematics, through dialogues which refuted or proved theses on 
matters of great interest and importance such as good, beauty, truth, justice, etc. In the 
Gorgias dialogue he stated that the health of the soul had to be taken care by politics, 
which comprised two real arts: legislation and justice; and that the health of the body, 
which lacked a proper denomination, comprised other two real arts: gymnastics and 
medicine. The false arts did not look for the best but for the most pleasant thing and 
consisted of a species of flatteries that were not founded on the nature of things, so they 
could not give reasons and explain causes, and they pretended take the place of real arts. 
Thus, in the soul sophistics replaced legislation and rhetoric replaced justice, whereas in 
the body, cosmetics replaced gymnastics and cooking replaced medicine.116 Those who 
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 keep this position, should be reminded that rhetoric includes, in addition to the judicial 
and epidíctic genres, the deliberative genre, one of whose model cases consists of 
counselling and discounselling, composing and criticizing laws (general juridical norms 
in the material sense). When rhetoric is conceived as the union of wisdom and 
eloquence as Protagoras, Isocrates, Cicero and their successors of this conception, 
there is no reason to be afraid of the criticism formulated in the Gorgias, which 
considers it to be a false art, a species of flattery, an exclusive patrimony of the sophists 
since, as it has been demonstrated in Chapter I hereof, rhetoric constitutes the 
foundation of the art of legislation. 
     Before ending their careers, both Teachers had moderated their respective points of 
view. Isocrates, in his Antidosis speech, asserted that, as well as in gymnastics, which is 
a part of physical education, professors teach the positions invented for physical 
competitions, philosophy professors teach all forms of speech through which the mind 
expresses itself. Knowledge cannot include all the circumstances that may arise, but the 
most attentive disciples capable of observing what usually happens will face them 
correctly, in most cases.117 Perhaps an echo of that wisdom still resounds in Justinian's 
Digest, where it is affirmed that the law in general deals with the things that often or 
usually happen and that, as regards things that may happen by chance, no laws are 
established.118  Isocrates admits philosophy, although "rhetoriced", as a useful 
knowledge for practical life. Plato, in his Phaedrus dialogue, admits the possibility of 
including in his system a "philosophiced" rhetoric based on the knowledge of passions 
and systematically explained in accordance with his dialectical method of definitions, 
divisions and classifications, like a genuine art for education and leading of the souls or 
psichagogia, founded on the knowledge of the truth of speech and not on its 
verisimilitude.119 
     Aristotle, at Plato’s request, taught rhetoric at the Academy. Afterwards, when he  
opened his own school, at the same gymnasium that Isocrates had used before, named it 
"Lyceum" as that gymnasium was known. He fulfilled Plato’s project regarding a 
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 philosophical rhetoric and, although he quoted Isocrates, both expressely and implicitly, 
he was in fact his competitor. Cicero recalls that Aristotle, who witnessed Isocrates’ 
success, suddenly changed the type of education that he offered and began to recite a 
poem from Philoctetes (the tragedy of Sophocles), modifying it; where the hero 
expressed he was embarrased for keeping silence and letting barbarians speak, he would 
replace "barbarians" for "Isocrates". He combined the theoretical study of things and the 
practice of eloquence, a merit which was noticed by Philip of Macedon, who entrusted 
him whit Alexander's education, in order that the prince might learn to act well and 
speak well at the same time,120 in accordance with the Homeric ideal. Isocrates’ efforts 
to make his disciples Theopompus or Isocrates of Apollonia teach Alexander, although 
fruitless, have left a beautiful testimony in Letter V addressed to Alexander, in which he 
praises the future emperor because, without underestimating the utility of eristics in 
private discussions, he prefers: 
 
          "[...] the training which rhetoric gives, which is of use in the practical affairs of everyday 
           life and aids us when we deliberate concerning public affairs. By means of this study 
           you will come to know how at the present time to form reasonable opinions about the  
           future, how not ineptly to instruct your subject peoples what each should do, how to form 
           correct judgements about the right and the just and their opposites and, besides, to reward  
           and chastise each class as it deserves"121 
  
     Isocrates, in his praises to the logos, creator of civilization, had mentioned the 
establishment of laws as one of its examples.122 Later, driven perhaps by his desire to  
polemicize, since Plato was writing his dialogue “The Laws”,123 he admitted the 
importance of the laws for the well-being of human life, but he asserted that it was 
necessary to estimate more the creators of speeches like his, which are rare, difficult, 
and demand a greater intellectual dedication, and serve to govern Greece as a whole 
fairly and usefully for Athens, since those who must propose laws find help among the 
great number of existing ones and do not need to find new ones, given the fact tha they 
must only compile those praised elswere, this beeing an easy task for anyone, while the 
orators are in the opposite situation, since most of the topics have been discussed and, if 
they were to repeat what has already been said, they would be regarded as shameless 
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 babblers and, if they were to look for new topics, these would be difficult to find.124 
Aristotle replied to him, without mentioning his name, and criticizing the sophists, when 
he affirmed that it was not easy to legislate by just assembling the laws which had 
acquired the best reputation, as if that selection did not require intelligence and good 
judgement was not the most difficult skill to achieve by the inexpert.125 The author of 
this work considers opportune to point out that Aristotle could also have refuted 
Isocrates using the arguments that the latter had supported in the Panegyric of Athens, 
when he wrote that rhetoric and the other arts would progress enormously if no honour 
was done or admiration expressed to those who started each one of them instead of 
doing so to those who exercised them the best; or to those who thought to speak about 
things on which none had ever spoken before rather than to those who could say them 
as anyone else could.126 He could also have refuted Isocrates by alleging that the laws 
are not appreciated by their novelty, because there are like wines: the older they are the 
better. If they have remained in force for a long time, they have already proven their 
wisdom and eloquence to this experimental laboratory of society kown as "history". 
     Isocrates was the author of the Constitution of Quios and in his capacity as teacher,  
a disciple of his is known: Lacritus, who was an Athenian nomothetes.127  It is said  that 
Plato was asked to legislate in Megalopolis, but declined the offer and perhaps his visits 
to Syracuse gave rise to the composition of  bills that he then used in his dialogue “The 
Laws”. The Academy was a place for consultation for those who needed experts in 
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 legislation,128 as it arises from Letter V, in which he recommends his disciple Eufreus to 
Perdiccas.129 It is known that several of his disciples were sent to different cities to 
legislate, at the request of the respective governments, such asAristonymus to Arcadia, 
Phormus to Elis, Menedemus to Pyrra and Eudoxus to Cnidos.130 Aristotle wrote the 
Constitution of Stagirus, his hometown, an honour granted to him by Alexander The 
Great, his former student.131  
 
                     Callimachus 
 
      Callimachus (born c 310 B.C.) divided the entire Greek literature kept at the Library 
in Alexandria in eight categories in his lost  work: "Table of Illustrious Writers and their 
Works",132 known as Pinakes (Tables or Pictures). The above mentioned categories 
were: drama; epic and lyric poetry; legislation; philosophy; history; oratory; rhetoric; 
and miscellanea. They were contained in separated books, one hundred and twenty in 
total, in which the authors were listed alphabetically or chronologically,133  maybe both, 
together with a biographical note. There, judgement was made on the authenticity of 
each work, on their respective attribution, and the first words of each one were indicated 
(incipit). It was the first comprehensive and systematic history of Greek literature and 
was used as a catalogue of the famous Library.134 The laws thus obtained their 
philological establishment as literary works and legislation as a literary genre on its own 
and, some legislators, perhaps, as writers worthy of study and imitation, established 
their reputation by means of criticism founded on reason; but regrettably no material of 
this sort has come to us in a systematic way. 
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       c.   Rome 
      
      This section will deal with the Law of XII Tables, the orators, sophists and 
bureaucrats, and with Cicero. 
 
                    Law of the XII Tables 
 
     The first Roman laws enacted during the monarchy (leges regiae), which are of 
doubtful existence and content, might have been compiled by Sexti Papirii, for which 
reason they are known as ius Papirianum. The Law of the XII Tables (c. 451 B.C.) has 
also generated historical doubts. According to the tradition, three Romans patricians 
were sent to Athens to bring a copy of Solon’s laws and to report about Greek law. 
Then, a legislative commission composed of ten members (decemviri), drafted the 
norms, which were engraved on ten Tables. Subsequently, a similar commission added 
more precepts, which gave rise to other two Tables, which were added to make up the 
Twelve Tables.135 
       
                    Orators, sophists and bureaucrats 
 
      As regards the subsequent legislative procedure, bills had to be proposed in writing, 
with the prior advice of the Senate, before their debate in the Assemblies, as it was done 
in Athens. The Senatus Consultum and the laws show such a degree of uniformity of 
scheme and style that they reveal the use of forms to produce them, which were 
improved by the clerks of both the Senate and the magistrates with legislative initiative. 
Following the great republican debates held in the Senate and in the Assemblies, the 
laws of the Empire were first generated in the Council of the Prince (Consilium 
Principis) and, after the accentuation of the monopolistic tendency, in the Imperial 
Counsel (Consistorium) or in the Central Imperial Chancellery. The legislative task 
always demanded certain professional skill.136 The bureaucrat jurists who integrated 
these bodies were the real authors of the imperial juridical norms, the composers and 
inspirers of the great codifications, like the first two (private) collections of 
constitutions by Gregorius and Hermogenianus, and the (official) Codex Theodosianus 
and, finally, Justinian's Corpus Juris Iuris Civilis, where Tribonianus, who had already 
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 been in charge of the highest offices of the State, played a key role.137 Therefore, the 
Roman law from an organic legislative source began with the Law of the XII Tables; it 
developed for centuries thanks to the forms silently and anonymously elaborated by 
clerks who attended the Senate and by the magistrates with initiative to promote 
legislation; it then grew in the Council of the Prince, the Imperial Council and the 
Imperial Chancellery; and became kown through the legislative, prudential and 
doctrinal work of the great bureaucrat jurists which culminated with Tribonianus, the 
soul of Justinian's great codification, with which the cycle is closed.  
     The traditional Roman education system started within the family and continued in 
the house of some eminent citizen who, only for the sake of honour, and with his own 
example, both through actions and words, in the Forum, in the Assemblies, in the 
Senate, or in the battlefield, revealed the secrets of the Roman civil and military virtues 
to young people. 
     The Greek rhetoricians, who offered in exchange for money an education based on 
the wise and eloquent word to form efficient citizens, were expelled from Rome by a 
senatus consultum in 161 B.C., due to the pressure exerted by traditionalists.138 In order 
to attract them back, a century later, Julius Caesar (c. 100-44 B.C.), granted them the 
Roman citizenship. The process was completed by Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus 
(9-79 A.D.) who, in addition to granting tax exemptions to them, established in Rome 
two official rhetoric chairs, one Greek and the other one Latin, with a fixed annual 
remuneration paid by the imperial Treasury, and also surrounded himself with a new 
type of  jurists, used to working in public offices during most of their lives, because of 
the honour that fulfilling such positions entailed and also, because of the salary. This 
change of attitude in educational politics was caused by the Roman imperial 
government’s need to have both a military service and a civil service. Roman 
bureaucrats were recruited in rhetoric schools.139 
 
                Cicero 
 
     Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C.-43 A.D.), a continuator of the ideas of Isocrates 
about the union of wisdom and eloquence, considered that knowledge without 
eloquence was seldom useful to the cities, and that eloquence without wisdom was 
always harmful, never useful.140 
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      He asserted that, as soon as the cities were established, eloquent men were needed to 
persuade through their speeches what they had found by means of their wisdom, so that 
the almighty, thanks to their physical force, might abide by the rule of law without 
violence, and admit as equals those whom they could dominate in fact, thus 
relinquishing a custom which favoured them.141 
     Quintilian criticizes Cicero for having attributed the origin of eloquence to the 
founders of cities and to legislators, since there exist nomadic peoples, without cities or 
laws, in charge of legations, which accuse and defend, and also believe that some of 
them speak better than others.142 It could be replied to Quintilian that both legislative 
and customary norms require a speech to be created, applied, modified or repealed, 
since they are all founded, at least, on the opinion that they are necessary for the city 
(opinio cive necessitatis), an opinion without which the laws cannot exist, since they 
may only be created and kept by means of wise and eloquent speeches, whose method is 
taught by rhetoric. 
  
2.   Medieval history 
 
This section will deal with Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidorus Hispalensis, Alcuinus, the 
ars dictaminis, the ars arengandi, the education of the Podestá, and humanists Salutati, 
Bruni and Valla. 
     The Corpus Iuris Civilis by Emperor Justinian, has already been mentioned as the 
culminating work of the Roman bureaucrats jurists. 
    
       a.   Boethius and Cassiodorus 
 
      The first renaissance of the classical culture took place in the Italic peninsula under 
the Ostrogothic king Theoderic the Great (454-526) who, as a hostage, was first held 
physically captive in Rome, and then held intellectually captive, since he had become a 
great admirer, keeper and spreader of the Roman civilization. Once he reached power, 
he preserved everything that survived and restored everything that had declined, both as 
regards institutions and buildings, which he had ordered to repair with his own money, 
something that had not happened since the time of the caesars who had built and 
maintained them.143 Boethius and Cassiodorus, together with Theodoric, at whose 
service they were, are the three protagonists of this renaissance. 
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       Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 480-c 524), a Roman nobleman appointed 
by Theoderic to the charges of Consul and Magister Officiorum, transmitted the 
classical hereditage to the Middle Age. He is remembered in this work for his two 
books about the topica, In Ciceronis Topica144 and De Topicis Diferentiis,145 both very 
important in the stage of invention or investigation of a bill, as will be explained in 
Chapter V. 
      Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus, Senator (c. 490-c 585), was appointed 
Quaestor by Theoderic, as a reward for the speech of praise that he had pronounced in 
his honour. One of his tasks was to draft norms.146 Cassiodorus preserved from 
forgetfulness the formula for the appointment of the Quaestores, in which the tradition 
of the art of legislation is continued. There, in addition to quoting textually a praise for 
eloquence taken from Cicero, expressly mentioning him, although without quoting the 
place from which it was taken (locus), he explains that Qaestores were appointed 
because of their reputation of wise and eloquent men, that norms should be rhetorically 
effective and juridically valid so that nobody could criticize them, and that punishment 
turned in something almost superfluous whenever the power eloquence prevailed,147 
since then the law was spontaneously fulfilled, without the need to resort to the use of 
force. Out of the copious production of his vast bureaucratic experience, he selected and 
assembled a collection entitled Variae, which served as a form and model of the art of 
writing official documents, which, fortunately, is available to us.148 
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      Cassiodorus is an archetypal example, since as an oriental scribe, he had it in his 
blood. Both his grandfather and his father had been officers and, the latter, who became 
Theodric’s Prefect of the Prethorium, initiated his son in the bureaucratic career as his 
Consiliarius. Boethius, Theoderic’s Magister Officiorum, was executed by him o the 
grounds of conspiracy. On the other hand, Cassiodorus, who replaced Boethius as 
Theoderic’s Magister Officiorum, became Prefect of the Prethorium during the regency 
of Queen Amalasuntha and, after a successful and long bureaucratic career, with some 
intervals, under the reigns of kings Athalaric, Theodate and Vitiges, he went on a retreat 
in good terms with the latter. When he returned from exile, he came back to his country 
house in Squillace and founded the monastery of Vivarium, where he installed a 
magnificent library, taught the monks the rudiments of Greco-Roman culture in a work 
named "Institutions" (Institutiones), he ordered the tranranslation and copy of 
manuscripts and, at the age of ninety-three, provided them with a compilation of 
orthographic rules.149 He was a man who got the reputation of being wise and eloquent, 
as it was required in the Varieae to be appointed quaestor: 
 
          “And therefore, prompted by the fame of your wisdom and eloquence, for this 
            indiction, I allot you, by God favour, the Quaestorship, the glory of letters [...]”150 
 
     He made barbarian monarches think, feel and speak like civilized Romans and 
bequeathed to posterity examples of the art of writing official documents (Variae) and a 
compendium of rhetoric and classic culture (Institutiones), on which the above 
mentioned art is based. Likewise, numerous translations, copies of manuscripts and the 
mentioned compilation of orthographic rules are also a part of his legacy. 
     Cassiodorus, in addition to the remembered family backgrounds, belonged to the 
imperial bureaucratic tradition. Before him, Antiochus Chuzon and Tribonian had held 
the position of Quaestor. Antiochus Chuzon, a bureaucratic jurist, presided over the 
commission in charge of the writing of the Codex Theodosianus (438). Tribonian, was 
the soul of Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis, given the fact he was a  member of the 
commission in charge of writing the Codex (528-529) and the manager of the Digest 
(530-533) and of the second edition of the Codex (534) and, after re-assuming the 
position, he kept on writing the Novellae, until he died. 
 
      b.   Isidore of Seville 
    
      Isidorus Hispalensis, bishop of Seville (c. 560-636), the next protagonist in the 
process of transmission of the classic culture, in his work Etimologiae, medieval 
encyclopedia, enunciated the following PRINCIPLE: 
 
          “xxi What sort of law should be made (Qualis debet fieri lex) A law should be 
            honourable, just, feasible, in agreement with nature, in agreement with the custom of the 
            country, appropriate to the place and time, necessary, useful, and also clear, lest in its 
            obscurity it contain something deceitful, and it should be writing not for private  
              convenience, but for the common benefit of the citizens.”151 
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      c.   Alcuin 
 
      Emperor Charlemagne (c. 748-814) and Alcuin of York (c 735-804), the master who 
was at his service, were the protagonists in the second renaissance. Charlemagne wanted 
to restore the ancient Roman Empire and, for that purpose, in addition to the diplomatic, 
military and political conquests, he needed that the Greco-Roman tradition be restored. 
Provided with a splendid library and a magnificent group of teachers, he was able to 
could create a school of classical culture in his palace to educate the court and form its 
officers and, as a leader, he set the example, and became one of Alcuin’s students. 
      Alcuin, who had been entrusted with the task of restoring classical education, wrote 
a work in which he taught rhetoric to give an answer to the needs of the new 
administration, and entitled it Disputatio de Rhetorica et deVirtutibus Sapientissimi 
Regis Karli et Albini Magistri152 (The Dialogue of the most Wise King Charles and 
Master Alcuin Concerning Rhetoric and the Virtues). It consists of a dialogue between 
the Emperor and his palatine teacher, in which Charlemagne recalls, among other 
remarks, that it is necessary to study rhetoric because it deals with civil quaestiones, an 
ancient significant formula that he re-interpreted with the meaning of the occupations of 
the prince and the palace, in the following words: 
 
      “1. CHARLEMAGNE. [...] I remember you once said that the strength of this art lay wholly 
         in dealing with public questions. As you very well know, in the course of the duties of 
         government and the cares of State, we are constantly wont to be busy with questions of  
         this kind; and it seems absurd not to know the rules of an art when the necessity of using it 
         confront us daily.”153 
  
     The Disputatio de Rhetorica was not only a mere compendium of the rhetorical 
tradition for students in schools, since the virtues about which it dealt with belonged to 
the ideal king, Charlemagne, who would appear to his subjects to be admired as the 
portrait of the model leader, ad therefore, that would implicitly mean it was also a work 
of political nature, a mirror of princes (speculum principis). 
     Alcuin, until his death and far from having been a humble school teacher, was a 
shrewd and energetic officer at the service of Charlemagne, who was in the centre of the 
events of the court.154 
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      d.  Ars dictaminis 
      
     In the third renaissance, which begun to be insinuated in Italy by the XI century, the 
need to form more and better drafters of public and private, secular and ecclesiastic 
documents emerged. The examples of official documents contained in the Variae by 
Cassiodorus and in the existing forms, among which Liber Diurnus Romanorum 
Pontificum stood out,155 from within the papal chancellery, turned out to be insufficient 
upon the variety and intensity of the economic, political and social activities caused by 
the flowering of independent cities with their respective local  governments, due to the 
relations that they kept with each other, with the feudal lords, with the Empire and on 
account of the struggle between these two in order to get control over all the rest. 
     In the course of the XI and XII centuries there were a rhetorical education and a 
rhetorical tradition, the ars dictandi or ars dictaminis, to form the expert scribes who 
wrote, in the chancelleries, epistles and legal texts for princes, prelates and other high 
ranking dignataries of the State.156  
     The Benedictine monasteries that traditionally provided the Bishop’s  Curia and the 
Roman Chancellery with notaries and chancellors, used to teach the rules to write 
epistles in their schools of liberal arts as a new genre of rhetoric. The classical authors 
of the ars dictaminis would not write their manuals, but rather dictate them to their 
secretaries; for this reasson they had imposed the meaning of composing to the Latin 
verb dictare and, thus, dictamen turned out to be a synonymous term for elaborated or 
artistic prose157 and, as the intellectual editor (dictator) was distinguished from the 
secretary (scriptor), the art of writing epistles became known ars dictaminis or ars 
dictandi.158 
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      In an anonymous ars dictaminis, the Aurea Gemma <Gallica>, we find a lost link 
between the medieval scribes and their predecessors and between wisdom and 
eloquence. There it is affirmed that letters and testaments were invented in the Egyptian 
city of Menphis, to protect the memory of industrious human actions, against floods and 
famine, so that the progeny might view the actions of their ancestors as in a mirror and 
understand that the need had imposed on them the virtues of probity and love glory, so 
that the memory of past actions might raise their minds until they found virtue.159 
     In this stage of the Middle Ages, the liberal arts schools, either monastic or not, upon 
addressing the judicial genre of rhetoric, provided their students with the only juridical 
knowledge that was taught,160 to such an extent that Anselm of Besate, in his work 
Rhetorimachia (1046-1048),161 could affirm that rhetoric and law go together, like two 
faces of the same science.162 Law was a branch of rhetoric, and its education as 
independent subject could not break its intimate connection with the writing of official 
documents, since the ars dictaminis, which was a key aid for the writing of legal 
instruments, received in the XII century a strong stimulus, due to the renaissance of 
literature and knowledge in general, to the cultivation of Latin letters and to the study of 
the law in particular.163 The liberal arts schools in Bologna, historical precedents of the 
famous School of Law, gave birth to the famous University. When he was a student, 
Irnerio, learned the trivium (grammar, dialectics and rhetoric), the most common 
elements of the law and the essentially practical part of the administration. Both in those 
schools, as well as in the University of Bologna, officials from the bureaucratic offices 
belonging to the communes, to the great feudal lords and to the ecclesiastic institutions 
were recruited.164 According to documents which date back to 1118, Irnerio, the famous 
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 protagonist of the juridical renaissance, appears as Magister Artium,165 i.e. he was 
connected to the liberal arts throughout his career, first as a student and then as a 
teacher. 
     Six personalities of the ars dictaminis will be remembered: Alberico di 
Montecassino, Giovanni di Gaeta, Alberto di Morra, Boncompagno da Signa, 
Rolandino Passageri and Giovanni di Bonandrea. 
  
              Alberico di Montecassino and Giovanni di Gaeta 
 
     Alberico di Montecassino,166 senior (c 1030-c 1105), according to the tradition, 
might be the first who set out in writing the rules of the art of dictating, in two works: 
Flores Rhetorici or Radii Dictaminum, and Breviarum de Dictamine.167 When Pope 
Urban II visited Montecasino in the year 1088, he took Giovanni di Gaeta, a disciple of 
Alberico’s as his secretary, so that he would restore the leonine cursus, an ancient 
prosaic rhythm of the clauses in the documents of the Curia. Giovanni restored it when 
he become Chancellor's and, later on, he confirmed it with his own authority, upon 
being elected Pope under the name of Gelasius II.168 The cursus, in addition to its 
beauty, allowed for the distinction of genuine documents from false ones, and even 
today it is studied in the auxiliary science of history called "diplomatic".169 
 
               Alberto di Morra 
 
      Since the style of the papal chancellery was the model imitated throughout Europe, 
another personality of the ars dictaminis should be remembered: Alberto di Morra or 
Mora, of Benevento, also Chancellor of the Roman Church (1187) and Pope, under the 
name of Gregory VIII, who in his work Forma Dictandi, set out the style of the Curia 
which, to his homage, is usually called "Gregorian".170 
     The ars dictaminis passed from Montecassino to Bologna,171 where it achieved an 
autonomous university level and then gave rise to the ars notaria. It reached the French 
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 schools located in Blois, Meung, Tours and, especially, Orleáns, which at some point 
got to mar the original places, until the Italians re-emerged as the undisputed masters of 
such art.172 
 
                Boncompagno da Signa 
 
      Boncompagno,173 Buoncompagno o Boncompagnus da Signa (c. 1165-c 1240) also 
sought to join law and rhetoric in his work,174 since he thought that both princes and 
officials of the Commune and of the Curia, i.e. all those dealing with politics, had the 
need to have good jurists who knew how to write a letter, a diploma, a treaty, even a 
speech, as the case might be.175 He was the most famous teacher of the ars dictaminis in 
the school of Bologna and wrote numerous works. Among them, Boncompagnus (or 
Candelabrum, or Pratum Eloquentia, or Rhetorica Antiqua) 176 related to the ars 
dictaminis, and Rhetorica Novissima,177 which competed against the book De 
Inventione, also known as Rhetorica Vetus, by Cicero. In the prologue of Rhetorica 
Antiqua, in the juridical form of the author’s testament, Boncompagno named his 
heiress in the epistolary style, and affirmed that she would be the empress of liberal arts 
and of the students of both civil and canonical laws.178 In the brief work titled Cedrus 
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 and without detriment to the others, he particulary deals with the composition of the 
laws.179 
     As in the case of other famous scribes who are still remembered and paid tribute to, 
the library of his hometown was named after him, Boncompagno da Signa. 
 
             Rolandino Passageri 
 
     In this brief sketch on the art of legislation Rolandino Passageri, chancellor of the 
Commune of Bologna (notario dictator) in the XIII century (c 1217), will also be 
remembered. He participated in the writing of the famous decree dated August 26, 1256 
by means of which the serfdom was abolished in Bologna, before any other Italian city. 
After becoming one of the greatest notaries and teachers of the notarial art, also the 
author of the famous Summa Artis Notariae, he acquired a great deal of prestige as 
politician and legislator. His mortal remains are still kept in a funeral ark, a beautiful 
sepulchral monument at the Square of Santo Domenico, in Bologna.180  
 
             Giovanni di Bonandrea 
  
      An interesting case, which illustrates the exchange between practice and teaching, is 
that of Giovanni di Bonandrea, a notary and chief of the chancellery of the Commune of 
Bologna, who was appointed teacher of rhetoric at the University in 1303, due to the 
prestige he had acquired as officer.181 He was the author of an influential work, Summa 
Dictaminis or Brevis Introductio,182 in which we may find exemples of letters and model 
speeches. He is still remembered as a "renowned teacher".183 
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        e.   Ars arengandi 
 
      The ars dictaminis, a new art integrated by sets of examples (models of letters and 
outlines of speeches), rules or both, emerged due to the fact that in the independent 
Communes, as in the city-states of the classical Greece, rhetoric had a fundamental 
practical importance, being that the legal, political and diplomatic matters used to 
develop by means of formal speeches and debates.184 
      Among the authors who stood out for their works related to public speeches, called 
ars arengandi or ars dicendi, the following will be remembered: Guido Fava, Matteo 
de'Libri and Albertano da Brescia. 
 
               Guido Fava, Matteo de'Libri and Albertano da Brescia 
 
     Guido Fava or Faba (c 1190-1240)185 was a grammar and rhetoric teacher in 
Bologna, where he competed against Boncompagno for academic prestige. As for the 
ars dictaminis, he wrote two important works: Summa Dictaminis186 (system of rules) 
and Gemma Purpurea187 (set of examples included in a form of official letters). With 
regard to the ars arengandi, he was the author of compilations of speeches, one in 
Latin, Arengae, and the other one in common language, Parlamenti et Epistole, which 
also included two or three samples of letters in Latin.188 
     Matteo de'Libri (c1250) published a collection of speeches in common language, 
destined to the most important officers in the Communes, Dicerie di Ser Matteo de'Libri 
da Bologna.189 
     In the year 1245, Judge Albertano da Brescia wrote a work for his son Stefano,190 
called “The Art of Speaking and of Being Quiet” (Ars Loquendi et Tacendi) which, 
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 either in a conscious form or not, follows the tradition of wisdom ad eloquence 
transmitted from parents to children. 
 
     f.  The education of the Podestá 
 
     During the XIII and XIV centuries, in the Italian republics, we may find the Rector 
Civitatis or Podestá, the maximum officer in charge of justice, administrative affairs 
and foreign relationships. This position emerged as that of a delegate of the emperor, 
but then, owing to the instability caused by the internal, political and military struggles, 
in the cities, it represented a compromise, an acceptable solution for all. The person 
holding this position had to be a noble person, from an ancient family, known to be 
brave, prudent and honest.191 He ended up being a foreign temporary and civil officer, 
usually from a friendly city, between thirty and sixty years old, responsible before the 
people, elected and paid for by the Commune. He had to form his own Curia of 
subordinate officers with foreigners: judges, notaries, chancellors and sheriffs; he would 
pay to all of them out of his own funds, rather than out of the Commune’s. He was 
entrusted with passing ordinances and establishig petty fines, convening and presiding 
assemblies and councils, as well as over public celebrations.192 
     To satisfy the need to educate the Podestá and his officers a special literature 
(podesteril) came to light, also deriving from the ars dictaminis and the ars arengandi. 
The authors of the above mentioned literature mostly came from the academic world, 
where they devoted themselves to teaching rhetoric to those aspiring to hold positions 
and, upon directly addressing magistrates with theirs advices books, they became the 
natural political advisers to "rulers and cities".193 There were also some cases of 
magistrates which, from the political arena become academicians, such as the above 
mentioned Giovanni di Bonandrea. 
     The three most famous works used for the education of the Podestá were: Oculus 
Pastoralis, Liber de Regimine Civitatum and Li Livres dou Trésor. 
 
                Oculus Pastoralis 
 
     The Oculus Pastoralis, an anonymous work written c 1222, was published for the 
first time in the XVIII century by Ludovico Muratori, who surmised that its author 
might have been some member of the regular clergy and later insinuated that such 
autorship belonged to Boncompagno.194 
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       It was a sort of manual on the "perfect Podestá", in which laymen of a poor culture 
could find wise advices and eloquent speeches for the most important occasions that 
they might be involved in while in office, as it is inferred from the Prologue. It includes 
chapters about the wisdom of the Podestá: what he must do when, upon being elected, 
he arrives for the first time in the territory where he will perform his duties (Part I, Cap. 
III); ways, criteria and sagacity to govern in order to acquire a good reputation without 
offending the governed (Part II, eleven Chapters); and modesty and discipline (Part VI, 
Cap. V). It contains nearly twenty-three models of eloquent speeches, most of them to 
be used by the Podestá, but also by ambassadors, advisers and even by private citizens, 
as in the four that refer to war and peace.195 
 
                 Liber de Regimine Civitatum 
 
      Giovanni da Viterbo is the author of Liber de Regimine Civitatum,196 also a work of 
the XIII century. It is based on the experience he acquired as an adviser to the Podestá 
of Florence and his knowledge both on civil law and the Latin classics, since he used 
the following works as sources of his book: De Ira, De Clementia and Epistolae, by 
Seneca; De Officis, by Cicero; Rethorica ad Herennium; and Controversiae, by Séneca 
the elder or the rhetorician. It has a Prologue, where he tells that he did all the writing at 
nights and in the rarely free time that he had available being an adviser to the Podestá, 
as well as one hundred forty eight chapters. The knowledge of the Podestá is developed 
in Chapters CXVII-CXLVIII, which deal with the way he must behave: in front of the 
people and at citizens' councils; with ambassadors; with other Podestás from nearby 
cities; in war and peace times; in the administration of justice and finances; and with the 
authorities of the empire and the papacy. Eloquence is there represented by examples of 
official correspondence, as in Chapters XII-XXIII, as well as by speeches, some of 
which have the exordium written in common language and the scheme in Latin, in 
Chapters LVI-LVII.197 Chapter CXLI deals with law reform.198  
 
                 Li Livres dou Trésor 
 
    As from mid XII century to the Renaissance humanism, Oculus Pastoralis, an 
anonymous work, and Liber de Regimini Civitatum, by Giovanni da Viterbo, together 
with Parlamenti et Epistole, the two versions of the Arengae by Guido Fava or Faba, 
and Dicerie di Ser of Matteo de'Libri da Bologna, were studied by the young Italians 
who aspired to politics, first as officers of the communes and then as advisers and 
ministers to the Signoria.199 
     Furthermore, from the second half of the XIII century, there was an encyclopedic 
work in common language, Li Livres dou Trésor, with all the necessary knowledge for 
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 the education of those who had to rule a city. The work comprised three books: the first 
one, about the birth of all things; the second one, about ethics; and the third one, about 
rhetoric and politics.200 
     The author of Li Livres dou Trésor is Brunetto di Bonaccorso Latini, better known as 
Brunetto Latini. He was born c 1220 and he was a son of Bonnacursus Latini of Lastra, 
Imperiali Auctoritate Judex et Notarius. After working as notary and travelling on 
diplomatic missions, he returned from the French exile and, on August 20, 1267 he was 
appointed as official notary of the vicarial government of Florence, Dittatore del 
Commune. As an intellectual, he had Guido Cavalcanti and Dante, who used to call him 
il mio maestro, as faithful disciples. He was highly respected, since, apart from serving 
as an officer, he taught how to rule and speak well to the Florentine Republic. He died 
in 1294; his remains are buried in the crypt of the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, in 
Florence, where, in one of the four columns supportig the sarcofhagus, the following 
inscription may be read: Sepulcrum Brunetti Latini et filiorum.201 
 
     g. The Humanists 
 
     Humanism affirmed the need to join wisdom with eloquence. Three professionals 
rhetoricians and civil servants defended the subordination of eloquence to wisdom 
(Salutati), their equality (Bruni) and the superiority of eloquence (Valla). 
 
                Coluccio Salutati 
 
     Humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331-1405?),202 a professional rhetorician and civil 
servant, after working as chancellor in Lucca, and then in Florence from the year 1375 
till his death,203 initiated the Florentine tradition of writers who put their culture to the 
service of the art of governing.204 
     The subordination of eloquence to wisdom fully arises from the following passage 
taken from Salutati’s collection of letters: 
 
          "The best thing is for wisdom and eloquence to join together, so that the second  
             expounds what the first comprehends. In a contest over which was to be preferred, give 
             the palm to wisdom. Never think it is useless, however, to give individual, especial and  
             continued attention to eloquence. For the pursuit of eloquence is itself a duty of  
             wisdom. Eloquence is placed under wisdom, and contained in it as in the sum of all  
             things which can be known, so that whoever pursues wisdom necessarily pursues   
             eloquence at the same time. Accordingly as the two can be separated by the intellect,  
             however, eloquence is more difficult than wisdom, since rarity is a most certain 
             evidence of difficulty in those attainments which are the products of study and  
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              industry, and which we obtain through effort. Let it be added that the intention, zeal,  
             and opportunity for speaking well spurs us in the desire to know; so that the pursuit of  
             eloquence is a means to the end of seeking wisdom. For nothing can be well said which  
             is not most perfectly known. We can know many things, however, which we do not  
             know how to say clearly and with the required ornament or grandeur of  
             speech.Therefore eloquence, with its connection to the pursuit of wisdom, ought  
             especially to be studied."205 
 
                Leonardo Bruni 
 
      Leonardo Bruni (1379-1444), also known as "The Aretino", was a disciple of 
Coluccio Salutati and, on his recommendation and on that of Poggio Bracciolini’s, he 
served as Secretary for the papal Curia from 1405 to 1410, and during 1410 he acted for 
a few months as Chancellor of Florence, a position which he reasumed in 1427, upon 
succeeding his teacher, and held until 1444, when he died.206 
     He was one of the most important figures of humanism in the times of Cosimo di 
Medicis. He spread the classics, specially from the Greek culture, translated 
Demosthenes, Aeschines, Xenophon, Plutarch, Plato and Aristotle; he also wrote in 
Latin, but defended the use of the common language and was a famous historian. Due to 
his knowledge and experience on governmental issues, his opinions were rarely 
contradicted in the Consiglio della Signoria. Solemn funerals were held in his name and 
his mortal remains are buried in Della Santa Croce Church, Florence, in a mausoleum 
built by Bernardo Rossalino, which may still be admired.207 
     Unlike Salutati, who by the end of his life subordinated eloquence to wisdom, Bruni 
neither criticized rhetoric nor doubted its harmonic relation to philosophy throughout 
his career, and kept a positive attitude towards continuing the union of wisdom and 
eloquence unscathed.208 
 
                 Lorenzo Valla 
 
     Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), a disciple of Leonardo Bruni, was the most famous 
humanist of the first half of the XV century; he exemplified the spirit of free 
investigation and independence typical of the Renaissance and set the foundations of 
philology and historical criticism.209 
     Valla, unlike Bruni, who defended the harmonic equality between wisdom and 
eloquence, subordinated the ancient philosophy and the scholasticism to rhetoric, in line 
with his intention to take the defence of eloquence against its slanderers.210 
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            “Philosophy is like a soldier or tribune under the command of oratory, the queen, as a 
             great tragedian calls it,” wrote Valla”.211 
      
     The next Chapter will deal with the Modern and Contemporary History of the art of 
legislation. 
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Chapter III 
Modern and Contemporary History 
          
1.  Modern history 
 
     From modern history, the following authors will be remembered: Bacon, for his 
disquisition on the certainty of laws and rhetorical investigation (inventio); Hopper, for 
constructing a general juridical theory of legislation and recognizing the importance of 
rhetoric for law professionals; Montesquieu, for making a rich source of argumentations 
out of a single book; Mably, for strongly pointing out the importance of the study of 
passions (pathos); and Filangieri, for developing such study. 
       
     a.  Bacon 
 
     Here the humanist officer reappears, the son of an officer, as the oriental scribe used 
to be. Nicholas Bacon, Francis's father, was a famous Adviser to Queen Elizabeth and 
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal for more than twenty years in charge, until he died.212 An 
act of Parliament declared that Lord Keeper of the Great Seal had Lord Chancellor’s 
same rights and duties to avoid doubts about Nicholas Bacon’s authority. 
     Francis Bacon (1561-1626), like his progenitor, held the office of Lord Keeper of the 
Greaçt Seal, but he overcame him in the bureaucratic and political career, since he was 
formally appointed Lord Chancellor, both offices fulfilled under James I. As for 
dignities, he was first Knight, then Baron of Verulam and finally Viscount of Saint 
Alban, until he lost them all for being a self-confessed corrupt (1621).213 
     He was a great orator in the Courts of Justice, in his capacity as attorney-at-law, 
prosecutor or judge, and also for a long time in the House of Commons, barely as a 
member of the opposition party, but most times as a member of the government party, 
all of this under the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I. In order to keep him as a 
representative, the above mentioned House (1613) granted him the right to remain a 
member, in spite of having been appointed Attorney General, since both positions could 
not be held at the same time.214 
     With Francis Bacon the deliberative genre of rhetoric was reborn, after one thousand 
six hundred years of silence.215 Ben Jonson (1573-1637) said in this regard: 
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           "Yet there happened in my time one noble speaking, who was full of gravity in 
        his speaking. His language (where he could spare or pass by a jest) was nobly 
        censorious. No man ever spoke more neatly, more pressly, more weightily, or  
        suffered less emptiness, less idleness, in what he uttered. No member of his speech  
        but consisted of his own graces. His hearers could not cough, or look aside from  
        him, without loss. He commanded where he spoke; and had his judges angry and 
        pleased at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his power. The fear of 
        every man that heard him was, lest he should make an end.”216 
  
     In addition to having been a great orator, he is one of the first English classic 
writers,217 to such an extent that some polemicists consider him as the author of 
Shakespeare’s works and his books are still being re-edited today. If this mastery of the 
spoken and written prose is hard to find, it is even harder to believe that he had also 
written about rhetoric and influenced its historical development, following Cicero's 
precedent.218 From the point of view of his contributions to rhetoric in general, he 
extended the stage of invention or investigation, included the forms and the promptuary 
along with the topics, and expanded the use of the colours of good and evil to dress the 
valid arguments as well as the sophistic arguments, as it will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter V of this book. 
     Although owing to his lack of wisdom he committed the offense that led him to end 
his career and be criminal punished, his vast experience in official affairs and his 
intellectual capacity, together with his eloquence as orator and writer, bloomed in works 
where he could show his political wisdom, such as in both versions of his Advice to 
Villiers, on his performance as King’s Favorite,219 and in The Essayes or Counsels, 
Civil and Moral.220 
     He had a lot of experience in the art of legislation, both as regards the composition 
and the criticism of general juridical norms, which can be verified, between with these 
examples, amongst others: the criticism of a Criminal Code bill221 and the composition 
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 of the Procedural Ordinances of the Chancery, when he was in charge of it.222 A long 
permanence in Parliament, as well as his positions as Adviser, Keeper of the Great Seal 
and Chancellor, gave him frequent opportunities to counsel or discounsel general 
juridical norms. He projected a Digest of the Laws of England, which he failed to 
achieve, but from his effort223 the following works emerged: Maxims of the Law, 
Proposal for Amending the Laws of England, De Diversis Regulis Juris, De Dignitate et 
Augmentis Scientiarum, from which the well-known “Justitia Universalis sive of 
Fontibus Juris” was taken (Book VIII, Chapter 3, final part).224 
     In his book The Advancement of Learning, published in 1605, he observed: 
 
          "Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is Laws, I Think 
           good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those who have written of 
           laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none one as 
           statesman. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary 
           commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light  
           because their are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states 
           where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be the law: for the 
           wisdom of the lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another.”225 
 
     In the Latin version of the above-mentioned work, notably ammended and 
augmented, which was published in 1623, under the title De Dignitate et Augmentis 
Scientiarum, he divided the civil knowledge into three parts, in accordance with three 
succinct actions of a society: to converse, to negotiate and to govern. Legislating is a 
part of the wisdom to rule or the wisdom of the State,226 an activity for which he 
enunciated the following PRINCIPLES: 
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          "7. But Before I proceed to the actual body of particular laws, I will take a brief  
            survey of the virtues and dignities of law in general. That the law may be set  
            down as good, which is certain in meaning, just in precept, convenient in  
            execution, agreeable to the form of government, and productive of virtue in  
            those that live under it.”227 
 
      Out of all these principles, regrettably, he only developed the one related to 
certainty. In spite of that, it was a very important milestone in the historical continuity 
of the art of legislation, since he also followed the wisdom and eloquence of classic 
tradition to write it. It represented progress because, although some of his predecessors 
had included the art of legislation in the art of government, he adopted the practical 
point of view of the experienced and reasonable statesman, thus managing to write a 
small great work about certainty, in ninety-seven aphorisms,228 with a depth, scope and 
elegance never seen before in ancient or contemporary philosophers, politicians and 
lawyers. Since then, this work has been a mandatory reference for posterity. 
 
     b.  Hopper 
 
     Jochim Hopper (1523-1576) was born in Sneek, Friesland. Following his solid 
juridical and humanistic education, he devoted himself to teaching until 1554, when he  
left the academic life and engaged in politics under the Spanish crown, an activity that 
he developed in The Netherlands and in Madrid, where he died.229 
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      Out of the twelve books composing his main work, Seduardus,230 dedicated to 
Phillip II, the first four deal with nomothesia, “a civil and regal art, which by means of 
laws and rights induces the republic and men to justice”, 231 subdivided in turn into a 
theoretical part dedicated to the most general concepts of law, and a practical part 
dedicated to legislation making. 
      He created a “general theory of legislation” from a technical and juridical 
conception, not merely political, something unusual in his time, and he also 
acknowledged the importance of rhetoric for law professionals.232 
      Those who be willing to learn about Hoppers’ nomothesia in more detail may 
consult, in addition to the book by Rodriguez Puerto, the following work: 
       Nomothesia sive de Iuris et Legum condendarum scientia, Versuch einer 
Bearbeitung der Bücher I-IV der Werkes “Seduardus sive de vera iurisprudentia” von 
Joachim Hopper (1523-1576), Dissertation, vorgelegt der Johannes Gutenberg 
Universitãt in Mainz, von Regierungsrat Paul Schäaus Mainz, Referent: Professor Dr. 
Th. Viehweg, Korreferent: Profesor Dr. P. Noll, Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 21, febrar 
1967, XXXI + 416 pp + X pp. 
 
     c.  Montesquieu 
 
     Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), a 
provincial magistrate, position which he had inherited from his uncle and then sold 
legally, a successful writer, an habitué of the great Parisian literary lounges, managed to 
became a memeber of the Academy of France.233 Without any political experience or a 
significant juridical education, in spite of his university studies and judicial activities,234 
as fruit of a solitary investigation and personal reflection during twenty years,235 in 1748 
he published De l'Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws), a work that caused sensation 
and, although included in the Index of Prohibited Books of the Catholic Church,236 
became a great political, juridical and philosophical outstanding classic. 
     Before its publication, the work already had its detractors, such as the famous 
Marquess D'Argenson (1694-1757), the Secretary of State of Luis XV, who affirmed: 
 
          "It is said that he aspires and prepares himself to publish finally his great work on the  
            laws. I already know some fragments that, supported by the reputation of the author, 
            cannot but increase it. But I am afraid that the whole work is insufficient, and that there 
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            are many pleaseant chapters to read, many ingenious and seductive ideas, other than  
           real and useful instructions on the way in which laws should be written and  
           understood. Nevertheless, this is the book that we should but do not still have, although  
           much has been written so far on this matter.  
           We have good institutes from the Roman civil law, some fairly good from French law, 
           But we do not have anything of the general and universal public law. We have nothing  
           from the spirit of the laws, and I strongly doubt that my friend, president Montesquieu, 
           may give us one that could serve as a compass to every legislator in the world. I admit 
           he has all the possible spirit. He has acquired most grasslands [sic] [a vast] knowledge, 
           both in his trips and in his retreats to the country. But I predict, once again, that he will 
           not give us the book that we should have, even though we may find in the one that he 
           is writing many deep ideas, new thoughts, surprising images, the splendor of the spirit, 
           genius and a multitude of curious facts, which application, yet, may imply more taste 
           than study.”237 
 
     While the first edition of the book De l'Esprit des Lois, under the care of Jacob 
Vernet was beeing printed in Geneva, at Jacques Barrilot’s publishing house, 
Montesquieu added238 Book XXIX, “De la Manière de Composer les Lois” (How to 
Compose Laws), which Chapter XVI, entitled “Choses à Observer dans la Composition 
des Lois” (Issues to Bear in Mind while Composing Laws), contains some rules to write 
laws.239 
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      A lot has been and will still be argued on the merit of Montesquieu’s masterpiece. 
Nevertheless, while critics keep on debating its virtues and defects, well-informed 
legislators and advisers find in the above mentioned work a great variety of wise and 
eloquent argumentations to compose and criticize, counsel and discounsel general 
juridical norms. There, in the same book, a rich source of inspiration is available, which 
consists in abundant rhetorical syllogisms, political maxims and historical examples, but 
difficult to remember, due to the lacking of a systematical order allowing for its 
opportune use. 
 
     Thus, Montesquieu showed the desire that led him to write The Spirit of the Laws: 
 
          "If I could act in a way that those who are in charge increased their knowledge 
            about what they must prescribe, and that those who obey found a new pleasure 
            in obeying, I would believe to be myself the happiest of mortals."240 
 
Next, some passages written by Montesquieu are transcribed. 
 
Reasonableness of the prescriptions: 
 
          "Law, in general, is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the people of the 
           Earth; and the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only particular  
           cases to which this human reason is applied."241 
 
Political maxims: 
 
     They are spread throughout his entire work, due to his stylistic tendency towards the 
use of epigrams. 
 
          "Many things govern men: [... among them] the government maxims [...]."242 
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          "In any magistracy it is necessary to compensate the magnitude of power with the  
            brevity of its duration."243 
 
     Historical examples, although the accuracy of some of them has been questioned, 
serve as imaginary examples, where historical truth fails. Fables are considered as such 
in the rhetorical tradition, since they are not introduced as sophisms, to cheat 
knowingly, but to teach with hypothetical special cases in political speeches, given the 
scarce number of examples on real similar cases.244   
 
     In spite of the strong criticism that he received in his time, posterity could not avoid 
praising the eloquence showed in Montesquieu’s book, as Ilbert once wrote: 
 
        “The leading definitions are loose and vague; the treatment is unmethodical and uncritical; half the  
            statements of facts are inaccurate; half the inferences are mere guesses. And yet it changed the  
            thought of the world. What is the explanation of this paradox? 
            Much, no doubt, was due to charm of style. If you want to be read, still more if you want 
            to be widely read, you must be readable. In Montesquieu's time, books on political and  
            legal science were, as a rule, unreadable. But the Spirit of Laws was, and still is, an  
            eminently readable book. No one before Montesquieu had dealt so lively and brillant a  
            manner with the dry subject of laws and political institutions."245 
 
     Chevalier  D'Aydie, a friend of Montesquieu’s, predicted that The Spirit of the Laws: 
 
 
          "[...] will contribute to make kings, ministers and people wiser in the future [...]"246 
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       d.  Mably 
 
     Abbot De Mably (1709-1785), brother of Condillac’s, the philosopher, who was also 
an abbot, met Montesquieu at Madame de Tencin’s literary lounge. Either due to a 
desire to emulate or to an independence of judgment, as Montesquieu had published in 
the 1734 Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur 
Décadence (Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their 
Decline), Mably’s first work was published in 1740, Paralèlle des Romains et des 
Français par Rapport au Gouvernement (Parallel between the Romans and the French 
with Regard to Government).Thus, De l'Esprit des Lois first appeared in 1748, Mably’s 
De la Législation ou Principes des Lois (On the Legislation or Principles of the Laws) 
appeared in 1776.247  
     Montesquieu, upon describing what the spirit of the laws was consisting, had said: 
 
          "They must be related to the physical [aspect] of the country, the freezing, torrid or  
           moderate climate; the quality of the territory, its situation, its extension, the genre of life  
           of its peoples, farmers, hunters or shepherds: they must be related to the degree of  
           freedom that the Constitution can support; the religion of the inhabitants, their  
           inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their customs, their ways of  
           behaving. Anyway, they relate to each other; to their origin, to the purpose of the  
           legislator, to the order of things on which they are established. It is within the framework  
           of all these points of view that it is necessary to consider them.This is what I begin to do  
           in this work. I will examine all these relations: they all form what is known as the  
           SPIRIT OF THE LAWS.”248 
 
     Without mentioning Montesquieu, Mably said: 
 
          "On the contrary, a pretended philosophy, upon taking what is done out of senselessness  
            in the world as the rule of what should be done, has come to help ours prejudices,  
            and has given them who knows what reason to eternize its empire.The chatterboxes 
            have flattered our caprices; and, willing to teach us before even overcoming their own 
            ignorance, their beautiful spirit could not have given them anything more than  
            sophisms that we have taken as truths, and we go lost with method. They have not  
            descended in any way inside our heart; they have not studied in any way our passions; 
            it is within things, so to speak, outside men, that they have looked for the laws and the  
            establishments that should make society happy. If they should be believed, the  
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 M. Villemain, Cours de Litérature Française, A. Jamar, Éditeur, Bruxelles, 1840, Tableau du Dix-
Huitième Siècle, Première Partie, 1827, Dix Septième Leçon, p. 155.  
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 "Elles doivent être relatives au physique du pays, au climat, glacé, brûlant o temperé; à la qualité du 
terrain, à sa situation, à sa grandeur, au genre de vie de ses peuples, laboreurs, chasseurs ou pasteurs: elles 
doivent se rapporter au degré de liberté que la constitution peut souffrir; à la réligion des habitants; à leurs 
inclinations, à leur richesses, à leur nombre, à leur commerce, à leurs moeurs, à leurs manières. Enfin, 
elles ont des rapports entre elles; elles en ont avec leur origine, avec l'objet du législateur, avec l'ordre des 
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Montesquieu, De L’Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., 
Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L’Esprit Des Lois par 
L’Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, Livre I, Chapitre III, without date, p. 8, text 
reproduced above. 
See also: 
C'est ce que je entreprends de faire dans cet ouvrage. J'examinerai tous ces rapports: ils forment tous 
ensamble ce que l'on appelle l'ESPRIT DES LOIS." 
Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société les 
Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Premier, Chapitre III, Paris, 1950, p. 26.     
             providence has made different types of happiness for the ancient and for us; for Asia, 
            Africa, America and Europe.They will seriously say to you that the good laws in the 
            tenth grade of latitude, are no longer valuable any more under the thirtieth degree;  
            truthfully: shouldn’t a legislator consult the affections of our heart rather than a 
            thermometer, to know what to order or prohibit? Are plains, mountains, a drier, more 
            humid, more or less fertile soil, the neighborhood of the sea or a big coast, and hundreds 
            of similar geographical features important to decide what the most suitable laws to make 
            man happy are? Does the nature of climates change the nature of their heart? Are the 
            same needs not everywhere, the same organs, the same senses, the same inclinations, the  
            same passions and the same reason? Are the attraction for pleasure and fear of pain not 
            the motives of our thoughts and of our actions? Are they not everywhere equaly bound  
            to cheat the desire we have to be happy? Under the Equator as well as under the Pole,  
            inside the plains and the valleys as in the mountains, does each of our senses not open  
            our soul for a hundred different passions? Which are the soils favored by the sky where  
            avarice, ambition, indolence and voluptuousness cannot germinate? Within which 
            climates will these poisoned plants grow with impunity? Within a certain place, our  
            passions will be more imperious, and within other one they will be more disciplinables;  
            there they will be exposed to more frequent temptations; here particular features will  
            slow down development and progress, and I consent to all that you wish to say about the  
            power of climates. But these passions everywhere are not the source of our happiness or  
            of our unhappiness, depending on whether they are well or badly regulated? Everywhere  
            they have the need of a brake and a driver, the law must begin by straightening 
            them up. 
            But this great art of governing our passions: who will teach it to me? Where will I drink  
            its secrets from? In the study of the human heart.”249 
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 "Au-contraire, une prétendu philosophie prenant ce qui se fait d'insensé dans le monde por la règle de 
ce qui doit se faire, est venue a secours de nos préjugés, et leur a donné je ne sais quel air de raison propre 
à éterniser leur empire. Des charlatans ont flatté nos caprices; et voulant nos instruire avant que d'être 
eux-mèmes sortis de leur ignorance, leur bel esprit n'a pu leur fornir que des sophismes que nous avons 
pris pour des vèrités, et nous nous égarons avec méthode. Ils ne sont point descendus dans nôtre coeur; ils 
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cherché les lois et les établissements qui doivent faire la bonheur de la societé. S'il faut les croire, la 
providence a fait des bonheures differens pour les anciens et pour nous, por l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Amérique 
et l'Europe. Ils vous diront gravement que des lois bonnes au dixièeme degrè de latitude, ne valent plus 
rien sous le trentième; en verité un législateur ne devroit'il pas plutôt consulter les affections de nôtre 
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montagnes, un sol plus sec, plus humide, plus o moins fertile, le voisinage de la mer ou d'une grande 
rivière, et cent autres pareils accidens, pour décider des lois plus propres à faire le bonheure de l'homme? 
La nature des climats change-t-elle la nature de son coeur? N'a-t-il pas partout les mèmes besoins les 
mèmes organes, les mèmes sens, les mêmes penchants, les mèmes passions et la mème raison? Partout 
l'attrait du plaisir et la crainte de la doleur ne sont-t-ils pas les mobiles de nos pensées et de nos actions. 
Partout ne sont y'ils pas également sujets à tromper le desir que nous avons d'être hereux? Sous l'equateur 
comme sous le pôle, dans les plaines et des vallès comme sur les montagnes, chacun de nos sens n'ouvre-
t-il pas nôtre ame à cent passions diffèrentes? Quelles sont les terres favorisées du ciel où l'avarice, 
l'ámbition, la paresse et la volupté ne puissent pas germer? Dans quels climats ces plaintes empoisonnées 
se produiront-elles impunément? Dans un lieu, si l'on veut nos passions seront plus impérieuses, et dans 
l'autre plus disciplinables; là elles seront exposées à des tentations plus frequentes, ici des accidens 
particuliers retarderont le développementy et le progrès; et je consens à tout ce que vous voudrez dire du 
puvoir des climats. Mais partout ces passions ne sont elles pas la source de nôtre bonheur, suivant qu'elles 
sont bien ou mal réglées? Partout elles ont donc besoin d'un frein et d'un conducteur, la loi doit donc 
commencer par les rendre droites. 
Mais ce grand art de gouverner nos passions, qui me l'apprendra? Où puisserai-jai les secrets? Dans 
l'etude du coeur humain."  
Mably, Oeuvres Complètes de l'Abbé de Mably, Tome Douziéme, De la Législation ou Principes des 
Lois, Livre Premier, Chapitre Premier, a Toulouse, Chez N. Etienne Sens, a Nismes, Chez J. Gaude, 
1793, pp. 24-26. 
  
     Nevertheless, Montesquieu had asserted: 
 
          "There is this difference 1 between the nature of [each of the forms of] government and 
            its principle, that its nature is what makes it be such [as it is]; and its principle what  
            makes it act. One is its particular structure, and other the human passions which set it 
            in motion. 
            1 This distinction is very important, and I will extract abundant consequences: she is the key of an infinity 
               of laws.”250 
 
     According to Montesquieu, the principle of the Republic is political virtue; the 
principle of monarchy, honor; and the principle of despotism, fear.251 He had limited his 
initial generalization about the spirit of the laws when, referring to the general spirit and 
to customs and habits, he said: 
 
          "Many things govern men: the climate, the religion, the laws, the maxims of  
           government, the examples of past things, the customs, the habits; from which  
           it forms a general spirit that from it results. 
           As, in every nation, when one of these causes acts with more force, the others weaken  
           proportionally. Nature and the climate dominate savages almost by themselves;  
           habits govern the Chinese, laws tyrannize Japan; custom had formerly all its 
           influence on Lacedaemon; the maxims of government and the ancient customs had  
          also all their influence on Rome.”252 
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 "Il y a cette difference 1 entre la nature du gouvernement et son principe, que sa nature est ce qui le 
fait être tel; et son principe ce qui le fait agir. L'une est sa structure particulière, et l'autre les passions 
humaines qui le font mouvir. 
1 Cette distinction est très important, et j'en tirerai bien des consequences: elle est la clef d'une infinité des 
lois."  
Montesquieu, De L’Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., 
Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L’Esprit Des Lois par 
L’Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre III, Chapitre 1,  p. 19, text 
reproduced above. 
See also: 
Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les 
Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Troisième, Chapitre I, Paris, 1950, p. 55. 
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Les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Troisième, Chapitre IX, Paris, 1950, pp. 64-65. 
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 "Plusieurs choses gouvernent les hommes: le climat, la religion, les lois, les maximes du 
gouvernement, les exemples des choses pasées, les moeurs, les manières; d'où il se forme un esprit 
général qui en résulte. 
A mesure que, dans chaque nation une de ces causes agit avec plus de force, les autres lui cèdent d'autant. 
La nature et le climat dominent presque seuls sur les sauvages; les manières gouvernent les Chinois; les 
loix tyrannisent le Japon; les moeurs donnent autrefois le ton dans Lacédemone; les maximes de 
gouvernement et les moeurs anciennes le donnaient dans Rome." 
Montesquieu, De L’Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., 
Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L’Esprit Des Lois par 
L’Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre XIX, Chapitre IV, p. 275, text 
reproduced above, without note 2. 
See also: 
Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les 
Belles Lettres, Tome Troisième, Livre Dix-neuvième, Chapitre IV, Paris, 1950, pp. 7-8. 
In an unpublished manuscript from his time, which Mably may have read, Montesquieu had asserted, 
before the publication of l'Esprit des Lois: "Les causes morales forment plus le caractère général d'une 
nation et décident plus de la qualité de son esprit que les causes physiques." 
  
     Mably, omitting the above mentioned passages and others that can be found 
dispersed in the work he criticizes, diminishes the importance of the factors pointed out 
by Montesquieu, but he is right when he claims the need for the study of human 
passions for the art of legislation. 
     Before Mably, Plato had demanded the study of the soul, so that rhetoric should rise 
to the category of the art of educating them or of leading them (psychagogy).253 
Aristotle fulfilled the desire of his teacher, describing passions and characters, with 
certain detail, but not as a foundation of rhetoric, but as one of the means of proof that 
depends on the technical skill of the orator upon delivering his speech, which is 
distinguished from those who are already given to him (witnesses, contracts, etc.).254 
 
      e.  Filangieri 
 
     Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri (1752-1758), a Neapolitan young nobleman, author of a 
famous book divided into VII volumes and published between 1780 and 1785, now 
almost forgotten, reproduces and extends the above paragraph by Bacon, without 
mentioning him, to explain his intention and the title that he has chosen, in the 
following way: 
 
          "It is a strange thing: among so many writers who have devoted themselves to the study 
            of the law, there is someone who has treated this subject just as a legal expert, someone  
            who has done it as a philosopher, another one as a politician, without taking into  
            consideration more than only one part of the immense building; there [is] someone, like  
            Montesquieu, who has reasoned more on what has been done that on what should be 
            done, but none has provided a complete and reasoned system of legislation; none has  
                                                                                                                                               
“Moral causes form more the general character of a nation and decide more the quality of its spirit, than 
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             yet reduced this matter to a safe science, joining the means to the rules, and the theory 
            to the practice. This is what I undertake to do in this work, entitled: The Science of  
            Legislation.”255 
 
     He did not mentioned Mably either, but took responsability for his claim on the need 
to include the study of passions, which Filangieri had announced in the reasoned plan of 
his work, in Book I, where, referring to his future Book IV, he wrote: 
 
          "From the direction of education to that of the passions, we will see the analysis of the  
           second virtue-producing force, without the knowledge, without the use of which  
           legislation will always be the most formless, more useless, more pernicious work, that  
           may come out of the hand of men. This will be one of the most interesting parts of this 
           work, because the refutation of some errors depends on it, that the politics of the century, 
           in spite of its progress, has adopted banefully because the establishment of a truth that is 
           of interest to know more than all others depends on that one too, but it requires a better  
           development, like that one, which hits against a common prevention.”256 
 
     In 1785 the volume VII was published, the last one appearing during the life of the 
author. Although he left the work incomplete, he managed to fulfill his promise to 
develop the topic of passions in legislative matters, as it can be appreciated from the 
transcription of the pertinent titles in the Index of Book IV, Part II: Laws that are related to 
Customs and Public Instruction: 
  
           Chapters: XXXIV Object of this part of Legislative Science; XXXV Possibility of  
           Achieving the mencioned object; XXXVI The only original passion of Men and   
           the effects of their modification in the diverse dominating artificial passions in  
           diverse peoples; XXXVII Physical, moral and political circumstances which  
           form the dominating passions of the peoples, and the double and main existing 
           influence between these and Legislation; XXXVIII The connection of the preceding  
           ideas and the examination to which they lead; XXXIX How the dominating passions  
           of the people proceed to get or to lose the object proposed; XL Continuation of the 
           same matter. The conducive passions; XLI The love for one’s homeland, and its  
           necessary dependence on the knowledge of laws and government; XLII Appendix to  
           previous Chapter. The Effects of the Passion for glory in a people where the passion 
           for one’s homeland reigns; XLIII The means that Legislation should use to introduce,  
           establish, expand, invigorate the passion for glory;  XLIV Continuation of the 
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 "E cosa strana: fra tanti scritori, che si sono consacrati allo studio della legge, chi a trattata questa 
materia da solo giureconsulto, chi da filosofo, chi anche da politico, ma non prendendo di mira, che una 
sola parte di questo immenso edificio; chi come Montesquieu ha raggionato piuttosto sopra quello, che si 
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quest'opera, che ha per titolo: La Scienza della Legislazione." 
Filangieri, La Scienza della Legislazione, del Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri, Nella Stamperia Raimondiana, 
Napoli, 1780, Tomo I, p. 14. 
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Filangieri, La Scienza Della Legislazione, Del Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri, Nella Stamperia 
Raimondiana, Napoli, 1780, Tomo I, 40-41.      
            same Matter; XLV Objection; XLVI The real cause for which wealth may have led, 
           lead and may lead to the corruption of the people; XLVII The absence of these causes 
           in a people which the Legislative System that forms the object of this work, was 
           adopted.257 
 
2.  Contemporary history 
 
     In contemporary history, Bentham will be remembered for having analyzed almost 
every topics on the art of legislation; afterwards, this chapter will synthetically deal with 
what happened after his death. 
 
     a.  Bentham 
 
     Jeremy Bentham (1748-1732), a prodigy who began to study Latin at the age of four 
and could write it by the age of five and nine months, attended Westminster School 
(1755) and the Queens College, Oxford (1755-1763), where he graduated with a 
Bachelor of Arts degree; was admitted into Lincoln's Inn (1763), went back to Oxford 
and graduated with a Master's degree of Arts (1766), on the following year dropped out 
of Oxford University, returned to London and was admitted to the English bar (1769). 
     Being the grandson and son to lawyers, despite the hopes of his father, who had 
wanted a succesful son to continue with family profession so as to became a Chancellor, 
he did not practice the profession in the conventional way. Although he lived long 
periods in accommodations for lawyers, such as Lincoln's Inn and Middle Temple, he 
failed to became Chancellor, despite his studies, the disciples who helped him, the 
interest that he showed on legislation and the intellectual influence that he had in its 
reform, both within and without his country.258 He neither litigated in courts, defended 
private interests, described the current law in special jurist work, taught in universities, 
nor finished his career as parliamentarian, Judge or Minister of the Crown, as any 
traditional English lawyer used to do. 
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soggetto, XLV Obbiezione, XLVI Delle vere cause, per le quali la richezza son divenute, divengano, e 
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Filangieri, La Scienza Della Legislazione, Del Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri, Nella Stamperia 
Raimondiana, Napoli, 1785, Tomo VII, pp. 1-108.    
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      All his work was related to the problem of the law that should be, not the problem of 
the law that is; it related to the reform of the laws, not to the explanation or application 
them. During his long life, and according to the plan that he had designed for himself, 
he wanted to create a new art of legislation, with the purpose of smoothing the path for 
the writing of two parallel and connected systems: 1) a complete body of laws and 2) its 
political justification; both adaptable to any particular State.259 To such an end, 
Bentham considered that:  
 
          "4. [...]  in as far as the measures it [the art of government] displays itself in are of permanent  
             nature, is generally distinguished by the name of legislation: as it is by that of administration, 
             when they are of temporary nature, determined by the occurrences of the day 4. [...].”260 
 
          "20. [...] Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose itself to pursue the course most  
             conducive to his own happiness, by such motives as offer of themselves: the art of legislation  
             (which may be considered as one branch of the science of jurisprudence) teaches how a multitude 
             of men, composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the whole is  
             the most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by means of motives to be applied 
             by the legislator [...] 
             ii. Jurisprudence, its branches. 
             21 Jurisprudence is a fictitious entity: nor can any meaning be found for the word, but by placing 
             it in company with some word that shall be significative of a real entity. To know what is meant 
             by jurisprudence, we must know, for example, what is meant by a book of jurisprudence. A book  
             of  jurisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. to ascertain what the law is: 2. to 
             ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case it may be styled a book of expository 
             jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of censorial jurisprudence: or, in other words, a book on the  
             art of legislation. 
             22. A book of expository jurisprudence is either authoritative or unauthoritative. It is styled  
             authoritative, when it is composed by him who, by representing the state of the law to be so and  
             so, causeth it so to be; that is of the legislator himself: unauthoritative, when it is the work of any 
             other person at large”.261 
 
     Every morning of his long life, he would write from ten to fifteen pages, in single 
sheets, indicating the place that they had within the general plan of all the works and 
within the scheme of each one of them in particular. Whenever a topic was unclear to 
him, he would interrupt his work and devote himself to clarify it in a new work, without 
going back to the former one for further revision. His disciples were entrusted with the 
hard task of transforming these originals into publishable works. In the first hours of 
every evening, after dinner, while walking around his desk, he usually dictated his texts, 
as he did with his autobiography, among others.262 This easily explains the fact that, 
after his death, the publication of a collection of his works has amounted to eleven 
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 volumes,263 of which the last two contain the story of his life and an elaborated index. 
As for his manuscripts, there are one hundred forty eight boxes at the University 
College in London with approximately seventy thousand free sheets, which –
fortunately– have  already microfilmed; some others are kept at the British Library, and 
the rest is beeing kept at the Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire de Genève (Public 
and University Library of Geneva).264 The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham is a 
scholarly new edition, which began to be published in 1968 and, some time later, under 
the editor F. Rosen and the care of different specialists from the prestigious Clarendon 
Press, from Oxford University.265 
     He did not manage to became a legislator in any nation,266 but he gave counsel to 
several governments. He had a great influence, both within and without his country. In 
France, the Assembly neither accept his parliamentary rules, nor his report on the 
reform of the Judiciary, not even his model jail (Panopticon), but he was granted the 
title of citizen (1792). The translation and systematization of his works by Genevan 
Étienne Dumont, Traités de Législation Civile et Pénale (1802), in successive editions 
extended under the title of Oeuvres, sold forty thousand copies in Spanish America, as 
calculated in 1830, and had an influence on their constitutions and legislations. In Spain 
his work influenced Jovellanos and the Constitution of that country, as well as the 
Constitution of Portugal and other States.267 In England, due to the irony of life, the 
Reform Bill of 1832 which established the ideas he had anticipated in his Plan of 
Parliamentary Reform of 1817, obtained Royal Assent one or two days after his 
death.268 
     Although he wrote numerous bills and criticized some others, and intervened in 
debates in which he counseled and discounseled general juridical norms, he never 
performed direct legislative functions, since his influence was based on his reputation 
both as a writer and as an independent adviser. 
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      Bentham analyzed almost all the topics of the art of legislation, but he failed to 
establish a well assembled fundamental system, just as any other author has also failed 
to do so far. 
 
     b.  Later... 
 
     In the XIX century, the development of the art of legislation was centered in France, 
Germany and England. In France, through the tasks developed by the State Council,  
Legislation Section in the enactment of the 1804 Civil Code and in the speeches of 
Portalis on this matter. In Germany, early that same century, throught the controversy 
between Thibaut and Savigny on the codification, and, upon its end, with the 
publication of interesting works on the art of legislation, led by the arguments 
concerning the 1900 Civil Code. In England, through the Parliamentary Reform of 1832 
and, in the second half of the century, through the creation of the Office of The 
Parliamentary Counsel to TheTreasury. 
     During the first half of XX century, publications kept on emerging in Germany 
motivated by the enactment of the Civil Code of 1900 (Zitelmann, Kohler); in France, 
by the centenary of the Civil Code of 1804 (Geny); and in England, emerged from the 
experience acquired in the Office of The Parliamentarian Counsel to The Treasury 
(Thring, Courtenay Ilbert). In the second half, in the United States of America and in 
Canada, the interest in the art of legislation increased, due to a search for uniformity in 
states legislation and the teaching of legislation as a subject matter at university level. In 
the 1970s, the expectation that England might enter the European Economic 
Community and the scarcity of legislative drafters in the Commonwealth also increased 
the interest in this type of studies. As from 1990, the market economy and the 
globalization have generated the need to reform the laws in many nations, with the 
consequent demand for handbooks, teachers and experts in the art of legislation. 
     The following Part II: System, includes Chapter IV Legislative Genres, Chapter V 
Investigation, Chapter VI Systematics and Chapter VII Style. 
 
  
 
 
Part II: System 
 
  
Chapter IV 
Legislative Genres 
 
     Laws should comprise two speeches: one prescriptive and other persuasive.269 The 
functions of persuasive speeches, as bills, consist in counseling and discounseling the 
debate and enactment of general juridical norms and, as laws enacted and published, 
consist in aiding their interpretation and application, according with the purpose sought 
by legislators. The functions of prescriptive speechees consist in: obliging, prohibiting, 
permitting, rewarding or punishing conducts.270 This chapter will firstly address the 
prescriptive speech because it precedes the persuasive one in the composition, although 
the latter follows the former in the presentation of a bill. 
 
1.  Prescriptive speeches 
   
     Prescriptive speeches comprise two legislative genres: the systematizing genre and 
the fragmentary genre. 
                                                 
269
 Plato, The Laws, IV, 723d. 
Plato, The Laws, IV, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 186. 
Platón, Las Leyes, IV, 723d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel 
Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, 
Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, p. 157. 
Platón, Leyes, IV, 723d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII 
Leyes (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 390. 
Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la 
Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 723d, 
Paris, 1942, p. 775. 
Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, XII 723d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori 
Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. 
Giacomo Gavazzi, La Motivazione delle Leggi, Il Politico, a. 39, no. 2, giugno 1974, pp. 173-193. 
270
 The Digest foresaw to command, to prohibit, to permit and to punish. 
D.1.3.7 
D.1.3.7. "Modestinus, liber I. Regularum.- Legis virtus haec est: imperare, vetare, permittere, punire.” 
D.1.3.7. "Modestinus, libro I. De las Reglas.- La naturaleza o esencia de la ley es esta: mandar, vedar, 
permitir y castigar.” 
El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, 1.3.24, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Bartolomé 
Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, 
Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta 
de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo. I, p. 42. 
D.1.3.7. "Modestinus, liber I. Regularum.- Legis virtus haec est imperare, vetare, permittere, punire.” 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus 
Mommsen,  Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 6. 
The project of Civil Code prepared by the Commission of the Government, which was giving birth to the 
Napoleonic Code (1804), had an article, 7, later suppressed, that added the rewards, in the following 
terms: 
“She [the law] orders, she allows, she prohibits, she announces the rewards and the punishments.” 
“Elle [la loi] ordonne, elle permet, elle défend, elle annonce des recompenses et des peines”). Jean Ray, 
Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Francais, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1926, p. 46. 
 
      a.   Systematizing genre 
 
     The prescriptive speeches that reduce a multiplicity of texts to the currrent unity of a 
single arranged text, a compilation or a digest; or that reduce a multiplicity of norms 
and principles to the unity of an institutional law, a consolidation or a code belong to the 
systematizing genre. The prescriptive speeches that fail to systematize their norms or 
principles in institutions (casuistic laws, laws of principles)271 or that introduce 
unsystematizing changes to other laws, either partially to their texts, or to their validity 
(amending laws) belong to the fragmentary genre,272 
 
     Juridical system 
 
     Before dealing with such species of laws as belong to the systematizing genre, it is 
necessary to rely on a theoretical model of juridical system, which advisers and 
legislators should always take into consideration as an implicit context for every genre 
of speech and every legislative species. 
 
PRINCIPLE: Laws shall be composed and criticized, advised and dissuaded, in 
accordance with the criterion with which they shall be interpreted and applied, taking 
into consideration the whole text of the law (explicit context), not only some of its 
parts,273 and the whole juridical system (implicit context), not only some of its parts. 
 
     The concept of juridical system or juridical order274 imposes on legislators, 
administrators, judges, lawyers and jurists in general the duty to maintain the 
reasonableness of positive law, preserving the juridical cosmos from falling into the 
chaos of arbitrariness. 
     The knowledge of a juridical system characterizes an expert and separates him from 
a lay person275 who, no matter how educated he may be, is unable to appreciate the 
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 wisdom of a certain norm, due to the fact he does not know the point at which it should 
be inserted in the juridical system to incorporate it, as the intermediate terms between 
the norm and its ultimate motivations, since he lacks the general vision and the logical 
perception of the whole.276 An adviser or legislator, before composing and criticizing, 
advising and dissuading general juridical norms, for any genre of legislative speech and 
any species of law, must know the point of insertion of the new law into the juridical 
system as the reasons for which he chooses such point, thus foreseeing the 
consequences, either desired or undesired, but always noticed, of such an insertion. 
      In past times, Civil Law277 countries were characterized by the notion of juridical 
system; now, this notion also characterizes Common Law countries,278 although both 
maintain their respective tendencies, rationalist the former and empiricist, the latter. 
Today, both types may be considered systematic, i.e. like a set of laws (general norms) 
and judicial precedents (individual norms), since there has been a modification of the 
relative importance of the above mentioned sources of law. In Civil Law countries, 
which did not admit judicial precedents, legislation is still the starting point, but judicial 
precedents are increasingly being resorted to. In Common Law countries, based on case 
law, legislation had a secondary function, but, as from Roosvelt’s New Deal, the norms 
contained in the legislation are increasingly taken as a starting point which is then 
followed by judicial precedents.279 A convergence between both positive law types has 
taken place in terms of considering legislation and judicial precedents as sources, and in 
both types, positive law is considered as a system, not a chaos born out of the whims of 
legislators, judges, or both. 
     A system or set is defined as any multiplicity that can be though as a unity.280 
Systematization tasks shall reflect the above mentioned idea of system, without any 
defects or excesses. 
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RULE: The attempts of systematization shall stay below the idea of system if 
multiplicity fails to reach unity; they shall stay above, if they try to reach unity, more or 
less, but lack multiplicity.281 
   
     When a system is difficult to understand, one can resort to a well-known 
understandable system, with fundamental similarities, to consider the one which is 
difficult to understand as if it were the one already well-known. If the similarities were 
only verbal, a metaphor –a mere figure of speech – would be obtained. Whenever the 
simmilarities are deeper, as those founded on the equality of the elements, the structure 
(isomorphism), the function (homology) or the properties, a theoretical model would 
thus arise, which will provide for a transference of both the terminology and the 
knowledge, from one system to the other, which will facilitate the understanding of the 
most difficult of them both.282  
     A juridical system is integrated by the following elements: juridical norms 
(individual and general), juridical principles, juridical institutions and juridical branches 
(or branches of the law). 
     The non-customary general juridical norms, are the answers provided by legislators 
to solve the problems raised by certain facts, acts and activities of social importance. 
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      The juridical institutions are integrated by sets of general juridical norms283 related to 
certain facts, acts and activities of social importance, founded on certain juridical 
principles.  
     The branches of the law are sets of institutions related to certain facts, acts and 
activities of social importance, founded on certain juridical principles of their own. 
Whenever the principles are proper of the branches, it is said that these are autonomous; 
whenever they are not proper, it is said that these branches are special. The difference is 
important since, beeing that the special branches lack principles of their own, after 
resorting to analogy, the general principles of the law are directly applied in order to 
integrate their gaps. 
     The juridical principles, i.e., the reasons or foundations of the norms (individual and 
general), are elements even more general and abstract than the norms themselves. They 
may be established in such a way that they remain isolated; together with norms but 
without integrating sets with them; or otherwise integrated in sets. Whenever they are 
integrated in sets, the principles serve as a foundation to institutions, the branches and 
the systems. This is the reason why it is necessary to distinguish which the considered 
level of abstraction is: the institution (principles of marriage, of property, etc.), the 
branch (civil law principles, criminal law principles, etc.), the internal juridical system 
(general principles of law), or the international juridical system (“general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations”284). 
     The empirical level of the juridical system, which allows it to make contact with the 
reality of the social system and is common to all levels of abstraction, is the set of 
certain concrete facts, acts and activities of social importance, which supports the 
relevant juridical relations. The increasing levels of abstraction are determined by: the 
norms (individual and general); the principles, the institutions; the branches; the 
internal order; and the international order. In the systematical conception of the Law 
underlies the idea of the double way of abstraction and concretion, of ascend and 
descend of understanding. A great lawyer is that whose understanding allows him to 
consider the general problems in a particular case and the particular cases in a general 
problem, while his will keeps on devising the most just solutions for the problems that 
he may cope with. 
     The structure of the juridical system is the logical relation between its elements: the 
norms, the principles, the institutions and the branches, within the internal order 
(national, regional, provincial or local), and within the international order (other 
national, regional juridical systems or the universal system). 
     To find the best-known system that may serve as a theoretical model of the juridical 
system, two types of logical systems will be considered, in accordance with their 
respective structures: deductive and classificatory systems. Geometry is an example of 
the deductive systems; botany and zoology are examples of the classificatory systems. 
     Among the elements that integrate a juridical system, principles play a fundamental 
role. 
     In a juridical system of a deductive structure, principles are considered as axioms 
from which branches, institutions and norms can be deduced. The multiplicity of the 
elements of the juridical order is conceived as a unity, because the more general 
elements allow to deduce the less general, as subsequent links are bound to the first 
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 ones to create a chain. The logical relationship existing among the elements of the 
juridical system is a deduction. 
     In a juridical system of a classificatory structure, principles are considered as the 
fundamental criteria allowing for the inclusion of norms, institutions, branches and the 
juridical order as subsets, in accordance with the relevant similarities and differences 
among the above-mentioned elements, as synoptic tables, as the parts that make up a 
tree.285 The multiplicity of the elements of the juridical system is conceived as a unity, 
because the less general elements are included as subsets within the more general: the 
norms within the institutions, the institutions within the branches, the branches within 
the internal order and the internal order within the international order, as in a synoptic 
table allowing for a clear vision and easy memory of the set and its elements. The 
logical relationship existing among the elements of the juridical system is the 
inclusiveness among classes, the classification in genres and species.286 The 
fundamental opposition between the juridical systems as classificatory or deductive was 
clearly seen by Ascarelli, among others: 
 
          "7. Early in the XVII century, reasoning was generally made in a strictly mathematical  
           fashion. Hobbes does not escape this method. Actually he not  longer considers genres 
           and species, but connections and relations. He seeks to create models which may capture 
           connections and not elaborate classifications which may allow for the identification of  
           species.”287 
                  
     The deductive model of a juridical system, in the same fashion as geometry (more 
geometrico), had its well-known supporters, such as the above-mentioned Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), in the Anglo-Saxon world; and Samuel Puffendorf (1632-1694) 
and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), in the European continental world,288 under the 
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 influence of the rationalism of René Descartes (1596-1650). In the XX century 
Alphonse Ménard’s traditional geometric version,289 the most modern versions of the 
axiomatic deductive system influenced by the contemporary development of the 
mathematical logic by Elemér Kováts, Miklós Ajtai, Luigi Ferrajoli290 and, by the 
deontic logic, by Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin291, are worth to be 
remembered.   
     The deductive inference is important for the application of juridical norms. The 
logical structure of the juridical norms may be represented as follows: 
     If  A were, B must be, where If A were is the part of the statement which describes 
the facts, acts and activities of social importance and their necessary and sufficient 
requisites (the antecedent); and B must be is the part of the statement that prescribes the 
obligatory, prohibited, permitted, rewarded or punished conducts that are imputed (the 
juridical consequence). 
     The application of juridical norms is usually represented as a syllogism, in which the 
norm is its major premise, the subsumption of the facts, acts and activities is its minor 
premise, and the logical conclusion is the application of the norm.292 Beccaria, a classic 
criminal law author, said: 
 
          "In each crime the judge has to do a perfect syllogism: the major premise must be  
            the general law; the minor premise the action conform or not to the law; the consequence  
            freedom or punishment. When the judge is restrained, or wants to do at least two  
            syllogisms, a door to uncertainty is opened.”293 
     
     Aristotle had previously said: 
 
          "I call perfect syllogism to that which, in addition to all that has been assumed, requires  
            nothing else to reveal the need for deduction; and I call, in turn, imperfect syllogism to 
            that which requires the addition of one or several objects, which are rather 
            necessarily required by the terms placed in the base, but which have not been assumed 
            through the premises.”294 
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     Here follows an example of what is commonly considered a judicial syllogism: 
 
          If someone kills a person, he shall be punished with imprisonement for not less 
          than 8 and not more than 25 years (law). 
          John Doe killed a person (subsumption).  
          Therefore, John Doe shall be imprisoned for 25 years (sentence). 
 
     From the logical point of view, norms are applied when the antecedent has been 
proved, in accordance with a hypothetical syllogism in modus ponens extended to make 
it applicable to the juridical reasoning. The modus ponens, typical of the propositional 
logic, originally was one of five basic arguments of the stoic logic that did not require 
any demonstration, since its validity was evident. 
 
     The scheme of the argument was: 
 
           If the first, then the second. 
          The first. 
          Therefore, the second. 
 
     The example that used to be quoted was the following: 
 
           If it is day, then it is light. 
          It is day.           
          Therefore, it is light.295 
 
     The modus ponens extended to logically express the judicial syllogism could be 
formulated as follows: 
 
           If A were, B shall be. 
          A has been proved. 
          Therefore, B shall be applied. 
     
     But the most serious difficulty for the judicial application of the norms does not 
generally lie in going from the premises to the conclusion, that is to say, in making the 
deductive inference that, as it has been pointed out, consists in applying the modus 
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 ponens, which is a very simple logical rule, but in being able to find the relevant texts 
and reconstruct the applicable norm (major premise), as well as in proving its 
antecedent (minor premise). 
     The judge reconstructs the norm from the texts, since rarely do the letter of the law 
and the complete legal norm which will serve as a major premise coincide, a 
circumstance which becomes serious due to the legislative hyperinflation. For the judge 
to enter a sentence for homicide, having a person killed another, is just only one of 
prerequisites, since others should be borne in mind, such as criminal responsability, 
illegality, guilt, etc. Acknowledging the antecedent of the norm as proven will neither 
be easy for him, since the subsumption requires that the judge has verified the 
performance of certain facts, acts and activities, and that he has qualified them as 
included in the antecedent of the norm.296 Once the applicable norm has been obtained 
and the performance of certain facts, acts and activities, qualified as included in the 
antecedent of the former has been proved, yet expressly assuming everything that is 
necessary for the inference, and once such delicate juridical operations have been 
completed, the judge will then have the major and the minor premises of the perfect 
syllogism which will make it possible for him to apply the norm “automatically”,297 due 
to the simplicity of the logical rule used (modus ponens).  
     If someone goes from the judicial interpretation and application of the juridical 
norms to the legislative task, the deductive system also turns out inadequate, among 
other reasons, because it would be obscure for lay people due to its length, since they 
could not follow the thread of a thought from a very distant starting point and for its 
verbiage, since obvious things would be said upon listing the propositions of each one 
of the syllogisms.298 
     The function of a deductive system consists in expressing what is implied in axioms 
and in propositions that necessarily derive from them through deductive logical 
inferences. In a juridical system conceived as deductive, Law is created only by the 
constituent power; everything else is a direct application of or a consequence deducted 
from the Constitution. The interpretation is not necessary; only deductive logical 
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 inferences from the Constitution are needed. In order to apply the norms to an 
individual case the facts, acts and activities are qualified or subsumed as if it were an 
automatic mechanism. Since no gaps may exist in the law, because what is not regulated 
or derived by analogy is not law, integration seems to be unnecessary. Some have 
imagined juridical systems of such a nature, but their impracticability prevents any 
reasonable man from believing that they could have existed as positive law or 
descriptive sciences of such Law. 
     Both the positive law and the science of the law are open systems299, interacting with 
society, in which it is always necessary to harmonize the requirements of juridical 
security, the foundation of certainty,300 with the requirements of justice, the foundation 
of the law, not only when constitutions are established. As for certainty, both positive 
law and the science of the law use natural language, but they also use a specialized, 
more precise language, although not exempted from ambiguity and vagueness. There 
are procedures intended to eliminate ambiguity and to reduce vagueness, as it will be 
discussed when dealing with legislative definitions. Nevertheless, it is impossible to 
avoid interpretating norms or to consider the qualification of all the cases as automatic, 
as those supporting the traditional deductive juridical system expect, or perhaps, as 
some of the supporters of the modern deductive juridical system may dream about. The 
latter wish they had a formalized language and an axiomatic system capable of 
eliminating interpretation and application as art tasks, reducing the controversies to a 
mere calculation, as Leibniz desired.301 As for justice, unforeseen problems or undesired 
effects of the adopted solutions result in the emergence of law gaps that will have to be 
filled, so that the integration of the juridical system could neither be avoided. 
      The taxonomic or classificatory model of a juridical system began with Quintus 
Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, at the beginning of the first century B.C., and culminated 
with Rudolf Von Ihering (1818-1892). Scaevola reduced the multiplicity of the civil law 
of his time to the unity of eighteen books,302 under the influence of his own family, 
especially his cousin, Quintus Mucius Scaevola Augur and the stoic Panaetius of 
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 Rhodes.303 It was a work much admired in the ancient world so, there, for the first time, 
as for the content, civil law was synthesized, which avoided the task of resorting to 
previous special works304 and, as for the form, a turn was made from casuistry to a 
systematical classification by genres305 and species, which although critized,306 made it 
possible to notice the existence of the respective principles, in such a way that the 
knowledge of the law was raised from an empirical state, which fails to provide reasons, 
to a technical state, which is capable of giving them. In the XIX century, Ihering found 
in natural history, a discipline that describes the things of the mineral, vegetable and 
animal kingdom,307 the model of the juridical techique: 
 
         "[...] in the same way a naturalist classifies the objects of natural history, 
           we must coordinate all the juridical bodies in a one and only systematical order.”308 
 
     The taxonomic model, which considers the juridical system as a classificatory 
system, similar to botany or zoology, is the conception that prevails in the European 
continental juridical science.309 This is the reason why, nearly a century after Ihering, it  
could be held that: 
 
          "And when the jurist rises to concepts of a higher and more comprehensive order, 
           such as rights in rem, obligations, juridical capacity, private or public law, etc., 
           he does nothing else but follow the same logical process of abstraction and  
           generalization. There is no difference between the logical work and the construction   
           of concepts, of institutes and of the systems inasmuch as there is no difference in the 
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            classification of animals that a naturalist does as regards orders, types of families, 
          species. Formation and classification of juridical concepts: here lies a jurist’s main  
          job.”310 
 
     Classifications are useful to express the natural relations among things and to allow 
the subsumption of particular things with ease and certainty.311 A juridical classificatory 
system is not aimed at deducing as principal function, but rather at showing the 
similarities and differences among its elements. It makes easier to find the norm sought 
for its application, provides an implicit context to interpret it and, should the norm not 
exist, it provides an implicit context to create it by analogy and thus insert it in the 
proper place, that is to say, to integrate it, which in turn, will also allow it to be 
remembered, interpreted, applied, suspended, repealed, restored or to create another by 
analogy. The classificatory conception facilitates the discovery of both the norm which 
serves as the major premise and of the one which serves as the minor premise. The 
subsumption is also facilitated by virtue of the mental habit that is acquired upon 
contrasting the similarities and differences of the abstract elements of the juridical 
system with the concrete facts, acts and activities, to determine whether the individual 
case, only identical to itself, coincides or not with the description contained in the 
relevant norm. 
      Therefore, it is worth of remembering that, as it has been said for another taxonomic 
discipline: 
 
         “Before continuing, it should be convenient to distinguish two processes which, in  
           Biology, are often confused: "classification" and "determination". The first implies  
           ordering or arranging living beings in definite classes which, finally, will constitute a  
           system. Determination is a task subsequent to the classification and consists in specifying  
           the position of an organism within a system possibly in use. Unities are classified,   
           specimens are determined. Classification is a synthesis activity, whereas determination is  
           basically analytical. 
           Thus, when the keys of a manual of the flora of a region are used, the plant that has  
           been collected or observed, already classified, is being determined. 
           Only when unknown specimens are found, are they classified, named and given position  
           within the system. 
           Since taxonomic hierarchies are defined as concepts of classes of individuals,  
           a plant or concrete an animal is "determined" [,] not "identified", since there are not two  
           beings exactly equal in nature, even though they may seem so. Identity only works with  
           regard to an individual.”312 
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 “Antes de continuar es conveniente distinguir dos procesos que, en Biología, se confunden a menudo: 
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definidas que, por último, constituirán un sistema. La determinación es una labor posterior a la 
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     The parts of the juridical system or the dogmatic science that describes them, in 
which maximum certainty is demanded (as in criminal law and tax law) do not admit 
analogy for interpretation, integration and application purposes, but are neither 
considered deductive subsystems conceived as syllogisms chains, but as tables of 
crimes or taxes, i.e., as classificatory systems. Whenever the principles of reservation 
and legality are respected, advisers, legislators and authors of juristic writings, 
motivated by the gap noticed upon examining the crimes and taxes contemplated in the 
juridical system in view of the conducts observed in the social system, may promote the 
passage of new types of crimes or taxes closed, never open, similar to the ones 
already in force. In the criminal and tax subsystems, analogy is restricted, as far as the 
art of judging (ars judicandi) is concerned, but it is admitted as an art of investigating or 
inventing laws (ars inveniendi), since the examples provided by history and by 
comparative law are the main source of knowledge for advisers and legislators. 
     The contemporary positive law is almost unmanageable, due to the diversity of 
sources and the number of accumulated norms. Today, more that ever, it is necessary to 
consider it as a classificatory system, to easily know and remember its main 
guidelines,313 by means of a synoptic vision, which is some sort of a map or mental 
description of the set,314 a guide to go through it and to remember its routes and 
accidents, since the following affirmation of Linneo is also applicable to the law: 
      
          "A system is Ariadne’s thread to Botany, without it this science is nothing but chaos. 
           Those who have stretched this thread deserve the acknowledgement of all centuries; 
           without it Botany would not offer but meanders in the middle of which it would be 
           impossible not to be shipwrecked.”315 
                                                                                                                                               
uso. Las unidades se clasifican, los ejemplares se determinan. La clasificación es una actividad de 
síntesis, mientras que la determinación es básicamente analítica. 
Así, cuando se emplean las claves de un manual de la flora de una región, se está determinando la planta 
que se ha coleccionado u observado, la cual está ya clasificada.  
Sólo cuando se encuentran especímenes no conocidos aún, se los clasifica, dándoles un nombre y un 
puesto en el sistema. 
Como las jerarquías taxonómicas son por definición conceptos de clases de individuos, una planta o 
animal concreto se "determina" [,] no "identifica", ya que no hay en la naturaleza dos seres exactamente 
iguales, por más afines que sean. La identidad sólo funciona con respecto al individuo.”  
Spanish into English translation by the author of this book. 
Elías R. de la Sota, La Taxonomía y La Revolución en las Ciencias Biológicas, Departamento de Asuntos 
Científicos, Unión Panamericana, Secretaría General, Organización de los Estados Americanos, Serie 
Biología, Monografía No. 3, Washington, 1967, p. 2. 
313
 Cicero, De Legibus (Laws) II, XVIII 45-46 
Cicero, De Legibus (Laws) II, XVIII 45-46, in De Re Publica, De Legibus, with an English Translation 
by Clinton Walker Reyes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd., London, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pp. 428-429. 
Marco Tulio Cicerón, Las Leyes, II, 18, 45-46, Traducción, Introducción y Notas por Alvaro d'Ors, 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Reimpresión de la Primera Edición de 1953, Madrid, 1970, pp. 164-167. 
314
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 "Un Système eft le fil d'Arianne pour la Botanique, sans lui cette science n'est qu'un chaos. Ceux qui 
ont tendu ce fil méritent la reconoissance de tous les siècles; sans lui la Botanique n'offriroit que des 
moendres au milieu desquelles il seroit impossible de ne pas égarer." 
French into English translation by the author of this book. 
  
     Neither will a level of certainty be reached, nor will computer systems for the  
storage and retrieval of information be fit for improving it, if users lack a theoretical 
model of the juridical system that works like an implicit context, in which it is possible 
to include the relevant information obtained. If, in the past, ignorance of the law 
consisted in not having current juridical texts available, on file by and for a minority, 
now such ignorance arises from the huge number of texts, the validity of which is 
impossible to determine with certainty in every case, especially in those regarding a 
tacit repeal.  
     It is indispensable to promote the certainty of the law,316 providing the juridical 
system with such reasonable precision and fixedness as may facilitate the knowledge of 
the juridical qualification of hypothetical behaviors, since certainty finds its foundation 
in the juridical security that makes it possible to foresee the juridical consequences of 
human actions, so that law-abiding subjects may direct their respective conducts, 
because, as Bacon said:  
 
          “Certainty is so essential to law, that law cannot even be just without it. "For if the  
             trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle ?" 1 So if the  
             law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore to warn  
             before it strikes. It is well said also, "That is the best law which leaves least to the  
             discretion of the judge; 2 and this comes from the certainty of it. 
             1 Corinth., xiv.8. 
             2 Arist. Rhet.I. 1."317 
      
     To satisfy the function of certainty, based on the juridical security that it offers, a 
juridical system must comprise certain properties: consistency (absence of 
contradictions or antinomies); completeness (absence of loopholes or gaps); and 
economy (absence of unnecessary or superfluous elements).318 
     It is interesting to remember that, in the ancient law of Athens, the thesmothetai were 
the magistrates in charge of the drafting, publication and conservation of the laws,319 
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 which they meticulously checked every year, to verify whether a law was inconsistent 
whith another, or was not longer in force among the current ones, or whether more than 
one law was related to the same action. They had to file a detailed report to the 
Assembly of the People so that a legislative commission of nomothetai could be 
appointed, entrusted with voting the laws that would be eliminated and those which 
would remain in force, in such a way that only a law would remain in force for each 
action.320 Any citizen could propose laws before the Assembly of the People in which 
all the legislation was ratified when it was convened at the beginning of each year.321 
     Legislative contradictions or antinomies are defects that must be avoided,322 since 
the consistency of the system contributes both to the predictability of the qualification 
of conducts and to promoting a feeling of equality among its recipients,323 through the 
restriction of arbitrary interpretations and applications. 
     In philosophy, the principle of Ockham’s razor, with which he presumably shaved 
Plato’s beard, asserts that entities must not be multiplied unnecessarily.324 Although it is 
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 true that it is a more esthetic than logical principle,325 linked to the elegance of the 
system, since from a strictly logical point of view it is not essential, it is also an 
economic principle. In the juridical world it is highly inconvenient to cumulate 
unnecessary materials, since one ends being crushed by a continuosly growing mass, 
succumbing under the weight of its own wealth,326 as it presently happens 
withlegislative hyperinflation. 
 
PRINCIPLE: The essential properties of the juridical system, namely consistency or 
unity (absence of contradictions or antinomies), and completeness or universality 
(absence of loopholes or gaps), have only one and the same base, unity, which will be 
negatively restored by removing the contradictions or antinomies and, positively, by 
filling the loopholes or gaps).327 
 
RULE: Advisers and legislators shall excercise control over economy and elegance. 
Negatively, by abstaining from legislating, unless it turns to be indispensable, in order 
to avoid adding superfluous elements to the juridical system; and, positively, by 
promoting the enactment of arranged texts, compilations, digests, consolidations, 
codifications and institutional laws, in order to simplify and grant certainty to the 
juridical system. 
 
     The procedures designed for the elimination of antinomies by means of 
interpretation are also useful for advisers and legislators, either because they may use 
them to remove the existing ones from the system, by promoting the enactment of an 
interpretative law, or to prevent the bill proposed from having internal contradictions, or 
conflicting with other bills or with the juridical order. 
     The plenitude of the juridical order does not mean that there are no gaps but, that 
when they do appear, judges or legislators must fill them in. It is convenient to 
distinguish the doubtful cases, which call for interpretation, from the unforeseen cases, 
which call for the integration of the gaps. 
 
RULE: Advisers and legislators shall not promote the enactment of a law should they 
verify that it is possible to integrate the gaps by means of case law in a timely fashion. 
 
RULE: Advisers and legislators shall take into consideration the taxonomic model of 
juridical system, as an implicit context, when they compose and criticize, advise and 
dissuade the enactment of general juridical norms. 
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      Systematizing laws 
  
     Systematizing laws reduce a multiplicity of texts or norms, principles and 
institutions, to the unity of a law in force in just one arranged text, compilation, digest, 
code or institutional law. There are two species: the external and the internal 
systematizing laws. 
 
     External systematizing laws 
 
      Sistematizing laws are external when they just gather in a single text in force the 
scattered texts of a law which was subjected to many amendmends, without introducing 
any changes in its wording, except for such grammatical, numerical and nomenclature 
updates as are necessary to carry out the arrangement (arranged texts);328 when they just 
gather in a single collection all texts in force related to certain matter scattered in 
multiple laws that do not modify the same law, arranged in accordance with a 
chronological plan, without introducing changes in their wording (compilations); and 
when they are arranged in accordance with a systematic plan (digests). They are internal 
when they reduce to the unity of a new complete legislative body, without antinomies 
and redundancies, a multiplicity of scattered norms, principles and institutions, and the 
law in force is rewritten, without introducing any changes to its content, in accordance 
with a proper systematic plan of exposition (consolidations); when they consolidate and 
introduce changes in content of the law in force, or only introduce changes in the 
content of the law in force and regulate a complete branch of the law (codifications); 
and when they legislate in the same fashion as codifications, but only regulate up to the 
level of institutions (institutional laws).     
      
      Arranged texts 
 
      Whenever a law has been subjected to amendements to such an extent that it is 
uncertain or troublesome to determine the text in force, it is necessary to systematize it, 
reducing the multiplicity of amendments to the unity of the amended text, so as to get a  
single text in force (arranged text). The original text of the law is then compared to the 
amendments, and numerical and gramatical modifications as well as nomenclature 
updates indispensable to obtain a single text in force are introduced. In addition to the 
single text in force, the legal sources of the included and excluded texts, as well as the 
updated nomenclature, are described in attached charts. 
      From a theoretical point of view it is a task of philological nature, which turns out 
very practical if performed as if it were the critical edition of a classical work.329 
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 PRINCIPLE: The changes to be introduced in arranged texts shall be the least 
indispensable ones and shall be exhaustively explained, leaving no doubts as regards 
their only purpose, which consists in establishing with certainty which the updated 
single text in force of the original amended law is. 
 
     The task seems very simple, but many times difficulties arise, since it is necessary to 
find the amending texts, which could be anywhere within the juridical order and, 
although reduced to the indispensable minimum number, the interpretation about the 
scope of the amendments introduced may not be eliminated. Since there should not be 
any remaining doubts, the intervention of the legislative organ is needed, either directly 
or through the express delegation of the power to draft the relevant arranged text, this 
being not a question of a mere republication, but a very delicate technical operation. 
     The approval of arranged texts on a regular basis, like in the case of tax and social 
security laws, contributes to juridical certainty. Approving arranged texts sporadically, 
erratically, without a plan, or authorizing such approval by norms of a rank lower than 
Executive Orders, adds uncertainty instead of eliminating it, since, if the arranged text 
does not reach its potential recipients, a new factor of disturbance is created for 
everyone. 
 
RULE: The bodies in charge of the publication of the laws shall keep and disseminate 
an updated list of all arranged texts, describing the following information in detail: title, 
norm by which they were approved, means of publication, date and page thereof; 
effective term, and chronological-numerical indexes of topics and of updated 
nomenclature. 
 
     Uncertainty is also generated whenever there is a text in force that already solves a 
specific problem but, due to ignorance of or fear about its validity, unnecessary laws are 
introduced, a vicious practice also used when the objective is to avoid an amendment to 
a relevant law in force, contributing to legislative hyperinflation and to a higher entropy 
or disorder of the juridical system.    
     Juridical certainty could be fostered if the new amending laws were clear-cut about 
the resulting amended text, establishing the respective arranged text without hampering 
the urgent need to legislate. 
  
RULE: The new amending laws shall approve the arranged text of the laws amended by 
them. Whenever reasons of urgency, which shall be expressly stated in its motivations, 
made the approval of the arranged text inconvenient, the prescriptive part shall 
determine which body shall be entrusted with such a task, and shall set a reasonable 
term for such fullfilment, under the warning of specific penalties in the event of 
unjustified nonfullfilment. 
 
     Compilations 
 
     When the norms related to a certain matter are scattered in multiple laws and fail to 
amend a same law, since if it were the same amended law one could resort to the 
method of the arranged texts, it is necessary to systematize them, creating a collection 
with all the texts in force, to facilitate their consultation (compilation), with two 
indexes, one of them containing a numerical-chronological order of laws included there 
and the other one, an alphabetical order of the topics dealts with. 
 
      Digests 
 
     When a compilation is insufficient to facilitate consultations, then it becomes  
necessary to arrange the collection in accordance with a systematical plan (digest), with 
three indexes: first, a systematical index of the whole work; second, a chronological-
numerical index of the laws included in it and third, and alphabetical index listing the 
topics dealts with in alphabetical order.  
      It has already been said that the arranged texts are similar to critical editions of 
classical works; now it could be affirmed that compilations and digests are similar to 
anthologies.  
 
      Internal systematizing laws 
 
     The internal systematizing laws comprise three species: institutional laws, 
consolidations and codifications. 
 
      Institutional laws 
 
     The laws that reach the level of abstraction of institutions (institutional laws) reduce 
a multiplicity of norms to the unity of a single text in force, grouping them around 
principles, either new or traditional although with certain innovations, respectively 
done by the laws on organ transplants, on protection of privacy, etc., and by those of 
bankruptcy proceedings, companies, etc., in decodifyng processes. 
 
      Consolidations 
      
     The inclusion of juridical norms within the relevant institution; the institutions 
within a branch; the branches within an internal, local, provincial, regional or national 
order; and internal orders within an international, regional or universal order, may be 
uncertain, since they are hard to find and, since once they are found, their texts in force 
may not be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty. Furthermore, if there is 
not a basic original law allowing to resort to the method of arranged texts and the 
interpretation of scattered laws, which often overlap with one another, is quite uncertain 
all of which prevents from the use of compilations or digests then it turns out 
necessary to resort to a more complex technical operation: consolidation. A 
consolidation consists in reducing a multiplicity of scattered norms, principles and 
institutions, to the unity of a new legislative body, without antinomies and 
redundancies, thus drafting again the law in force, without introducing a new content, 
within an only explicit legislative context, in accordance with a proper systematic 
expository plan, in harmony with the juridical system, implicit context of the speech. 
     If arranged texts are similar to critical editions of classical works and the 
compilations and digests to anthologies, consolidations are like those masterly treatises 
that reshape the content of scattered topics in articles, monographs and other treatises 
that, without introducing new knowledge, establish the current status of the matter. 
     Many times, tasks are delayed on account of the obstacles that usually come up. 
Before such tasks are commenced, it may be necessary to enact laws which facilitate  
consolidation and, afterward, should the government promote laws on the same matter, 
it will be necessary to wait for their enactment to include them. Among other obstacles, 
it may be remembered that usually drafters are only a few, that high-ranking officials of 
the departments in charge of the enforcement of the laws to be consolidated are usually 
 under pressure and have to deal with other priority tasks and therefore are unable to give 
advise with its thorough knowledge of the current law, etc..330  
     Consolidations are measures abstractly praised by everyone, but which nobody feels 
like complying with. Added to the technical difficulties mentioned before, is the lack of 
interest of political authorities, who think they cannot obtain any benefits, and of theirs 
advisers, who refuse to change the form of the laws with which they are  familiar and 
whose preparation might imply a lot of time, both theirs and of their subordinates.331 
 
RULE: The preparation of arranged texts, compilations, digests and consolidations shall 
be entrusted to only one public, technical and specialized body which, as primarily 
responsible for such task, may require cooperation from other public or private entities, 
as well from specialists. 
      
     Codifications 
 
     Unity is achieved by bringing together all the scattered modifying texts in force, 
related to a same law, in a single text of the modified law (arranged texts); by bringing 
together all the scattered texts in force related to a subject, in a single collection 
arranged in numerical-chronological fashion (compilation) or systematical (digest); by 
gathering all the texts in force on certain subject in a single legislative body, without 
antinomies and redundancies, in accordance with a proper systematical plan 
(consolidation). In arranged texts, compilations and digests, as well as in consolidations, 
it is always a question of the law in force, without filling in the gaps that may exist at 
the moment of their approval. 
     Although codification332 also grants certainty to a part of the law in force at the time 
of its approval, since the historical experience shows that it is very difficult to change it 
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 completely, it also has another purpose, its main purpose: to enact a reform that, in 
addition to granting certainty, may do justice. Antinomies and redundancies are thus 
removed, but gaps of the juridical system are also filled in, introducing changes in both 
the form and content of the law in force. 
     In the XIX century, the multiplicity of sources of the law legislation, custom and 
case law corresponding to the fundamental branches of the juridical system, were 
limited to the unity by means of the eactment of the civil, commercial, criminal and 
procedural codes. 
     From the XX century on, no branch of the law is usually demanded for every code; it 
is sufficient if it regulates a matter of social importance, like traffic, customs, food, etc. 
A triple process is also noticed: recodification, which unifies the civil branch with the 
commercial one in private law codes; decodification, which separates certain 
institutions from codes, like legislation on: adoption, bankuptcy, corporations, 
negotiable instruments, etc.; and institutionalized, where new sets of norms appear 
regarding facts, acts and activities of social importance grouped according to certain 
principles, such as organ transplantation, privacy protection of computerized 
information, etc. 
     Arranged texts are like critical editions of classic texts, compilations and digests are 
similar to anthologies, and consolidations to masterly treatises that reshape the content 
of a scattered matter in articles, monographs and other treatises, without introducing any 
new knowledge. Codes are similar to masterly treatises that, in addition to stating the 
current knowledge, rectify the state of the relevant juridical science and introduce new 
knowledge which establish them as paradigms to be followed by scientists as models of 
the normal science that relegate previous paradigms to the history of the relevant 
discipline, until the appearance of another one causes a new scientific revolution.333 
     Unlike arranged texts, compilations, digests and consolidations, codifications grant 
political credit and personal prestige. Napoleon, in spite of his victories in times of war, 
considered that he would be remembered more as a legislator than as a soldier. Since the 
French Revolution, all attemps to codify the civil legislation had failed, but Napoleon, 
who wanted to achieve such codification as soon as possible, created a commission that 
drafted the bill in just four months, and he personally participated in the subsequent 
debate held at the Council of the State.334 Enacted as the French Civil Code, it increased 
the reputation of its promoter; it was later denominated “Napoleonic Code”, the name 
with which it is known nowadays. He may have inspired in Machiavelli, who had 
written: 
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           "And no thing gives so much honor to a new man who emerges, as a new law and  
           the new orders found by him. These things, when they are properly founded and have  
           greatness in themselves, make him respectable and admirable."335  
 
     No bureaucrat would ever refuse to appear among the codifiers of his country. 
 
     b.  Fragmentary genre 
      
     Laws are fragmentary when they do not systematize their norms or principles in 
institutions (casuistic laws and laws of principles),336 or when they introduce 
unsystematic changes to other laws, either partially in their texts, or otherwise in their 
validity (amending laws). 
                
           Casuistic laws 
 
     Casuistic laws usually emerge in the first stages of the development of a statute law, 
when, from the experience acquired from problematic cases and their previous 
individual solutions, the legislator passes a text vested with authority, with the 
maximum degree of concretion and the minimum degree of abstraction. Isolated norms 
multiply, even though they respond to the same principle, instead of using wide 
formulae that produce the logical concentration of the matter dealt with. 
     Casuistic laws should not be confused with the prolix but internal systematizing 
laws, although they descend to the regulation of the details that come up, they have 
principles which serve as their basis, whose consequences the legislator prefers to 
specify in sets of explicit norms and around principles which serve as foundation to 
them (institutions), instead of leaving them to custom, case law or juristic writings. 
Laws which only contain principles, only norms, or principles and norms isolated which 
fail to be systematized in institutions, should not be confused with internal 
systematizing laws. 
 
RULE: Casuistic laws should not be confused with the prolix but internal systematizing 
laws. Nor shall the laws which only contain principles, only norms, or principles and 
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 norms isolated which fail be systematized in institutions, be confused with internal 
systematizing laws. 
 
     Whenever a legislator faces new problems calling for urgent concrete solutions, but 
fails to have available new principles allowing him to implicitly include the relevant 
norms in laws of principles or to pass internal systematical laws such as institutional 
laws, in spite of not being in a primitive stage of the historical development, he usually 
resorts to casuistic laws to satisfy such urgent social need.  
 
RULE: Whenever new problems shall need urgent legislative solutions, and there is no 
possibility of enacting laws of principles or of having these ones serves as a foundation 
to enact institutional laws, then casuistic laws may be resorted to. 
 
     Casuistic laws, when understood as exceptions to established principles, form a 
singular law (ius singulare). However it should be borne in mind that, when they appear 
for the first time, it may be the right historical moment for the inception of a new 
principle of a more abstract nature than the urgent solution of the concrete problem.337 
This new principle, once explicit, will allow the legislator to concentrate the matter 
logically, by grouping norms which had been scattered, eliminating the superfluous 
ones and adding others that are a consequence of the aforesaid principles; so that new 
institutions will form, allowing the juridical system to overcome the exceptional 
situation raised by the existence of the singular law. 
 
RULE: Before opting for casuistic laws, it shall be verified whether it is the right 
historical moment for the inception of a new principle, which would allow norms to be 
grouped in institutions, in which case institutional laws shall be resorted to. 
 
           Laws of principles 
 
     Legislators may required neither to enact a special norm for each and every concrete 
situation that may emerge in real life, nor to show all principles so clearly that the 
consequences applicable to all the cases may derive from them.338 Therefore, principles 
and norms coexist in every mature juridical system. The natural place for principles is 
the persuasive speech, but sometimes, principles are included in the prescriptive speech 
in the form of concise formulae and norms are not systematized in institutions, when it 
is prefered that norms or institutions be inferred from custom, case law or juristic 
writings. 
 
RULE: Principles shall be included, without systematizing the norms in institutions, 
whenever a legislator may prefer that norms or institutions be inferred from custom, 
case law or juristic writings. 
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              Amending Laws 
 
      Amending laws introduce unsystematic changes to the text or to the validity of other 
laws, as parts of a complex speech formed by the law introducing the changes 
(amending law) and those who turn out to be changed (amended laws). 
     The basic principle of amending laws consists in the fact that they must be adapted 
to the respective amended laws and, therefore, should not introduce in them alien 
matters that may turn them difficult to retrieve, or different styles that may cause 
unnecessary interpretative doubts, since in both cases the juridical certainty of the 
system would be adversely affected. 
 
PRINCIPLE: Amending laws shall be adapted to the modified laws and no alien matters 
or different styles shall be introduced to them, so that the certainty of the juridical 
system may remain unaffected. 
 
                 Spatial validity 
 
      Laws amending the spatial validity of other laws are usually used in  serious 
situations, such as droughts, floods, epidemics, rebellions, wars, etc. 
 
                Temporal validity 
 
      Laws amending the temporal validity either suspend, extend or repeal the validity of 
the amended laws. 
 
                       Suspension 
 
     There are some species of laws not very well-known or studied, the so-called laws of 
dispensation or laws of waiver, which suspend the application of other laws, either in 
whole or in part, without repealing or abrogating them.339  
    The laws of provisional dispensation, generally passed in times of crisis or serious 
disorders, suspend the application of ordinary or regular laws, which recover their 
validity once such crisis or disturbances have been overcome. They are also passed 
when legislators wish not to re-open the debate of a very controversial law but to avoid 
its application, as in the case of the Decree-law 4070/56 which suspended Section 31 of 
Law 14.394, which had admitted absolute divorce in the Argentine Republic.  
     The laws of definitive dispensation, besides suspending the application of the 
ordinary or regular ones, establish different regulations that are not reached when the 
suspendend laws recover their application. They can be of defeasance (leges 
annulatoriae), as those of amnesty, which render punishments ineffective, or those 
related to the cancellation of debts, which render claims ineffective (Hebrew jubilee, 
Solon´s Seisachtheia, etc.). They are confirmatory (leges confirmatoriae), when they 
make certain null and void acts produce legal effects, as in the case of  notarized 
instruments made by French notaries before only one witness, against the law that 
required the presence of either a notary and two witnesses, or of two notaries. This 
ground for nullity could not have been ignored by judges, the norm having been so 
clear; however, its very serious consequences were avoided by a special Law of 
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 Paul Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire (Conflit des Lois dans le Temps), 2e. Édition Entièrement 
Refondue, Éditions Dalloz et Sirey, Paris, 1960, pp. 17-21.    
 Confirmation dated June 21, 1843. The retroactiveness of this type of laws has been 
justified, because it respects the intentions of the parties, despite any defects in the 
solemn formulae, and tends to peace and the settlement of past transactions.340 
 
                       Extension in time 
 
     Laws that extend the application of other laws in time are also amending laws,341 
generally non textual, but they could be so, should the transitory disposition of the 
amended law be replaced for other extending its validity in time. Both merely transitory 
laws and those of dispensation are usually extended when the reasons for their 
enactment remain or when new reasons arises. Contemporary laws on fiscal moratorium 
(taxes, social security matters), have denatured their name, since they do not limit 
themselves to establish time extensions for payments, due to the fact that they also 
establish deductions, debts cancellations, and amnesties of applicable fines and 
interests. 
 
                Repeal 
 
     Under Roman law there used to be a distinction between abrogation (abrogatio), 
wich caused another law to be completely ineffective, and repeal (derogatio), which 
caused another law partially ineffective.342 Today it is frequent to speak of a total or 
partial repeal. 
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      Whether the law expressly refers to the repeal of all opposed provisions or whether it 
says nothing in that regard, there will always be a tacit repeal of the opposed previous 
laws, due to the principle that establishes that later or subsequent laws repeal previous 
ones (lex posterior derogat priori). 
 
                  Tacit repeal 
 
RULE: There shall be a tacit repeal343 of a previous law, whenever a later law complies 
with all the following requisites: 
a) equality of matters; 
b) identity of recipients; 
c) contradiction and incompatibility of the ends sought; 
d) equal or higher normative hierarchy. 
 
                   Express repeal 
 
     To avoid interpretive doubts about tacit and organic repeals as a result of the 
enactment of a later law, it is also preferable to expressly repeal all the norms related to 
the previous law that are not wished to be kept in force. 
 
RULE: Whenever a new law is enacted and the previous law is completely repealed, all 
the norms related to the previous law that are not wished to be kept in force shall be 
explicitly repealed, so as to avoid interpretative doubts. 
 
RULE: Whenever a purpose in a general law is to repeal a special law, the method of 
express repeal shall be used in the prescriptive text to avoid interpretative doubts. 
 
RULE: Whenever a law expressly repeals another law, it may state that it shall produce 
its effects inmediately, as from a term, or retroactively.344 This last hypothesis shall be 
exceptional and not always valid. 
 
                Amendment method 
 
     Amending laws, from the viewpoint of the method through which they may be 
formulated, present two species: textual amending laws and non-textual amending 
laws.345 
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                       Textual amending laws 
 
RULE: Textual amending laws shall partially and expressly amend the texts of the 
amended laws by means of suppression, addition, substitution, division, reunion or 
transposition.346 
 
                             Suppression 
 
      A suppression repeals part of the text of the modified law. 
   
                             Addition 
 
      An amending law may add text to the amended law; this change has also been 
known as integration.347 
 
                             Substituition 
 
      Substitution consists in the repeal, generally partial, of the text of the amended law 
and the addition of the text introduced by the amending law.        
     Whenever a law is completely changed by another one, the new law is usually passed 
and the old one is totally repealed, without substituing the text of the old for the text of 
the new, unless the name and the number of the old law are to be kept. 
     Frequently, the text of the amended law is partially changed. Legislators proceeds as 
a publisher who publishes an erratum or an addendum, mentioning which parts of the 
text of the old law must be substituted by the text of the new law.348 It would be 
preferable to use legislative systematical units such as subsections, sections, etc., instead 
of grammatical units, like words, phrases etc. In this case the interpreter is entrusted 
with the task of reconstructing the text of the systematical unit as it will be after the 
substitution, but it is preferable that such task be directly carried out by legislators. If, 
furthermore, a comparative chart showing the differences between the old text and the 
new one is attached, the understanding of the scope of the amendments is facilitated, 
both for legislators and for the interpreter. 
      
RULE: Whenever a new law substitutes partially the text of an old law, the whole 
partial legislative systematical unit of the later shall be substituted and a comparative 
chart of both texts shall be attached in a special annex. 
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                        Division   
 
RULE: Upon deliberation, everything that may be separated for better understanding, 
voting and application shall not be considered as a whole, to which end the provisions 
shall be divided until the simplest systematical units be reached. 
                                      
                       Reunion 
 
RULE: Whenever systematical units are scattered, they shall be reunited, in order to 
homogenize the explicit context. 
 
                       Transposition 
 
RULE: Whenever a systematical unit is not placed where it belongs according to the 
fundamental criterion adopted, such unit shall be transposed. 
 
                   Non-textual amending laws 
 
     Non-textual amending laws introduce partial and implicit changes to the regulation 
of conducts which have already been regulated by other laws. 
     Due to the complexity of the contemporary juridical system, worsened by the 
number and poor quality of the laws, it is very difficult to reach the knowledge of the 
law currently in force in a precise form and before its application. It is also difficult to 
exactly determine the effects that a new law will produce, since they will be like a stone 
thrown in a pond, which sinks at a certain spot, but the waves of which reverberate in 
almost the whole surface, or like an ink jet, which colours the surface wherever it falls 
and then vanishes away in water. Non-textual amending laws, usually enacted without 
this previous knowledge, would not have been enacted more than once had legislators 
foreseen their incidence on other norms.349 
 
RULE: When permitted by the circumstances and the political intentions, textual 
amending laws shall be preferred, without referrals, as long as they shall preserve 
juridical certainty and forbid interpretations as may be feasible, but opposite to the 
purpose sought by legislators. 
 
2.  Persuasive speeches 
 
     Persuasive speeches are adapted to the nature of prescriptive speeches and may be 
considered from two points of view: as prologues and as speeches per se. As prologues, 
like the preludes in music or overtures in concerts, operas and ballets, they introduce the 
works instead of beginning them directly in their main part. They smooth the way, 
prepare the audience, trying that they show themselves attentive (attentos), docile 
(docile) and benevolent (benivolos).350 As speeches per se, they try to teach (docere), 
please (delectare) and move (movere).351 
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RULE: As prologues of prescriptive speeches, persuasive speeches, shall try that their  
addresees show themselves attentive, docile and benevolent and, as speeches per se, 
they shall try to teach, please and move. 
 
RULES: Persuasive speeches shall fulfill two functions: to counsel and to discounsel. 
To those who may be in a position to enact or reject bills they shall counsel, on the one 
hand, the enactment of the bill; and, on the other hand, they shall criticize and 
discounsel them, implicitly or explicitly, either to keep the current juridical system 
unchanged, or to come up whith other solutions different from the bill proposed. 
 
      Legislators, when composing and counseling the enactment of a bill seeks, as 
supreme ideal, the introduction of the proposed changes and not of others to the 
juridical order; or, as a realistic alternative, the introduction of other changes, provided 
always that they are acceptable; but they shall only admit that no change be made, 
should those changes be unacceptable. The other recipients who shall also have to be 
persuaded are all members of public opinion, most of it, most of the wise men, the most 
distinguished of those, and those who will have to interpret and apply the laws, either 
spontaneously or forcibly. 
     As persuasive speeches have certain characteristics of their own, it will be very 
useful to consider their species. Since the use of persuasive speeches has been 
questioned, the most frequent objections will be then refuted and it will be established 
when the above mentioned speeches turn out to be necessary. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
[Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, Libro Primero, IV, 6. 
 [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, I.iv.6, with an english translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, First published 1954, Reprinted 
1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, London, England pp. 12-13.   
[Cicerón], Retórica a Herenio, Libro Primero, IV, Traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Francisco 
Alcina, Bosch, Casa Editorial S.A., Barcelona, pp. 68-69. 
[Cicéron], Rhétorique a Hérennius, Livre Premier, IV, 6, Traduction Nouvelle de Henri Bornecque, 
Librairie Garnier Frères,  Paris, pp. 8-9. 
Cicero, De Inventione I, XV, 20. 
Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Livre I, XV, 20, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et 
Notes par Henri Bornecque,  Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 30-31. 
Cicero, De Oratore, II, XXVII, 115. 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur (M. Tulli Ciceronis, De Oratore), Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, 
Livre II, XXVII, 115, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, p. 53. 
Cicero, Brutus, LXXX. 
Cicéron Brutus ou Dialogue des Orateurs Illustres (M. Tulli Ciceronis, Brutus seu Dialogus de Claris 
Oratoribus), Texte Établi, traduit et Annoté par François Richard, LXXX, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, 
1934, pp. 182-183. 
Octave Navarre, Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote,  Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1900, 
p. 213. 
351
 Cicero, Brutus, LXXX. 
Cicéron, Brutus ou Dialogue des Orateurs Illustres (M. Tulli Ciceronis, Brutus seu Dialogus de Claris 
Oratoribus), LXXX, Texte Établi, traduit et Annoté par François Richard, Librairie Granier Frères, Paris, 
1934, pp. 182-183. 
Cicero, De Oratore, II, XXVII, 115. 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur (M. Tulli Ciceronis, De Oratore), Livre II, XXVII, 115, Texte Établi et Traduit par 
Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, p. 53. 
       a.  Species 
  
     The most common species of persuasive speeches are: the preambles, the “whereas” 
section, the exposition of motives, and the messages, reports, notes and epilogues.  
      
                 Preambles 
 
     Preambles were a very important tool to restore the origins and the purposes, the past 
and the future, that is to say, the ontological and teleological aspects of legislation, until 
they fell in disuse,352 except in constitutions. 
     The preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America, which may serve 
as an example of this species of persuasive speech, indicates the source from which its 
title comes in order to be obeyed, the people of the United States, and sets forth the 
great purposes of the Constitution established by it: 
 
          "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish  
            justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the 
            general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity, do  
            ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America”353 
 
                 The “WHEREAS” section 
 
     The “WHEREAS” sections of executive orders and resolutions, which also precede 
the prescriptive speeches, are more concrete than preambles of constitutions and, 
therefore, similar to the grounds of court judgments, which consist of two parts that 
come before the judgement in strict sense: the “WHEREAS” and the “AND ALSO 
CONSIDERING” sections.354 
     The persuasive speeches of executive orders and resolutions may be composed of 
only one part, the “WHEREAS” section; or by two parts, when the “AND ALSO 
CONSIDERING” section is added. 
 
RULE: In the WHEREAS section of executive orders and resolutions, the problems to 
be solved shall be detailed or reference shall be made to the documents in which they 
are detailed; the AND ALSO CONSIDERING section shall describe in detail the 
explanations and justifications of the solutions to be adopted. 
 
     The understanding of the sense of AND ALSO CONSIDERING seems clear, while 
that of the WHEREAS part needs to appeal to the maxim of political wisdom that 
recommends controlling that things are not only real and fair or just, but that they also 
look as such, with the typical verisimilitude of the rhetoric, this being the reason why 
Roman senators and judges, who gave so much value to appearance, would render their 
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 decisions by beginning with the verb videri,355 a historical backround that would explain 
the current use. 
      
               Exposition of Motives 
 
     The expositions of motives are persuasive speeches that also precede prescriptive 
speeches, although separated from one another. They are not part of the same text, 
together with the prescriptive speech, like the Preamble of a constitution and the 
WHEREAS and the ALSO CONSIDERING sections of an executive order or 
resolution. They provide explanations on the relations among the different parts of the 
prescriptive speech, both among themselves as well as with regard to the current law, 
and they also provide justifications that state the reason for each adopted solution, 
providing clarifications and materials356 to which one may resort for the debate, 
interpretation and enforcement of the law. 
     Jean Étienne Marie Portalis (1745-1807) has left to posterity three models of 
expositions of motives. The first one is his famous Preliminary Speech of the Civil 
Code Bill. The second one is the General Exposition that he personally delivered in the 
session of the Legislative Body on the 3rd day of frumaire of year X. The third one is the 
Exposition of Motives also personally delivered by him in the Legislative Body session 
on the 28th day of ventose of year XII, upon presenting the bill for which the civil laws 
were reunited in a single body entitled “Civil Code of the French,”357 a piece less 
known, but still significant to be imitated. 
 
               Messages and Reports 
 
     Messages are typical of the Executive Power in the exercise of its authority to initiate 
laws.They are also persuasive speeches, separated from the prescriptive speeches that 
explain and justify them. They differ from expositions of motives because they 
accompany the complete bill (persuasive and prescriptive speeches) before the 
legislative organ and emphasize more the political aspects than the technical ones, 
trying to move recipients so that the prescriptive speech is discussed, approved, 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the purpose sought by the legislator. The 
Reports issued by Legislative  Commissions, typical of the Legislature, are also 
persuasive speeches separated from prescriptive speeches, of a political and juridical 
nature, based on which the members of the respective Commissions vote before sending 
the relevant bill to the Plenary session of each Chamber. 
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                 Notes 
 
     A persuasive speech may accompany the prescriptive one as if it were a scientific 
work, explaining the bill in notes published as footnotes, as in the Argentine Civil 
Code,358 or published all together at the end, after all sections, as in the Chilean Civil 
Code.359 
     Although they may just indicate the sources of the sections, notes of the prescriptive 
speeches are persuasive speeches which provide information and work as arguments of 
authority that justify the relevant parts of the prescriptive speeches. 
     
                Epilogues 
 
     The preambles, expositions of motives, messages and reports are persuasive 
speeches that precede prescriptive speeches. Epilogues, which are also persuasive 
speeches, close prescriptive speeches, but they are not longer used. In ancient times  
they were included to dissuade subsequent legislators from changing the respective 
laws, thus exhorting them to maintain them, cursing them or blessing them depending 
on whether or not they satisfied such a desire, as it has been said and exemplified in 
Chapter II upon recalling the Mesopotamian codes by Lipit-Ishtar and Hammurabi. 
 
      b.  Refutation of certain frequent objections 
 
     No one would ever dare to question prescriptive speeches as a tool to which may be 
resorted to under certain circumstances, except anarchists; but persuasive speeches have 
been subjected to objections against the use of their best-known species, the preambles. 
     Two criticisms usually come up: that preambles make laws lengthier, when these 
should be briefer so that they may be memorized more easily, and that laws should 
order, not teach, since they order to be obeyed, not to be questioned.360     
     As it will be said upon discussing style, it is worth noting that brevity in itself is not 
a virtue of the laws and moreover it may also turn them obscure. 
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 RULE: Persuasive speeches shall explain, justify361 and exhort the enactment and 
application of the relevant prescriptive speeches, in such a way that the interpretation, 
the memory and the application of these be facilitated. 
 
      Some laws may even be more concise, not only brief, when preambles show their 
principles, since this would allow thelegislator to reduce the use of prolix formulae in 
prescriptive speeches, replacing them with others which are more general.362 
 
     As preambles lead prescriptive speeches, those who challenge their mandatory force 
generally explain that preambles are not part of prescriptive speeches, but that they 
precede them, as it has been said about the Preamble of the Constitution of the United 
States of America.363 Including prescriptions in the persuasive speech to oblige, 
prohibit, permit, reward or punish conducts, instead of doing so in the prescriptive 
speech, constitutes a violation of the rules of the art of legislation, since a persuasive 
speech is not appropiated for such purpose; but disregarding the persuasive speech to 
interpret the prescriptive one represents a hermeneutic error. 
 
RULE: Persuasive speeches shall not include prescriptive texts to oblige, permit, 
prohibit, permit, reward or punish conducts, but to explain and justify them. 
 
     Without denying the utility of preambles, it is recommended that certain vices be 
avoided when possible, because preambles tend to be insufficient as they describe the 
intention of the law, limiting themselves to exemplify certain passages and leaving aside 
other significant ones; or excessive, as they include restrictions of the law which do not 
require an explanation364 and prescriptions referred to in the text of the law, making it 
more obscure and less safe.365 
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RULE: Persuasive speeches shall deal with such parts of a bill as may require an 
explanation and shall not include prescriptions referred to in the text of the law, so as to 
prevent the latter from becoming more obscure and less safe, thus disrupting their 
functions. 
 
RULE: Defects should be avoided, instead of avoiding the use of persuasive speeches 
because they may bring about defects. In judging laws, not only their brevity should be 
considered, but whether that makes them better or worse, since their lengthiness can be 
good, if it fulfills a useful function.366  
      
     The storage of wisdom, this being understood as pieces of advice on life, is largely 
found in literature written with eloquence, either as prose or poetry. Laws, presently 
written in prose, are also eloquent expressions of wisdom. They deserve the greatest 
attentions367 and should not be considered orders to be obeyed, but conduct models to 
be imitated or avoided. But even when they are considered orders, having the 
legislator’s persuasive speech at hand as a resource of education, they are of an 
undeniable utility;368 this is how peoples transmit their culture generation to generation, 
since when orders are well understood they are better obeyed. 
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 RULES: The legislator’s persuasive speech shall be useful, whether prescriptive 
speeches are considered orders to be obeyed or pieces of advices (conduct models to be 
imitated or avoided), since laws that are well understood are better obeyed. 
 
     The persuasive speech of a law, once written, remains fixed and, although it is true 
that it cannot answer the questions of whoever wants to learn, as it happens in oral 
dialogues,369 it is not less true that, as a pedagogic resource, it remains always ready for 
the scrutiny of the slow-witted in understanding, who may examine it again and 
again.370 
     The assistants to medical doctors, in classical Greece, were either free men or slaves 
who, due to their regular contact with the practice of medical doctors, learnt that when 
certain symptoms appeared, specific treatments had to be applied; but they neither knew 
nor could explain the reasons why it should be like that and not otherwise. In  general, 
they were slaves who, to relieve medical doctors from the burden of their tasks, took 
over the treatment of sick slaves, to whom they prescribed medications with a speed 
typical of their ignorance and with the confidence of a tyrant who only demands 
obedience, without accepting or giving reasons. 
     Unlike their assistants, medical doctors generally treated sick free men, and talked 
with them in order to identify the causes of the illness out of their symptoms and choose 
the right medication and, only then, they would tell their patiens the reasons underlying 
their illness and persuade them to follow the advised treatment.371 
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      A legislator who discusses the interests affected by a law with its recipients turns out 
to be pleasent and nice, shows his benevolence, that he loves them well as if he were a 
parent372 or a friend373 who gives them wise and eloquent pieces of advice,374 not a 
tyrant that threatens to punish them. Those who consider that laws are orders and value 
brevity as a manifestation of power, should be told that, even though a legislator may 
apparently lose his majestic brevity, he is in fact acquiring more power over the spirit of 
his recipients,375 since his words are worth of more credit, and the prescriptive speech is 
then more easily received by them. 
     The persuasive speeches of medical doctors during the treatment of free men did not 
only inform them of their illness and medications, because they were not trying to train 
a professional in the art of medicine, but to educate patients so that they could consider, 
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 accept,376 interpret and apply the prescribed theraphy, in accordance with the purpose 
sought by the medical doctors, educating and leading their souls (psycagogy)377 to a 
healthy life. 
     If prescriptive speeches were never accompanied by persuasive speeches, they would 
be like orders given by ignorant slaves and tyrants convinced that they would all be 
obeyed, that it is enough to prescribe medications in order to heal. Legislators, who do 
not belong to a superior species and speaks to other reasonable men, being themselves 
subjected to errors, must give and accept reasons.378 
 
RULE: Persuasive speeches shall explain prescriptive speeches to their recipients, with 
teachings and justifications, as parents or as friends, who love them well and give wise 
and eloquent pieces of advice to them, nicely, not as a tyrant who threatens to impose a 
punishment on them. 
 
RULE: Persuasive speeches shall motivate recipients of prescriptive speeches to 
consider, pass, interpret and apply the conducts to be imitated and avoided, in 
accordance with the purpose sought by legislators. 
          
     Persuasive speeches are composed after prescriptive speeches, thus providing an 
excellent opportunity to control the quality of the later, modify the noticed defects and 
rebut probable criticism in advance, in the event that waiting for a debate is not 
preferable. 
 
RULE: Upon the composition of a persuasive speech, the quality of the prescriptive 
speech shall be controlled and any probable criticism shall be rebutted in advance, in the 
event that waiting for a debate is not preferable. 
 
     The juridical reason (ratio juris) is specified in custom by the requirement of the 
need in public opinion (opinio cive necessitatis), in court decisions by the exposition of 
the reasons on which such decision are grounded (ratio decidendi) and in the law, which 
is a general decision, by the reasons which justify it (ratio legis). 
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      Persuasive speeches serves as barriers379 that may limit the power of legislators. If 
they are prudent, they will refrain from using the prescriptive speech spontaneously, 
because of the absence of acceptable reasons that justify it and, in case they achieve 
acceptance, it may be possible to judge whether the means chosen are proportional to 
the purposes sought, to which end there are usually institutional remedies, like a veto by 
the Executive Power, or a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Judiciary due to lack 
of reasonableness. 
      
RULE: Persuasive speeches shall act as barriers for legislators, whenever they prudently 
set limits to themselves, or when those speeches allow judging whether the means 
chosen are proportional to the purposes sought (reasonableness), to which end there are 
usually institutional remedies, like a veto by the Executive Power, or a declaration of 
unconstitutionally by the Judiciary. 
 
      c.   Need for persuasive speeches 
 
     There are those who hold that laws must always be provided with their 
corresponding persuasive speech, as a sort of complete treatise, a reasoned comment 
that should accompany them all.380 
     Persuasive speeches may be composed for any prescriptive speech, but there are not 
always necessary.381 To determine when they are necessary, the level of defensibility of 
bills should be taken into consideration, which allows for their classification as easy, 
difficult and doubtful. They are not necessary when they are: easily defensible, as in 
honest prescriptive speeches, which coincide with the feelings of public opinion; clear-
cut, which do not need major efforts to understand the meaning of the problems to be 
resolved and the proposed solutions; and humble, of little importance, except when it is 
                                                 
379
 Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, "Legislator of the World": Writings on 
Codification, Law and Education, Edited by Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris, Clarendon Press, Letter 
V, III. Of Justifiedness, as applied to a Body of Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 142. 
Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de 
L'Abbé De Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, pp. 280-281. 
380
 Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de 
l'Abbé de Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, pp. 280-281. 
Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Et. Dumont,  Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, 
Hauman et Ce., Tome Premier Promulgation des Lois, Promulgation des Raisons des Lois; Tome 
Troisième, De la Codification, Section IV, Rationnel de la Loi, ou Commentaire Justificatif, Bruxelles, 
1840, p. 249 y p. 96. 
Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, "Legislator of The World": Writings on 
Codification, Law and Education, Edited by Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris, Clarendon Press, Letter 
V, III. Of Justifiedness, as applied to a Body of Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 144. 
381
 Plato, The Laws, IV, 723. 
Plato, The Laws, IV, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 186.Platón, Las Leyes, IV, 
Platón, 723d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel 
Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, 
Tomo I, p. 157. 
Platón, Leyes, IV, 723d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII 
Leyes, (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 390. 
Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec La 
Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 723d, 
Paris, 1942, p. 775. 
Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, XII 723d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori 
Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. 
 necessary to defeat the inertia so that they may be discussed and approved. They are 
necessary when their defensibility is difficult, either because the proposed solutions 
differ from the ones supported by public opinion, as in the case of awkward and obscure 
matters, or because they are important.382 They are also necessary when easy and 
difficult parts are combined, making them of a doubtful defensibility, since the resulting 
strength or weakness cannot be established. Therefore, in a persuasive speech rebuttals 
shall anticipate any probable criticism to the prescriptive speech, to leave the 
prospective opponents of the bill without arguments in the debate stage. Finally, they 
are also necessary in those prescriptive speeches for the interpretation and application of 
which it is generally not foreseen that lawyers be consulted, since all trust their own 
judgment, for which they need the most complete explanation possible.383 
 
RULES: Persuasive speeches shall be composed, whenever the prescriptive speech has: 
a) little importance, so that it may be debated and enacted;  
b) a difficult defensibility, as in awkward matters, so that it may decrease; as in obscure 
matters, so that they may be cleared up; as in important matters, to show the pertinent 
care; 
c) a doubtful defensibility, to leave the opponents in the debate without arguments; 
d) a direct interpretation by the interested parties, without consulting with their lawyers, 
since they will need the most complete explanation possible. 
 
     A speech is the result of a rhetorical process which comprises five stages: 
investigation, systematization, style, action and memory.384 Investigation (inventio) 
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 consists in finding the things to say; systematization (dispositio), in placing the things to 
say in order; style (elocutio), in to dressing the things to say with words; action (actio), 
in selecting the voice and the gestures with which the speech will be pronounced; and 
memory (mnemé) in retaining the things to say in the spirit, placed in order, with the 
words that express them and the voice and the gestures that are to be used upon 
delivering the speech. Written speeches comprise only three stages: investigation, 
systematization and style.385 Whether three stages are considered, as in the written 
speech (investigation, systematization and style), or the five stages, as in the oral speech 
(investigation, systematization, style, action and memory), it is all about successive 
operations inside a process, an iter, a way that is followed to obtain the good speech 
promised by rhetoric as the art of good saying (ars bene dicendi)386 and, in the present 
work, the good law promissed by the art of good legislation (ars bene legislandi).  
      Since contemporary laws are, in general, written speeches, Chapter V will discuss 
Investigation; Chapter VI, Systematization; and ChapterVII, Style 
                                                                                                                                               
[Cicero], Rethorica ad Herennium, I, II 
[Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English translation by Harry Caplan, I.ii.3, The Loeb Classical 
Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 
1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, London, England, p. 6 (latin), 7 (english).  
[Cicerón], Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Bosch, Casa 
Editorial S.A., Libro Primero, II, Barcelona, pp. 64-65. 
Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, I.3. 
Cicéron Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Les 
Belles Lettres, I.3, Paris, 1960, p. 3. 
Cicero, De Inventione, I, 9. 
Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione). Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri 
Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, 9, Paris, pp. 12-15. 
Cicero, De Oratore, I, XXXI, 42. 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre Premier, XXXI, 142, Société 
d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, Première Edition 1922, Sixième Tirage, 1967, p. 141. 
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, III, 3.1-3. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four 
Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, 
Volume I, Book III, iii, 1-3,  London, 1921, pp. 382-385. 
Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles 
Lettres", Tome II, Livre III, 3.1-3, Paris, 1977, p. 147. 
385
 Gustave Lanson, Conseils sur l'Art d'Écrire, Treizième Édition, Librairie Hachette, Première Partie. 
Préparation générale, pp. 1-40; Deuxième Partie, Invention, pp. 41-107; Troisième Part, Disposition, pp. 
106-164; Quatrième Part, Élocution, Paris, 1926, pp. 165-248. 
Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique. Aide Memoir, dans Communications, École Pratique de Hautes 
Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223, B.0.5, p. 197. 
386
 Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique. Aide Memoir, Communications, École Pratique de Hautes 
Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223, B.0.5, pp. 
197-198. 
    
  
Chapter V 
Investigation 
 
     The first stage in the drafting of a bill, like in the case of any other speech, consists 
in determining what to say. In the rhetorical tradition this is called heuresis (Greek) or 
inventio (Latin), which has preferably been translated into "investigation",387 because it 
is referred to a way towards the arguments (via argumentorum),388 in order to recover 
them from the place where they are, more than to create them.389 The author of the 
present work uphold that the investigation stage includes all the relevant things to say in 
prescriptive or persuasive speechees, unlike those who limit such stage to the 
arguments. But, before beginning the development of the investigation stage, it turns out 
suitable to deal with two previous matters: instructions and knowledge. 
 
1.  Previous instructions 
 
RULE: Rulers shall establish the politics, which shall consist in the determination not 
only of the targets to be hit in the social system but also in the legislative changes to be 
introduced in the juridical system,390 giving previous instructions to their advisers about 
both aspects. 
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RULE: Previous instructions shall be given in writing, with sufficient reasons to sustain 
the fostered politics, in the form of conclusions deriving from a report that will 
contemplate, at least, the following points: 
a) the accredited controversial facts, in accordance with the submitted proofs; 
b) the opinions about the sectors involved, in accordance with the proof of the 
declarations made by them; 
c) other opinions that have been or could be adopted.391 
 
     Should the rulers fail to establish the legislative politics, this shall be decided by 
theirs advisers, who will have worked in vain if the rulers, founded on political reasons, 
reject such bills as may have been submitted to them. 
 
RULE: In the absence of instructions from the rulers, the advisers shall try to request 
them from the rulers, assisting them with diplomacy. The instructions may be 
completed by oral hearings and by the reading of other documents, if necessary. 
 
     The instructions must not be substituted for an already drafted bill, which may lead 
to misinterpretations about the purpose sought, except when such purpose is expressly 
established in the corresponding persuasive speech, in which case it will play the role of 
the instructions. In spite of a good interpretation of the purpose sought, it is usually 
expected that the bill will be reviewed and returned on the same day or the following 
one, which is often the last one of the useful term. The creative imagination of the 
advisers is also restricted, inciting them to a mere review. Had the bill circulated, it will 
generate resistance from those who participated before and must review it again, since 
they will not admit any attempt of altering its fundamental structure, hoping to find 
something similar to what they had already considered.392 
 
RULE: The written instructions to legislate shall not be substitued for an already drafted  
bill. 
 
2.  Previous knowledge 
 
     After studying the instructions received and before the drafting of the prescriptive 
and persuasive speeches, certain previous knowledge (noesis; intellectio)393 is required 
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 in connection with the state of the cause, the defensibility of the initiative and the 
determination of the legislative genre and its species. 
 
     a.  The state of the cause394 
 
     Those who take the initiative to legislate know that they will face a struggle with the 
opposition or with the government party, an agonistic situation that determines the 
fundamental position that they must adopt in terms of the performance expected from 
the opponent, who can question it, mainly taking into consideration the topics 
developed in point 5 of this Chapter. 
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Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1966, T. I, números 224-238, pp. 203-212. 
Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by 
Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, 
Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, numbers 224-238, pp. 97-102. 
Cicero, Rethorica ad Herennium, Book I, xi-xv. 
Cicerón, Retórica a Herenio, Libro I, XI-XV, Traducción Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, 
Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 84-97. 
Cicéron, Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre I, 18-25, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Ciceron, Texte Revue et 
traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères,  Paris, pp. 20-33. 
Cicero, De Inventione, Book I, 10-16. 
Cicerón, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín 
por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica, Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 1-103, Madrid, 1879, Libro 
Primero, pp. 6-9. 
Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Livre I, 10-16, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes 
par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 14-25. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, vi. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, vi, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler 
in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New 
York, Volume I, London, 1921, pp. 406-463. 
Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre III, VI, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Edition 
"Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Paris, 1977, pp. 160-188. 
Hermogenes, Staseis. 
Hermogène, Les États de Cause (Staseis), dans L'Art Rhétorique, Première Traduction Française 
Intégrale, Introduction et Notes par Michel Patillon, Préface de Pierre Laurens, L'Age d'Home, Paris, 
1997, pp. 153-208. 
      b.  Defensibility395 
 
     An initiative may be of an easy, difficult or doubtful defensibility. 
 
                Easy defensibility 
 
RULE: Defensibility shall be easy in the case of honest, clear and humble initiatives. 
Such inititiatives will be: 
a) honest, if they coincide with the feelings of public opinion; 
b) clear, if no major efforts are required to understand their respective meaning; 
c) humble, if they solve problems of minor importance. 
 
                Difficult defensibility 
 
RULE: Defensibility shall be difficult in the case of awkward, dark or important 
initiatives, that is to say, in the case of initiatives opposite to those of easy defensibility. 
 
                Doubtful defensibility 
 
RULE: Defensibility shall be doubtful when the initiatives combine easy and difficult 
elements, without the resulting strength or weakness being established. 
 
                                                 
395On Genera causarum in the the rhetorical tradition, see: 
Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del original alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1966, T. I, número 64, pp. 109-110. 
Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by 
Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, 
Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, number 64, pp. 34-38. 
Cicero, Rethorica ad Herennium, LIbro I, III. 
Cicerón, Retórica a Herenio, Libro I, III, Traducción Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, 
Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch,  Barcelona, 1991, pp. 66-69. 
Cicerón, Retórica a C. Herennio, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por 
Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 105-210, Madrid, 1879, Libro 
Primero, p. 109. 
Cicéron, Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre I, III, 5, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et 
traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères,  pp. 6-7. 
Cicero, De Inventione, Book I, III, 5. 
Cicerón, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín 
por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 1-103, Madrid, 1879, Libro 
I, p. 12. 
Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Livre I, 20, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par 
Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères,  Paris, pp. 30-31. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IV, i, 40. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IV, i, 40, with an English Translation by H.E. 
Butler in Four Volumes, Volume II, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. 
Putnam Sons, New York, 1921, pp. 26-27. 
Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Livre IV, 1, 40, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition 
"Les Belles Lettres", Tome III, Paris, 1976, p. 28. 
 
 RULE: If the defensibility of the initiative is: 
a) easy, the answers to the foreseeable objections shall be reserved up to the discussion 
of the bill, to favor victory in the debate; 
b) difficult, a prescriptive speech without these objections shall have to be prepared with 
the view to avoid the expected criticism; 
c) doubtful, the answers shall be anticipated in the persuasive speech, so as to deprive 
the opposition of suitable arguments. 
 
      c.  Determination of the legislative genre and its species 
 
RULE: After having evaluated the defensibility of the initiative, the legislative genre 
and the species of the bill to be prepared shall be determinated, in order to entrust the 
investigation tasks and to fix the term in which the corresponding report shall have to be 
submitted. 
 
     In the case of either a persuasive or prescriptive speech, in the task of finding the 
things to say (investigation), the legislators and their advisers may not relay only on 
their respective memory and imagination or fantasy,396 in matters of such a vast scope 
as legislative issues are. The above mentioned natural skills are perfected, facilitating 
their opportune exercise when they are promoted by the art of legislation, since 
legislators and advisers are used to perform certain intellectual operations as a means to 
obtain abundant things to say in each case (instruments)397 and previously keep on file 
such things to say as are convenient to have available for repeated use (promptuary).398 
                                                 
396Memory and imagination or fantasy are necessary for orators and jurists alike. 
Giambattista Vico, Il Metodo degli Studi del Nostro Tempo, 1708, da Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di 
Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, III, 
p. 796. 
397Aristotle, Tópics, I, 13-18. 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 13-18, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation Edited 
by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, 
Second Printing, 1985, pp. 175-181. 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 13-18, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, 
Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 109-121. 
Eug. Thionville, De la Théorie des Lieux Communs Dans les Topiques d'Aristote, et des Principales 
Modifications qu'elle a subies jusqua nos Jours, Thése présentée a la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, 
Réimpresion de l'Édition de 1855, Osnasbrück, Otto Zeller, 1965, pp. 47-54. 
Aristote, Topiques, I, 13-18, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les 
Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 18-33. 
W.A. de Pater, La fonction du lieu et de l'instrument dans les Topiques, in Aristotle on Dialectic, 
Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Edited by G.E.L. Owen, Oxford at The Clarendon 
Press, 1968, pp. 164-188. 
Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Montréal, Bellarmin, 
Montréal, 1991, pp. 321-322. 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 13-18, in Aristotle Topics Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary by Robin 
Smith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 11-19. 
Paul Slomkowski, Aristotle's Topics, Brill, Leiden, New York, KÖln, 1997, pp. 54-58. 
Stéphanie Grégoire, The Dialectic Tools: Theory and Practice, Thèse Présentée à la Faculté des Études 
Supérieures de l'Université Laval pour la obtention du grade de Philosopiae Doctor (PH.D), Faculté de 
Philosophie Université Laval, Novembre 1999, Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada 0-612-47571-9, 350 
pp. 
The author of this book extends the application of the Instruments to the securing of the abundant and 
available things to say, for their opportune use, wheter or not they work as premises or conclusions. 
       
3.  Instruments 
 
     As well as there are procedures to obtain abundant words to say (copia verborum),399 
there are instruments to obtain abundant things to say in connection with each bill 
(copia rerum), which perfect the exercise of the natural imagination and memory as 
well as the use of the artificial resources included in the promptuary. 
 
RULE: To obtain abundant things to say in connection with each bill, one shall resort to 
the following four intellectual operations (instruments):400 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristotle applies the instruments only to the acceptable things to say (endoxas) that work as premises 
(arguments). 
398Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Fifth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol.I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, pp. 422-423.Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication & Rhetoric, the University of 
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hil, 1943, p. 56. 
The author of this book extends the conception of Bacon’s Promptuary, incorporating the Topics to it. On 
the other hand, Bacon supports that the provision of arguments for the speeches is obtained in two 
different ways: with the Promptuary (the arguments are composed in advance and remain to be used) and 
with the Topics (the places where the things must be looked for are marked, as if they were indexed): 
Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Fifth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis 
Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, 
Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 
422. 
399Erasmo in his treatise De Duplici Copia Rerum et Verborum, or De Utraque Verborum ac Rerum 
Copia (1511), usually quoted as "On Copia" ("On Abundance"), lists 150 ways of saying "I liked your 
letter very much" in Latin and 200 ways of saying, also in Latin, "I will remember you as long as I live", 
according to George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient 
to Modern Times, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980, p. 206. 
400The instruments in Aristotle's Topics are applied to reasonings, deductive arguments, deductions, or to 
syllogisms and inductions, according to the different translations of Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, 105a20. 
To reasonings: 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 13, 105a20, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, 
Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 109, 
Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Montréal, Bellarmin, 
Montréal, 1991, p. 329. 
To deductions: 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, 105a20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation.Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 175, 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, 105a20, Aristotle Topics Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary by 
Robin Smith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 11. 
To deductive arguments: 
Aristote, Topiques, I, 13, 105a20, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les 
Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 19, 
To syllogisms: 
Aristotele, Topici, I, 13, 105a20, da Aristotele, Organon, a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Edizioni, 
Milano, 2003, pp. 422-423. 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, dans Stéphanie Grégoire, The Dialectic Tools: Theory and Practice, Thèse 
Présentée à la Faculté des Études Supérieures de l'Université Laval pour la obtention du grade de 
Philosopiae Doctor (PH.D), Faculté de Philosophie Université Laval, Novembre 1999, Bibliothèque 
Nationale du Canada 0-612-47571-9, p. 118, 
To syllogisms and inductions: 
 a) to obtain acceptable and relevant things to say in connection with each bill, whether 
they are included in the promptuary or not; 
b) to distinguish how many ways there are to say each thing; 
c) to find the differences; 
d) to examine the resemblances. 
 
RULE: The acceptable and relevant things to say in connection with each bill shall be 
ordained401 in accordance with the following divisions:   
a) ethical402 (includig political), physical and logical issues;403 
b) in increasing universality grades, being that the species are included in the genres;404 
c) in decreasing authority grades: in terms of the coincidence with the opinion accepted 
by all or the majority, by all the wise persons or the majority or the most reputed ones; 
of the similarity or contradiction with the opposite ones; and of agreement with 
recognized techniques.405 
 
4.   Promptuary of the things to sayRULE: To deal with the vast scope of legislative 
matters and to be able to find the acceptable things to say in a rapid manner, a file shall 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristote, Topiques, I, 13, dans Eug. Thionville, De la Théorie des Lieux Communs Dans les Topiques 
d'Aristote, et des Principales Modifications qu'elle a subies jusqua nos Jours, Thése présentée a la Faculté 
des Lettres de Paris, Réimpresion de l'Édition de 1855, Osnasbrück, Otto Zeller, 1965, pp. 48. 
In this book the instruments are applied to the whole Promptuary and to all things to say, whatever their 
origin may be (memory, imagination, books, magazines, Internet, etc.). 
401Ivan Pelletier, Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Montréal, 1991, 
Bellarmin, Montréal, 1991, pp. 368-369.   
402Aristotle, On Rhetoric, A Theory of Civic Discourse, Newly Translated with Introduction, Notes, And 
Appendixes by George A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, p. 51. 
403Aristotle, Topics, I, 14, 105b20-25. 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 14, 105b20-25, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre 
las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 110. 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 14, 105b20-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One; Princeton University Press, Princeton, Princeton, 
New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 175-176. 
Aristote, Topiques, I, 14, 105b20-25, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition 
"Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 20-21. 
404Aristotle, Topics, I, 9; 14, 105b32-33. 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 9 y 14, 105b32-33, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One,; Princeton University Press, Princeton, Princeton, 
New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 172-173; p. 176. 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 9; 14, 105b34-36, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre 
las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 103-104; p. 110. 
405Aristotle, Topics, 1, 14, 105a35-105b. 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One,; Princeton University Press, Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 175-176. 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 14, 105a 35-105b, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre 
Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones Y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid , 1982 , pp. 109-110. 
Aristotle, Topics, I, 14, 105a35-105b5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Aristote, Topiques, I, 14, 105a35-105b5, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, 
Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 19-21. 
 be prepared in advance and kept available for immediate use when needed 
(promptuary).406 
 
RULE: They promptuary shall be composed of: 
a) the most common acceptable things to say, free from any particular circumstances407 
(forms); 
b) the arguments for and against relevant issues (dissoi lógoi or double reasons); 
c) the most favorable colors to promote the acceptance of the things to say (colors of 
good and evil); 
d) an ordained set of things acceptable to say (topics); 
e) an ordained set of things acceptable to say only in appearance (sophisms). 
 
     a.  Forms 
 
     In ancient Greece, before the emergence of rhetorical rules, oratory was learned by 
way of examples, imitating the speeches of the great orators. The teaching of the first 
sophists consisted in making their disciples learn by heart speeches that they could use 
to compose or criticize other speeches, changing the particular circumstances mentioned 
in them. In the Middle Ages, forms appeared firstly, followed by the manuals on ars 
dictaminis.408 
     Prologues and epilogues are those parts of persuasive speeches that turn out most 
suitable to form collections of examples to be used when the favorable occasion arises. 
Fifty six Demosthenes’ prologues have come up to us.409 Cicero, perhaps, also had a 
collection of prologues, as it might be inferred from the apologies asked from his good 
friend Atticus for having sent to him his work On Glory with the same prologue that 
had appeared in the third book of the Academics, anticipating him that he had already 
sent a new one to him.410 
     In his "Promptuary". Bacon included digressions, transitions, intimations about that 
which will next happen, excusations and other similar "interstices of the speech", which 
he denominated “Lesser Forms”, whose description finished with the four following 
 
                                                 
406Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Fifth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, pp. 422-423; the Sixth Book, Chap. III, pp. 455-493. 
407Cicerón, De Oratore, II, XXX, 130. 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Livre Deuxième, XXX-130, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société 
d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, pp. 58-59. 
408With regard to ars dictaminis, see: 
A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Édition, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1925, p. 482. 
409Demosthenes, Exordia. 
Demosthenes, Exordia, in The Orations of Demosthenes, Translated by Charkles Rann Kennedy, Bohn's 
Classical Library, George Bell, Sons, Vol. V, London, pp. 302-337. 
Demosthenes, Exordia, Translated by Norman W. de Witt and Norman J, de Witt, The Loeb Classical 
Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, William Heinemann Ltd., London, Vol 
VII, pp. 86-193. 
Demóstenes, Proemios de Discursos Políticos, en Discursos Políticos III, Introducción Traducción y 
Notas de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos Madrid, 1985, pp. 340-407. 
410Cicero, Letter to Atticus, XVI, 6. 
Cicero, Letter to Atticus, XVI, 6, in Cicero, Letters to Atticus III, with an English Translation, by E. O. 
Winstedt, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd, London, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961, pp. 393.  
 EXAMPLES: 
 
            "A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE [SPEECH] 
 
  So may we redeem the fault passed and at the same time prevent the inconveniences to 
              come."411 
 
            "COROLLARY OF AN ACCURATE DISTRIBUTION 
 
 That all may know that I have no wish either to evade anything by silence or to obscure  
             it by speech1. 
               1. Cic. Pro Cluent. c. i. 
 
              A TRANSITION WITH HINT 
 
 Let us pass these things, and yet no without marking and turning back to look at them as 
             we go by.1 
              1. Cic. Pro. Sext. C. 5. 
 
       A FORM TO PREOCCUPY THE MIND AGAINST AN OPINION PREVIOUSLY 
FORMED 
 
 I will make you understand in all this business how much is truth, how much error, and  
             how much envy.2 
              2. Cic. Pro Cluent. C. 4."412    
 
     From times immemorial, the chancelleries have relied on forms for the writing of 
their documents; like for example the ones that existed in the Middle Age, before and 
after the appearance of the manuals on ars dictaminis.413 In the art of legislation of the 
modern times, the respective forms of Ilbert, Russell, Driedger and Crabbe may be 
remembered.414 
     The official rules of legislative drafting, both North American and European, are 
usually accompanied by examples to be imitateed and forms to be filled in.415 
                                                 
411Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, p. 492. 
412Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, pp. 492-493. 
413A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Édition, LIbrairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1925, pp. 479-492, 
on the forms and manuals; pp. 661-820, on the chancelleries. 
414Sir Courtney Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms, Oxford at The Clarendon Press, 1901. 
Sir Alison Russell, Legislative Drafting and Forms, Butterworth & Co.(Publishers) Ltd., Fourth Edition, 
London, 1938. 
Elmer A. Driedger, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Ottawa, 1963, later attached to a previous work in 
The Composition of Legislation, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Second Edition, Published by The 
Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976. 
V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993. 
V.C.R.A.C.  Crabbe, Legislative Precedents, Volume II, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1998. 
415For Canada, from 1949, see: 
  
RULE: The forms, a section that integrates the promptuary, shall include such 
persuasive and prescriptive speeches, or parts thereof, as are likely to be used as they 
are or with certain particular circumstances being specified. 
 
       The preparation of the forms, as classical tradition requires, is a personal task 
performed by legislators and advisers or an institutional task entrusted to specialized 
organs. 
 
RULE: The forms shall include a selection of successful persuasive and prescriptive 
speeches, as well as others that might also achieve success. 
 
     After the print appeared, notebooks were replaced by dictionaries of quotations, 
perhaps in the future the personal and institutional forms will be replaced by national, 
regional and international forms, but nothing will prevent legislators and their advisers 
from treasuring and composing persuasive and prescriptive speeches, to use them when 
the favorable occasion arises. 
 
     b. Double reasons (dissoi logoi) 
      
     Double reasons, antithesis of things, contradictions, arguments for and against 
certain important topics, were already known in ancient Greece (dissoi logoi), among 
them, the famous ones by sophist Protagoras of Abdera (c 490-420 B.C.).416 To have an 
idea of the topics argued about, one should remember the antithesis by an anonymous 
author, traditionally placed after the works of Sextus  Empiricus (c ends of the II 
century), concerning good and evil, the beautiful and the awkward, the just and the 
unjust, the true and the false, whether wisdom and virtue are likely to be taught, whether 
magistratures should be elected by drawing lots, and whether the practise and teaching 
of an art may be merged in the same person, including in the development of the latter 
topic an incomplete praise of the advantages of memory.417 
                                                                                                                                               
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada-An Outline and Rules of Drafting, Published by The Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 1949, 41 pp., and the successive Annual Meeting 
Proceedings. 
For The United States of America, see the style manuals of the different States, among which the 
following one stands out: 
Minnesota Revisor's Manual, With Styles and Forms, by The Office of The Revisor of Statutes, St. Paul, 
Minessota, 2002. 
At Federal level, see: 
A Guide for Drafting Federal Legislation, Department of Air Force, Judge Advocate General, AFP 110-1-
1, 12December, 1951, 9 pp. 
Style Manual for Drafting Regulations in The Department of Transportation, Department of 
Transportation, Office of The General Counsel, 17 pp. 
Preparation of Papers Related to Legislation (Other than Appropiation Bills) Executive Orders, and 
Proclamations, Headquarters, Department of The Army, Memorandum No. 340-6, Washington DC, 21 
november 1972, 44 pp., especially the Appendixes, pp. 28-44. 
For Europe, see: 
Rodolfo Pagano, Introduzione alla Legistica, L'Arte di Preparare Leggi, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Appendice n. 2, 
Elenco di Testi Ufficiale di Direttive di Legistica ed Altri Testi Attinenti alla Produzione Legislativa, 
Milano, 1999, pp. 303-310.  
416Mario Untersteiner, I Sofisti, Giulio Einaudi, Torino, 1949, pp. 17-54. 
417Sofisti, Testimonianze e Frammenti, Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento a Cura di Mario 
Untersteiner, Fascicolo Terzo, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1a. edizione 1954, 1a. ristampa, 1967, 
pp. 150-191.  
      As an example of an orator held contradictory positions in successive speeches 
reference is often made to skeptic Carneades of Cyrene (214/213-129 B.C.) who, 
together with other two Greek philosophers, peripatetic Critolaus and stoic Diogenes, 
integrated the embassy  to Rome in 155 B.C., to defend the interests of Athens before 
the Senate. The three of them took advantage of their stay in Rome to give lessons or 
deliver lectures in the city, which impressed the youth. Carneades, in two successive 
and contradictory speeches, argued for the justice one day and agains it on the next, 
following the custom among Academicians, with like eloquence, not based on 
philosophical conviction, but as an intellectual exercise, to support arguments for and 
against an important topic. Nevertheless, the scandal was so great among the Romans, 
that Cato the censor demanded and obtained the rapid departure of the Athenian 
delegation, to protect the youth from the bad influence of the aforesaid philosophers.418 
     In the Middle Ages, there were four fundamental methods applicable to disputes419 
for and against a thesis: common, Socratic, megarian and syllogistic. When the common 
method was used, the orators expressed their respective contradictory speeches with 
great freedom. With the Socratic method practised in the platonic Academy and also in 
the educational institutions of the Middle Ages, given a question that admitted only two 
contradictory answers, one of the parties took over one of two admissible answers and 
tried to answer the questions of the other one, without incurring contradictions with the 
answer given at the beginning; and the party who asked the questions did so to obtain an 
answer contradicting the initial one. According to the megarian method, each party tried 
to show that the assertions of the other implied a contradiction. In the employment of 
the syllogistic or scholastic method, of medieval origin, this way of arguing for and 
against was strictly followed.420  
     While forms included complete speeches or parts of them, which may be used as 
they are or specifying the particular circumstances involved, in the case of double 
reasons there is a higher abstraction level, because the arguments are synthesized for 
and against important and recurrent topics in concise and sharp sentences, so that they 
may be easily memorized. The existence of opposite or contradictory speeches is not 
required, as long as they serve to sustain each of both positions, to amplify them in a 
concrete confirmatory or refutatory speech and, in the latter case, so that the author may 
be warned and prepared for an opportune reply.421  
 
                                                 
418George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.-A.D. 300, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972, pp. 53-54. 
419For the distinctions between the common, Socratic methods and silogístico, see: 
Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Bellarmin, Montréal, 
1991, p. 104, n. 16. 
For the distinction Socratic between the methods Socratic, megarian and syllogistic, see: 
Ignacio Angelelli, The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic, The Journal of Philosophy, 57 
(1970), p. 802, n.7. 
420Martín Grabmann, Filosofía Medieval, traducción de Salvador Minguijón, Editorial Labor, Barcelona, 
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421Aristotle, Topics, VIII, 14, 163b1-16. 
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First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 276. 
Robin Smith, Aristotle Topics, Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary, Clarendon Preess, 
Oxford, 1997, pp. 38-39. 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, VIII, 14, 163b1-16, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre 
las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial 
Gredos,  Madrid, 1982, pp. 302-303.  
 RULE: In double reasons, a section that integrates the forms, arguments shall be 
synthesized for and against important and recurrent topics in concise and sharp 
sentences, so as to facilitate their opportune memorization and amplification. 
 
     Bacon collected forty seven antitheses, under the following titles: 
 
 I. NOBILITY, II. BEAUTY, III. YOUTH, IV. HEALTH, V. WIFE AND CHILDREN, VI 
RICHES, VII. HONOURS, VIII. EMPIRE, IX. PRAISE, REFUTATION, X. NATURE, XI. 
FORTUNE, XII. LIFE, XIII. SUPERSTITION, XIV. PRIDE, XV. INGRATITUDE, XVI. ENVY, 
XVII. UNCHASTITY, XVIII. CRUELTY, XIX. VAIN-GLORY, XX. JUSTICE, XXI. 
FORTITUDE, XXII. TEMPERANCE, XXIII. CONSTANCY, XXIV. MAGNANIMITY, XXV. 
KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION, XXVI. LEARNING, XXVII. PROMPTITUDE, XXVIII. 
SILENCE IN MATTERS OF SECRECY, XXIX. FACILITY, XXX. POPULARITY, XXXI. 
LOQUACITY, XXXII. DISSIMULATION, XXXIII. BOLDNESS, XXXIV. CEREMONIES, 
PUNTOS, AFFECTATION, XXXV. JESTS, XXXVI. LOVE, XXXVII. FRIENDSHIP,  
XXXVIII. FLATTERY, XXXIX. REVENGE, XL. INNOVATION, XLI. DELAY, XLII. 
PREPARATION, XLIII. MEETING THE FIRST MOVE, XLIV, VIOLENT COUNSELS, XLV. 
SUSPICION, XLVI. THE WORDS OF THE LAW, XLVII. FOR WITNESS AGAINST 
ARGUMENTS.422  
 
     Only three antitheses will be transcribed, as examples representating the collection: 
 
EXAMPLES 
 
                                                             "XXI. FORTITUDE. 
 
                                 For.                                                   Against. 
                                  
                                       Nothing is to be feared                    A noble virtue, to be willing 
                      except fear itself.                             to die yourself in order to kill another! 
                                    There is nothing either solid               A noble virtue, which a man may 
                                in pleasure,or secure in virtue,          acquire by getting drunk!          
                                   where fear intrudes. 
                                         He that looks steadily at                           He that is prodigal of his 
                    dangers that he may meet                  own life is dangerous to other 
                    them sees also how he may               men's. 
                    avoid them. 
      Other virtues free us from                 Fortitude is the virtue of 
                                the domination of vice,                      the iron age. 
                    fortitude only from the 
                                domination of fortune."423 
 
     As a curiosity and a sample of its contemporary employment, it is necessary to 
remember that President Franklin Delano Roosvelt (1882-1945), in its First Inaugural 
Speech, said: 
 
                                                 
422Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, pp. 473-493. 
423Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I,  New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, p. 481. 
           "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." 
 
     Similar statements, in addition to those of Bacon and Roosvelt, are found in the 
Bible and in Montaigne, Wellington and Thoreau.424 
 
                                                    "XXVII PROMPTITUDE. 
 
                                    For.                                             Against. 
 
                     Wisdom that comes not                The wisdom that is ready at 
                    quick comes out of season.          hand does not lie deep. 
                      He that quickly errs quickly        Wisdom is like garment, 
                  amends his error.                          it must be light if it be for speed. 
                      He that is wise in                         He whose counsels are not 
                  deliberation and not upon            ripened by deliberation, his 
                  the moment does no great            wisdom will not ripen with age. 
                  matters 
                                                                           Things speedily devised speedily 
                                                                                   fall out of favour."425 
 
                                                             ""XLI. DELAY 
                                                For.                                                      Against. 
 
                                   Fortune sells many things                  Opportunity offers the handle 
  to him that is in a hurry,                      of the bottle first, and  
                              which she gives to him that waits       afterwards the belly. 
                                    While we hasten to take                      Opportunity is like the 
  hold of the beginnings of                     Sibyl; she raises the price as 
                              things, we grasp shadows.                   she diminishes the offer. 
                       While things are wavering,                 Speed is Pluto's 426 helmet. 
                 watch; when they have taken                    Things that are done 
                 their direction, act.                               betimes are done with judgement; 
                       Commit the beginnings of              things that are put off too late, 
                                    Actions to Argus, 427  the end        by circuit.1 
                              to Briareus. 428 
1. Per ambitum: meaning, I suppose (if the reading is correct) that first you can choose the best way, but 
 at last you must take the way that offers.- J. S."429 
                                                 
424
 John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, Fourteen Edition, Revised and Enlarged, Emily Morison Beck, 
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Taylor and Walton, London, 1844, Vol. I., p. 282. 
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Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Edited by William Smith, Published by 
Taylor and Walton, London, 1844, Vol. I., p. 24. 
429Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
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       c. The colors of good and evil 
 
     In addition to having the sections corresponding to forms and double reasons 
available, it is necessary to consider the cases in which reason alone is insufficient to 
move the will of the recipients of prescriptive and persuasive speeches, to which end the 
colors of good and evil must be resorted to. 
 
RULE: When reason alone turns out insufficient to move the will of the recipients of the 
prescriptive and persuasive speeches, one shall appeal to imagination and to the basic 
political emotions (hope and fear), resorting to the colors of good (usefulness) and evil 
(uselessness or harmfulness) and, should this be impossible, comparatively maximizing 
the good (hope) and minimizing the evil (fear) or vice versa. 
 
     The will of the recipients of persuasive and prescriptive speeches usually succumbs 
to the force of emotion, because emotion shows the good and the evil as real and 
immediate. Since reason shows the good and the evil as underlying, deep and mediate, 
to gain the above mentioned wills, it is necessary to appeal to imagination and to 
introduce the reasonable goods and evil as currently present in the minds of the 
recipients,430 with more liveliness and strenght. 
 
EXAMPLE: "Yours enemies will be glad with this", instead of: "this will be bad for you."431 
    
RULE: Persuasive and prescriptive speeches shall be introduced by resorting to the 
colors of good (usefulness) and evil (uselessness or harmfulness), applying reason to 
imagination, so that the latter will show problems and solutions as currently present in 
the minds of the recipients, to move their wills in the desired direction. 
 
        d. Topics 
 
     The topics method, a section made a part of the promptuary, facilitates the finding of 
things to say in persuasive and prescriptive speeches on any legislative matter. 
Likewise, it facilitates the avoidance of confrontations, to which end it takes as a 
starting point the opinions acceptable for all or for the majority, for all or the majority of 
the wise persons or for the most reputed ones, provided always that they are not 
paradoxical or contrary to the opinion of the majority. This method also takes as a 
starting point the opinions similar to the acceptable ones, those that contradict the 
opinions contrary to the above and those that are consistent with recognized techniques. 
Such starting opinions, on which men agree, become acceptable just by making 
reference to them or by enunciating them, without the need to justify them (endoxa)432 
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Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 458. 
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 and, when used as principles, they allow for systematization of the prescriptive speech 
and for motivation of the persuasive speech. Topics will be developed in point 5 of this 
Chapter. 
 
        e. Sophisms 
 
     If the acceptable, normal things to say, found or not with topics, painted or not with 
the colors of good and evil, were acceptable only in appearance, because they endure 
certain secret pathologies (sophisms), then it shall be necessary to describe in 
systematical form how to diagnose them and to prescribe how to apply the 
corresponding therapies to cure them. Sophisms will be discussed in point 6 of this 
Chapter. 
 
5.  Topics 
 
     The use of acceptable opinions, the justification of which turned out unnecessary, 
already existed in the ancient Greece. They were used by Sócrates, who upheld that 
Homer could characterize Ulysses as a man of "sure word", because he used them 
too.433 The method was systematized by Aristotle in a special work made a part of his 
logical writings, Organon or Instrument, and applied in his Rhetoric.434 Adapted to the 
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 law and spread by Cicero,435 it culminated in ancient Latin times with a final synthesis 
by Boethius, 436 who pointed out that topics promise something great, a footpath to 
discovery, that the ignorants people believe is owed only to natural talent, without 
noticing how much is acquired through its study, of that which gives force to art and 
power to nature.437 
     Bacon, with his promptuary method, preserved the sophistic tradition of topics: to 
memorize speeches or its parts (forms), to argue for and against (antithesis of things), 
and revalued the acceptable opinions (topics), but fought those that were so in 
appearance (sophisms regarded as colors of good and evil). 
     Vico also preserved the importance of topics against the attacks of Descartes’ 
followers, but detected insufficiencies in the followers of certain ancient and modern 
schools: in those of the Academy, the platonic ones, because they identified dialectics 
with the art of invention, and in those of the Porch, the stoics, because they identified it 
with the art of judging, and none of them understood that neither can invention be true 
without judgment, nor judgment without invention.438 He advised young people to begin 
with the topics method, which prepares the materials, to judge them later with logic, as 
he himself did, following the natural course of the ideas, which are firstly learned, then 
judged and finally reasoned, preventing them from being arid and dry in their 
explanations, for not having done anything and for trying to judge everything.439 In the 
light of the overvaluation of topics by the ancient ones (the platonic) and the scorn of 
the modern ones (Descartes’ followers), Vico was salomonic in the quarrel. He 
considered that if truth is one, verisimilitudes multiple and falsities infinite, then topics 
represent a defective method, because it often assumes true things as false; and that the 
critical method of Descartes’s followers is also defective, because it rejects what is 
verisimilar.440 
     Cicero, who had already criticized the stoics for having deal with judgment only, and 
recognized Aristotle as the prince of both arts (inventing and judging), describes the 
concrete motives that led him to write about a method to find the arguments (Topics).441 
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 He says that he was at his library in Tusculano, with a friend, jurist C. Trebatius, 
consulting the works, each one independently from the other and according to their 
respective tastes, when a book entitled "Topics" called  Trebatius’s attention and, stung 
by curiosity, he asked what it was about. When Cicero said to him that in said book 
Aristotle exposed an infallible method to find arguments, a lively desire to know such 
method awoke in him and he asked Cicero to explain it to him. Cicero advised him to 
read it alone or with the help of a rhetor that he recommended to him. Later on, as 
Cicero knew that, on account of the darkness of the work and the rhetor’s 
ignorance,Trebatius had not achieved success, during a trip by ship, not to appear as 
ungrateful or proud, with no books at hand, he wrote a special work, known as "Topics 
to C. Trebatius”,442 which he dedicated to him, with examples taken from the law, 
except when others were necessary,443 fortunately for his friend and for posterity.444 
     Cicero’s Topics proved useful to jurists romanists and law philosophers. Together 
with the Topics by Aristotle, Boethius, Bacon and Vico, now all of them prove useful to 
the art of legislation. Topics may be applied with little efforts to the persuasive speech, 
traditionally included in the deliberative genre of rhetoric, through which the enactment 
of a bill is counselled or discounselled. More effort is needed with regard to the 
prescriptive speech, that is, to that part of a bill intended not to argue, but to oblige, 
prohibit, permit, punish and reward conducts. Without it being necessary to take sides in 
the controversy between jusnaturalism and juspositivism, it is convenient to bear in 
mind that, to be incorporated and remain in a positive juridical system, except for a few 
temporary exceptions, only the norms based on acceptable reasons or principles 
(endoxa) make it possible to obtain such consent from the rulers and governed people as 
is required for their approval, interpretation and application in an effective and lasting 
manner. 
     While it is easy to find a hidden thing if the place where it remains has been marked  
and recognized, to trace arguments we must know the topics or places (topoi, loci) 
where they are located, as if they were their seats.445 The method is infallible to 
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 overcome more quickly the absence of ideas, the syndromes of slowness and silence in 
an improvised oral speech, or that of a white sheet in a written speech. As we 
spontaneously associate the question with the acceptable opinions (endoxa), or review 
those that compose the promptuary or others suggested by them, using the Instruments 
to select such topics as may be adequate to deal with the concrete question, something 
relevant to say will usually arise in our mind. It is so because this method stimulates 
memory,446 one of the parts of prudence,447 as well as imagination or fantasy, which is 
the source, the eye of ingenuity. This is the faculty to join diverse and separate things; it 
is sharp when it penetrates with more speed and facility, and joins the diverse things 
more closely, like an angle narrower than a rectum; it is obtuse when it penetrates more 
slowly and with difficulty, leaving things separated and distant, like an angle wider than 
a rectum.448 To invent or to investigate does not consist in constructing new 
combinations with already well-known entities, since many of them prove useless, but 
in choosing those that reveal unsuspected kinships between certain entities that  have 
beeing mistakenly considered strange, forming analogies with elements taken from very 
distant domains, some of which, very rare, are the most fecund of all.449 
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      Here follows a discussion about the following topics: public opinion, opinion of the 
interested sectors and opinion of the experts; legislation, custom, case law and juristic 
writings; character of the legislator (ethos), hope and the fear of the recipients (pathos), 
and reasonableness of the speeches, examples and enthymemes (logos): definitions, 
genres, species, similarities, differences, contraries, concomitances; antecedent, 
consequent and incompatibly, causes, effects, comparisons, possibility, feasibility, 
probability, need, opportunity, merit, antinomy, justice, expediency and harmonization 
of justice, expediency and juridical security. 
 
      a. Public opinion 
 
     To learn about public opinion, reports by spies were resorted to; later on, in the XIX 
century, press releases were taken into account; and from the XX century on, other mass 
media, like radio, television and the Internet were added; finally, surveys450 are almost 
decisive at present. Since surveys are conducted by specialized public, private and 
mixed entities, legislators and advisers, before using them, should evaluate how reliable 
they are.451 
 
RULE: Before using public opinion surveys, their reliability shall be determined 
through the evaluation of: 
a) the identity of the sponsor and the background of the surveyor; 
b) the objective and exact linguistic formulation of the questions; 
c) the care with which the sample was defined and its size and the method selected; 
d) the percentage of real answers and its relation with partial and total ones; 
e) the consultation way (personal or by mail, phone, Internet); 
f) the period during which the surveys were performed, since supervening events may 
make respondents change their opinions. 
 
     In addition to public opinion, it is necessary to know the opinion of the interested 
sectors 
      
      b. Opinion of the interested sectors 
 
     A complete list of the interested sectors to be affected by the enactment of a bill is 
not always made available to legislators and advisers. 
 
RULE: Legislators and advisers shall be provided with a complete list of such interested 
sectors as will be affected by the enactment of  a bill, to consult them and to evaluate 
the effects that will take place in the stages of drafting, promotion, debate, rejection, 
enactment, veto, publication and dissemination. 
 
     It is convenient to remember that the opinions of the interested parties almost always 
will subsume the sectorial interest in the general interest.This is the reason why it is 
necessary to consider them with a critical spirit, but without an automatic 
disqualification. 
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 RULE: The opinion of the interested sectors subsumed in the general interest shall not 
automatically discredit the critics or the formulated proposals. 
 
      c. Opinion of the experts 
 
     The experts may be independent or be proposed by the interested parts; experience 
indicates that their attitude tends to be less objective in the latter case. In addition to not 
coloring his opinions with interests foreign to the art practiced by him, a specialist 
although independent, should always be able to say on time "I do not know it", so as not 
be later forced to say "I was wrong because I did not know it", since not only the scope 
of his knowledge will be evaluated: he will also be demanded to have the exact notion 
of what he ignores.452 
 
RULE: The opinions of the experts shall be considered both in terms of their 
impartiality and of the scope and limits of their knowledge. 
 
      d. Legislation 
 
     Aristotle studied one hundred fifty eight constitutions of Greek and barbarian 
peoples, as materials gathered for his work Politics, of which only the Constitution of 
Athens, found by Sir Frederic Kenyon and published in 1891,453 has come to us in its 
historical and systematical aspects. Perhaps Aristotle also used it in connection with his 
role as legislator of his reconstructed hometown,454 Stagirus, or for the benefit of his 
disciples, so that they could learn the art of legislation or practice it as legislative 
advisors. He considered useful both the study of the current laws in the past and of other 
peoples in the present, for which latter purpose he recommended reading voyage 
stories.455 
     The legend goes that, for the preparation of the Laws of XII Tables, three patrician 
Romans were sent to Athens to obtain a copy of Solon’s Laws.456 
     In the past, laws were very different and difficult to obtain; today, as a result of 
globalization, they have become more uniform, given the similarity of problems and 
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 solutions, and easier to obtain on account of the development of communications, 
especially across Internet. Today, more than ever, it is necessary to be able to compare 
the laws, considering them as a whole, not in isolation,457 before transplanting them,458 
so that rejections do not take place in the juridical system, with pertinent care practices, 
as if it were a question involving high complex surgery. 
 
RULE: Before transplanting laws, their operation in the system of origin shall be 
studied as much as their hypothetical reception in the system of destination, to prevent 
them from becoming invalid or ineffective or from producing undesired effects. 
 
RULE: In order not to prepare a bill in vain and to avoid its rejection or, if approved, 
the annulment of the pertinent law, it shall be necessary to avoid: 
a) the incompetence of the organ that will take the initiative and that of the one that will 
receive it (status traslationis, status conmutationis),459 and the invalidity of the 
procedure to be followed by the legislative function that will be exercised (formal 
legality); 
b) the antinomy (leges contrariae) with other bills under analysis or with current 
laws,460 if the legislator does not wish it or if, wishing it, he lacks the authority required 
to withdraw such bills or to repeal such law (material legality). 
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      e. Custom 
 
     Sometimes it turns out preferable not to legislate and leave the solutions of problems 
to custom or case law. In most cases, in spite of having been legislated, custom 
establishes the prevailing interpretation and integration, as a result of spontaneous 
fulfillments or of court decisions, since law is also made with the aid of time. 
 
RULE: The legislator may entrust the solution of some problems to custom or case law. 
He shall bear in mind that custom, in most cases, will establish the prevailing 
interpretation and integration of the law, as a result of spontaneous fulfillments or of  
court decisions. 
 
     f. Case law 
 
     In connection with case law, the reason why a case was decided (ratio decidendi) 
differs from other considerations mentioned in the fundamentals of the judgment (obiter 
dicta). The former constitutes the precedent as such and from there its obligatory force 
arises, while the latter are statements lacking binding force, but which may be used as a 
source of inspiration in the art of legislation, since they arise from the experience of the 
judges, who compose one of the law users' sectors, in their capacity as public authorities 
entrusted with the administration of justice. 
 
RULE: When case law is studied, the reasons why the cases were decided shall be taken 
into consideration as much the criticism of the current law and the suggested 
amendments. 
 
      g. Juristic writings 
 
      Without succumbing to the technocratic danger of believing that juristic writings are 
the only authorized source of law, it is necessary to consult them. Jurists have been 
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 assigned two tasks, which must be neither confused nor mutilated: the objective and 
systematic description of the current or historical, local or comparative law (juridical 
dogmatic), which takes the existing law as a material (lege lata); and the law imagined 
for the future (lege ferenda). Juristic writings should not be identified with juridical 
dogmatics, since they must also include the criticism and the composition of the laws. 
 
RULE: When juristic writings are studied, the objective and systematic descriptions of 
the law shall be taken into consideration as much as the criticism and composition of the 
laws. 
 
      Classical rhetoric establishes that speeches may appeal to three technical resources 
   to try to obtain persuasion: the favorable presentation of the orator’s character (ethos),  
   the excitement or calmness of the emotions of the audience (pathos) and the  
   reasonableness of the speeches (logos).461 Next, in accordance with the rhetorical model  
   adopted in the present work, the orator will be concretized in the legislator, the 
emotions, 
   in the hope and fear of the recipients of the laws, and the reasonableness of the 
speeches, 
   in the examples and legislative enthymemes. 
 
      h. Character of the legislator (ethos) 
 
     The enactment of a bill and the interpretation, spontaneous fulfillment or 
enforcement, publication and dissemination of the enacted law are facilitated if the 
character of its author is presented in the most favorable way, as a virtuous person and a 
legislator worthy of credit, who deserves the authority vested in him. 
     The general character of a virtuous person and the particular character of a wise, 
eloquent, honorable and benevolent legislator must arise out of the prescriptive or 
persuasive speech itself.  
 
RULE: The general character of a person with the virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude 
and temperance, and the particular character of a legislator with wisdom, eloquence, 
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 honorableness and benevolence shall arise from the prescriptive or persuasive speech 
itself, so as to arise fortitude and temperance and favor the enactment of the bill 
proposed, as well as the interpretation, spontaneous fulfillment or enforcement, 
publication and dissemination of the enacted law. 
 
RULE: A prescriptive or persuasive speech shall not denote ignorance of the facts or of 
the law, incompatible interests or grudge against the recipients of the norms since, if the 
legislator was prestigious, he will lose such prestige and, had he not background, he will 
gain a bad reputation.462 
        
      i. Hope and fear of the recipients of the laws (pathos) 
 
     The enactment of a bill and the interpretation, application, publication and 
dissemination of the enacted law are also facilitated by exciting or calming down the 
emotions of its recipients. 
     No reference will be made here to emotions in general or to each one of them in 
particular, but only to the basic political emotions, namely, hope (spes) and fear 
(metus)463 since, when these are excited or calmed down, they predominate and stop the 
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 others in the internal government of the minds and in the government of the states, like 
when in the latter case it turns out necessary to stop a faction with another one.464 When 
Pericles realized: 
 
       “For example, whenever he saw  the dangerously over-confident, he would make a speech 
         which shocked the into s state of spprehension, and likewas he could return them from 
         irrational fear to confidence."465   
      
RULE: Men shall be more difficult to govern than other live beings when they are not 
treated in an intelligent way,466 but when reasonable hope and fear are generated in 
them, they will be easier to govern. 
 
     Some recipients of the laws know and approve good conduct, but nevertheless they 
adopt the worse one, letting them be driven by the emotional impulse of reaching the 
actual good. Reason, when applied to imagination, showing future and remote things as 
present in the spirit and probable in reality, takes emotion to its side and moves the will 
in a better way, motivating good conduct. 
 
RULE: Reason shall be applied to imagination, exciting hope or fear,467 showing future 
and remote things as present in the spirit and probable in reality, to move the wills of 
the recipients of the laws in a better way: 
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464Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Seventh Book, Chap. III, in The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 
Vol. V, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 
1883, pp. 422-423; The Sixth Book, Chap. III, p. 24. 
465Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, II, 65. 
English translation from: 
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Translated by Martin Hammond, With an Introduction and Notes 
by P.J. Rhodes, Oxford World’s Classics, OUP, New York, 2009, p. 91. 
Tucídides, Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Traducción de Francisco Rodriguez Andrados, Editorial 
Hernando, Tomo 1, Madrid, Reimpresión, 1984, II, 65, p. 283. 
Translation from Spanish to English by the author of this book. 
466Xenophon, Cyropaedia, I,i,3. 
Xenophon, Cyropaedia, With an English Translation by Walter Miller, In Two Volumes, I.i.3, Loeb 
Classical Libray William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1925, pp. 4-5. 
James Tatum, Xenophon's Imperial Fiction, On the Education of Cyrus, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 62.  
467Digest, I, 1, 1. 
("FIRST BOOK 
TITLE I 
On justice and the law 
1. Ulpiano in the first book of the institutions. 
 For any prospective law student, it is convenient to know, in the first place, the origin of this name, of 
justice, because as elegantly defined by Celsus, it is the art of the good and the equitable. 
1 For such reason anyone may call us priests: since we cultivate justice; profess the news and science of 
the good and the equitable, separating the just from the unjust, discerning the licit from the illicit; in our 
 a) in the prescriptive speech, through awards, punishments, or other measures that 
maximize usefulness and minimize harmfulness; 
b) in the persuasive speech, by explaining the motives for the awards, punishments, or 
other measures that maximize usefulness and minimize harmfulness. 
           
      j. Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos) 
      
     The topics associated to the reasonableness of speeches (logos) serve as a check list 
that assures that the matter debated has been contemplated from many of the reasonable 
points of view that could appear, so that it may be well distinguished. They suggest 
concepts, judgments and reasonings, for the association of ideas. They facilitate the 
finding of an idea that joins other two about the debated question, the art of finding the 
                                                                                                                                               
wish to make men good, not only for fear of punishment, but for the hope of reward: strongly desiring (if 
I do not deceive myself) the true and not the apparent philosophy.") 
"LIBRO PRIMERO 
TÍTULO I 
De la justicia y del derecho 
1. Ulpiano en el libro primero de las instituciones. 
 El que haya de estudiar el derecho, conviene que primero sepa de donde trae origen este nombre; de la 
justicia, porque según la define elegantemente Celso, es el arte de lo bueno y equitativo. 
1 Por lo cual nos puede llamar cualquiera sacerdotes: pues cultivamos la justicia; profesamos la noticia y 
ciencia de lo bueno y equitativo, separando lo justo de lo injusto, discerniendo lo lícito de lo ilícito; 
deseando hacer buenos a los hombres, no solo por el miedo de las penas, si también con la esperanza del 
premio: deseando con vehemencia (si no me engaño) la verdadera filosofía, y no la aparente." 
D. I, 1, 1, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín 
Rodriguez de Fonseca, del Colegio de Abogados de esta Corte, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la 
Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las 
Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo I, Madrid, 1872, p. 31.  
1 ULPIANUS LIBRO PRIMO INSTITUTIONUM. Iure operam daturum prius nosse oportet unde nomen 
iuris descendat est autem a nostra appellandum: 
1 nam ganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et aequi. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet: iustititia 
namque colimus et boni et aequi notitiam profitemur, aequm ab iniquo separantes, licitum et illicito 
discernentes, bonus non solum metum poenarum, verum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere 
cupientes, veram nisi fallor philosophiam, non simmilatam affectantes." 
D. I, 1, 1, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, 
Theodorus Mommsen, I, 1, 1, Apud Weidemans, Berolini, 1899, p. 1. 
See the work of the founder of the legists school: 
Shang Yang, Le Livre du Prince Yang, Traduit du chinois et présenté par Jean Lévi, Chapitre IX De 
l'Établissement des lois, Flammarion, Paris, 1981, p. 107, chapter written after the death of Shang, as 
indicated in n. 1, p. 31. 
Lord Shang, The Book of Lord Shang, Translated by J.J.L. Duyvendak, Original Edition, Probssthain, 
London, 1928, Introduction by Robert Wilkinson, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 
Hertfordshire, 1998, Chapter 3, 9 Establishing Laws, p. 187. 
Plato, Laws, I, 644c. 
Platón, Las Leyes, I, 644c, en Platón, Diálogos VIII, Libros I-VI, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de 
Francisco Lisi, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 230. 
Platon, Les Lois, I, 644c, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon 
Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Édition de la Nouvelle Revue 
Française, Paris, 1942, Paris, T. II, p. 663. 
"Hope is the prospect of pleasure [...] Fear, is the prospect of pain [...]": 
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in The Collected Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, Edited by J.H. Burand H.L.A. Hart, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, p. 18.    
Bentham, Théorie des Peines et Récompenses, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Ét. Dumont, 
Troisiéme Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Second, Bruxelles, 1840, pp. 1-234.    
 "middle term"468 allowing for the formulation of syllogisms and enthymemes, that is to 
say, where and how to look in order to find propositions containing the aforesaid middle 
term that may serve as premises necessarily leading to the conclusion in the desired 
sense, because they relate the two “extreme terms” of the proposition to be proved. The 
classic example of a syllogism in logic manuals, which does not belong to Aristotle, 
since he "does not introduce singular terms or premises into his system"469, is: 
 
           All men are mortal, 
           Socrates is a man, 
           Socrates is mortal. 
 
     “Men” is the middle term that allows to join two “extreme terms” , namely, 
“Socrates” and “mortal” (it appears in the major premise and in the minor premise but 
not in the conclusion). 
 
RULE: In any prescriptive speech, topics shall facilitate the finding, choice and use of 
principles and norms in a consistent, complete and, if suitable, concise manner, without 
being overwhelmed or getting lost; for such purpose the probable problems shall be 
considered and acceptable solutions (norms) shall be designed, taking as a starting point 
certain relevant endoxas that will provide them with reasonable support (principles). 
 
RULE: In any persuasive speech, topics shall allow for the finding, choice and use of 
inductions and syllogisms and of examples and enthymemes, that will explain and 
justify the prescriptive speech. 
 
     As well as there are two types of logical inferences: inductions and syllogisms, two 
are the reasonable means of persuasion and prescription: rhetorical inductions 
(examples), and rhetorical syllogisms (enthymemes).470 
                                                 
468Giambattista Vico, L'Antichissima Sapienza degli Italici da Ricavarsi dalle Origine della Lingua 
Latina Libri Tre, 1710, da Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a 
Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, p. 163. 
Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto 
Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [30], pp. 182-183, pp. 186-189. 
In addition to the topics, in medieval logical tradition, the search for the middle term in syllogisms was 
called "inventio medii", for this purpose a mnemonic formula (Thomas Bricot), or a diagram known as 
"pons asinorum" (bridge of the donkeys), because its obvious difficulty (Petrus Tartaretus), was used : 
I.M.Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (Formale Logik, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg-München, 
1956), Traslated and Edited by Ivo Thomas, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961, 
pp. 219-221. 
Anton Dumitriu, History of Logic (Istoria Logicii, Revised Updated and Enlarged Translation of the 
Second Edition of the Single Volume Roumanian Work Istoria Logicii, Published by Editura Didactica, 
Bucharest, 1975, Translated by Duiliu Zamfirescu, Dinu Giurcaneano, Doina Doneaud, Translation 
Edited by The Staff of Abacus Press, T. Wells, Kent, England, 1977, Volume II, pp. 118-120. 
On "inventio medii" and the Aristotelian logic, see: 
Carlo Cellucci, La Ragione della Logica, Prima Edizone 1998, Quarta Edizione, Gius, Laterza & Figli 
Spa, Roma-Bari, 2005, pp. 15-17; pp. 124-125.  
469
"First, the premiss "Socrates is a Man" is a singular proposition, as is subject "Socrates" is a singular 
term. NowAristotle does not introduce singular terms or premises into his system." 
Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, First Edition 1951, 
Second Edition Enlarged 1957, Reprinted from Sheets of the Secondd Edition, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1958, p. 1. 
470Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, 2, 1356b5. 
             Legislative examples 
 
     Examples are imperfect inductions,471 since they are not as numerous as to allow for 
an induction, but turn out to be acceptable for analogy purposes. Induction climbs up 
from the individual or particular to the universal. An example or analogy goes from the 
individual                                                                                                                                                                         
or particular to a similar individual or particular.472 
     The use of examples to prescribe, not only to persuade, is very clear in the Common 
Law system, where courts pronounce judgments following what has been decided in 
previous similar cases (stare decisis), that is to say, on the basis of the analogy existing 
between a previous case (precedent) and the one to be decided.473     
     Legislative precedents mentioned in the form of notes in the prescriptive speech are 
persuasive examples, arguments of authority based on the prestige of their origin. When 
they are used to oblige, prohibit, permit, punish and reward conducts, although their 
respective origins are not mentioned in the notes, they are prescriptive examples 
adopted as a result of their resemblances with the problems, the solutions, or both, 
reasonably imitating their models, by way of analogy. 
 
RULE: When more than one example is used in the same provision of a prescriptive 
speech to facilitate its comprehension, it shall be made clear that it is not a question of a 
limited enumeration, to avoid useless controversies. 
 
     Legislation is not an easy task, in which it was enough to be provided with a 
collection of laws and choose the best, as if choosing examples and harmonizing them 
did not demand certain intelligence and a correct reasoning to such an end were not very 
important.474 Legislating is not an arbitrary practice that may remain freed to mere 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 2, 1356b4-5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First 
Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2156, he translates "deductions" instead of "syllogisms". 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro I, 1356b5, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 180. 
Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", 
Tome Première, Livre I, 2, 1356b4-5, Paris, 1932, p. 78. 
Aristotele, Retorica, I, 2, 1356 b, A cura di Armando Plebe,  Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 8. 
471Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book II, 1184A17-23, Translated, With Notes and Essays on the 
Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 45. 
472Friedrich Ueberweg, System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, Translated from the German 
with Notes and Appendices by Thomas M. Lindsay, Longmans Green, and Co., p. 476; p. 492.  
473Edward P.J. Corbett, Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Fourth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1999, p. 119. 
On reasoning by means of examples and rules in the North American Law, see: 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, La Naturaleza de la Función Judicial, Con Prefacio de Carlos Cossio, Traducción 
de la primera edición en inglés, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1921, por Eduardo Ponssa, Ediciones Arayu Buenos Aires, 1955, 148 pp. 
Edward H. Levi, Introducción al Razonamiento Jurídico,  Traducción, Revisión Técnica y Notas de 
Genaro R. Carrió, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1964, 148 pp. e índice, de la obra original An Introduction to 
Legal Reasoning, The University of Chicago Press, séptima reimpresión, Chicago, 1961. 
474Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1181a15-1181b11. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1181a15-1181b11, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 1866-1867. 
 hazard or to the simple intuition of the inexpert one, but a reasonable activity submitted 
to the rules of the art of legislation. 
 
RULE: Practitioners of the art of legislation shall choose the best examples of laws, to 
imitate them, and the worst examples, to reject them, in accordance with the topic of 
reasonableness (logos), on account of the resemblance or structural and functional 
analogy between the law to be transplanted (comparative law) or re-implanted (history) 
and the juridical system that will receive it. 
 
     Usually, experienced advisers and legislators keep in their files a select repertoire of 
bills and laws, to use them as examples to be imitated in future similar cases, as they 
arose or were transformed into forms, like those used by notaries public and lawyers in 
their respective professional practice.475 With or without experience, with or without 
repertoires or forms, it may be affirmed that no advisor or legislator sets aside the 
precedents provided by history and comparative law, since examples476 constitute the 
main source of the invention or investigation to produce both prescriptive and 
persuasive speeches. Although situations are never equal, sometimes it is possible to 
find relevant resemblances, whether in the problems, in the solutions or in both 
simultaneously, since: 
 
PRINCIPLE: Although analogy is not a strong method to judge, it is a very fecund 
method to invent. 
 
            Legislative enthymemes 
      
      A legislative principle, the reason for which one legislates (ratio legis), is a species 
of the juridical reason (ratio juris). 
 
RULE: Principles shall not accompany their respective norms in the prescriptive 
speech, when: 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristóteles Etica a Nicómaco, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo y Julián Marías, 
Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, X, 9, 1181a-1181b, Madrid, 
1981, pp. 173-174. 
475Elmer A. Driedger, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Second Edition, Revised, Published by The 
Department of Justice, Ottawa, Canada, 1976, pp. 143-316, published as an independent book in its first 
edition, in 1963, and in this second edition, toggether with the second edition of The Composition of 
Legislation, pp. V XXIX, pp. 1-141, the first edition of which was published in 1956. 
476Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, viii. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, viii, 36, With an English Translation by H.E. 
Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, 
New York, Volume I, London, 1921, pp. 496-497. 
Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre III, 8.36, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition 
"Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Paris, 1977, p. 205. 
Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation For Literary Study, Foreword by 
George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David 
E. Orton & Dean Anderson, Brill, number 61, point 2b, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, p. 33. 
Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1966, T. I, número 61, punto 2b, p. 109. 
 a) the norms were known and accepted in advance or the principles would clearly arise 
from the reading of the norms;477 
b) it will be enough that the principles are only made a part of the persuasive speech. 
 
RULE: Principles shall accompany their respective norms in the prescriptive speech, 
when: 
a) the solutions were controversial, unusual or opposite to commonly accepted ones 
(paradoxical);478 
b) the norms were systematized around the principles (internal systematic laws). 
          
     Although it is true that reasonings would be improper in the style of a contemporary 
prescriptive speech, which is meant to oblige, prohibit, permit, reward and punish 
conducts, a legislator resorts to enthymemes, since a good prescriptive speech is 
reasonable in itself, be the principle explicite or not, when he systematizes the norms. 
Enthymemes are rhetorical syllogisms designed for ordinary people, who would neither 
arrive at a deductive conclusion starting from very distant premises, since such 
deduction would turn out obscure because of the length of the syllogisms chain, nor 
even admit the development of all the steps leading to the conclusion, since this means 
verbosity, as obvious things would be said.479 With regard to the above mentioned, it is 
convenient to know that the word "enthymeme", of Greek origin, means, in accordance 
with its etymology, to keep in the spirit (in thumo)480 or in mind,481 and it is commonly 
used to name the imperfect, incomplete syllogism, in which one of the premises has 
been omitted, generally the major one (First Order enthymeme), the minor one (Second 
                                                 
477Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b11-16, with regard to the maxims. See 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b9-16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2222. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1394b11-17, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 411. 
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Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, II, 2, XXI, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 135. 
478Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b8-9, with regard to maxims. 
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Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2221-2222. 
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Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 411. 
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d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 107. 
Aristotele, Retorica, II, 2, XXI, 1394b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 135. 
479Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1395b25-27. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1395b25-27, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2224. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro II, 1395b25-30, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 417. 
Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1395b23-27, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société 
d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 111. 
Aristotele, Retorica, II, 21, 1395b, A cura di Armando Plebe,  Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 139. 
480Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhéthorique, Aide-Memoire, Séminaire Donné à l' école Pratique de 
Hautes Études, Paris, 1964-1965, Communications 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, p. 202. 
E. Littré, Dictionnaire de la Langue Françoise, Librairie Hachette et Cie, Paris 1889, T. II, p. 1424. 
481W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Macmillan And Co., London, 1870, p. 153. 
 Order enthymeme), or the conclusion (Third Order enthymeme).482 But it is not 
necessary to identify the rhetorical syllogism (enthymeme) with the incomplete 
syllogism, since an enthymeme may present iself as a complete or incomplete 
syllogism. It usually appears as incomplete because its premises or conclusion are 
acceptable opinions that do not required any further proposition to achieve acceptability 
(endoxas). 
     Enthymemes, as incomplete rhetorical syllogisms, are the ordinary way in which 
men express their reasonings, suppressing such propositions as will be easily replaced, 
for being too clear or well-known, since the spirit goes more rapid than words, so that, 
as the speech is being abridged, it is given more force and liveliness, pleasing the vanity 
of the interpreter at the same time, making the user of his own intelligence, without 
allowing him to fall down in the boredom to which prolixity leads.483          
     If to a maxim, that is, a general formula related to such human actions as must be 
chosen or avoided,484 one adds its respective reason, in an explicit or implicit way, a 
rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is formed.485 
     When to a legislative juridical norm, that is a species of the maxims genre, one adds 
its respective principle or ratio legis, a legislative enthymeme is formed. In the 
contemporary prescriptive speech, there is neither an explicit principle for each norm, 
nor a norm for each principle, joined by logical particles such us "since", "because", 
"since then", "so", etc., and nor two premises at least, or a premise and the conclusion 
are made explicit. 
                                                 
482W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Macmillan And Co., London, 1870, pp. 153-154. 
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pp. 285-286. 
484Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394a21. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394a21, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2221. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro II, 1394a20, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 409. 
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      Internal systematic laws (consolidations, codifications and institutional laws), as 
mentioned in Chapter IV of this work (Legislative Genres), use principles in their 
explicit or implicit form to systematize the prescriptive speech.  
     Section 1134 of the Napoleonic Code (1804) illustrates the incorporation of a 
principle, when the solution hass been controversial and turns to be paradoxical like its 
systematization function. The above mentioned section, after an interesting debate, was 
finally written in this way: 
 
              “Legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them. 
                They may be revoked only by their mutual consent, or for the causes 
                authorized by law. 
                They must be performed in good faith.”486 
 
     The first two paragraphs of this section introduced the principle of autonomy of the 
will and one of its consequences, legal rescission, with a reference to other causes 
authorized by the law to render conventions ineffective. The third paragraph, which 
creates the obligation to perform conventions in good faith, is a clear norm, the 
historical inception of the principle of good faith, since this principle not only comprises 
performance as a whole, but also all its stages: the ones before inception (precontractual 
negligence), that of inception (included in the bill), interpretation, integration, 
modification and termination of the conventions, and the subsequent stage 
(postcontractual obligations). The above mentioned principle includes not only 
conventions or contracts, but also, juridical acts in general, as legal reasoning and 
experience were able to prove later on. 
     The Court of Cassation had already accepted the principle of autonomy of the will, 
but some jurists were still against it, because, without having been struck other than by 
the general will, that of the law, they did not want to acknowledge in contracts, in the 
will of the individuals, an emanation of the law itself, not less sacred than the former. 
Favard, in its report to the Tribunate, described and explained the above mentioned 
situation, justifying the incorporation of the principle of autonomy of the will: 
 
          "But there will not be any more uncertainty about this principle; it is founded on a 
           positive law which secures the authority of the contracts, and consequently the 
           fortune of the individuals; and, what is even more precious, the good faith  
           that must dominate the performance of conventions. Thus, whenever a convention 
           shall have been legally formed, and its causes acknowledged by law, such convention 
           will be a law in itself, and any judgment supporting its violation will be submitted to 
           the censorship of the courts entrusted by the constitution with the preservation of  
           them all, and with protecting them againts arbitrariness."487 
                                                 
486
"Les conventions légalment formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux  qui les ont faites. 
Elles ne peuvent être revoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou por les causes que la loi autorise. 
Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi." 
Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Ou Commentaire et 
Complément des Codes Françaises,  Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Tome Douzième, París, 1828, p. 14. 
487
"Elles tiennent lieu de la loi à ceux qui les ont faites. 
Dejá le tribunal de cassation avait consacré ce principe: quelques jurisconsultes trop rigoristes 
improuvaient sa jurisprudence; ils n'étaient frappés que de la violation faite à la volonté générale, qui est 
la loi; ils ne voulaient pas voir que le contrat légalment formé était una émanation de la loi même, en non 
moins sacré qu'elle. 
Mais il n'y aura plus d'incertitude sur ce principe; il sera désormais fondé sur une loi positive et garante de 
l'autorité des contrats, garante par conséquent des fortunes des particuliers; et, ce qui est plus précieux 
encore, garante de la bonne foi qui doit régner dans l'exécution des conventions.  
   
     Bigot-Préameneu, in his Exposition of Motives, with reference to obligations and the 
systematization function of the principle of autonomy of the will, said: 
 
          “Having the necessary elements to form a valid obligation, the consent of the parties, 
           their capacity, a thing or fact that were the object and matter of the commitment and 
           a legitimate cause been compiled, now the effects of the obligations must be regulated. 
           Here there immediately appears the principle that serves as a basis for this part of the 
           Civil Code, and that is expressed in clear and simple terms.  
           "Legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them. 
           They may be revoked only by their mutual consent, or for the causes authorized by 
           the law. 
           They must be entered and performed in good faith. 
           They oblige not only to what is expressed, but also to all the consequences that equity, 
           use or the law attributes to the "obligation according to its nature." 
           There is no species of obligation, whether of giving, doing or refrain from doing, 
           that does not rest on these fundamental rules: it is to these rules that one resorts for  
           their interpretation, performance or determination of all their effects.”488 
 
     For further clarification,489 an enthymeme may be explicitly expressed either as a 
complete or and incomplete syllogism. 
                                                                                                                                               
Ainsi toutes les fois qu'une convention aura été légalement formée, et dont les causes seront avouées par 
la loi, cette convention sera elle même une loi, et le jugement qui la violera  sera soumis à la censure du 
tribunal chargé par la constitution de les conserver toutes, et de les garantir de l'entreprise de l'arbitraire." 
Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Ou Commentaire et 
Complément des Codes Françaises,  Rapport Fait au Tribunat par M. Favard, dans la Séance du 13 
Pluviose an XII (3 février 1804), Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Tome Douzième, París, 1828, p. 430. 
488“Aprés avoir ressemblé les éléments nécessaires pour former une obligation valable, le consentement            
des parties, leur capacité, une chose ou un fait qui soit l'objet et la matière de l'engagement, une cause 
légitime, on a eu à régler quels sont les effets des obligations. 
C'est ici que se présent d'abord le principe qui sert de base à cette partie du Code Civil, et qui se trouve 
exprimé en ces termes clairs et simples. 
"Les conventions légalment formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. 
Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement, ou pour les causes autorisées par la loi. 
Elles doivent être contractées et executées de bonne foi. 
Elles obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais encore à toutes les suites que l'équité, l'usage ou 
la loi donnent à la "obligation d'après sa nature." 
Il n'est aucune espèce d'obligations, soit de donner, soit de faire ou de ne pas faire, qui ne repose sur  ces 
règles fondamentales: c'est à ces règles qu'on a recours pour les interpréter, pour les exécuter,  
pour en déterminer, tous les effets.” 
Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Ou Commentaire et 
Complément des Codes Françaises,  Exposé de Motifs Fait par M. Bigot-Préameneu, Conseilleur d'Etat et 
Orateur du Gouvernement, dans la Séance du 6 Pluvieuse an XII (27 janvier 1804), Treuttel et Würtz, 
Libraires, Tome Douzième, París, 1828, pp. 325-326. 
489A similar didactic method has been used when reason expresses itself in the same proposition that 
enunciates a maxim (ethymematic statement), that is the most reputable one, as it may be noticed in the 
following example and its explicit reasoning: 
 Maxim (as an enthymematic statement): 
 “Being mortal, do not keep an immortal rancor.” 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b18-25. 
“Siendo mortal, no guardes un rencor inmortal”,.Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1394b20-27, 
Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero,  Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 412. 
English translation by the author of this book. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b18-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2222. 
 EXAMPLE: 
 
           Complete syllogism 
 
           If constitutionally formed laws are obligatory upon all, because they arise 
           from the general will (major premise) and legally formed conventions are  
           like a law for those who have made them, because they arise from the will of  
           the individuals (minor premise), then legally formed conventions are 
           obligatory upon those who have made them (conclusion). 
 
EXAMPLE: 
 
          Incomplete syllogism 
 
          If legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them,  
          because they arise from the will of the individuals (minor premise), then  
          legally formed conventions are obligatory upon those who have made 
          them (conclusion). 
 
     In the enacted formula, the major complete premise was omitted, since it was 
obvious that laws were obligatory upon all, because they emerged from the general will. 
The conclusion was also partially omitted, because if the only enacted formula were the 
explicit norm establishing that conventions were obligatory for the parties, not all would 
accept it and many would consider it paradoxical. As the legislator wanted to explain, in 
the very text of the prescriptive speech, why conventions were obligatory, without 
explicitly mentioning their obligatory nature, he introduced the principle of autonomy 
of the will, that is to say, that the individuals could establish norms for themselves. To 
such end, he included only the minor, but incomplete premise, without saying that 
"conventions are obligatory", but associating the conventions to the laws in an explicit 
manner, and the particular will, generator of obligations, in an implicit manner, to the 
general will, generator of the law, an indisputable source of obligations. Whenever 
enthymemes are incomplete syllogisms, reasoning remains semisecret, since only one 
proposition is omitted, be one of the premises or the conclusion. In this example, two 
complete propositions were omitted, namely, the major premise and the conclusion, and 
also the part of the minor premise that deals with the particular will as generator of 
obligations, and reasoning stays completely secret, thus leaving an explicit principle 
(autonomy of the will) and an implicit norm (that conventions are obligatory upon the 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1394b20-26, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société 
d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première,  Paris, 1938, p. 108. 
Aristotele, Retorica, II, XXI, 1394b, A cura di Armando Plebe,  Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961. 136. 
An enthymeme (as species of incomplete syllogism): 
 If you are mortal (minor premise), 
 then your hate is not immortal (conclusion). 
An enthymema (as species of perfect or complete syllogism): 
 If the one who is mortal must not heep an immortal hate (major premise),  
              and since you are a mortal (minor premise), 
 then you must not keep a an inmortal hate (conclusion). 
Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l'Art de Penser, Sur la Cinquième Édition, Revue & de 
Nouveau Augmenteé; Faite à Paris, Chez Guillaume Defprez, &c. en 1683, Chapitre XIV, Des 
Enthymêmes & des Sentences Enthymématiques, Introduction de Louis Martin, Paris, Flammarion, 1970, 
p. 286. 
 
 parties). Having said that conventions are like the law, the legislator refers to their 
obligatory effect, but also to the reason behind them: they are obligatory for those who 
have made them because they arise from the will of the individuals, as well as the laws 
are obligatory for all because they arise from the general will of the people. This is not 
an enthymeme, but an enthymematic statement,490 a statement that, lacking the form of 
an enthymeme, which require two statements at least, produces its effects, because the 
principle or the norm and the logical inference between both remain implicit; in this 
case, it is a question of an explicit principle. 
     Principles usually takes the form of sententious sayings, and the juridical norms, the 
form of paraphrased principles.491 Sententious sayings are resorted to because they are 
remembered more easily, and paraphrases, because they allow for the exemplification of 
the application of the principles and give more clarity to them. Sometimes, when the use 
of some word or figure of speech is undesired, an euphemism is used. 
 
EXAMPLE: 
 
          The above mentioned section 1134 of Napoleonic Code, reads as follows: 
  
          "Legally formed conventions are like a law [euphemism for obligatory] for 
            those who have made them", so as to avoid saying: 
          "Legally formed conventions are obligatory for those who have made them". 
 
     Principles, in addition to their usefull systematization purposes, also serves to fill the 
gaps by autointegration (within the same juridical order).492 Since to fill the gaps one 
resorts to the general principles of law, the principles of the branches of law, the 
principles of the institutions, and to analogy, it is necessary to highlight that, from the 
point of view of rhetoric, principles are, in general, the endoxas that form enthymemes 
and enthymematic statements, and that analogy is an incomplete induction, a reasoning 
by example. Enthymemes and examples provide reasonableness to prescriptive or 
persuasive speeches. 
    To obtain enthymemes and examples, stronger arguments and reasonable things to 
say not regarded as arguments, it is possible to resort to legislative definitions and to 
other topics. 
 
           Legislative definitions 
 
     It has been repeatedly claimed that definitions in the laws are improper for being 
useless and dangerous. Useless, because there would no be provisions inside the law, 
but rather the result thereof, and they would not have a binding force on the interpreter, 
since laws should only order, not teach, a task proper of juristic writings. Dangerous, 
                                                 
490Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l'Art de Penser, Sur la Cinquième Édition, Revue & 
de Nouveau Augmenteé; Faite à Paris, Chez Guillaume Defprez, &c. en 1683, Chapitre XIV, Des 
Enthymêmes & des Sentences Enthymématiques, Introduction de Louis Martin, Paris, Flammarion, 1970, 
p. 286. 
491Claude du Pasquier, Introduction a la Thèorie Générale et a la Philosophie du Droit, Deuxième 
Édition, Revue et Mise a Jour, Éditions Delachaux, Niestlé S.A., Neuchatel, Suisse, Paris, France, 1942, 
p. 62. 
492Norberto Bobbio, Teoria Generale del Diritto, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 1993, p. 262.  
 because they would be very difficult to establish and, if turned out vicious, they may 
lead to false consequences.493 
     A provision may contain a complete juridical norm, like the definitions of crimes in 
the codes and special penal laws, which prescribe each crime (murder, assault and 
battery, robbery, theft, etc.) in the form of a figure of speech, the imprecation, which 
consists, in one of its variants, in threatening,494 in this case, enforcement of the 
respective punishment against those whom may perform certain conducts. There is not 
always a coincidence between the provision and the juridical norm (fact and 
consequence; in the aforesaid examples, crime and punishment). The provision may 
contain a part of a juridical norm, of a penal nature or otherwise, which, together with 
other provision or provisions, forms a complete juridical norm. Thus, from the point of 
view of the art of legislation, there would be implicit referrals,495 since, when the 
defined term is used in the same or other provision, it is considered that the interpreter 
will have to replace it mentally by the defined concept, as it happens with nominal and 
mixed definitions. But when a concept is formulated, whether or not denominated, 
without the same or other provisions mentioning the denomination, the definition might 
also be useful if the defined concept integrates, not in redundant form the factual or the 
juridical consequences of the norm in question. 
     It is true that some definitions proper of juristic writigs are the result of the 
provisions, that is, a brief description of the content of the latter, namely, the rules of 
law, which, as such will be true or false; but this does not imply that the legislator, in 
the excercise of his powers, should not use definitions. 
 
                                                 
493In the discussion of the project of Civil Code in the Council of the State Session of January 27, 1803, 
presided over by Napoleon, as the definition of donations was dealt with, it was stated: 
 "M. REGNAUD (of Saint-Jean-d'Angely) thinks that definitions are useless, because they are not 
dispositions inside the law." (“M. REGNAUD (de Saint-Jean-Angely) pense que les définitions sont 
inutiles, puisque elles ne sont pas dispositions dans la loi.”); 
 "M. BERENGER says that the definitions belong to case law, not law; they are very difficult. It 
is then dangerous to include them in a code because if they turned out vicious, they would lead to false 
consequences. ("M. BÉRENGER dit que les définitions appartiennent à la jurisprudence, et non à la loi; 
elles son très difficiles. Il est donc dangereux de les placer dans un code car si elles étaient vicieuses elles 
conduiraient à de fausses conséquences.); 
  Definitions are the result of the provisions of a code, they fall within the scope of science: 
whereas a code is what it is done by the legislator. (Les définitions sont le résultat de les dispositions du 
code, elles son donc du domaine de la science: or le code es le fait du législateur.") 
 Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Teutel et Würtz, 
Libraires, Tome Onzième, Paris, 1827, pp. 88-89 (REGNAUD), p. 90 (BÉRENGER). 
"In law all general rules and conceptions are liable to cause catastrophes, as it is impossible, when 
formulating a rule, to foresee all possible complications which life may bring about." 
Fritz Schulz, Principles of Roman Law, Translated from a Text Revised and Enlarged by the Author, by 
Marguerite Wolff, at The Clarendon Press, Oxford, First English Edition 1936, reprinted, 1956, 1967, p. 
41. Original German First Edition, Prinzipien Des Römischen Rechts, Duncker Und Humblot, Munich, 
1934. 
494Antonio de Capmany and Montpalau, Filosofía de la Elocuencia, Londres, 1812, p. 459; pp. 463-465. 
495Definitions would be not independent norms according to Hans Kelsen, Théorie Pure du Droit, 
Traduction française de la 2e édition de la Reine Rechtslehre, Franz Deuticke, Viena, 1960, par Charles 
Eisenmann, Dalloz, Paris, 1962, p. 77. 
Incomplete juridical propositions are either explanatory, limitative or referencial. Explanatory 
propositions are either definitory ones, which usually refer to the factual antecedent, and complementary 
ones, which clarify a juridical consequence. 
Karl Larenz, Metodología de la Ciencia del Derecho, Traducción de Enrique Gimbernat Ordeig del 
original  Methodenlehre der Rechstwissenchaft, Springer Verlag OHC, Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg, 
1960, Ediciones Ariel, Barcelona, 1966, pp. 175-176.  
 RULE: Definitions shall be used in the prescriptive speech, provided that they will 
serve to oblige, prohibit, permit, punish or reward conducts, where it will not be 
considered suitable to leave them in charge of custom, case law or juristic writings. 
 
     When the definitions of custom, case law or juristic writings precede the legislator, 
he will not unnecessarily detach himself from pre-existent concepts and usual words, 
since, in contrast to the formal propositions in logic and mathematics, juridical norms 
are formulated in a natural language that admits stipulative definitions, but does not 
tolerate arbitrary stipulations, since the legislator or the interpreter will rarely forget the 
previous meaning and substitute it for the new one. They often end up saying one thing 
and doing another, a real danger posed by legislative definitions.496 
 
RULE: Definitions shall not unnecessarily be detached from pre-existent concepts and 
usual words, because both of them are of a very difficult replacement in the minds of 
legislators and interpreters. 
 
     Justinian's Digest states that any definition is dangerous in civil law, since subverting 
it is not possible in very few ocassions.497 It was dangerous for the parties, for historical 
reasons, because in the "actions of the law" (legis actiones) they had to recite the exact 
words before the pretor (in iure civilis) since, as Gaius remembers a person whose 
vineyards had been knocked down lost his claim for having said "vineyard" instead of 
"trees", which was the general term used in the formula of the Law of the XII Tables.498 
It has been ad still is also dangerous for lawyers, because when the denomination of a 
fact, act or activity is argued about, if any of them risks a definition, as his adversary 
criticizes a word or adds or removes another one, he shall witness how such adversary 
snatches it off his hands and turns it against him.499 
     A definition, which always uses words, may linguistically formulate a concept 
without naming it (conceptual definition); establish the concept denomination (nominal 
definition); or linguistically formulate a concept and establish its denomination (mixed 
definition). Concepts should not be confused with the words or things.500 No mistake 
                                                 
496Sebastián Soler, Las Palabras de la Ley, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1969, pp. 172-173. 
497D. 50.17.202. 
D.50.17.202, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum Digesta, Recognovit, 
Theodorus Mommsen, apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 873. 
D.I.17.202, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín 
Rodriguez de Fonseca, del Colegio de Abogados de esta Corte, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la 
Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las 
Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo III, Madrid, 1874, p. 851. 
It is taken from Iavolenus, eleventh book epistolarum. 
498[Gaius], The Institutes of Gaius, Part I, Text With Critical Notes and Translation, by Francis de 
Zulueta, Clarendon Press, Oxford, First Edition 1946, Reprinted 1951, Book IV, 11, Oxford, 1958, pp. 
234-235. 
Gaius, Institutes, Texte Établi et Traduit par Julien Reinach, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", III, 
11, Paris, 1950, p. 140. 
Stella Maranca, Le "Regulae Iuris" e la "Definitio in Iure Civilis", Reçueil Gény, T. II, Paris, 1934, pp. 
91-111; p. 97.   
499Cicero, De Oratore, II, XXV, 108. 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Livre II, XXV, 108, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société 
d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, pp. 50-51.  
500François Geny, La Technique Législative dans la Codification Civile Moderne (A Propos du 
Centenaire du Code Civil), Le Code Civil, 1804-1904, Livre du Centenaire, Arthur Rousseau, Editeur, T. 
II., Paris, 1904, p. 993.  
 should be made about the most useful sequence to deal with the above mentioned 
aspects which, from the point of view of the interpretation, application and criticism is: 
words, concepts, things; and, from the perspective of the composition, is: concepts, 
words, things. 
 
               Conceptual definitions 
 
     Conceptual definitions, that is, the explanations of concepts in words,501 must not be 
confused either with the concepts themselves, since concepts differ from their 
formulation by means of language;502 or with nominal definitions. 
     Conceptual definitions are speeches that explain things existing in reality, that can be 
looked at or touched, like farms, leaks, etc.; or in the mind, like usucaption, 
guardianship, etc.503 The definitions of systematical concepts are more frequent in Civil 
Law, as it happens in the French Civil Code with the concepts of property (section 544), 
usufruct (section 578), easement (section 637), contract (section 1101), etc., while the 
definitions of non-systematic concepts are more frequent in the Common Law world.504 
Should a speech admits two or more meanings, it would suffer from ambiguity,505 
which can arise either from the way in which words are linked together (syntactic 
ambiguity) or from the words themselves (semantic ambiguity). 
       In the case of syntactic ambiguity it is difficult to immediately identify the subject 
and direct object of the sentence, as in the following example: Cicero recommends Tyro 
to Curius, since only those who knows that Tyro was a slave much valued by Cicero can 
interpret with certainty that said slave is the recommended one.506 
 
                                                 
501Friedrich Karl Von Savigny, Metodología Jurídica (Juristische Methodenlehere, K. F. Koehler Verlag, 
Stuttgart, 1951, que corresponde al curso de invierno 1802-1803), Traducción de J. J. Santa Pinter, 
Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 39. 
502R. Von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur 
La 3e. Édition avec l'Autorisation de L'Auteur par O. de Meulenaere, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, 
Technique, Chap. I. Sect. 2. B. 3., Construction.  46. 3. 1. Notion et distinction des corps juridiques, 
Maresq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 54. 
503Cicero, Topics, V, 26-27. 
Cicéron, Topique, V, 26, dans Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par 
Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960, p. 74. 
504
 Alf Ross, Definition in Legal Language, Logique et Analye, Nouvelle Serie, 1e. Année, Août 1958, p. 
147. 
Jean Ray, Index du Code Civil, Contenant Tous les Mots qui Figurent dans le Texte du Code 
Accompagnés des Références a Tous les Articles où ils se Trouvent et Illustrés de Citations qui Peuvent 
en Éclairer le Sens ou l'Emploi, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1926, Préface IX pp., Abréviations 1 p., 
Index 117 pp., Addenda 1 p. This work was inspired in a similar one for the B.G.B., Wörtverrzeichnis 
Zum Börgerlichen Geserzbuche, O. Gradenwitz, 1902, Préface, p. V. 
505Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book I, XI, 16. 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book I, XI, 16, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb 
Classical Library, LCL 403, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussets, London, England, pp. 
84-85. 
Retórica a Herenio, Libro I, XI, Traducción Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, p. 122. 
Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre II, XI, 16, Ouvrage Longtemps attribué a Ciceron, Texte Revue et traduit 
avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 56-57.  
506Real Academia Española, Gramática de la Lengua Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de 1931, 
Madrid, 1962, punto 482, p. 443. 
 RULE: To eliminate syntactic ambiguity (it is difficult to immediately identify the 
subject and direct object of the sentence), words shall be given a different placement, or 
linked with other particles, or any of the latter shall be omitted. 
 
EXAMPLE: 
 
           Cicero recommends Tyro to Curius. (Who is the recommended one?). 
           Tyro is recommended by Cicero to Curius. 
           
     The semantic ambiguity refers to the comprehension of the concept, its typical 
properties, the core of meaning. Vagueness refers to the extension, to the class of 
elements with properties typical of the concept, contemplated on the border of meaning, 
from a half-light area.507 
 
RULE: To eliminate semantic ambiguity, equivocal words shall be replaced by 
unequivocal ones, or they shall be defined. 
 
Because the present work uses the taxonomic model of the juridical system, then: 
 
RULE: Definitions following the method of the next genre and the specific difference 
shall be preferred.508 
                                                 
507
"The fact is that all words are undoubtedly attributable in certain domain, but become questionable 
inside a half-light area, out of which they are again undoubtedly not attributable. Someone might try to 
obtain precision in the use of words, by saying that no word may be applied in the half-light area; but 
fortunately half-light itself is not exactly definable, and the whole ambiguity given by it to the primary 
use of the words, is also given by it as we try to fix a limit to its undoubtful applicability." Spanish to 
English translation by the author of this book. 
“El hecho es que todas las palabras son sin duda atribuibles en cierto dominio, pero se tornan 
cuestionables dentro de una zona de penumbra, fuera de la cual nuevamente son sin duda no atribuibles. 
Alguien podría tratar de obtener precisión en el uso de las palabras, diciendo que ninguna palabra puede 
ser aplicada en la zona de penumbra; pero por fortuna la penumbra misma no es excatamente definible, y 
toda la vaguedad que confiere al uso primario de las palabras, la confiere también cuando tratamos de 
fijar un límite a su indudable aplicabilidad.” 
Bertrand Russell, Vaguedad ("Vagueness", The  Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1, 
1923, p. 84), en Antología Semántica, compilada por Mario Bunge, Traducciones de Mario Bunge, 
Emilio O. Colombo, Estela Arias y Lilia Fornasari), Ediciones Nueva Visión, Buenos Aires, 1960, pp. 17-
18. 
508Aristotle, Topics, I, 8, 103b14-15. 
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     Alike any other writer who uses natural language, a legislator may eliminate both 
syntactic and semantic ambiguity, whereas vagueness may not be eliminated, only 
reduced.  Doubts will always exist if some marginal concrete cases likely to appear 
remain included or excluded from formulated abstract definitions. To reduce the 
ambiguity of quantitative concepts, numbers may be used; in the case of qualitative 
concepts, all their species (divisio) or all their parts (partitio) may be enunciated, or 
replaced by other quantitative concepts, for example, the maturity that capacity requires 
upon attainment of the legal age, established by a certain number of birth 
anniversaries.509 
 
RULE: To reduce ambiguity: 
a) in the definitions of quantitative concepts, numbers shall be used in their formulation.  
b) in the definitions of qualitative concepts, all their parts shall be enunciated (partitio), 
all their species (divisio),510 or qualitative concepts shall be replaced by quantitative 
concepts. 
 
              Nominal definitions 
 
     In nominal definitions, the equivalence between the meaning of a name and the 
linguistic formula of a concept is established; thus the speech is abridged, since it is 
enough to use the name instead of the set of words that constitutes its linguistic formula. 
     The introduction of a definition just to abridge the speech is only justified if it turns 
out very uncomfortable to repeat the linguistic formulation of the concept511 and no 
appropriate usual name exists. 
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RULE: Nominal definitions shall be introduced only to abridge the speech, when it 
turns out very uncomfortable to repeat the linguistic formulation of the concept and no 
appropriate usual name exists.  
 
RULE: Neither shall the same name be used as an equivalent for the linguistic formulae 
of several concepts, nor more than one name shall be used as an equivalent for the 
linguistic formulae of the same concept.512 
 
     When the purpose sought consists in abridging the exposition only, but once the 
equivalence between the meaning of a name and the linguistic formula of a concept is 
established the name is no longer used in the rest of the speech, the definition turns out 
unnecessary, since there will be no opportunity to carry out replacements. 
 
RULE: When definitions are established only to abridge the exposition (nominal 
definitions), but the name is no longer used in the rest of the speech, they shall turn out 
unnecessary.  
 
     The mental replacement of the linguistic formulation of a concept by a name not 
only abridges the speech, but also favors memorizing it, enhances the comprehension of 
the meaning and facilitates the discussion of the issues raised. It has the advantage of 
simplifying the speech, since what is understood with only one strike of attention, which 
in turn depends on the length of the symbols used, is better received; but it has the 
disadvantage of disregarding that the presence of many words serves to remember that a 
complex issue is being dealt with.513 
 
RULE: Nominal definitions shall abridge the speech, favor memorizing it, facilitate the 
comprehension of the meaning and simplify the discussion of the issues raised, but they 
shall lead to forgetting that a complex issue is being dealt with. 
 
                Mixed definitions 
 
     A mixed definition formulates a concept linguistically and establishes the only 
denomination of such concept that will be consistently used in the rest of the speech. 
     Due to the disparity of certain concepts and denominations in juristic writings, the 
German Civil Code of 1900 (B.G.B), established mixed definitions. It formulated the 
concepts and placed the respective nomen iuris only once between parentheses. With 
the linguistic formulation of the concept, it intended to eliminate the discrepancies 
existing among juristic writings and, as it established the nomen iuris, it looked for the 
concision of the prescriptive speech, since it turned out unnecessary to repeat the 
linguistic formulae of the concepts to use them in other provisions, since beeing it 
enough to use their denomination.514 
 
                                                                                                                                               
511Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First 
Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, pp. 80-81. 
512Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First 
Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, pp. 81-82. 
513Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First 
Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, p. 68; p. 79.   
514Code Civil Allemand, Traduit et Annoté, par R. Saleilles, Paris, 1904, p. XXXI. 
 RULE: A mixed definition shall extend, restrict or formulate a concept and shall 
establish the only denomination of  such concept which will transparent it consistently, 
so that the prescriptive speech will gain clarity and concision. 
 
               Persuasive definitions 
 
     Conceptual, nominal and mixed definitions serve to obtain clarity and concision in 
the speech. Clarity, because they reduce ambiguity and eliminate vagueness, 
introducing, extending or restricting the meaning of words. Concision, because they 
allow to use a denomination instead of the linguistic formulation of a concept. However, 
persuasive definitions are not formulated to achieve clarity or concision in the speech, 
but as emotional arguments (pathos).515 
     Persuasive definitions are those that, with an apparent impartiality, re-defines the 
descriptive meaning of words while retaining their emotional meaning, so that, 
generally in a secret way, they direct the emotion to the new object,516 to move the 
wills. They will be open to criticism if they remain secret and without the respective 
reasonable justification in the persuasive speech. 
 
      In a nutshell: 
        
RULE: Definitions may be resorted to when it is intended to: 
a) introduce, extend or restrict concepts; 
b) reduce ambiguity; 
c) eliminate ambiguity; 
d) abridge the speech; 
e) re-define the descriptive meaning and retain the emotional meaning, if acceptable 
reasons are given to justify them in the persuasive speech. 
 
RULE: To introduce definitions, the following formulae shall be used, depending on 
whether such definitions are: 
a) conceptual: X, where X represents the linguistic formulation of the concept; 
b) nominal: "In the present law "X" will be denominated "Y", where "X" mentions the 
linguistic formulation of the concept, and "Y" mentiones the nomen iuris; 
c) mixed: X (Y) where X, without quotation marks, represents the linguistic formulation 
of the concept, and (Y) the nomen juris appears between parentheses, instead of 
appearing between quotation marks, as in the nominal definition. 
 
     All definitions, whether nominal, conceptual, mixed or persuasive, make the tasks of 
both legislators and interpreters heavier, because instead of abiding only by the 
established meaning, they also have to remember the equivalence stipulated between the 
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 concept, its linguistic formula and the nomen iuris, and to practice a mental replacement 
in a consistent way as they used or interpret the nomen or the formula,517 these beeing 
the reasons why it is convenient to introduce the least possible number of definitions. 
 
RULE: It is convenient to introduce the least possible number of definitions, so as not to 
make both the legislator’s expression and the interpreter’s comprehension heavier. 
 
RULE: Before finishing the composition of a prescriptive speech, useless definitions, 
persuasive definitions not justified in the persuasive speech and the inconsistent use of 
the language with regard to the admitted definitions shall be eliminated. 
 
   For the purposes of obtaining reasonable things to say, in addition to legislative 
definitions, the following topics may be resorted to. 
    
          Genres     
 
RULE: The things, which genres are different, shall themselves be different as well.518 
 
          Species 
 
RULE: The properties of the genre shall survive in its species.519 
 
          Similarities 
 
RULE: When the same quality appears in different things (similarity), the proposition 
shall be the same and only one.520 
 
          Differences 
 
RULE: When things are different, the proposition shall not be the same and only one.521  
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           Contraries 
 
RULE: Where contraries were: 
a) adverse (white/black); exclusive (justice/injustice), negatives (to live/not to live), it 
shall not be possible to reconcile one another; 
b) relative (master/servant), one will not happen without the other.522 
 
          Concomitances 
 
RULE: When things were associated with others, it will be possible to consider 
concomitant circumstances,523 in which case a rebuttable or disputable presumption 
shall be established, in line with the force of conviction of such circumstances. 
 
          Precedents, consequents and incompatibles 
 
RULE: When a proposition is conditional: 
a) if the precedent is affirmed, the consequent will follow;524 
b) if the consequent is negated, the precedent will be negated;525 
c) the consequences of contraries (incompatibles), will not be found at the same time in 
the same thing;526 
 
          Causes 
 
RULE: When an efficient cause happens, the effect shall not be absent.527 
 
          Effects 
 
RULE: When an effect happens, the efficient cause shall not be absent.528 
 
          Comparisons 
 
RULE: When comparisons are made: 
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 a) what will be reputed good for the biggest thing, shall be reputed good for the smallest 
one.529 
b) what will be reputed good for the smallest thing, shall be reputed good for the biggest 
one;530 
c) with regard to equal things, the proposition shall be the same and only one.531 
                   
           Possibility (status coniecturae)532 
 
RULE: When the problem or the proposed solution may not even happen,533 it is not 
necessary to deliberate, to prepare either the prescriptive speech or the persuasive one. 
He who shall notice the impossibility, shall see beyond between parentheses the others. 
 
     If the bill were enacted and published, it would not contain legal prescriptions 
applicable to all, being that the impossible thing does not oblige, not even in any of the 
cases described above, since such prescriptions would represent mere pious desires, 
which would not achieve the purpose sought by the legislator at the time he established 
them. An old example of impossibility of application is to have punished those who 
committed adultery with the deprivation of sight in a case in which the accused was a 
blind person. 
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            Feasibility 
 
RULE: If norms were very difficult to apply, they shall be equated to impossible ones. 
 
     To have ordered not to lie in a public square is another old example, in this case of 
the assimilation of the impracticable to the impossible thing.534 
 
           Probability 
 
RULE: If the problems to be resolved by means of legislation are possible, but highly 
improbable, no legislation shall be enacted either, since it shall fall short of 
contemplating all the things likely to happen some day; it will be enough to legislate on 
the things that happen ordinarily.535 
 
     It would be possible, but improbable, for example, to establish stringent earthquake-
proof rules in a zone that has never suffered from either earthquakes or earth tremors 
and is far away from areas exposed to these dangers, according to the unanimous 
opinion of the experts in the matter. 
 
           Necessity 
 
RULE: A bill shall be necessary when it answers a social request, provided always that 
the contemplated result may be obtained not by means of other available, political or 
juridical instruments, but by means of a law.536 
 
           Opportunity 
 
     A bill may have been convenient or inconvenient yesterday and stop being so today 
or tomorrow; the prudence of a legislator, like that of a navigator or a medical doctor, in 
addition to the knowledge of the rules of their respective arts, requires the ability to 
identify the propitious moment for the action or abstention, an ability that turns very 
difficult to teach and learn.537 
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RULE: A project will be opportune if promoted in the propitious time for its approval; 
inopportune, if promoted in the propitious time for its rejection, unless rejection has 
been looked for. 
                  
            Merit 
 
RULE: Rewards and punishments shall be established in accordance with the merit of 
the respective conducts, and they shall be neither insufficient nor excessive.538 
 
            Justice 
 
     Justice539 shall consist in the virtue of producing or distributing equality,540 that is to 
say, in the constant and perpetual will to give each one what is his,541 so that, there shall 
be injustice in the cases of inequality. 
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Come si Pre                                                                                                                 vengono i Delitti); pp. 
192-195 (VI Proporción Entre los Delitos y Las Penas), pp. 397-402 (XXIII Proporzione Fra Delitti e le 
Pene). 
539Demosthenes, XX Against Leptines, 94. 
Demosthenes,  XX Speech Against Leptines, 94, in Demosthenes with an English Translation by J. H. 
Vince, The Loeb Classical Libra William Heinemann Ltd, London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 
1930, pp. 552-554. 
Demóstenes, XX Contra Leptines, 94, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, en 
Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Editorial Gredos, Tomo II, Madrid, 1985, pp. 219-220. 
540Aristotle, Topics, VI, 5, 143b15-16. 
             Expediency 
    
     Expediency shall consist in utility or profit, so that there shall be unsuitability in the 
cases of uselessness, of harmfulness, or of both simultaneously. 
 
RULE: The approval of a bill shall be suitable if it shall preserve the current advantages 
and add new ones, if it shall get rid of current disadvantages and not create new ones. 
 
            Juridical security542 
 
     Juridical security shall consist in the predictability of the juridical consequences of  
human actions, so that the subjects under the law may relay on such result and direct 
their respective conducts with the guarantee of the law.543 
 
            Harmonization of justice, expediency and juridical security 
 
     Experience indicates that the best laws harmonize the requirements of justice, 
expediency and juridical security, and reveal the secular process of the enhancement of 
the wisdom and eloquence that supports them, irrespective of the historical 
circumstances in which the political tensions in every society are overcomed. When any 
of the requirements exceeds certain limits, whether in the short, medium or long term, 
the laws shall not be spontaneously complied with and, irrespective of how much 
coercion may be inflicted, they shall finally be no longer applied.544 
                                                                                                                                               
Topics, VI, 5, 143b15-16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited 
by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One,  Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, 
Second Printing, 1985, p. 241. 
Aristóteles, Tópicos, VI, 5, 143b16-17, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre 
las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 235.Aristotle,  
Aristotele, Topici, VI, 5, 143b 16-17, Organon, a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Edizioni, Milano, 2003, 
p. 563. 
541Digest I.1.10. 
D. I. 1. 10, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum Digesta, Recognovit, 
Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 1. 
D. I. 1. 10, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín 
Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de Los Proemios, Completada y 
Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón 
Vicente, Tomo I, Madrid, 1872, p. 33. 
542In general, see a selection of the works presented in the Third Congress of Philosophy of the Law and 
Juridical Sociology, held in Rome, 1937-1938, in: 
Le Fur, Delos, Radbruch, Carlyle, Los Fines del Derecho, Bien Común, Justicia, Seguridad, traducción de 
Daniel Kuri Breña, Universidad Autónoma de México, Segunda Edición, Imprenta de la Universidad, 
1958 (primera edición en español, Editorial Jus, S.A., 1944), México, 1958, 163 pp.  
Especially, see: 
Sebastián Soler, Las Palabras de la Ley, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1969, pp. 181-190. 
Paul Roubier, Théorie Géneral du Droit, 2e. édition revue et augmentée (1re. édition, 1947), Librairie du 
Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1951, pp. 317-334. 
543Paul Roubier, Théorie Géneral du Droit, 2e. édition revue et augmentée (1re. édition, 1947), Librairie 
du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1951, p. 324. 
544In relation to the conflict between justice and juridical security, to which expediency may be added: 
"It is possible that order reigns in an unjustly organized society where the power will manage to impose it 
perhaps momentarily; but the apparent peace founded on fear, and the order imposed by force, will have a 
very ephemeral life. The conflict between justice and juridical security always happens within certain 
limits very close to one another. When an arbitrary power tries to penetrate them, and create a security 
  
RULE: A prudent legislator shall harmonize the requirements of justice, expediency and 
juridical security, whenever possible. 
 
     After having obtained the acceptable things to say, the things to say acceptable only 
in appearance (sophisms), the last item of the promptuary will be dealt with next. 
 
6.  Sophisms 
 
     Here follows a discussion over sophisms in general and, in particular, over 
legislative sophisms in the wide sense (deliberative sophisms and legislative sophisms 
in the strict sense). 
 
      a. Sophisms in general   
 
     The things to say or already said, acceptable only in appearance, are called sophisms, 
because they were used in ancient Greece times by certain itinerant teachers of rhetoric, 
the sophists, who, in exchange for money, promised to teach the art of winning any 
discussion (eristics), both with acceptable things and with things acceptable only in 
appearance, since they and their disciples preferred to appear as wise persons without 
being so, rather than to be wise persons without appearing as such, according to the 
interpretation of Plato545 and Aristotle546 about the sophists. They are also called 
                                                                                                                                               
state on the foundations of a completely unjust law, security disappears, the bad law is violated, and 
resistance is organized, to culminate, in extreme cases, with a revolution and the violent rupture of an 
unbearable situation. What was said as regards the whole juridical system, may be said as regards any 
norm in isolation. The authority is capable of applying coactively an unjust law; but if the injustice of the 
precept goes beyond certain limit, its recipients refuse to comply with it, and violate it systematically." 
Translation from Spanish to English by the author of this book. 
"Es posible que en una sociedad injustamente organizada impere el orden; el poder logrará quizás 
imponerlo momentáneamente; pero la paz aparente, fundada en el temor, y el orden impuesto por la 
fuerza, tendrán vida muy efímera. El conflicto entre justicia y seguridad jurídica se da siempre dentro de 
ciertos límites, muy cercanos entre sí. Cuando un poder arbitrario intente traspasarlos, y crear un estado 
de seguridad sobre los cimientos de un derecho completamente injusto, la seguridad desaparece, la ley 
mala es violada, y la resistencia se organiza, para culminar, en casos extremos, con la revolución y la 
ruptura violenta de una situación insostenible. Lo que se afirma en relación con todo un sistema jurídico, 
puede decirse en relación con cualquier norma aislada. La autoridad es capaz de aplicar coactivamente 
una ley injusta; pero si la injusticia del precepto va mas allá de cierto límite, sus destinatarios se resisten a 
cumplirla, y lo violan sistemáticamente." 
Eduardo García Maynez, El Problema Filosófico-Jurídico de la Validez del Derecho, Imprenta Mundial, 
México, 1935, p. 85. 
545Plato, The Sophist, 268c. 
Platon, Le Sophiste, 268c, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon 
Robin avec la collaboration de M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, T. II, pp. 337-338. 
546Aristotle, On Fallacies, 1, 165a20-30. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, I., with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 5. 
Aristotle, On Fallacies, 1, 165a 20-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 279. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 1, 165a20-30, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 310-311. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 1, 165a 20-30, da Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, pp. 648-649. 
 fallacies, because the Latin word fallacia means “deceit“547 and because it comes from 
the Greek sphal, "cause of the fall", related to the struggle, but also used to express 
"cause of the fall due to argument".548 
     The things to say or already said, acceptable in appearance only (sophisms), conceal 
defects that, if noticed, would make them unacceptable. They must be studied to avoid 
deceit, not to teach how to cause them, like poisons are studied in medicine: to treat 
illnesses or to discover crimes, not to teach how illness may be worsened or injuries and 
murders committed. Thus,  potentially cheated dividuals will be able to know in 
advance the diagnosis and therapy applicable to sophisms, whether they be provoked by 
involuntary errors (of their own or of third parties) or voluntarily by third parties 
(simulations and dissimulations). 
 
PRINCIPLE: Sophisms shall to be studied in order to refute them, not to commit them. 
 
PRINCIPLE: Legislators and advisers shall not let themselves be deceived by sophisms, 
shall not cheat others, and shall prevent others from deceiving themselves or from 
cheating others.549 
      
                                                                                                                                               
The target of Aristotle's attacks would not be the sophists of the first generation (Protagoras, Gorgias, 
Hippias, etc.), but the Megarians. 
Aristóteles, Les réfutations sophistiques, 1, 165a 20-30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par 
Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de 
l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, Introduction, pp. 52-53; 111-112; pp. 120-121. 
Without having to determine if the target there were two generations of sophists, only the first one, or 
only the second one, it is not possible to forget the Megarians, a Socratic school of philosophy founded by 
Euclides of Megara (c 450-380 B.C.), since: 
1) in the discussions they were attacking, generally with questions, not the premises, but the conclusions 
of the adversary, leading him to contradict these: 
Anton Dumitriu, History of Logic, Revised, updated and enlarged translation of the second edition of the 
single volume Roumanian work, Istoria Logicii, by Anton Dumitriu, published by Editura Didactica, 
Bucarest, 1975, Translated by Duiliu Zamfirescu, Dinu Giurcaneanu, Doina Doneaud; translation edited 
by the staff of Abacus Press, England, printed in Roumania, Volume I, pp. 130-131; 
2) "megarian questions" was the nickname given to sophistry: 
The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third Edition, Edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, megarian school, p. 951; 
3) Eubulides of Miletus, disciple of Eucleides of Megara, was Aristotle's enemy and often criticized him: 
Diogène Laercë, Vie, Doctrines et Sentences des Philosophes Illustres, Traduction, notice et notes par 
Robert Genaille, Garnier-Flamarion, Vol. I, Paris, 1965, p. 143. 
547Félix Gaffiot, Dictionnaire Illustré Latin Français, Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1967, p. 651. 
548Douglas Walton, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy, The University of Alabama Presss, Tuscaloosa and 
London, 1995, p. 250. 
549Aristóteles, On Fallacies, 1, 165a24-25. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, I, pp. 4-5. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 
1984, Second Printing, 1985, 1, 165a 24-25, p. 279. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, 
Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, 1, 165 a 24-25, p. 311. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, 1, 
165 24-25, pp. 648-649. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, 
Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-
France, France, 1995, 1, 165a 24-25, p. 120. 
      The study of sophisms in certain opinions acceptable only in appearance, will begin 
with the Colours of Good and Evil, dealt with in the book Of the Dignity and 
Advancement of Learning (De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum), of Francis 
Bacon.550 The study of the sophisms in general will be based on Aristotle’s Sophistical 
Refutations.551 Neither of these works will be exposed completely, nor will the study of 
sophisms be reduced to them; they will be just the starting point. 
     Refutations may be normal or pathological. Normal refutations contradict the 
sayings of others with arguments. Sophistical Refutations belong to the genre of the 
occult pathological arguments: they are apparent refutations. 
     It has already been said, when dealing with the integral parts of the Promptuary, that 
opinions may paint themselves up with the colors of good and evil to motivate conducts 
and, also, to pretend acceptability and conceal defects (sophisms). Bacon wrote a set of 
twelve examples of sophisms in the opinions, with their corresponding "answers" 
(refutations), of which only two will be transcribed, the first and the fifth ones, as a 
genuine sample of the aforesaid set. 
 
EXAMPLES: 
 
           "Examples of the Colours of Good and Evil, both Simple and Comparative. 
 
                                                               “SOPHISM 
1. What men praise and honour is good; what they dispraise and condemn is evil. 
 
                                                                  ANSWER. 
 This Sophism deceives in four ways; by reason of ignorance, of bad faith, of party spirit 
and factions, of the natural dispositions of those who praise and blame. By reason of ignorance;  
for what is popular judgment worth as a test of good and evil? Better was Phocion's inference, 
who when the people applauded him more than usual, asked whether he had done wrong.1 By 
reason of bad faith, because in praising and blaming, men are commonly thinking of their own  
business, and not speaking what they think.  
Laudat venales, qui vult extrudere, merces.2 
 And again; "It is naught, it is naught (says de buyer); but when he is gone his way, he 
will vaunt."3 By reason of factions; for any man may see that men are wont to exalt those of 
                                                 
550[Bacon], The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, 
and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of the Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Of the Dignity and 
Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, 
pp. 458-472. 
551Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, 252 pp. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation,  
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 
1984, Second Printing, pp. 278-314. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, 
Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 307-382. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, da Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, Milano, 
pp. 647-725; pp. 1007-1030. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, 
Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-
France, France, 1995, X pp; 476 pp. 
Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, 
State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, XV pp; 248 pp. 
 
 their own party with immoderate praises, and depress below their desert those of the contrary. 
By reason of natural disposition; for some men are by nature formed and composed for servile 
adulation, while others on the contrary are crabbed and captious; so that in praising and blaming 
they do but gratify their own dispositions, with little regard for truth. 
1 Plutarch, in Phocion, c. 8.  
2 Hor. Ep. ii 2. 11. [The merchant praises what he wants to sell.] 
3 Proverbs, xx. 14.”552 
 
"SOPHISM. 
 
      5. That which the other parties or sects agree in giving the second place (each 
putting itself first) seems to be the best; for it seems that in taking the first place they are moved  
by zeal and partiality, but in bestowing the second by truth and merit. 
      So Cicero argues that the sect of the Academics, which maintained the impossibility  
of comprehending truth, was the best of the philosophies. "For (said he) ask the Stoic which is 
the best philosophy, and he will prefer his own to the rest; then ask him which is the next best, 
and he will acknowledge the Academic. So again the Epicurean (who will hardly deing to look 
at a Stoic), after he has placed his own philosophy at the head, will place the Academic next."1 
In like manner, when a place is vacant, if the prince ask to each candidate whom he would most 
recommended next to himself, it is probable that their second votes would meet in the most able 
and deserving man. 
 
                                                                    ANSWER. 
 
      This sophism deceives by reason of envy. For next to themselves and their own 
party, men generally incline to those who are weakest and least formidable, and have given 
them least trouble; in despite of those who have most insulted or inconvenienced them. 
1. Cf. the fragment of the Academ. ad Verr. preserved by St. Augustine."553 
 
         In classical tradition, the examples of sophisms are usually taken from the 
dialogue Euthydemus or The Disputant, by Plato554 and the systematic method, with its 
rules, from the work On the Sophistical Refutations (Sophistici Elenchi, in Latin 
transliteration), by Aristotle.555 The words elenchi and sophistici in the title, whether 
                                                 
552Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and 
Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Of the Dignity and 
Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, 
p. 459. 
553Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, 
and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Of the Dignity and 
Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, 
pp. 461-462. 
554Euthydème ou le Disputeur, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par 
Léon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque De La Pléiade, Édition de la Nouvelle 
Revue Française, Paris, 1950, Paris, T. I, pp. 559-611, notes, pp. 1295-1303. 
"[...] the most famous thesaurus of sophisms in Greek literature is Plato's Euthydemus." 
Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, A Study of Post-
Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Volume I, The Greek Tradition, E.J. Brill, 
Leiden, 1981, p. 15,  
555Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 1-95, n. 97-172. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 
1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 278-314. 
 included by the author, its publishers or commentators, provide a good synthesis of the 
main content of the work. 
       Refutation was the most important of five targets enunciated by Aristotle to gain 
discussions; it is in the title because it is the main topic (twenty-five out                                                               
of thirty four Chapters), which eclipses the others four targets, which are briefly 
discussed (to make the adversary incur in: paradoxes, falsities, solecisms and 
mechanical repetitions of the same words).556 Elenchus is a transliteration to Latin of a 
Greek term,557 which, among other meanings, means "refutation", but also "catalog".558 
In addition to being used as a transliteration, in Latin, one of its two meanings is 
"appendix of a book".559 The translation "Sophistical Refutations" indicates that they are 
of a special type, different from dialectical refutations in general and from those of 
Socrates and Plato in particular. Sophistical Refutations is not an independent work, but 
a part of the Topics, not only because the author himself560 and several of his 
commentators561 say so, but also because,  the author does so. In the Topics he presents 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, en Tratados De Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, 
Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 307-384. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, da Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, 
pp. 645-725, n. pp. 1005-1030. 
For a comparison between the Eutidemo and the Sophistical Refutations, see: 
Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de 
Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, 
France, 1995, pp. 91-104. 
556Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, A Study of Post-
Aristotelian Ancient And Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Volume I, The Greek Tradition, E.J. Brill, 
Leiden, 1981, p. 6. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, 
Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-
France, France, 1995, pp. 23-24. 
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William of Sherwood’s, Introduction to Logic, translated with introduction and notes by Norman 
Kretzmann, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966, p. 155, n. 129. 
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the cooperation of many scholars, At The Clarendon Press, New (ninth) Edition completed 1940, 
reprinted 1948, 1951, 1953, Oxford, p. 531. 
559Félix Gaffiot, Dictionnaire Illustré Latin Français, Librairie Hachette, "elenchus, i, m... appendice d'un 
livre", Paris, 1934, p. 581. 
560Aristóteles, Sophistical Refutations, 34, 183b10. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXXIV, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 93. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 34, 183b10, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 313. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 34, 183b 10, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 381. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 34, 183b10, Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 723. 
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Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 202. 
561
"[...] On Sophistical Refutations, an addendum to the Topics.", in: 
 a "catalog" of acceptable arguments (topic places) and the way to find them; and in 
Sophistical Refutations, a "catalog" of arguments acceptable in appearance only 
(sophistic places) and the way to refute them. These two catalogs differ in their content, 
but are identical as to the taxonomic method and the  purpose sought: to facilitate the 
finding of really acceptable normal arguments and refutations, to be used (Topics); and 
of pathological arguments and the apparent refutations, sophisms, which deceive about 
their acceptability, to facilitate the corresponding diagnosis and therapy (Sophistical 
Refutations). 
     The taxonomic method consists in the description of certain entities by means of a 
systematic classification and a transparent nomenclature (that facilitates visualization of 
the described entity) and concise (that facilitates memorizing), to "store" data about the 
respective entities and "to recover them" as information when it will be desirable to use 
them. Further examples of certain objects of study and their respective taxonomic 
disciplines are: the animal kingdom and zoology; the vegetable kingdom and botany; 
human health and medicine; law and juridical dogmatic. Under the taxonomic method 
two fundamental operations are clearly distinguished: the inclusion of a new entity as a 
species in the classification and the determination of a concrete specimen as belonging 
to some of the classified species; the rule for these operations is usually expressed with 
the following formula: species are classified, specimens are determined. The 
classification of sophisms species and the determination of their specimens may not be 
an easy task,562 but they should be regarded as two different operations. If a previous 
classification of the species did not exist, the concrete specimens could not be 
determined as belonging to any of them. But, if it turns out impossible to determine, 
then a new species will be created in the classification to include it in the catalog, in the 
corresponding place and with the appropriate nomenclature. 
     In the Topics, the taxonomic method allows to prepare a catalog of the species of 
really acceptable arguments and refutations, to facilitate their generation and use in 
speeches. The taxonomic method, in the Sophistical Refutations, makes it possible to 
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"[...] des Réfutations sophistiques, comme celles des Topiques don elles sont une sorte d'appendice [...]", 
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Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 89. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 312. 
Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 33, 182b30, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 378. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 33, 182b30, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 720. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 33, 182b30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 199. 
 catalog such arguments and refutations as are acceptable in appearance only, due to 
their defects or secret pathologies (sophisms),563 to facilitate the corresponding 
diagnosis and therapy.564 The diagnosis, which consists in determining the presence of 
some specimen of the species of sophisms in a speech, is facilitated because the catalog 
describes both the causes of the appearance of acceptability and the secret defects that 
they endure.565 The therapy is facilitated because suitable answers are described for 
every species in the catalog. Aristotle, who foresaw the difficulty of detecting and 
resolving sophisms in the heat of a debate,566  dedicated nine chapters of his Sophistical 
Refutations to indications to recognize (diagnosis) the sophisms (apparent normality 
and secret pathology), and fifteen chapters to prepare answers intended to resolve them 
                                                 
563“A catalogue of the varieties of apparent evidence which are not real evidence, is an enumeration of 
Fallacies." 
John Stuart Mill, System of Logic Rationative and Inductive, in two volumes, Longmans, Green, Reader, 
And Dyerr, Vol. II, London, 1872, p. 300. 
564The plan of exposition in the Sophistical Refutations or On Fallacies is not given by the division of the 
Chapters as the point of view of the one that asks about (1-15) and of the one that answers (Chapters 16-
34), but from the point of view only of the one that answers: a description of the pathological symptoms 
of the respective sophisms (4-11), to facilitate the diagnosis to him; and a description of the 
corresponding recommended treatment (16-33), to facilitate the therapy to him. Works of medicine 
always describe the symptoms of the illnesses and the treatments recommended from the point of view of 
the medical doctor, who must diagnose and recommend the therapy, although the symptoms are endured -
and even sometimes reported- by the patients. 
565Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b5. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXXIII, with a Translation and Notes by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 89. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 311. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 33, 182b 5, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 376-377. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 33, 182b5, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 719. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 33, 182b5, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 197. 
Saint Thomas d-Aquin, Sur les tromperies, á quelques nobles artistes, traduction par Yvan Pelletier, 
Chapitre IV, #645, dans: www.profs.fr.ulaval.ca/YPelletier/site_yp/Textes/trad/Tromperies.pdf, p. 8; de 
Divi Thomae Aquinatis, "Opuscula Philosophica", Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzo, O.P., 
Torino, Marietti, 1954. pp. 223-240, según e@mail del profesor Pelletier de fecha 23/08/04. 
Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, 
State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 81. 
566Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 16, 175a20.  
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XVI, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 53. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 16, 175a20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 297. 
Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 16, 175a20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 348. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 16, 175a20, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 688. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 16, 175a20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, pp. 161-162. 
 when the occasion arises (recommended therapy).567 Many of the works that deal with 
sophisms fail to include the above mentioned answers in the catalog, and leave the 
therapy freed at random to the improvisation, that is to say, out of the art of refutation. 
     In the Topics, the acceptability is based on the maxims that guarantee it, such as 
"what is attributed to the genre, is also attributed to the species". Topical maxims are 
distinguished and denominated for the differences that they present between themselves: 
genre, species, whole, part, etc. 
     The topical maxim of the genre allows arguing: "if Socrates is a man, then he is 
mortal".568 The sophistic maxim of the species: "what is attributed to the species is also 
attributed to the genre", does not allow to be argued validly:" if Socrates is mortal, then 
he is a mortal", because there are mortal beings that are not men, like animals, since the 
maxim could refer, for example, to a pet called "Socrates". Topical maxims and 
acceptable premises are usually omitted on account of their obviousness, and make 
room for enthymemes. Sophistic maxims and unacceptable premises also are omitted, 
but for different reasons, not because of their obviousness, but because if they were 
explicit they would stop cheating, since the secret defect in the argumentation or 
refutation would become clear; this is why sophisms are apparent –not real– 
enthymemes. In the example of Socrates, the relation between genre and species, valid 
in the topical maxim and invalid in the sophistic maxim, is the cause of the apparent 
acceptability, since the sophistic maxim remains secret and the topical maxim appears 
in implicit form, due the relation between genre and species, but without the valid logic 
relation being distinguished from the invalid one, thus provoking deceit through 
confusion. 
     The method of the Sophistical Refutations, like that of the Topics, consists in the 
anticipated preparation of a catalog, which also integrates the Promptuary. 
      
RULE: The catalog of sophisms shall contain the taxonomy of their species, as if it 
were a vademecum of pathological medicine,569 and shall make explicit: 
a) both the causes for the apparent acceptability and the pathologies or secret defects 
endured by every sophism species, to facilitate the determination of the specimens that 
will appear in the speeches (diagnosis); 
                                                 
567Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, Chapters 1,4-11; and 16-30, respectively. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 1,4-11; 16-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 278, 280-292; pp. 297-310. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, I, IV-XI; XVI-XXXIII, with a Translation and Notes, by 
Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 2-5, 7-41; 50-85. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 1,4-11; 16-30, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 309, 312-339; pp.348-373. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 1, 4-11; 16-30, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, pp. 647-648, 650-677; pp. 687-716. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 1, 4-11; 16-30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, pp. 119-121, 124-150; pp. 161-192.  
568Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Sur les tromperies, á quelques nobles artistes, traduction par Yvan Pelletier, 
Chapitre 4, #644, en www.profs.fr.ulaval.ca/YPelletier/site_yp/Textes/trad/Tromperies.pdf, pp. 7-8; de 
Divi Thomae Aquinatis, "Opuscula Philosophica", Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzo, O.P., 
Torino, Marietti, 1954. pp. 223-240, según correo electrónico del profesor Pelletier, de fecha 23/08/04. 
569Brunschwig qualifies Aristotle's Topics as a "vademecum of the perfect dialecticalician", Aristote 
Topiques, Tome I, Livres I - IV, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les 
Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, p. IX. 
 b) the abstract refutations applicable towards every sophism species, to facilitate the 
opportune concrete refutations of the sophism specimens determined in the speeches, 
without having to improvise the refutations (recommended therapy);      
c) the inclusion of the respective sophism species of in an explanatory order based on 
the distinction between those that only depend and those that do not only depend on 
language to cause deceit (basic division), which facilitates the comprehension and 
memorization of the catalog; 
d) the denominations of sophism species: transparent, to visualize the concepts; and 
concise, to memorize them. 
 
RULE: Whenever in any speech the existence of a specimen of any of the sophism 
species in the catalog is determinated (diagnosis), then it shall be possible to remember 
or to consult also the adequate answer for its opportune refutation, without having to 
improvise the latter (recommended therapy). 
 
RULE: Whenever in the analysis of any speech both the cause of the apparent 
acceptability and the secret defect are made explicit, but it is impossible to determine as 
a specimen of any of the species in the catalog of sophisms (diagnosis), then a new 
sophism species will be classified, to which end: 
a) it will be included in the catalog, as dependent on or independent from language, as 
the case may be; 
b) it will be named in a transparent and concise way; 
c) the adequate answer shall be indicated (recommended therapy)for the opportune 
refutation of another specimen, without having to improvise it. 
 
     Sophisms are usually ordained on the basis of the distinction between those that only 
depend and those that do not depend on language only to cause deceit.570 Although it is 
true that all sophisms depend on language to be expressed, some of them, also, depend 
only on language to cause deceit. Aristotle, the origin of the aforesaid order, enumerates 
thirteen sophisms species; six that only depend on language: homonymy, amphibology, 
combination, division, accentuation and form of expression; and seven that do not 
depend on language only to cause deceive: accident, absolute and not absolute sense, 
consequent, petition of principle (petitio principii), cause that is not a cause, several 
questions in one, and ignorance of the refutation (ignoratio elenchi);571 but he thinks 
                                                 
570Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b20. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 7. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b20-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 280. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 165b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 312-313. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 165b 20-25, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, pp. 650-680; p. 650. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 4, 165b23-25, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 124. 
571Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b25; 166b20. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV; V, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 7; p. 11. 
 that all the species may come down to only one: ignorance of the refutation.572 
Excessive vagueness is added by the author of the present book as the seventh sophism 
that depends on language to cause deceit. 
     Next, under the concise style of a vademecum, the catalog of the sophisms will be 
exposed, divided into two parts: those that only depend and those that do not depend on 
language only to cause deceit. 
 
     Sophisms that depend on language only to cause deceit 
 
           Sophism of excessive vagueness573 
 
           diagnosis: 
             apparent normality:                a word or phrase is used as if it had a precise 
                                                            field of application;  
             secret pathology:                    the field of application of the word or phrase is so  
                                                            doubtful that it exceeds the area of admissible  
                                                            half-light (excessive vagueness); 
 
           recommended therapy:            to reduce the excessive vagueness: in quantitative   
                                                            concepts, use numbers; and in qualitative  
                                                            concepts, enunciate all the species (divisio), all the 
                                                            parts (partitio), or replace them with quantitative 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b25; 166b20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 280; p. 281. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 165b25; 166b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 313; p. 317. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 165b25; 166b20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 
1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 650; p. 654. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 165b25; 166b20, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par 
Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de 
l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 124; p. 127. 
572Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a15-20. 
Aristotle on Fallacies or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 19. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a15-20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 284. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a15-20, en Tratados de Lógica, Organon, I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 322. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a 15-20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 659. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 168a 17-20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 133.  
Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, 
State University of New York Press, New York 2003, for it it supports that are twelve sophisms, Preface, 
p. xiii. 3, and n. 13, p. 192. In the pp. 72-74; p. 80; pp. 90-92; 206 n. 18, implicitly reduce them to eleven, 
since he believes that two sophisms, composition and division, are two different descriptions of the same 
sophism, as he interprets Aristotle to have considered in Rhetoric II, 24. 
573Aristotle does not distinguish vagueness from homonymy. 
 
                                                             concepts 
 
           example of  vagueness:           if in towns life is calmer than in cities 
                                                            and XX is a town, then life in XX is calmer; 
 
           diagnosis: 
             apparent normality:               the words "towns" and "cities" are used as if  
                                                            the difference between them was precise; 
             secret pathology:                   "towns" and "cities" are words that endure an 
                                                            excessive ambiguity because, in many cases, it is 
                                                            not known when to apply one or the other: Is XX  
                                                            a town or a city?; 
 
           recommended therapy:            if life is calmer where there are less than one  
                                                            hundred thousand inhabitants and XX has less  
                                                            than one hundred thousand inhabitants, then life is  
                                                            calmer in XX. 
 
RULE: Whenever a word or phrase is used as if it had a precise field of application 
(apparent normality), but the latter is so doubtful that it exceeds the area of admissible 
half-light (secret pathology), then the sophism of the excessive ambiguity shall be 
incurred  in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for excessive vagueness sophisms shall consist, 
when concepts are: 
a) quantitative, in the use numbers; 
b) qualitative, in the expression of all the species (divisio), or of all the parts (partitio) 
or in their replacement by quantitative concepts. 
 
     Sophism of semantic ambiguity (homonymy) 
 
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:               a phrase is used as if it had only one meaning; 
              secret pathology:                   semantic ambiguity of the word (homonymy); 
 
           recommended therapy:             to eliminate semantic ambiguity by substituting 
                                                             homonymous words by unequivocal ones, to  
                                                             formulate definitions, or make homonymy  
                                                             explicit; 
            
           example of homonymy:            if eagles are hunted and this is an eagle  
                                                             specimen,574 then this specimen is hunted; 
                                                 
574The word "eagle", as an example of homonymy in fallacies, but without it being used as such, may be 
found in: 
Edward Poste, Aristotle o Fallacies o The Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 19. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a 15-20, in The Complete Works Of Aristotle. The Revised 
Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 284. 
  
 
           diagnosis 
              apparent normality:                the word "eagles" is used as if referred to  
                                                             an animals species only; 
              secret pathology:                    "eagles" may refer both to certain birds and 
                                                             to certain fish; 
 
           recommended therapy:              make the homonymy of the word "eagles"  
                                                              explicit and transform the sophism into an  
                                                              acceptable argument: 
                                                              if birds are hunted and fish are fished, and  
                                                              word "eagles" is used to refer both to  
                                                              birds aand to fish, then "eagles" that are 
                                                              birds are hunted and "eagles" that 
                                                              are fish are fished; 
 
RULE: Whenever a word is used as if had only one meaning (apparent normality), but 
with more than one meaning (secret pathology), then the sophism of semantic ambiguity 
shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of semantic ambiguity (homonimy) 
shall consist in replacing homonymous words for unequivocal others, in defining them, 
or in making homonymy explicit. 
 
     Sophism of syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) 
         
           diagnosis: 
             apparent normality:                 a phrase is used as if it had only one meaning;                                          
             secret pathology:                     syntactic ambiguity of the phrase (amphibology);  
 
           recommended therapy:              to eliminate the syntactic ambiguity  
                                                             (amphibology), change words order or join them  
                                                             with other grammatical particles, or make  
                                                             amphibology explicit; 
                                                                                                
           example of amphibology:         if Aristotle´s books are good and this is    
                                                             an Aristotle’s book, then this book is good; 
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:               the formula "Aristotle's books"575 is used as if 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a 15-20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 322. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a 15-20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 659. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 168a 17-20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 133. 
575For "Aristotle's book" in singular, as an example of an ambiguous phrase, see: 
Sur les tromperies, á quelques nobles artistes, par saint Thomas d'Aquin, traduction par Yvan Pelletier, 
Chapitre 7, #652, en www.profs.fr.ulaval.ca/YPelletier/site_yp/Textes/trad/Tromperies.pdf, p. 11; de Divi 
                                                              if it had only one meaning; 
              secret pathology:                   it may be interpreted that it means "books the  
                                                             property of which belong to Aristotle"," books the 
                                                             authorship of which belong to Aristotle" or 
                                                             “books the property and authorship of which  
                                                             belong to Aristotle"; 
                                                                                                   
           recommended therapy:             make the amphibology of the phrase "Aristotle’s   
                                                             books" explicit and transform the sophism into 
                                                             an acceptable argument: 
                                                              
                                                             if the books the property of which belong to  
                                                             Aristotle are good and this book is Aristotle’s  
                                                             Property, then this book is good; 
                              
                                                             if the books the author of which is Aristotle are  
                                                             good and this book is of Aristotle´s authorship, 
                                                             then this book is good; 
 
                                                             if the books the property and authorship of which 
                                                             belong to Aristotle are good and this book is of   
                                                             Aristotle’s property and authorship, 
                                                             then this book is good. 
                                                              
RULE: When a phrase is used as if it had only one meaning (apparent normality), but 
with more than one meaning due to its syntactic ambiguity (secret pathology), then the 
sophism of syntactic ambiguity or amphibology shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) 
shall consist in changing the words orders, in joining words with other unequivocal 
grammatical particles in the respective context, or in making the amphibology explicit. 
 
     Sophism of combination (or composition)576 
 
           diagnosis: 
               apparent normality:              as they are pronounced,577 the terms of an  
                                                             initial expression that was divided, are combined 
                                                             as if the resulting meaning does not change; 
                                                                                                                                               
Thomae Aquinatis, "Opuscula Philosophica", Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzo, O.P., Torino, 
Marietti, 1954. pp. 223-240, according to Professor Pelletier email of 08/23//2004. 
576It uses “combination”: 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. 
They use “composition“: 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VII with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 25.Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 20, 177b20, en Tratados de 
Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, 
Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 358. 
577William of Sherwood’s, Introduction to Logic, translated with introduction and notes by Norman 
Kretzmann, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966, 3.1.3., pp. 140-141, 141, n. 52. 
                secret pathology:                   although it is true that often the combination of 
                                                             the terms of an expression does not change the  
                                                             resulting meaning, sometimes it does;578 
 
               recommended therapy:         to divide expressions combined later as they were  
                                                             before, to make explicit the difference of the  
                                                             meaning of both expressions (divided and  
                                                             combined), to ratify that only the (true) divided  
                                                             expression and not the (false) combined  
                                                             expression was accepted; 
                                                   
           example of combination:          is it true to say now you_have_been born? 
                                                                ("now” divided from “you have been born”) 
                                                             −Yes. 
                                                             −Then now_you_have_been born. 
                                                                ("now” combined with “you have been  
                                                                 born”)579 
                                             
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:                it is assumed that: 
                                                             “to say now you_have_been-born”, and 
                                                             “to say now_you_have_been-born” have the same 
                                                             meaning; 
              secret pathology:                   divided, it is a true expression: 
                                                             (“It is true to say now you_have_been-born”); 
                                                             combined, it turns out to be a different 
                                                 
578Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25; 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VII with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 25. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 7, 169a25, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 664. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 169a25, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 326. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 7, 166a25, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 137. 
579Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 20, 177b20; 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XX, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 63. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 20, 177b20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 302. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 20, 177b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 358. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 20, 177b20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 698. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 20, 177b20, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 173. 
                                                              expression, which is false: 
                                                             (“To say now_you_have_been-born”);                                     
 
            recommended therapy:             to divide “It is true to say 
                                                             now_you_have_been-born”,  
                                                             which is a false expression, to explain that it is  
                                                             not the same to say “It Is true to say now 
                                                             you_have_been-born”, which is a true expression,  
                                                             and the only one that was accepted. 
 
RULE: When, as it is pronounced an initially divided expression is combined as if this 
combination does not change the resulting meaning (apparent normality), but the 
meaning changes, the sophism of combination shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for the sophism of combination shall consist in 
dividing the expression combined later, as it was at the beginning (divided); in making 
explicit the difference of the meaning of both expressions (divided and combined); in 
confirming that only the divided expression, as it was at the beginning (true), not the 
expression combined later (false) was accepted. 
      
     Sophism of division 
 
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:               as they are pronounced,580 the terms of  
                                                             an initially combined expression are divided, as if   
                                                             this does not change the resulting meaning; 
               secret pathology:                  although it is true that often the division of 
                                                             the terms of an expression does not change 
                                                             the resulting meaning, sometimes it does;581 
 
           recommended therapy:             to combine expressions divided later as they were  
                                                             before, to make explicit the difference of the  
                                                             meaning of both expressions (combined and  
                                                             divided), to ratify that only the (true) combined  
                                                             expression, not the (false) divided expression was  
                                                             accepted; 
                                                 
580William of Sherwood’s, Introduction to Logic, translated with introduction and notes by Norman 
Kretzmann, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966, 3.1.3., pp. 140-141, 141, n. 52. 
581Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25; 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VII with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 25. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 169a25, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 326.Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 7, 169a25, 
Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 664. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 7, 166a25, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 137. 
  
           example of division:                −May a number be simultaneously a pair and an  
                                                              odd? 
                                                            −No. 
                                                            −But isn’five two_and_three? 
                                                            −Yes. 
                                                            −And are not two and three respectively a pair and  
                                                              an odd number? 
                                                            −Yes. 
                                                            −Then five is a pair and an odd number;582                                                                                 
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:               it is assumed that “two_and_three and “two and  
                                                            three” have the same meaning; 
              secret pathology:                   "two_and_three" (combined) are five 
                                                             “two and three” (divided) are a pair and an odd 
 
           recommended therapy:            to divide “two_and_three are a pair and 
                                                            an odd”, which is a false expression, to explain  
                                                            that this not the same expression as “two and three  
                                                            are five”, which is a true expression and the only  
                                                            one that was accepted. 
 
RULE: Whenever, as it is pronounced an initially combined expression was combined, 
as if this does not change the resulting meaning (apparent normality), but the meaning 
does change, the sophism of division shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of division shall consist in combining 
the expression later divided, as it was at the beginning (combined); to make explicit the 
difference of the meaning of both expressions (combined and divided); to confirm that 
only the (true) combineded expression, as it were at the beginning, not the expression 
divided later (false) was accepted 
 
     Sophism of accentuation (more properly, "ambiguity" only in the written  
                                               speech with regard to the oral speech) 
 
           diagnosis: 
             apparent normality:                a word or phrase is used in the written speech as 
                                                 
582Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166a33-35. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV, Edward Poste, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 11. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166a33-36, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 166a33-35, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 314. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 166a30-35b, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, pp. 652-653. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 166a33-35, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 126. 
                                                              if it had only one meaning; 
              secret pathology:                   a word or phrase is used in an ambiguous way  
                                                             only in the written speech (it is written in like  
                                                             manner but may be given more than one  
                                                             meaning),583 despite the fact that in the oral  
                                                             speech it does not suffer from any ambiguity  
                                                             whatsoever (different pronunciation, according to  
                                                             the respective meaning);584 
 
           recommended therapy:             to eliminate the ambiguity of the written speech  
                                                             with signs of accentuation and punctuation to  
                                                             express, to the largest extent possible, the wealth  
                                                             and the tones of the voice and the gesture proper  
                                                             of oral speech; 
                                                      
           example:                                   in a Greek oral speech the word "ou" with a 
                                                             grave accent and a soft aspiration means "no" and,  
                                                             with a circumflex and inhaled accent, it means  
                                                             "where";585 before the widespread use of  
                                                             accentuation and punctuation signs, this case 
                                                             of ambiguity could appear only in the written 
                                                             speech; 
                               
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:                the place ou you inhabit it is obviously a house? 
                                                             Yes. 
                                                             And "ou you live:" is not the denial of "inhabit"? 
                                                             Yes. 
                                                             But you have said that ou you inhabit is a house. 
                                                             Yes. 
                                                             Then a house is a denial.                           
              secret pathology:                      in certain historic period the Greek  
                                                                pronunciations of denial (ou=no) and place  
                                                                (ou=where) adverbs were written in the same  
                                                                manner, which could provoke an ambiguity  
                                                                sophism in the written speech, although there  
                                                 
583Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical 
Refutations, 20, State University of New York Press, New York 2003, pp. 59-60. 
584Augustus de Morgan, Formal Logic or the Calculus of Inference Necessary and Probable, Taylor and 
Walton, London, 1847, Elibron Replica Edition, Adamant Media Corporation, 2003, considers that the  
fallacy of accent and that of prosody are the same and only one, p. 248 and that when a person quotes 
another one and omits or adds the signs that show the animus of the original meaning, irony, sarcasm, 
emphasis, etc., as well as when in this way he enhances his own assertions to imply more than he might 
say openly, he incurs in a "fallacia accentus", p. 249. 
585Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, XXI, p. 65. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a15-20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 359, n. 81. 
 
                                                                 was not any ambiguity in the oral speech; 
 
           recommended therapy:             to eliminate the ambiguity of the written Greek  
                                                             word " ou": 
                                                             the place hoû (where) you live is obviously 
                                                               a house? 
                                                             Yes. 
                                                             And it is not true that "ou you do not live" is 
                                                                a denial of "inhabit"? 
                                                             Yes. 
                                                             But you have said that the place hoû (where) you  
                                                               live is a house. 
                                                             Yes.  
                                                                  Then a house is not a denial. 
 
RULE: Whenever a word or phrase is used in the written speech as if it had only one  
meaning (apparent normality), but two or more meanings are distinguished in the oral 
speech by means of pronunciation (secret pathology), the sophism of accentuation shall 
be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE The therapy recommended for sophisms of accentuation shall consist in using 
the appropiate accentuation and punctuation orthographic signs to express the 
unequivocal oral speech. 
 
     Sophism of the form of expression (or word figure)586 
 
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:               an equal form of expression is used as if it were  
                                                             the explanation that the things to which it refers  
                                                             will also be equal;587                        
              secret pathology:                    an equal form of expression may refer to  
                                                             different grammatical categories (a masculine 
                                                             expression referred to a feminine thing, or vice  
                                                             versa, etc.), or to different categories of things   
                                                             (a qualitative expression referred to quality, or 
                                                             vice versa, etc.);588 this being the reason why 
                                                 
586Peter of Spain, Language in Dispute, An English Translation of Peter of Spain Tractatus Called 
Afterwords Summulae Logicales, VII, 88, word-figure (figura dictionis), Translated by Francis P. 
Dinnen, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelpia, p. 115.  
587Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 166b10, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 653. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 166b10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 126. 
588Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10-15. 
Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV, Edward Poste, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 11. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10-15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. 
                                                              deceit is produced as the equality of the things    
                                                             referred to is inferred from the equality of the  
                                                             form of expression, without any further  
                                                             arguments; 
 
           recommended therapy:             to differentiate the things to which reference is  
                                                             made in equal forms of expression, using  
                                                             grammatical categories (feminine and masculine  
                                                             genres, active and passive voice, etc.) or a  
                                                             category of things (action and passion, quality and  
                                                             quantity, etc.)589 to warn about the absence, or  
                                                             partial or total concordance, between language,  
                                                             thought and reality; 
 
           example:                                  "−it is perhaps possible that a passion be an action? 
                                                                   −No. 
                                                                   Then the expressions: it is chopped, it is burned, 
                                                                      it is affected by a sensitive object, are not perhaps  
                                                                      similar in their form, and not all of them indicate a  
                                                                      passion? On the other hand, the expressions: to say 
                                                                     [dire], to run [correre], to see [vedere], are similiar  
                                                                      to one another to the form. Nevertheless, it is true  
                                                                      that seeing is to be impressed by sensitive objects,  
                                                                      and [,] therefore seeing will be a passion and an  
                                                                      action at the same time.";590 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 166b10-15, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 316. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 166b10-15, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, pp. 653-654. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 166b10-15, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 126. 
589Aristóteles, Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a5; 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a5, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 359. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXII, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 65. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178a 5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 303. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 22, 178a 5, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 700. 
Aristóteles, Les réfutations sophistiques, 22, 178a 5, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 175. 
590Aristóteles, Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a 10; 
Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a 10, Tratados De Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 360. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle On Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXII, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 65. 
  
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:                to "say" [dire], to "run"[correre] and to "see"  
                                                             [vedere], are words with the same form of  
                                                             expression (the termination), this being the reason  
                                                             why all of them refer to actions; "it is burned",  
                                                             "it is chopped" and it is "affected" have the same  
                                                             form of expression "it is (...)ed", this being the  
                                                             reason why all the aforesaid forms of expression  
                                                             would refer to passions; 
              secret pathology:                    like the remaining senses (hearing, touch, taste  
                                                             and smell), sight, the capacity of seeing, is a  
                                                             passion ("to be affected by a sensitive object");  
                                                             this being the reason why deceit is produced as  
                                                             the equality of the thing referred to is inferred  
                                                             from the equality of the form of expression,  
                                                             without any further argument;  
     
           recommended therapy:             the apparent incompatibility between action and  
                                                             passion disappears if it is not taken for granted  
                                                             that seeing is an action and it is assumed that it is  
                                                             a passion (res), in spite of the form in which the  
                                                             word finishes (verba);591 in which case, there  
                                                             would not be any refutation. 
 
RULE: Whenever an equal form of expression is considered as if it were the 
explanation that the things to which it refers shall also be equal (apparent normality), 
but the equality of the things referred will not necessary follow the equality of the form 
of expression, without any further arguments (secret pathology), then the sophism of the 
form of expression shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178a 10, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 303. 
It has been used for the translation into English that appears in the main text between quotation marks: 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 22, 178a 10, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 700. 
Aristóteles, Les réfutations sophistiques, 22, 178a 10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 175.  
591Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 178th 15-25. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle On Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXII, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 65-66. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178a 10, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 303. 
Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a 10, Tratados De Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 360. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 22, 178a 10, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 700. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 22, 178a 10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 175-176. 
 RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of the form of expression shall consist 
in differentiating the objects to which reference is made in equal form of expression, for 
which purpose grammatical categories (feminine and masculine genres, active and 
passive voice, etc.) or categories of things (action and passion, quality and quantity, 
etc.) shall be used, to warn about the absence partial or total congruity between 
language, thought and reality. 
 
     The general therapy for the sophisms which depends on language only to cause 
deceit;592 described above, may be formulated in this way: 
PRINCIPLE: The therapy recommended for any sophism that depends on language only 
to cause deceit, shall consist in supporting an admissible interpretation, opposite to the 
secret pathology chosen to produce the sophism and in interpreting:  
a) the excessive vagueness of the significant, with a meaning opposite to the meaning 
chosen in the sophism;  
b) the semantic or syntactic ambiguity, with an opposite meaning admitted by the 
meaning chosen in the sophism; 
c) the composition chosen in the sophism, with the division and the division chosen in 
the sophism, with the composition;   
d) the grave accent chosen in the sophism, with the acute accent and the acute accent 
chosen in the sophism, with the grave accent; 
e) the form of expression chosen in the sophism, with the form of the opposite 
expression. 
 
     Sophisms that do not depend on language only to cause deceit 
 
     It has been said before that it is true that all sophisms express themselves by means 
of language, although some of them depend on language only to cause deceive and 
others not. Hre follows a description of the latter, namely: sophisms of the accident, of 
the absolute and not absolute sense, of begging the question, of the consequent, of a 
cause that is not a cause, of several questions in only one, and of ignorance of the 
refutation. 
 
      Sophism of the accident 
 
      diagnosis:  
        apparent normality:                     it is upheld that "[...] an attribute whatsoever is 
                                                                  considered to belongs in the same way to the subject  
                                                                  and to the accident";593 
                                                 
592Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 23, 179a11. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXIII, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 70-71. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 23, 179a11-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised 
Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 305. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 23,179a11-25, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 363-364. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 23, 179a11-25, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, pp. 704-705. 
Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 23, 179a11-25, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 179. 
         secret pathology:                         "[...] as the same subject receives numerous accidents,  
                                                                  it is not necessary that all the same attributes belong  
                                                                  simultaneously to all predicates and to the subject 
                                                                  with regard to which they are predicated.";594 
 
      recommended therapy:                  to show with a counter example that the  
                                                             conclusion does not necessarily follow from the 
                                                             premises;595 
      
      example:                                        if a triangle has angles equal to two recta  
                                                             and a triangle is a figure, 
                                                                                                                                               
593Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5,166b28. 
"[...] un attribut quelconque est considéré appartenir de la même façon au sujet et à l'accident.": 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 166b28, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 128. Translation from French to English by the author of this 
book.  
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 13. Translation from french to english by the author of this book. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b30, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 166b28, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 317. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 166b30, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 
2003, p. 654.  
594Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b30.  
"[...] comme le même sujet reçoit de nombreux accidentes, il n'est pas nécessaire que tous les mêmes 
attributs appartiennent à la fois à tous les prédicats et au sujet dont ils sont prédiqués.": 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 166b30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 128. Translation from French to English by the author of this 
book. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 13. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 166b30, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 654. 
Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 
Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 
317. 
595Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations,24, 179a30. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXIV, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 73. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 24, 179a30, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 305. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 24, 179a30, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 364.Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 24, 179a30, 
Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 705-706. 
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                                                              then a figure has angles equal to two recta;596                                                   
 
      diagnosis:                                
        apparent normality:                     since the form of the sophism is similar to that of   
                                                             a valid syllogism (antecedent: if a triangle has  
                                                             angles equal to two recta and a triangle is a  
                                                             figure) and the two propositions integrating the 
                                                             purported precedent are true, it turns out easy to  
                                                             make believe that the purported consequent  
                                                             necessarily follows and is also true, when it is  
                                                             actually false;597 
                                                                                                                      
      secret pathology:                           the second proposition integrating the purported  
                                                             antecedent, although as true as the first one, is  
                                                             predicated as an accident,598 which does not allow 
                                                             for convertibility with the respective subject (all 
                                                             triangles are figures but not all figures are 
                                                             triangles), since for a figure it is an "accident" to  
                                                             be a triangle, which prevents the purported  
                                                             conclusion to be validly inferred (all the figures  
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First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 285. 
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Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 323. 
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Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 134. 
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598Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73a35-b24. 
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                                                              have angles equal to two recta), since the angles 
                                                             are equal to recta because the figure is a triangle,  
                                                             not merely a figure;599 
     
      recommended therapy:                  to mention at least a geometric figure with 
                                                             angles not equal to two recta like, for example, a 
                                                             square. 
 
RULE: Whenever an attribute is considered to belong in the same way to the subject 
and to the accident (apparent normality), but it were a predicate by accident, which shall 
not allow for convertibility between subject and predicate (secret pathology), the 
sophism of the accident shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of the accident shall consist in 
mentioning at least one counter example, to prove that the purported conclusion shall 
not necessarily follow from the purported premises. 
 
      Sophism of the absolute and not absolute sense 
 
           diagnosis: 
              apparent normality:                what is said to a certain extent (relative) is  
                                                             considered as if it had been said without any  
                                                             restriction (absolute);600                           
              secret pathology:                    the deduction of a contradiction does not exist  
                                                             because there are restrictions related to the object, 
                                                             aspect, place, manner or relation;601                                                            
                                                 
599Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a40. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, Vi, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 21. 
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           recommended therapy:             to examine the conclusion in the light of its 
                                                             purported contradictory one and to verify whether  
                                                             they deal  with the same thing, in the same  
                                                             manner or in the same relation;602 
 
      example:                                        If an Ethiopian is black and his teeth are white, 
                                                             then he is black and not black;603 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                     it would seem that it is the same to affirm that an  
                                                             Ethiopian is black, without qualification, and that   
                                                             an Ethiopian is of black skin, with qualification; 
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        secret pathology:                         this is not the case of an absolute term (an  
                                                             Ethiopian), despite the fact that it is presented  
                                                             without qualification, but of a relative term (the  
                                                             skin of the Ethiopian) opposed to other relative  
                                                             term (the Ethiopian’s teeth) and, as both refer to  
                                                             different things that can have different colors,  
                                                             there is no valid deduction of a contradiction  
                                                             between the first proposition of the purported  
                                                             antecedent and the purported conclusion, so that  
                                                             there is no a valid refutation either;                                                      
 
      recommended therapy:                  to examine the purported conclusion in the light  
                                                             of its apparent contradictory proposition and to  
                                                             show that it does not necessarily follow from the  
                                                             propositions  integrating the purported precedent,  
                                                             since it does not refer to the same thing (the  
                                                             Ethiopian) without qualification (absolute sense),  
                                                             but to two different colors (black and white) of  
                                                             two different things belonging to the Ethiopian  
                                                             (his skin and his teeth) and, because they are not  
                                                             the same thing, there is not deduction and,  
                                                             because they are not contradictory with regard to  
                                                             the same thing (the Ethiopian), there is not  
                                                             refutation either. 
                              
RULE: Whenever what was said to a certain extent (relatively), is considered to have 
been said without restriction (absolutely), or vice versa (apparent normality), but not 
with regard to the same thing, manner or relation (secret pathology), the sophism of the 
absolute and not absolute sense shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for the sophisms of the absolute and not absolute 
sense shall consist in examining the purported conclusion in view of its purported 
contradictory proposition, to verify if reference is made to the same thing, in the same 
manner, in the same relation. 
      
      Sophism of begging the question 
 
      diagnosis:                                                           
        apparent normality:                   that which started the discussion is petitioned,  
                                                          obtained and assumed as if it were a premise604 or a  
                                                 
604Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a37. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, 
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Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319. 
                                                           valid  conclusion 
                                                                                                                    
        secret pathology:                       the conclusion is not proved, because it is difficult  
                                                          to notice when the premise605 is equal to the point  
                                                          in issue to be proved or because the conclusion has 
                                                          been assumed; 
                                             
      recommended therapy:               if the maneuver were clear, the premise should not  
                                                          be granted; had it been granted, deny that the  
                                                          conclusion has been proved, having the point at  
                                                          issue been assumed in the premise606 or in the  
                                                           conclusion;  
                                                                         
      example:                                   “Banker: who can give your references? 
                                                          Client: my friend Jones can give them. 
                                                          Banker: how do we know that Jones may be  
                                                             reliable? 
                                                          Client: I assure you that Jones may be reliable”;607 
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      diagnosis:                                
        apparent normality:                 the client’s credibility based on the credibility of the 
                                                         person givig references is assumed as if it were a 
                                                         valid conclusion; 
  
        secret pathology:                      the banker asked for references because he needed 
                                                         to prove the client’s credibility on the basis of the 
                                                         statement of a third party, not of the client,  
                                                         whose credibility had to be proved; 
 
      recommended therapy:              the banker will have to ask for references from a  
                                                         third party whose credibility does not depend on the 
                                                         client’s statements.            
 
RULE: Whenever something equivalent to that which started the discussion is 
petitioned, obtained and assumed as if it were a valid premise, because the incapacity of 
the one who shall have granted it to distinguish the identical from the different 
(apparent normality), but the conclusion was postulated (secret pathology), then the 
sophism of begging the question shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for the sophisms of begging the question shall 
consist, should the maneuver be clear, in not granting the purported premise and, had it 
been granted, in denying that the conclusion has been proved, because the point at issue 
is assumed in the purported premise. 
 
      Sophism of the consequent 
 
       diagnosis:                                                                 
        apparent normality:                 the relation between antecedent and consequent is 
                                                         regarded convertible, so that if the consequent  
                                                         happens the antecedent necessarily happens;608 
        secret pathology:                      the relation between antecedent and consequent is  
                                                         not convertible, so that if the consequent happens,  
                                                         the antecedent does not necessarily happen;609  
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       recommended therapy:              to give at least one counter example;  
                                              
      example:                                    if, after raining, the land remains drenched and  
                                                         now the land remains drenched, then it has  
                                                         rained;610 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 the land soaked by water makes us assume that it has 
                                                         rained, which is the most frequent thing; 
        secret pathology:                     land may be soaked by water due to a cause  
                                                         different from rain; 
 
      recommended therapy:              to mention as counter example the land soaked by a  
                                                         flood caused by the opening of the floodgates of a  
                                                         dam during a drought. 
 
RULE: Whenever it is considered that the relation between antecedent and consequent 
is convertible in such a way that if the consequent happens the antecedent will 
necessarily happen (apparent normality), but the relation between the antecedent and 
consequent were not convertible (secret pathology), then the sophism of the consequent 
shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of the consequent shall consist in 
mentioning at least one counter example, to prove that the consequent does not 
necessarily follow from the antecedent. 
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          Sophism of a cause that is not a cause 
 
          diagnosis:                               
           apparent normality:                something is added to the speech as if it were the  
                                                        cause of the absurd conclusion;611 
           secret pathology:                    the thing added (a cause that is not a cause) to the  
                                                        speech does not make the absurd612 conclusion  
                                                        necessarily follow;  
                                                         
                                                          
          recommended therapy:             to suppress what was added in the speech as the  
                                                        cause of the absurd conclusion and to verify that the  
                                                        absurd conclusion remains, but necessarily follows  
                                                        from a different cause;613 
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Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 320. 
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Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
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       example:                                   if soul and life are the same thing, and generation is 
                                                        opposite to corruption, and a certain generation is  
                                                        the opposite to a certain corruption; and death is  
                                                        certain corruption opposite to life; then life is  
                                                        generation [change of a non existent substance for a  
                                                        new substance614] and living [process of change of a  
                                                        substance that persists during the process615] is to be  
                                                        generated (impossible conclusion); this being the  
                                                        reason why the statement that soul and the life are  
                                                        the same thing is refuted on the basis of absurdity; 
 
      diagnosis:                                 
        apparent normality:                 it turns out impossible that what has been generated 
                                                        (something previously nonexisting) and life (process  
                                                        of change of a substance that persists during the  
                                                        process) which are species of mutually exclusive  
                                                        changes, are equal (impossible conclusion); and on  
                                                        having presented it as if it had necessarily followed  
                                                        from the statement that “life and soul are the same  
                                                        thing”, it would seem that this statement was refuted  
                                                        on the basis of absurdity; 
        secret pathology:                    "life is generation and living is to be generated”  
                                                         (impossible conclusion) does not necessarily follow 
                                                         from the statement that “life and soul are the same  
                                                         thing” (a cause that is not a cause);                                                                                     
                                                                                                  
      recommended therapy:              to suppress “life and soul there are the same thing”  
                                                         (a cause that is not a cause) and to verify that “life is  
                                                         generation and living is to be generated” (impossible  
                                                         conclusion) also necessarily follows, but for a 
                                                         different cause; 
 
RULE: Whenever something is added in a speech as if it were the cause of the 
conclusion (apparent normality), but the conclusion did not necessarily follow from 
such addition (secret pathology), then the sophism of a cause that is not a cause shall be 
incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of a cause that is not a cause shall 
consist in suppressing what has been added and in verifying that the same conclusion 
will necessarily follow, but for a different cause. 
 
      Sophism of several questions in only one 
 
      diagnosis:                                 
        apparent normality:                 several questions are formulated as if they were only  
                                                         one616 calling for only one answer; 
                                                 
614In Aristotle's conception, Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in 
The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 108.  
615In Aristotle's conception, Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in 
The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 108. 
         secret pathology:                     it is ignored that a premise needs only one predicate  
                                                        for only one subject;617 
                                                       
      recommended therapy:              to distinguish the several questions from the  
                                                         beginning;618 
 
      example:                                     JOHN: if A is a good thing and B is a bad thing:  
                                                            are A and B good or bad? 
                                                         PETER: A and B are neither good nor bad,  
                                                            because A is not bad and B is not good; 
                                                         JOHN: then the same thing is at the same time  
                                                            good and bad, and neither good nor bad!; 
 
        
                                                                                                                                               
616Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXX, with to Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 83. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised 
Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 309. 
Aristotle, On the Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37, Treaties of Logic (Organon), I, Categories, 
Topics, Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 372. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 30, 181a36-37, Organon A Priest I gave Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 
1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 714. 
Aristote, They Réfutations Sophistiques, 30, 181a36-37, Introduction, traduction et commentaire pair 
Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de 
L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 191.  
617Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 169a15-16. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 23. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 169a15-16, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 169a15-16, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, 
Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 325. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 169a15-16, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 663-664;. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b6, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130.  
618Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37. 
Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXX, with a Translation and Notes, 
Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 83. 
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised 
Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 309. 
Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 30, 181a36-37, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, 
Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel 
Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 372. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 30, 181a36-37, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, 
Adelphi, 2003, p. 714. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 30, 181a36-37, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 191. 
         diagnosis: 
         apparent normality:                     as “good thing” and “bad thing” are two  
                                                             contradictory attributes presented as if they were  
                                                             predicates of the  two subjects "A" and "B", “then  
                                                             the same thing is at the same time good and bad,  
                                                             and neither good nor bad” seems to necessarily  
                                                             follow;  
         secret pathology:                        "A" and “B“ are “good things” with regard to "A"  
                                                             and bad things” with regard to "B", not in an  
                                                             absolute manner (“the same good and bad thing,  
                                                             and neither good nor bad”); 
 
      recommended therapy:                  to distinguish the relative sense from the  
                                                             beginning: good thing with regard to A and a bad  
                                                             thing with regard to B, so that the apparent  
                                                             contradictory conclusion will not take place.  
 
RULE: Whenever several questions are formulated as if they were only one requiring 
only one answer (apparent normality), but the rule that a premise needs only one 
predicate for only one subject is ignored (secret pathology), then the sophism of 
different questions in only one shall be incurred in (diagnosis). 
 
RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of different questions in only one shall 
consist in distinguishing the different questions from the beginning. 
  
 
      Sophism of the ignorance of the refutation 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 the purported contradictory conclusion appears   
                                                         as if it had satisfied all the requisites demanded by 
                                                         the definition of refutation;                                                                                                                  
        secret pathology:                     not all the requisites demanded by the definition of  
                                                        refutation have been satisfied. 
                                                         “A refutation is in effect the contradiction of a single  
                                                              and identical attribute, not of a word but of a thing,  
                                                              and not of a synonymous word but of the same one; 
                                                              it necesarily follows from the premises granted (not  
                                                              taking into consideration as a premise that what is at the  
                                                              beginning [of the discussion and to be proved]) [except in  
                                                              the case of reasoning via absurdity] and it is carried out  
                                                              according to the same point of view, with regard to the  
                                                              same thing, in the same manner and in the same time.”;619 
                                                 
619Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5,167a23-28.  
“Une réfutation est en effet la contradiction d’un attribut unique et identique, non pas d’un mot mais 
d’une chose, et non pas d’un mot synonyme mais du même; elle découle avec nécessité des prémisses 
concédées (en ne prenant pas en compte ce qui est au début)  et elle s’effectue selon le même poin de vue, 
par rapport à la même chose, de la même manière, et dans le même temps.”  
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167a23-28, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université 
                                                         
      recommended therapy:              to examine the purported conclusion in the light of  
                                                         its apparent contradictory proposition and to show  
                                                         that it does not satisfy the requisites of the definition  
                                                         of refutation;   
 
      example:                                    like other sophisms contained in the present  
                                                         vade mecum they do not satisfy some or a number  
                                                         of the requisites of the definition of refutation,620 its  
                                                         respective examples are also examples of the present  
                                                         sophism of ignorance of the refutation, which, by  
                                                        definition, is the unit to which the multiplicity of all  
                                                        other sophisms may be reduced. 
                                                             
RULE: All sophisms contained in this vade mecum are species of sophisms that ignore 
the requisites of the definition of refutation. 
There shall only be a refutation,621 when: 
a) what must be proved shall not appear as a premise, except in the argumentations via 
absurdity; 
b) the conclusion shall necessarily follow from the premises; 
c) the conclusion shall deny the same predicate affirmed by the answerer; 
d) the predicate will deny: 
1) the signified thing, not only the name; 
2) the signified thing meant by the same name assigned by the answerer; 
3) the thing qualified precisely in the same manner as it was affirmed by the 
answerer. 
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Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 
1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 284-286. 
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Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
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621Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical 
Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 88. 
  
      Out of the seven sophisms that depend on language only to cause deceit, the 
excessive ambiguity ignores the requisite of  “c” (the conclusion does not deny the same 
predicate affirmed by the answerer); the semantic ambiguity (homonymy), the syntactic 
ambiguity (amphibology) and the form of expression, they ignore the requisite of “d,” 
paragraph 1 (the predicate does not deny the signified thing, only the name), while the 
others three: the sophisms of composition and division, and of the accentuation violate 
so the requisite of  “d”, paragraph 1 as well that of paragraph 2 (the predicate does not 
deny “the signified thing meant by the same name assigned by the answerer “).622 Out  
the seven sophisms that do not depend on the language only to cause deceit, if that of 
the ignorance of refutation is excluded, six remain: that of begging the question and that 
of the absolute and not absolute sense, which ignore the requisite of “d”, paragraph 3 
(“the thing qualified precisely in the same way as it was affirmed by the answerer”); and 
the sophisms of the accident, of the consequent, of a cause that is not a cause, of 
begging the question and of several questions in only one, which ignore the requisite of 
“b” (“the conclusion shall necessarily follow from the premise”).623 That is to say, all 
sophisms in the vade mecum may be reduced to the unit of the sophism of ignorance of 
the refutation.624 
  
     b.  Legislative sophisms in the wide sense 
 
     It has been said that the history of sophisms is the political history of the human 
race625 and that the main sophisms should be taught in schools to such youngsters as 
may wish to hold public offices.626 Nevertheless, not all politicians use sophisms, but no 
politician should allow that they are used against him or against others. The main 
sophisms should be taught in schools to young people at large, not only to those who 
aspire to govern, but also to those who will be governed, to those who may cheat and 
those who may be cheated, so that they lose their character of secret knowledge,627 a 
privilege of the few ones initiated in their mysteries. 
                                                 
622Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical 
Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 90. 
623Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical 
Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 97. 
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Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 
1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 284. 
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Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel 
Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 322. 
Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a20, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 
2003, p. 659. 
Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 6, 168a20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-
André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université 
Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 133. 
625Baron de Reiffemberg, Principes de Logique Suivies de l’histoire et de la Bibliographie de cette 
Science, Lois Hauman et Compagnie, Éditeurs, Bruxelles, 1833, num. 210, p. 106. 
626Wilfred Châteauclair, TheYoung  Seigneur; Or Nation-Making, Wm. Drysdale & Co., Publishers, 
Montreal, 1888, Chapter XXVI, The Ideal State, p. 128. 
627On politics as a secret or as a secret knowledge, see: 
        All arts hide certain secrets only kept by teachers, who seldom discovered them by 
themselves, like geniuses and who most times obtained them when, still as disciples, 
their respective teachers decided to initiate them in such occult knowledge. 
       Political sophisms are part of the “secrets of power”(arcana imperii).628 But 
“political sophisms” is too wide a denomination for “legislative sophisms”, although 
both of them happen to be appropriate if the former is used for the genre and the latter 
for the species. In the treatment of legislative sophisms in the wide sense, as a genre, the 
denomination “deliberative sophisms” has been preferred for one of its two species, 
because it reveals the matter treated (discussion of the laws) more properly and is more 
clearly opposed to the denomination of the other species, namely “legislative sophisms 
in the strict sense” (laws as sophisms).629 The study of deliberative sophisms will be 
based on the “Treaty of the Political Sophisms” (French version) or on “The Book of  
Fallacies” (English version), both by Bentham630 and, that of legislative sophisms in the 
strict sense, on Book VI (IV), Chapter 13 of “The Politics” by Aristotle.631 
 
           Deliberative sophisms 
 
     Deliberative sophisms affirm without arguing, or affirm with apparent arguments, 
intended to postpone the respective legislative debates (dilatory sophisms), for the 
                                                                                                                                               
Peter S. Donaldson, Machiavelli and Mystery of  State, Cambridge University Press, First Published 
1988, First Paperback Edition, New York, 1992, pp. 111-140. 
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629Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, Edited by a Friend [Peregrine Binham], 1824, in The Complete 
Works of  Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, 
Volume II, Simpkin Marshall, & Co., London, 1848: 
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Dumont, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Cie., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 435-504. 
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 purpose of avoiding them and, when it is no longer possible to avoid them, to confuse 
the use of reason (confusionist sophisms) or to prevent it (impedimental sophisms).632 
             
              Sophisms intended to postpone the debate (dilatory)          
 
     Six species of dilatory sophisms shall be included: those of the quietist, of false 
consolation, of the most opportune future, of gradualism, of the distraction maneuver 
and, finally, of the danger. 
 
                  Sophism of the quietist 
     
       diagnosis 
        apparent normality:                since no complaints have been raised on the alleged  
                                                        problems that the proposed bill would resolve,  
                                                        then it would not be necessary to debate it,633 least of  
                                                        all approve it; 
        secret pathology:                     the fact that no complaints have been raised  
                                                        perhaps for fear, uselessness of previous  
                                                        complaints, economic or bureaucratic difficulties,  
                                                        etc.  does not mean that the problems do not exist or  
                                                        will not probably exist and that a prudent legislator  
                                                        should not propose now a bill meant to resolve or  
                                                        prevent them;634 
                                                   
      recommended therapy:             to show that the evils that the proposed bill is  
                                                 
632On dilatory political sophisms, see: 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  461. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, Palabras del Editor pp. 69-109 
For the dilatory political fallacies, to see: 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
430. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp. 107-121. 
633Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
430. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp.  109. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  461. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 73. 
634Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
430-431. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 110. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 462. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
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                                                         intended  to remedy exist at present or will probably  
                                                        exist in an immediate future; to excite the fear of  
                                                        suffering damages and the hope to avoid them with  
                                                        the measures adopted, this being the reasons why it  
                                                        will be necessary to debate and approve the proposed  
                                                        bill as soon as possible; 
 
      example:                                   "The measure is unnecessary; nobody complains of  
                                                        disorder in that shape in which it is the aim of your  
                                                        measure to propose a remedy to it: even when no  
                                                        cause of complaint has been found to exist,  
                                                        especially under governments which admit of  
                                                        complains, men have in general not been slow to  
                                                        complain; much less where any just cause of  
                                                        complaint has existed.”635 
                                                        For these reasons, since the measure is unnecessary,  
                                                        it turns out unsuitable to waste the resources of the 
                                                        State in idle debates;636 
                                                            
      counter example:                      Although it is true that men in general have been  
                                                        slow to complain, this slowness is not due to 
                                                        the nonexistence of problems, but to inertia, fear,  
                                                        uselessness of previous complaints, economic or  
                                                        bureaucratic difficulties, etc. Be that problems exist  
                                                        at present, or that they will  probably arise in the 
                                                        immediate future, a prudent legislator will avoid the 
                                                        possibility that the people suffer from serious losses,  
                                                        by repairing or preventing them.  
                                                        For these reasons, and for the specific and concrete 
                                                        motives exposed upon the introduction of the bill, 
                                                        it turns out opportune and expedient to invest the  
                                                        resources of the State in the debate and approval of a  
                                                        bill so necessary and prudent as the one proposed.637  
 
                   Sophism of the false consolation 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                consolation is given to the people of the country  
                                                        where 
                                                        a bill was proposed to remedy certain abuses,  
                                                        remembering them that the people of other countries  
                                                        suffer from the same particular abuses and, also,  
                                                 
635Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
430. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p.109.   
636Paragraph added by the author of this book. 
637Counter example by the author of this book. 
                                                         from other general abuses, but are not so happy as  
they are. 
        secret pathology:                    the people of the country where a bill was proposed 
                                                        to remedy certain abuses, instead of resigning  
                                                        themselves with the false consolation that the people  
                                                        of other countries suffer from the same particular  
                                                        abuses and, also, from other general abuses, but are  
                                                        not so happy as they are, would not have to keep on  
                                                        bearing the abuses, but should demand that the bill  
                                                        proposed to remedy should be debated and approved  
                                                        as soon as possible; 
          
      example:                                       “What is the matter with you?” “What would you  
                                                        have?” Look at the people there, and there: think 
                                                        how much better off you are than they are. Your  
                                                        prosperity and liberty are objects of envy to them;  
                                                        ─your institutions are the models which they  
                                                        endeavour to imitate.”638  
                                                        Remember the ancient saying: “Other’ evils provide  
                                                        –or give– consolation”639, and be aware that there is  
                                                        not need to debate the proposed bill.640 
 
      counter example:                      Although it is true that our people are in a much  
                                                        better condition than the people of other countries,  
                                                        that we enjoy prosperity and freedom, and that our  
                                                        institutions are models that other countries try to  
                                                        imitate, it is not less true that our people should not  
                                                        resign themselves with the false consolation that the  
                                                        people of others countries suffer from the same  
                                                        particular abuses and, also, from other general  
                                                        abuses, but they are not so happy as we are. 
                                                        Remember the ancient saying: "Other’ evils are no 
                                                        consolation for ours”641 and be aware that we have  
                                                        need to debate and approve the proposed bill as soon  
                                                        as possible. 
                                                 
638Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
431. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 111. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 464.Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los 
Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 81. 
639“Mal ajeno, hace –o presta- consuelo”). 
Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Más de 2.100 Refranes Castellanos, no Contenidos en la Colección del 
Maestro Gonzalo Correas, Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, Madrid, 1930, p. 193.  
640Paragraph added by the author of this book. 
641“Mal ajeno, para el nuestro no es consuelo”. 
Francisco Rodríguez Marín, 12.600 Refranes Más no Contenidos en la Colección del Maestro Gonzalo 
Correas, Tipográfica de la Revista de Archivos, Madrid, 1930, p. 193. 
                  Sophism of the most opportune future 
 
      diagnosis:                                 
        apparent normality:                 it is affirmed that the most opportune future has not  
                                                        come yet, and that it is necessary to wait a little  
                                                        longer to deliberate on the proposed bill; 
        secret pathology:                     neither is an argument given to support that “the  
                                                        most opportune future has not come yet”, nor is a  
                                                        reasonable term fixed to wait for it, all of which  
                                                        allows to suppose that what is really wanted is to  
                                                        avoid not only the debate but also the approval of the  
                                                        proposed bill, without anticipating an opinion against  
                                                        it, since the objection lies in the will, not in the  
                                                        judgment;642  
                                                                                                          
      example:                                   A legislator, like a medical doctor, must wait for the 
                                                        propitious moment to apply the remedy that will cure  
                                                        a sick patient. The same remedy, applied at the  
                                                        wrong time, not only fails to cure the sick patient but  
                                                        may even damage his health, whether the patient be a  
                                                        human being or the social body.  
                                                        For these reasons, it will be necessary to wait untill a  
                                                        More favorable opportunity arises to debate the  
                                                        proposed bill, being it inconvenient at the present  
                                                        time to give an opinion on its advantages or  
                                                        disadvantages. 
 
      counter example:                      It is true that a legislator, like a medical doctor, has  
                                                        to wait for the propitious moment to apply the  
                                                        remedy that will cure a sick patient, and that the  
                                                        same remedy, applied at the wrong time, not only  
                                                        fails to cure the sick patient but may even damage  
                                                        his health, whether such patient be a human being or  
                                                        the social body.  
                                                        Nevertheless, if legislators, as well as medical  
                                                        doctors are prudent as they addresss free men 
                                                        like us, they should persuade us by explaining the  
                                                        reasons why this is not the propitious moment, what 
                                                        requisites should be fulfilled and within what  
                                                        probable term will the opportunity arise, instead of  
                                                        formulating mere affirmations without reasonable  
                                                 
642Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
432. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p.. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  462. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 75. 
 
                                                         arguments supporting them. 
                                                        For these reasons, there is no motive why we should 
                                                        wait for an opportunity more favorable than the  
                                                        present one to debate and approve the proposed bill,  
                                                        being that such opportunity and its advantages have  
                                                        been sufficiently explained in its exposition of  
                                                        motives.      
 
                 Sophism of the gradualism 
 
      diagnosis 
        apparent normality:                 upon the emergence of a complex problem needing 
                                                        the adoption of  several measures, coordinated in a  
                                                        concurrent or successive form, within brief periods,  
                                                        the arguments go: "one thing at a time”, “not so  
                                                        fast”, “slow but safer form”, as if the gradual debate  
                                                        and approval a set of measures coordinated in the  
                                                        proposed bill were a more prudent action;643 
                         
        secret pathology:                     complex problems need the adoption of several  
                                                        measures, coordinated in a concurrent or successive  
                                                        form, within brief periods to be effective and,  
                                                        even when they could be executed gradually,  
                                                        partially or within longer periods, they will always  
                                                        delay the achievement of the results sought, a delay  
                                                        that turns out unacceptable when no reasonable  
                                                        arguments justifying it are given; 
 
      example:                                   The proposed bill implements a set of measures that  
                                                        it would be more prudent to debate and approve  
                                                        gradually, one at a time, not so fast, in a slow but  
                                                        safer form. 
                                                 
643Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
433. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 115. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  463.Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los 
Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 77.  
   
      counter example:                      Real prudence resolves complex problems with a set  
                                                        of measures coordinated in a concurrent or  
                                                        successive form within brief periods to be effective.  
                                                        Even if it was possible to debate, approve and  
                                                        execute them gradually without losing efficacy, it  
                                                        would be highly imprudent to accept the resulting  
                                                        delays, without demanding such reasonable  
                                                        arguments as may justify them. 
                                                       
 
                 Sophism of the distraction maneuver 
  
      diagnosis 
        apparent normality:                 another bill that turns out more attractive to debate is 
                                                        proposed;644                                                               
        secret pathology:                     this it is the case of a distraction maneuver, because 
                                                        there is not intention of presenting the bill  
                                                        immediately and such presentation shall be  
                                                        postponed with the excuse that there are more urgent  
                                                        matters to debate and, if the bill is debated and  
                                                        approved, the author of the initiative will try to take  
                                                        charge of its execution, to keep on delaying the  
                                                        same.645                
 
      example:                                    I cannot but acknowledge the usefulness of the bill  
                                                         to debate, but I wonder: why this bill and not this  
                                                         other one?, which, considering the limited time  
                                                         available, is much more important and deserves all  
                                                         the attention 
                                                         that we may focus on. 
                                                 
644Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
435. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 120. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 470. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 107. 
645Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
435. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 121. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  471. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 108. 
       counter example:                       I cannot but acknowledge the importance of the new 
                                                         bill proposed either, but I cannot but warn that  
                                                         its treatment turns out not to be incompatible with  
                                                         the other bill on debate, which, in addition, has the  
                                                         advantage of having overcome the stage of mere  
                                                         initiatives and is a concrete bill, ready to be debated,  
                                                         approved and executed immediately, capitalizing all  
                                                         the time already spent, while the other proposal,  
                                                         because of its importance, will need a greater  
                                                         investment of the available time, for the preparation  
                                                         of the concrete bill as well as for its later debate,  
                                                         approval and execution. 
 
                 Sophism of the danger 
 
      diagnosis:                             
        apparent normality:                 it is affirmed that the proposed bill is so bad that it  
                                                         should not be even debated, be it for the nastiness 
                                                         or inconsistency with the positions previously  
                                                         assumed by those who initiated it and now support  
                                                         it, without it being known what they hide behind; or  
                                                         be it because any innovation is dangerous;646  
                                                                
        secret pathology:                     the mere affirmations of nastiness or inconsistency  
                                                         of the positions previously assumed by those who  
                                                         initiated the bill and support it, without it being  
                                                         known what they hide behind; or be it because any  
                                                         innovation is dangerous, both affirmed without any  
                                                         evidence, do not contradict the advantages of the bill  
                                                         described in the speech that accompanied it, and it  
                                                         does not even necessarily follow from such mere  
                                                         affirmations that the bill is so bad that it should not  
                                                         be debated, least of all approved; 
                                                 
646Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
413-430.  
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 73-106. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, pp.  465-468eremías Bentham, Tratado de los 
Jeremías Bentham, Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, 
Rosario, 1944, pp.  85-99. 
       example:                                    If those who took the initiative and those who now  
                                                         support the proposed bill have a bad intention or, 
                                                         an evil character, act for a bad motive, have fallen in  
                                                         inconsistencies with their previous positions   
                                                         criticizing similar bills and supporting the opposite  
                                                         ones; are intimate friends or, at least, hold frequent 
                                                         meetings with certain persons with dangerous 
intentions 
                                                         and dangerous principles like John Smith and James  
                                                         Jones, or share some or all their opinions, without it  
                                                         being known what they hide behind,647 or because  
                                                         any innovation is dangerous; then the proposed bill  
                                                         is so bad that it should not be debated, least of all 
                                                         approved. 
 
      counter example:                       It is argued that the bill is so bad that it should not 
                                                         be debated, least of all approved, affirming 
                                                         that those who took the initiative and those who now  
                                                         support the above mentioned bill have a bad 
                                                         intention or an evil character; act for a bad motive;  
                                                         have fallen in inconsistencies with their  
                                                         previous positions, criticizing similar bills and  
                                                         supporting the opposite ones; are intimate friends or,  
                                                         at least, hold frequent meetings with certain persons  
                                                         with dangerous intentions and principles, like 
                                                         John Smith and James Jones and share some or all  
                                                         their opinions without it being known what they  
                                                         hide behind; or because any innovation is  
                                                         dangerous. 
                                                         These serious charges are mere insulting  
                                                         affirmations  
                                                         In the absence of relevant evidence supporting them,  
                                                         and do not contradict the reasons exposed in the  
                                                         message that accompanies the proposed bill on the  
                                                         advantages that it will bring about if approved. In  
                                                         addition to sinning against logic and the  
                                                         constitutional right of the presumption of innocence  
                                                         and to falling in the prejudice of believing that any  
                                                         innovation is bad, even if proved, this would be not  
                                                        the first or the last time in which villains make  
                                                        something good, which does not redeem them but at  
                                                 
647Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
414. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 75. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 465. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  85. 
 
                                                         least provides a benefit to others worthy of  
                                                        protection, a benefit which no legislator should  
                                                        deprive them of, because it would be unjust and  
                                                        imprudent. 
                                                        For all these reasons, the proposed bill should be  
                                                        debated and approved as soon as possible. 
 
                 Sophisms intended to confuse the debates (confusionist) 
 
     Confusionist sophisms spread deep darkness on the matter dealt with, with the 
expectation that the approval or rejection of a bill be thus avoided, in the middle of the 
resulting darkness for the uses of reason,648 in such debates as may no longer be 
avoided. Twelve species of sophisms will be included as confusionist ones: that of the 
only word, of the impostor term, of vague generalities, of allegorical idols, of popular 
corruption, of the antithinkers, of paradoxical affirmations, of the confusion of the 
obstacle with the cause, of the partiality, of the end that justifies the means, of the 
universal opponent and, finally, of the rejection instead of the modification. 
 
                       Sophism of the only word that implies approval or rejection (epithet) 
       
      diagnosis: 
         apparent normality:                only one word is used as if it were neutral with 
                                                        regard to the approval or rejection of the bill on 
                                                        debate, without adding any reasonable argument to  
                                                        support the approval or rejection of the aforesaid bill;              
         secret pathology:                    this single word, used as seemingly neutral, in fact, 
                                                        implicitly means the approval (praise) or rejection  
                                                        (condemnation) of the bill on debate, without any 
                                                        reasonable argument to support it, thus  
                                                        surreptitiously introducing the sophism of begging  
                                                        the question;649 
                                                 
648Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  474. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  113. 
649Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
436-438. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp. 125-126. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  481. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp.  145-146. 
  
                                                          
      examples:                                 The bill on debate improves650 the current law 
                                                        avoiding the current disadvantages. This is the  
                                                        reason why the approval of the aforesaid bill is  
                                                        requested. 
 
                                                        The bill under debate worsens the current law, 
                                                        aggravating the current disadvantages. This is the  
                                                        reason why the rejection of the aforesaid bill is  
                                                        requested. 
 
      counter example:                      The mere use of a word of praise ("improves”) 
                                                        or of condemnation ("worsens") without any  
                                                        reasonable arguments to support it may not replace  
                                                        the debate, which consists in an exchange of ideas,  
                                                        not in the exchange of sentences where the  
                                                        prevailing word has an implicit meaning of approval  
                                                        or of rejection. This is the reason why I am begging  
                                                        the distinguished orators that preceded me to add  
                                                        such reasonable arguments as will support their  
                                                        respective positions. 
                                                        After having listened to them attentively, we will be    
                                                        in better conditions to continue with the present  
                                                        debate.  
                                                        Nothing further, Mr. President.                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                       
                   Sophism of the impostor term (euphemism) 
 
      diagnosis:                                
         apparent normality:                a seemingly acceptable term is used to name  
                                                        something;                                                         
         secret pathology:                    the seemingly acceptable term is used to substitute 
                                                        another one which, although proper, turns out  
                                                        unacceptable;651 
                                                 
650The examples and the counter example belong to the author of this book; the word "improves" is taken 
from: 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
437. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 128. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  482. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 148. 
651Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
138. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 130. 
                                                          
      example:                                   The bill on debate regulates, with suitable zeal,    
                                                        the exercise of the freedom of cults established in our 
                                                        Constitution. 
 
      counter example:                      The bill on debate, with an apparent zeal to 
                                                        regulate the exercise of the freedom of cults  
                                                        establisheded in our Constitution, actually restores  
                                                        the religious persecution of those who do not belong  
                                                        to the official cult.652 
 
                   Sophism of vague generalities 
   
      diagnosis:                                
         apparent normality:                an expression more generic and undetermined than    
                                                         an specific and determined one, which would be 
                                                         grammatically proper, is used ;   
         secret pathology:                    the expression may mean something good or  
                                                         something bad, depending on the circumstances;653 
 
      example:                                   The utility to and need of the government, the law,  
                                                        the moral and the religion have been always  
                                                        respected in this honorable place and this orator will  
                                                        not be the one to subvert them. 
 
      counter example:                      The bill on debate preserves the utility and need of  
                                                        the good government, the good law, the good moral  
                                                        and the good religion, because it avoids determined  
                                                                                                                                               
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, pp. 484-485. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 157-158. 
652The composition of the example and of the counter example belongs to the author of this book; the 
terms "zeal" and “persecution“ are taken from Bentham: 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
438. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 130. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 484|. 
Jeremías Bentham. Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 157. 
653The composition of the example and of the counter example belongs to the author of this book; the 
expressions “law“, “government“, “moral“ and “religion“, are taken from Bentham. 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
440.   
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 134 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  483. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 153 
                                                         evils, as it is indicated in full detail in its exposition  
                                                        of motives, the attentive reading of which will clear  
                                                        such implicit doubts as could have been left by the  
                                                        insinuations of the orator who has preceded me, who  
                                                        does not distinguish between the good thing that we  
                                                        must preserve and the bad thing that we must fight  
                                                        against in the present circumstances and in those that  
                                                        will probably emerge in the near future. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
                   Sophism of allegorical idols 
      
      diagnosis: 
         apparent normality:                a person who holds a public office is denominated  
                                                        with the name of the institution;                
         secret pathology:                    the institution generally implies the attribute of 
                                                        excellence; but the one who holds a public office  
                                                        may have had a good or a bad performance in the  
                                                        fulfillment of his duties;654 this is the reason why this  
                                                        sophism has also been denominated “sophism that  
                                                        protects official prevaricators”;655                                                          
 
      example:                                   The purported abuses, the description of which is 
                                                        enjoyed by some opponents, are not reasonable  
                                                        critics to the performance of some officers. To attack  
                                                        us is to attack the Government. 
                                                        They want to destabilize us! 
                                                        
      counter example:                      Without analyzing, for the time being, whether the 
                                                        abuses denounced by the opposition have been  
                                                        committed or not, it is necessary to point out that the 
                                                        officers charged may have had a good or a bad  
                                                        performance in the fulfillment of their respective  
                                                        duties, but they neither may nor must be identified  
                                                        with the Government to avoid control over their  
                                                        conducts by public opinion and the others Powers of  
                                                        the State authorized to do so, by surreptitiously  
                                                        seeking protection 
                                                        in the prestige of the institution to the excellence of  
                                                        which they should contribute.656 
                                                 
654Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
448.   
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 150. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  483. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 153. 
655Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  490. 
   
                   Sophism of popular corruption 
       
      diagnosis:                                 
        apparent normality:                 the corruption of the people is alleged to avoid the   
                                                        introduction of political reforms;  
        secret pathology:                     in fact the term “corruption“ is used to discredit the 
                                                        people in an undetermined form or attributing it a  
                                                        bad moral nature or mental frame, confusing the  
                                                        ideas, since true and concrete corruption is that of the  
                                                        rulers who bribe one another sacrificing the common  
                                                        interest to obtain their own profit;657 
 
      example:                                   “[...]The source of that corruption to which the  
                                                        honorable member alludes is in the minds of the  
                                                        people; so rank and extensive is that corruption, that  
                                                        no political reform can have any effect in removing  
                                                        it. Instead of reforming others – instead of reforming  
                                                        the State, the Constitution, and everything that is  
                                                        most excellent, let each man reform himself! let him  
                                                        look at home, he will find there enough to do without  
                                                        looking abroad and aiming at what  
                                                        is out of his power [Loud cheers.]”658    
                                                                                                                                               
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 175. 
656The example and the counter example belong to the author of this book; inspired in the expressions 
“You are an enemy to government” and “Your endeavour is to destroy government!” (equivalent to the 
more updated “they want to destabilize us!”), that belong to Bentham, according to the editions by 
Dumont and Bowring, respectively: Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & 
Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 448. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 151. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  483. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 153 
657Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
453. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 161. 
658Fallacies of Antireformers, A review of “The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy 
Bentham, by a Friend. London, 1824”, Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), pp. 367-389, p. 388. 
It is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy, of the famous "Noodle's Oration" of Sydney Smith (1771-
1845), the "Friend" author of the aforesaid review that, in the end, composed a speech covered in which it 
threaded, with certain irony, successive proper examples of the fallacies descripted by Bentham. 
                                     
 
      counter example:                      It is not necessary to confuse ideas and things by 
                                                        attributing to the people, in an undetermined and  
                                                        apparent form, a bad moral nature on which any  
                                                        reform would depend, exhorting each one to reform  
                                                        himself, since the real corruption, the concrete and  
                                                        actual corruption takes place between the rulers who  
                                                        bribe one another, sacrificing the common interest to  
                                                        obtain their own profit. 
 
                   The sophism of the antithinkers 
       
      diagnosis:                                                                                                
        apparent normality:                 the measures on debate are discredited by means of 
                                                        epithets and set phrases, as if the exercise of thinking  
                                                        in itself were incompatible with a useful and  
                                                        successful practice; 
        secret pathology:                     discredit arises in the absence of reasonable  
                                                        arguments to reject such measures as impair the  
                                                        defended interests;659 
                           
      example:                                   The proposed measures are mere theoretical,  
                                                        romantic, fantastic and utopist speculations . 
                                                        They may seem good in theory, but, beyond any  
                                                        doubt they will turn out bad in practice. 
                                                        If someone dares thinking that the measures are  
                                                        good, it would be necessary to warn him that they are  
                                                        too good to be practicable. 
                                                        The proposed measures should be rejected, due to  
                                                        Their confusion between the ideal level of thought  
                                                         and the concrete reality of the problems to be  
                                                         resolved. 
 
      counter example:                       The prudent man, who is characterized for thinking  
                                                         before acting, cannot despise the exercise of  
                                                         thought, which distinguishes him from the irrational  
                                                         beings.  
                                                         A debate is an exchange of ideas, not of mere  
                                                         epithets and set phrases to discredit to the thought of 
                                                         others. This latter resource is typical of those who  
                                                         try to defend the interests impaireded by the  
                                                 
659Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
457. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 170. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  474. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 123 
                                                          measures on debate, when they lack reasonable  
                                                         arguments to oppose them.660 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
                 Sophism of paradoxical affirmations  
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 the denomination of the debated question is attacked  
                                                        with vehemence, as if it was the question itself; 
        secret pathology:                     as the debated question turns out unassailable with  
                                                        reasonable arguments, the attack is directed towards  
                                                        the denomination with which it is known, confusing  
                                                        the denomination of what is debated with the debated  
                                                        question, so that the rejection of the denomination  
                                                        provokes the rejection of debated question itself;661 
 
      example:                                   Not always the lack of interest of an officer proves  
                                                        praiseworthy, since sometimes it is a sign of   
                                                        corruption, for example, when he gives up collecting 
                                                        his compensation, which makes it reasonable to  
                                                        presume that he hopes to gain much more with what  
                                                        he will receive in unofficial form! 
                                                                                                              
     counterexample:                        When an officer gives up collecting his  
                                                        compensation, one should presume that his lack of  
                                                        interest is a sign of corruption, since it should not be  
                                                        forgoten that in addition to those interested in money  
                                                        there are also those who seek honors, this being the  
                                                        name with which ancient Romans denominated the  
                                                        civil service: a “career of honors” (cursus  
                                                        honorum).662 
                                                 
660The composition of the example and the counter example belong to the author of this book. Bentham 
refers to the abuse of the following words: “speculative“, “theoretical“, “chimerical“, “utopian“ and to the 
phrases: "Good theoretically, villain in practice”, “too good to be practicable”. 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
457-462. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 170-179. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, pp.  474-477. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 123-132. 
661Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
462. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 180. 
662The composition of the example and of the counter example belong to the author of this book. Bentham 
quotes a speech by Edmond Burke on the Official Economy Bill in which Burke supports that the 
resignation of official emoluments is “a mark of the basest profigacy”; the distinction between love for 
wealth and love for reputation belongs to Bentham. 
  
                Sophism of the confusion of the obstacle with the cause 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 after praising an excellent system, one of its parts is  
                                                        also praised, as if it were the cause of excellence; 
        secret pathology:                     the praised parts as if it were the cause of excellence,  
                                                        is in fact, an obstacle for the system, but an obstacle  
                                                        the preservation of which is sought due to the  
                                                        interests it favors;663 
 
      example:                                  “In virtue and knowledge-in every feature of  
                                                        felicity, the empire of Montezuma outshines, as  
                                                        evereybody knows, all the sourrounding states, even  
                                                        the commonwealth of Tlascala not excepted.  
                                                        Where (said an inquirer once, to the hight priest of  
                                                        the Temple of Vitzlipultzli,) is it that we are to look  
                                                        for the true cause of so glorious a pre-eminence?  
                                                      “Look for it!”, answered the holy pontiff-where  
                                                        shouldst thou look for it, blind sceptic, but in the  
                                                        copiousness of the stream in which the sweet and  
                                                        precious blood of innocents flows daily down the  
                                                        altars of the great God?” 
                                                       “Yes,” answered in full convocation and full chorus  
                                                        the archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, and  
                                                        prebends of  the religion of Vitzlipultzli:  
                                                         ̶̶̶ “Yes answered in semi-chorus the vice chancellor,  
                                                        with all the doctors, both the proctors and masters  
                                                        regent and non-regent of the us yet uncatholiced  
                                                        university of Mexico: 
                                                         ̶̶̶ “Yes, in the copiousness of the stream in which the  
                                                        sweet and precious blood of the innocents flows  
                                                        daily down the altars of the great God.”664 
                                                                                                                                               
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
464-465. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 183. 
663Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, 
Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 133 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 476. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 187.. 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
466. 
664Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
468, text reproduced above. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 190.  
        
      counter example:                      A current historian may recognize the persuasive  
                                                        value of such answers at that time, but should not  
                                                        allow to be deceived by accepting that the cause of  
                                                        the preeminence of Moctezuma’s empire was the  
                                                        practice of human sacrifices, one of its most  
                                                        objectionable aspects. 
                                                        The reasonable arguments of a current historian will  
                                                        distinguish between the real causes for the  
                                                        preeminence of Moctezuma’s empire over its  
                                                        neighbouring peoples, and its objectionable and  
                                                        indifferent aspects. 
 
                Sophism of the partiality  
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 bad parts are omitted as if the whole was good; or 
                                                        are considered as if they were less than the good  
                                                        ones;665 because the abuse it is not a valid argument  
                                                        agains the use; 
        secret pathology:                    whether the bad parts are omitted or presumed less  
                                                        than the good ones, bad parts should be neither  
                                                        omitted nor presumed, but weighted together with  
                                                        the real good ones, to judge them later; 
     
      example:                                    In spite of the efforts that I have made I have not  
                                                        been able to find any bad part in the law the reform  
                                                        of which is sought. Moreover, I am persuaded that  
                                                        even in the hypothetical case that some defects are  
                                                        found, they will always be less in relation to the  
                                                        virtues that the current law has proved to possess. 
                                                        For these reasons, I request that the amendment bill  
                                                        On debate is rejected.                     
 
      counter example:                      No reasonable legislator, either of the government  
                                                        party or of the opposition, could deny merits to the  
                                                        current law. 
                                                        However, we are not debating its abrogation, but an  
                                                        amendment bill, because we cannot remain  
                                                        impassive in the light of such defects as are  
                                                        described in full detail in the Message, if we want to  
                                                        preserve immaculate the undeniable virtues that the  
                                                        law in force has proved to possess, by adapting it to  
                                                                                                                                               
Jéremie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 478 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp 134-135. 
665Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
469. 
                                                         the current reality. 
                                                        For these reasons, I request that the amendment bill  
                                                        in debate is approved.666                                                                            
  
                 Sophism of the end that justifies the means 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 arguments for the measures are given as if the end 
                                                        sought by them justified the means used to obtain it; 
        secret pathology:                     for the end to really justify the means used to obtain  
                                                        it, it is required that such end be good, that the means  
                                                        be also good in themselves or that the evil inherent to  
                                                        them be less than the goodness of the end, and that  
                                                        the evil be 
                                                        less than other means that could be used to obtain the 
                                                        same end;667                                                                                                       
                                                         
      example:                                   It is true that some of the proposed measures are not 
                                                        completely good, if they are considered in  
                                                        themselves, but one should not forget that the end  
                                                        justifies the means. 
                                                        For these resons, I request that the bill on debate is  
                                                        approved. 
 
      counter example:                      The end justifies the means is an old maxim, which  
                                                        has been much criticized, because it established the  
                                                        separation between morality and politics. 
                                                        Those who go so far as to admit it dare not support  
                                                        it in absolute form, but submit it to certain  
                                                        requirements: that the end be good, that the means be  
                                                        good in themselves or that the evil inherent to them  
                                                        be less tha the goodness of the end, and that the evil  
                                                        be less than  
                                                        other means that could be used to obtain the same  
                                                        end.  
                                                        For these reasons, I request that the bill on debate is  
                                                        rejected.668 
 
                 Sophism of the universal opponent 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 it is argued that the measures, not the men, or that  
                                                        the men, not the mesures, are important to obtain the  
                                                 
666Both the example and the counterexample belongs to the author of this book. 
667Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
469-470. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 191. 
668The composition of the example and of the counter example both belong to the author of this book, 
based on Bentham. 
                                                         end;669                                                                  
        secret pathology:                     both the measures proposed and the men entrusted  
                                                        with their execution, are important to obtain the end; 
                                                         
      examples:                                  Although it is true that the proposed measures seem 
                                                        reasonable, regrettably it is not possible to affirm  
                                                        the same of the persons entrusted with their  
                                                        execution, this being the reason why, much to my  
                                                        sorrow, I am inclined to vote against the bill on 
                                                        debate. 
 
                                                        Although it is true that the proposed measures are  
                                                        perfectible, the men entrusted with their execution  
                                                        undoubtedly fit from the moral as well as from the  
                                                        intellectual viewpointg, this beeing the reason why  
                                                        I am inclined to vote for the bill on debate. 
                                     
      counter example:                      It turns out inadmissible that arguments are given  
                                                        against the bill on debate considering only the  
                                                        measures or the men entrusted with the execution, as  
                                                        if it were not indispensable to consider both  
                                                        arguments at the same time! 
                                                                                                                
                 Sophism of the rejection instead of the modification 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                objections are raised as if they were sufficient to 
                                                        reject  the proposed measures; 
        secret pathology:                     objections are really not preponderant or  
                                                        irremediable and, therefore, the former may be  
                                                        ignored and the latter, or both, may be rectifieded  
                                                        through the mere amendment of the bill;670 
                                                          
      example:                                   The political party that I represent is opposed to the  
                                                        creation of a new bureaucratic organism, for  
                                                        economic reasons and because it means another  
                                                        example of the  
                                                        ambition for power of the authorities in office. 
                                                 
669Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall and Co., London, 1843, Volume II, 
pp. 470-471. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas. Madrid, 1960, pp. 192-193. 
670Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
471-472. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 194. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  478. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  137-138. 
                                                         
      counter example:                      Instead of using well known universal objections, 
                                                        over and over again, let's focus the debate on the  
                                                        need, opportunity and expediency of the bill with  
                                                        reasonable arguments. Then, let's see if the budget of  
                                                        the new organism is too bulky and if too many  
                                                        powers are granted to the officers and, in the  
                                                        affirmative, let's introduce appropiate modifications.  
                                                        Let's not fall in the pitfall of rejecting the bill with  
                                                        objections that are neither preponderant nor  
                                                        irremediable, when we are able to ignore the former  
                                                        and the latter or when both of them may be rectified  
                                                        through the mere amendment of a bill of great utility,  
                                                        rather than through its rejection.671 
 
           Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental) 
 
     Impedimental sophisms are mere arguments of authority, intended to substitute and  
prevent the use of reason in already inevitable debates. Four species of impedimental 
sophisms will be included: those of the wisdom of our ancestors, of the absence of 
precedents, of irrevocable laws and of laudatory personalities.672 
 
                 Sophism of the wisdom of our ancestors 
 
      diagnosis 
        apparent normality:                one affirms the purporteded repugnance of the  
                                                        proposed bill based on the opinion of those who long  
                                                        ago lived in the country of those who now deliberate, 
                                                        by merely quoting the opinion of some writer, or  
                                                        laws or institutions existing at that time, as sufficient  
                                                        reason to justify the rejection of the aforesaid bill;673 
                                                                 
        secret pathology:                     if: "Experience is the mother of wisdom”, between 
                                                        contemporary persons, the older ones are wiser,  
                                                        because of their greater experience; while between 
                                                        generations, the more recent ones are wiser, because  
                                                        of their greater experience, since they add their own  
                                                        to that of the previous ones;674 
                                                 
671The composition of the example and of the counter example they belong to the author of this book. 
672Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  447.eremías Bentham, Tratado de los 
Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp.  11-
12. 
673Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
398. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 41. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  447. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  25. 
                                                                                           
      example:                                  “What would our ancestors say to this, Sir? How this  
                                                        measure tally with their institutions? How does it  
                                                        agree with their experience? Are we to put the  
                                                        wisdom of  yesterday in competition with the  
                                                        wisdom of centuries ? 
                                                       ´[Hear! Hear] is beard less youth to show no respect  
                                                         for the decisions of mature age (Lout cries of hear! 
                                                        hear!)”675 
                                                        Our wise ancestors, the prudence of ours parents, the 
                                                        good sense of old times, the venerable antiquity are  
                                                        sufficient reasons for the rejection of the proposed  
                                                        bill and the closing of the debate.676 
 
      counter example:                      Our ancestors could not say anything because neither 
                                                        the problem nor the solution existed in their times. 
                                                        Why should it be taken into account whether 
                                                        the measure is consistent with their institutions? 
                                                        The mesure must be consistent with ours institutions, 
                                                        with the current ones, not with those then existing.  
                                                        If: "Experience is the mother of wisdom”, unlike  
                                                        contemporary persons, between whom the older ones  
                                                        are wiser, because of their larger experience,  
                                                        between generations, the current ones are wiser,  
                                                        because they add their own experience to that of the  
                                                        previous ones.                  
                                                        Mere affirmations about our wise ancestors, 
                                                        the prudence of our parents, the good sense of the  
                                                        old times, the venerable antiquity, in addition to  
                                                        trying to replace the use of reason, do not refute the  
                                                        advantages of the proposed bill, the fundamentals of  
                                                        which have been sufficiently explained in its  
                                                        exposition of motives. 
                                                        For these motives, if no reasonable arguments are  
                                                        raised against it, the proposed bill must be approved  
                                                        without any further debate.677 
                                                                                                                                               
674Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
398-399. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 41-44. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  447. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp.  25-26. 
675Fallacies of Antireformers, A review of “The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy 
Bentham, by a Friend. London, 1824”, Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), p. 367-389, p. 386.  
This is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy in the famous "Noodle's Oration", by Sydney Smith 
(1771-1845), the "Friend" author of the aforesaid review that, in the end, composed a fluent speech in 
which he inserted, with certain irony, successive proper examples of the fallacies described by Bentham. 
676Added by the author of this book. 
677Counter example of the author of this book. 
                                                          
                Sophism of the absence of precedents  
 
      diagnosis 
         apparent normality:                the absence of precedents is affirmed without any  
                                                        relevant evidence, as if it were sufficient reason to  
                                                        justify the rejection of the proposed bill;678 
         secret pathology:                    whenever it is not possible to use the sophism of  
                                                        “the wisdom of our ancestors” because they do not  
                                                        exist or because there are neither previous opinions  
                                                        to be quoted, nor previous laws or institutions, the  
                                                        sophism of  “the absence of precedents” is resorted  
                                                        to; proved or not, there is not motive why this  
                                                        sophism should hinder the use of reason to deliberate  
                                                        on the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed  
                                                        bill, least of all serve as sufficient reason for its  
                                                        rejection; 
                                                                                                                                     
      example:                                    “The proposition is new and of an unprecedented  
                                                        nature: this is, not doubt, the first time that any  
                                                        such thing was ever heard of in this House. 
                                                        [...] Deliberate well before you act, as you have not  
                                                        precedent to direct your course.”679 
                                                            “If this measure be right, would it have escaped the  
                                                        wisdom of those Saxon progenitors to whom we are  
                                                        indebted for so many of our best political  
                                                        institutions?  
                                                        Would the Dane have passed it over?  Would the  
                                                        Norman have rejected it? Would such notable  
                                                        discovery have been reserved for these modern and  
                                                        degenerate times?”680 
                                                 
678Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, 
Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  33. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  449. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 65-66. 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
410.  
679Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
410. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 65-66. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 449. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 33. 
680Review of “The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham, by a Friend. London, 
1824”,  by Sydney Smith (1771-1845) in Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), pp. 367-389, pp.386-387.  
                                                         No! Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the 
                                                        absence of precedents in itself constitutes sufficient  
                                                        reason for the rejection of the proposed bill and for  
                                                        the closing of the debate.681 
 
     counter example:                       The distinguished member of the opposition who  
                                                        preceded me in taking the floor, has wondered:  
                                                        “If this measure be right, would it have escaped the 
                                                        wisdom of those saxon progenitors to whom we are 
                                                        indebted for so many of our best institutions? Would  
                                                        the Dane have passed it over? Would the Norman  
                                                        have rejected it? Would such notable discovery have  
                                                        been reserved for these modern and degenerate  
                                                        times?” 
                                                        Yes!, Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the 
                                                        absence of precedents usually stems from different  
                                                        causes, among which I cannot set aside the  
                                                        permanent influence exercised by the powerful,  
                                                        everlasting interests, which have been adversely  
                                                        affected by the measures, or from the fact that  
                                                        neither the problem to be resolved nor the proposed  
                                                        solutions existed at the times of our wise  
                                                        ancestors.682 
                                                        Furthermore, the absence of precedents, in itself,    
                                                        does not constitutes sufficient reason for the rejection  
                                                        of the proposed bill and for the closing of the debate. 
                                                        For these motives, if no reasonable arguments are  
                                                        Raised against it, the proposed bill must be approved  
                                                        as soon as possible.683  
  
                 Sophism of irrevocable laws 
 
      diagnosis 
         apparent normality:                once enacted, laws are irrevocable, whethe they are 
                                                        regarded as founded on a contract or on a solemn  
                                                        oath;684                                                         
                                                                                                                                               
It is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy of the famous "Noodle's Oration", of the aforesaid review 
that, in the end, includes a speech in which, with certain irony, successive proper examples of the fallacies 
described by Bentham are given. 
681Paragraph added by the author of this book. 
682Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
401. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 49. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, pp. 449-450. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp.  34-35. 
683
 Counter example by the author of this book. 
          secret pathology:                    unless enacted as temporary, laws are permanent, but 
                                                        this principle is confused with their perpetual nature  
                                                        and its consequence, irrevocability, taking the  
                                                        argument based on “the wisdom of our ancestors” to  
                                                        an extreme, also forgetting that “perpetual“ is not a  
                                                        synonymous for irrevocable, when both the  
                                                        circumstances and the reasons on which laws are  
                                                        founded are altered;685 
 
      example:                                   “If this were an ordinary mesure, I should not oppose  
                                                        it opposition with so much vehemence; but, Sir, it  
                                                        calls in question the wisdom of an irrevocable law.”  
                                                        It was enacted in the memorable period of the  
                                                        founding fathers of our Homeland, at the beginning  
                                                        of our national organization: What right do we have  
                                                        to demolish this firm column on which the great men  
                                                        that preceded us stamped their eternal wisdom?686 
                                                        No, Sir, the proposed bill deserves to be immediately  
                                                        rejected just because it cast doubts on the eternal  
                                                        wisdom of our more glorious ancestors!687 
                                                
      counter example:                      Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the  
                                                        proposed bill, like the laws enacted by the founders  
                                                        of our Homeland, maintains the same spirit of those  
                                                        times with regard to the promotion of the well-being  
                                                        of the people without distinctions, as those founders  
                                                        did and as we must do now. 
                                                        In the world of nature, the validity of laws lies in the  
                                                                                                                                               
684Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
401-402. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 49-50. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, pp.  451-452. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp.  41-42. 
685Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
407. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 59. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p. 455. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 52. 
686Review of “The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham, by a Friend. London, 
1824”, by Sydney Smith , Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), pp. 367-389, p. 387. 
This is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy in the famous "Noodle's Oration" by Sydney Smith 
(1771-1843), thr “Friend” author of the aforesaid review that, in the end, composed a fluent speech in 
which he inserted, with certain irony, successive examples proper of the fallacies described by Bentham. 
The text between quotation marks reproduces the original, the rest is an adaptation by the author of this 
book. 
687Paragraph added by the author of this book 
                                                         maintenance of the experimental conditions in which  
                                                        they were verified, while in the legal world, the  
                                                        validity of  laws lies in the maintenance of the  
                                                        circumstances and reasons on which they were  
                                                        founded upon their enactment. Neither the current  
                                                        circumstances are the same that our glorious  
                                                        ancestors lived, nor the reasons that they had upon  
                                                        the enactment of the law, the amendment of which is  
                                                        now proposed, are applicable now. Nevertheless, the  
                                                        proposed bill is imbued with the same spirit  
                                                        promoting the well-being of the people and is also  
                                                        based on the same unyielding will of the founders of   
                                                        our Homeland. 
                                                        For these reasons, and for the considerations that  
                                                        arise from the Report of the Commission of [...] of  
                                                        this Honorable Chamber, which has accompanied the  
                                                        bill  Now on debate, if the opposition does not raise  
                                                        any reasonable arguments for its rejection, the bill  
                                                        should be approved as soon as possible.688  
                                                                                                     
                 Sophism of laudatory personalities 
 
      diagnosis 
        apparent normality:                  a person who enjoys certain high position confesses, 
                                                         with ironic modesty, that he cannot render an  
                                                         opinion on the proposed bill because he does not  
                                                         understand it, to underestimate it without having to  
                                                         judge it; or tries that a majority trusts his negative  
                                                         judgment, without analyzing the purported  
                                                         inconveniences that it would have, through a self  
                                                         praise about the purity of the motives that guide him  
                                                         and the integrity of his life;689                                                                                                  
      secret pathology:                        be it for ironic modesty or for the self-proclaimed  
                                                         authority, the secret pathology consists in rejecting  
                                                         the bill without any reasonable arguments against   
                                                         it.690 
                                                 
688Counter example by the author of this book. 
689Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  459. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 64. 
Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
412. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 69. 
690Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 
412-413. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 69-70. 
   
     
      example:                                    Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber, I must  
                                                         confess that I do not understand the proposed bill, in 
                                                         spite of my long lasting parliamentary experience,  
                                                         this being the reason why I am not able to render my 
                                                         opinion about its approval or rejection. 
                                                          
      counter example:                       Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: I must  
                                                         acknowledge that it would have been very useful to 
                                                         rely on the authorized opinion of the distinguished 
                                                         parliamentarian who preceded me in taking the  
                                                         floor, but, because of the time spent in the study of  
                                                         the topic now on debate, we must deprive ourselves  
                                                         of his illustrated judgment, so as not to delay the  
                                                         enactment of a law of such an importance to the 
                                                         happiness of the people and the greatness of the 
                                                         Nation.  
                                                         If no reasonable arguments are raised against the  
                                                         bill, we should approve it without any further delay. 
 
      example:                                    Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the purity 
                                                         of the motives that have always guided me and the  
                                                         integrity I have demonstrated in many years of  
                                                         hones parlamentarian life, in the government party  
                                                         as well as in the opposition, impose on me the moral  
                                                         and political duty to move for the rejection of the  
                                                         proposed bill whithout any further debate. 
 
      counter example:                       Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: nobody  
                                                         can deny the parliamentary experience, the purity of 
                                                         the motives and the integrity demonstrated in  
                                                         many years of honest parliamentary life, so in  
                                                         government party as well as in the opposition, of the  
                                                         distinguished member of this High Body who has  
                                                         preceded me in taking the floor. However, since  
                                                         character is demonstrated by conduct and not   
                                                         conduct by character,691 I invite him, with the 
                                                                                                                                               
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, pp.  451-45. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  66. 
691Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the 
Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 
413. 
Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier 
Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 70. 
Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de 
Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,  Tome Premier, p.  459. 
Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial 
Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p.  67. 
                                                          utmost cordially respect, to let us know in detailed 
                                                         his authorized opinion about the purported specific  
                                                         inconveniences of the bill on debate that have led  
                                                         him to move for its rejection without any further  
                                                         debate. If neither he, nor any other member of his  
                                                         political party, or of other political parties, is able to  
                                                         illustrate us about the rejection of the bill with  
                                                         reasonable arguments, then I will move for its  
                                                         immediate approval, on the basis of the  
                                                         considerations contained in the Report of the  
                                                         Commission of [...] that has accompanied it.692 
                                                       
      b.  Legislative sophisms in the strict sense 
 
      Deliberative sophisms, although also applicable to many other political debates not 
about laws, take the discussion of the laws as a model. Legislative sophisms in the strict 
sense are those incurred by the law itself; 
 
      diagnosis: 
        apparent normality:                 the law grants exemptions to certain persons for  
                                                         the optional exercise of certain activity, as if this  
                                                         would benefit them, and imposes sanctions on other  
                                                         persons who fail to exercise the above mentioned  
                                                         activity, as if this would damage them; 
        secret pathology:                     in fact, since the purported beneficiaries will not  
                                                         exercise the optional excercise that the law granted  
                                                         to them, because they will not be fined for being  
                                                         exempted or, since when a fine is established on the 
                                                         the enrolled citizens who fail to excercise the  
                                                         aforesaid activity, they will not register themselves  
                                                         for fear of  being fined, in any of two cases the ones  
                                                         purportedly damaged are those actually benefited  
                                                         with the exclusive exercise of the activity thus  
                                                         regulated. 
 
      Examples:                                   
                                                         Sophism of the oligarchy693 
                                                          
                                                         Due to the little participation of the citizens in 
                                                         Assemblies of the People, the magistratures and the 
                                                         administration of justice, it turns out necessary, 
                                                 
692Both the example and the counter example belong to the author of this book. 
693Aristotle, Polítícs, Book IV, Cap. 13, 1297a15-25. 
Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, 1297a15-23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2059. 
Aristotle, Politics, VI, 13, 1297a14-25, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis 
and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and 
London, 1997, p.195. 
Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, 1297a15-25, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María 
Araujo, Introducción y Notas por  Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 191. 
                                                          opportune and expedient to encourage them to  
                                                         participate. 
 
                                                         Therefore,  
                                                                          THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE 
                                                                                 DOES HEREBY ENACT 
                                                                                 THE FOLLOWING LAW: 
 
                                                         ARTICLE 1: The citizens with an annual income 
                                                         equivalent to or higher than [...] drachmas who have  
                                                         failed to participate in the Assemblies of the People,  
                                                         or in the administration of justice, or who have  
                                                         resigned from their offices in the magistratures,  
                                                         shall, in any of the aforesaid cases, pay a fines  
                                                         amounting to [...] drachmas for each day of absence.      
                                                         ARTICLE 2: The citizens with an income lower  
                                                         than [...] drachmas will be entitled to participate in  
                                                         the Assemblies of the People, the administration of 
                                                         Justice and the magistratures. They will remain  
                                                         exempt from the imposition of fines if they fail to 
                                                         participate in the former cases or resign their offices  
                                                         in the later case. 
                                                         ALTERNATIVE ARTICLE 1 and 2: The citizens  
                                                         who shall register in a special record will be entitled  
                                                         to participate in the Assemblies of the People, the  
                                                         administration of justice and the magistratures.  
                                                         The citizens registered in the aforesaid special  
                                                         record who not participate in the Assemblies of the  
                                                         People or in the administration of justice, or who  
                                                         shall resign their offices in the magistratures, shall  
                                                         pay a fine amounting to [...] drachmas, for each day  
                                                         of absence. 
                                                         ARTICLE...: On the relevant formalities.                                                       
 
                                                         Sophism of the ochlocracia694 
 
                                                         Due to the little participation of the citizens in the 
                                                         Assemblies of the People, the administration of  
                                                         justice and the magistratures, it turns out necessary, 
                                                         opportune and expedient to encourage them to  
                                                         participate.  
                                                          
                                                 
694Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, Cap. 13, 1297a35. 
Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, 1297a35, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2060. 
Aristotle, Politics, VI, 13, 1297a34, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis 
and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and 
London, 1997, p. 195. 
Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, 1297a35, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo, 
Introducción y Notas por  Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 192. 
                                                          Therefore,  
                                                                          THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE 
                                                                                 DOES HEREBY ENACT  
                                                                                 THE FOLLOWING LAW: 
 
                                                         ARTICLE 1: The citizens with an income higher  
                                                         than [...] drachmas, will be entitled to participate in 
                                                         the Assemblies of the People, the administration of  
                                                         justice and the magistratures. They shall remain  
                                                         exempted from the imposition of fines if they fail to 
                                                         participate in the former cases or resign their offices 
                                                         in the latter case. 
                                                         ARTICLE 2: The citizens with an annual income  
                                                         equivalent to or lower than [...] drachmas, will be 
                                                         entitled to participate in the Assemblies of the  
                                                         People, the administration of justice and the  
                                                         magistratures. They shall receive a subsidy of [...]  
                                                         drachmas for each day of participation. 
                                                         ARTICLE 3: On the relevant formalities. 
                                                         
         counter example:                    Refutation of two previous sophisms695 
 
                                                         Due to the little participation of the citizens in the 
                                                         Assemblies of the People, the administration of  
                                                         justice and the magistratures, it turns out necessary, 
                                                         opportune, expedient and fair, to encourage them to 
                                                         participate. 
 
                                                         Therefore,  
                                                                THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE 
                                                                         DOES HEREBY ENACT  
                                                                         THE FOLLOWING LAW: 
 
                                                         ARTICLE 1: The citizens who, without any  
                                                         Reasonable justification, shall not participate in the  
                                                         Assemblies of the People, the administration of  
                                                         justice, or who shall resign their offices in the  
                                                         magistratures, in any of the aforesaid cases, shall  
                                                         pay a fine equivalent to [...] % of  their annual  
                                                         income, for each day of absence. 
                                                         ARTICLE 2: The citizens with an income  
                                                         equivalent to or lower than [...] drachmas, shall  
                                                 
695Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, Cap. 13, 1297a15-25. 
Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, 1297a15-23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2059. 
Aristotle, Politics, VI, 13, 1297a14-25, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis 
and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and 
London, 1997, p. 195. 
Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, 1297a15-25, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María 
Araujo, Introducción y Notas por  Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 191. 
                                                          receive a subsidy of [...] drachmas for each day of  
                                                         participation in the Assemblies of the People, the  
                                                         administration of justice or the magistratures. 
                                                         ARTICLE 3: On the relevant formalities. 
 
      Those willing to enlarge their knowledge on political sophisms in general and on 
legislative sophisms in the wide sense (deliberative and legislative in the strict sense), 
may look for inspiration in Tacitus (55 - c. 117 A.D.)696, who narrated some historical 
examples of “secrets of the power”(“arcana imperii”);697 in Arnoldus Clapmarius 
(1574-1604), who included Aristotle’s “political fallacies” in the “arcana imperii” from 
Tacitus, and  systematized the whole subject matter with numerous cites of them both 
and of other classical authors;698 in William Gerard Hamilton (1729-1796), who 
detailed a large number of observations and rules from and for an astute 
parlamentarian,699 and in George Junkin (1790-1868), who wrote about the false 
assumptions and the refutations of the fallacies incurred with regard to the civil war in 
the United States of America.700 
      The things to say that were found will have to be chosen once weighted and selected 
by means of previous reflection, by using the Instruments. Although it is true that there 
is nothing more fertile than a spirit cultivated by studying, it is not less true that, as well 
as  fecund lands produce good grains and also bad grasses that damage the grains, the 
Promptuary registers in a systematical form not only the good thinks to say, but also the 
bad, the weak or the useless ones701 to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel 
                                                 
696The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, Compiled and Edited by Sir Paul Harvey, Oxford 
University Press, First Published October 1937, Reprinted with Corrections 1940, 1946, Oxford, p. 413. 
697Tacitus, Annals II, 36. 
The Annals of Tacitus, II.xxvi, in Tacitus  II, Annals, Books I-III, The Annals with an English Translation 
by John Jakson, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemenn Ltd., Harvard University Press, First 
Printing 1931, Reprinted 1943, 1951, 1956, pp. 436-438. 
Tácito, Anales II, 36, en Cayo Cornelio Tácito, Obras Completas, Traducción, Introducción y Notas, Obra 
Publicada Bajo la Dirección de Vicente Blanco y García, Aguilar, Madrid, 1957, pp. 146-147. 
698Arn. Clapmarii, De Arcanis  Rerumplublicarum Libri Sex, ed. Johannes Clapmarius, Bremen, 1605 
(primera edición, póstuma). 
Arn. Clapmarii, De Arcanis Rerumpublicarum Libri Sex, apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, Amsterodami, 
1641, Arcana imperii, pp. 73-113 (the cites correspond to this edition). 
699William Gerard Hamilton, Parliamentary Logick, To which plows Subjoined Two Speeches Delivered 
in the House of Commons of Ireland, and other Pieces, With an Appendix, Containing Considerations on 
the Corn Laws, by Samuel Johnson, Never Before Printed, Printed by C. And B. Baldwin, London, for 
Thomas Payne, Pall-Mall, 1808, Preface xlvi pp.; 1-100 pp. 
Guillermo Gerardo Hamilton, Logical Parliamentarian, The Modern Spain, Madrid, s.f., 96 pp. 
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 George Junkin, Political Fallacies: An Examination of the False assumpyions, and Refutation of the 
Sophistical Reasoning, which have Brought on this Civil War, Charles Scribner, New York, 1863, 325 
pp. 
701With regard to the topics especially: 
Cicerón, El Orador, 15, 47-49. 
Marco Tulio Cicerón, El Orador, ( M. Tulli Ciceronis Orator), 15, 47-49, Texto Revisado y Traducido por 
Antonio Tovar y Aurelio Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma Mater S.A., Barcelona, 1967, pp. 20-21. 
Cicéron, L'Orateur (M. Tulli Ciceronis Orator ad M. Brutus), XV, 47-49, Texte Établi et Traduit par 
Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the corresponding prescriptive and persuasive speeches, since before they are used it is 
necessary to value them with regard to every particular occasion. 
 
RULE: Before begining with the Systematics stage, it shall be verified that all the parts 
of the Promptuary (Form, Double reasons, Colors of Good and Evil, Topics and 
Sophisms) have beeng considered, like a check list, but not all the things to say that 
have been found shall be used without previous reflection, through the employment of 
the Instruments, about their respective utility to compose and criticize, to counsel and  
discounsel, in each occasion, the corresponding persuasive and prescriptive speeches. 
 
     The things to say that were found and chosen in the Investigation stage will be 
distributed in accordance with the explanatory plan to be adopted, this beeing the 
second of the three stages of the algorithm established for the drafting of a bill, which 
will be developed in the following Chapter, dedicated to Systematics. 
  
 
Chapter VI 
Systematics 
 
     The rhetorical algorithm that will result in a written, prescriptive or persuasive 
speech, connects the previous stage, investigation, which provided the things to say 
(res), with the following one, style, which will state them (verba). After going out of 
one and before entering into the other one, it is necessary to arrange the content in a 
suitable form (taxis, dispositio), in accordance with a systematics, also known as order, 
method, plan, disposition or economy. 
 
RULE: The systematics shall be suitable when it facilitates distribuing, finding, 
understanding and remembering the contents of the speech, as well as its internal and 
external references. It will vary depending on whether the speech is prescriptive or 
persuasive. 
 
1.  Prescriptive speeches 
 
     Systematics has been one of the most studied topics by Romanist scholars as they 
criticized the Institutes of  Gaius, the Digest and the Institutes of Justinian, and by Civil 
Law scholars, as they examined the respective codes and compared them with  
Napoleon’s Code (1804), the German Civil Code (1900), and the Italian Civil and 
Commercial Code (1942). It has also been one of the most studied topics in the works 
on the art of legislation, both in the Civil Law and Common Law, but, curiously, it has 
not been related to the taxis or dispositio of the rhetorical tradition. 
     The order, method, plan, disposition, economy or systematics of legislation is of the 
utmost importance both in the composition and criticism of the general juridical norms, 
and in their interpretation, approval, application and amendment, since it determines the 
explicit context, what is stated, and also determines the implicit context,702 what is not 
stated, but assumed: the idea of a juridical system. 
 
     a.  Natural order 
 
     The juridical system has a classificatory structure already given to legislators like a 
pre-existing natural order (ordo naturalis), that they will follow under normal 
circumstances.703 This structure consists in the relationship of logical inclusion between 
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 "The context of the law shall serve to illustrate the sense of each of its parts, so that between all of 
them there is a proper correspondence and harmony. 
The obscure passages of a law may be illustrated by means of other laws, particularly if they are about the 
same matter." 
"El contexto de la ley servirá para ilustrar el sentido de cada una de sus partes, de manera que haya entre 
todas ellas la debida correspondencia y harmonía. 
Los pasajes oscuros de una ley pueden ser ilustrados por medio de otras leyes, particularmente si versan 
sobre el mismo asunto." 
Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición Autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, 
Santiago de Chile, Julio de 1858, art. 22, p. 3. 
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 It is the ordo naturalis of the rhetorical tradition, which is already given, does not depend on the 
orator and is followed under normal circumstances: 
Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by 
George A. Kennedy, Translated from Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der 
 the sets of norms, institutions, branches, the internal juridical orders, and the 
international juridical order, all of them founded on the respective levels of principles 
(normative, institutional, proper of each branch, internal, international, general of the 
law and of civilized nations). It denotes the close link between the relevant differences 
and similarities that join together all the integral elements of a juridical system, 
reducing to a unity the multiplicity of materials originated in the sources of law 
(legislation, custom, case law, and juristic writings). 
 
RULE: The things to say found and chosen at the investigation stage, shall be shown in 
accordance with the systematics that will determine the explicit context of the speech, 
following, under normal circumstances, the classificatory structure of the implicit 
context (juridical system), so that it will facilitate distribuing, finding, understanding 
and remembering the content of the speech, as well as its internal and external 
references, for its opportune interpretation, approval, application and amendment. 
 
     A set of separated materials is not the same as those materials combined in a house 
constructed with them. Members just smelt, are not the same as joined in the statue for 
which they were destined. 
 
 RULE: The systematics order shall be natural, when it makes its integral parts so 
tightly cohesive that its sutures are not noticeable, forming a single body, instead of 
members only joined with each other.704 
  
      b.  Artificial order 
 
      If the speech is like a body, a good cook will cut it by its natural joints, trying not to 
break any part, like an inept cook would.705  
 
PRINCIPLE: Divisions shall follow the natural order, but if special circumstances 
indicate the conveniency or utility of a separation (ordo artificialis), others may be 
used,706 as long as, in accordance with the principle of just tolerance, they do not 
                                                                                                                                               
Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Second Edition, 1973, by Matthew T. Bliss, 
Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leyden, Boston, 
Köln, 1998, numbers 447-448, p. 213. 
Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de  José Pérez Riesco del original alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1966, T. I, numbers 447-448, p. 373. 
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 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria, III, VII, Preface, 1-2; VII.10.16. 
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four 
Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, 
Volume III, Book VII, Preface, 1-2, London, 1921, pp. 2-5, VII.x.16, pp. 170-171. 
Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Societé d'Edition "Les Belles 
Lettres", Tome IV, Livre VII, Avant-propos, 1-2, Paris, 1977, p. 106, 7.10.16. 
705
 Plato, Phaedrus, 265d-e. 
Platon, Phédre, 265e, dans Platon Oeuvres Complètes, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, 
avec la Colaboration de M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Tome II, Paris, 1942, p. 62. 
Platón, Fedro, 265d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, pp. 61-62.  
706
 It is the ordo artificialis or ordo artificiosus of the rhetorical tradition, which consciously sacrifices 
the natural order (artistically), on account of special requirements of the cause (utilitas). 
 destroy the real unity of the institutions, nor assemble heterogeneous elements, nor 
distort their harmony, and nor alter their truly essential features, thus obscuring the 
matter and becoming an obstacle to distributing, understanding,707 finding and 
remembering the speech, as well as internal and external references, for their opportune 
interpretation, approval, application and amendment. 
 
     The systematics facilitates the understanding of a speech, since the context enables to 
omit words without generating reasonable interpretive doubts, like, for example, when 
the spanish word gato (meaning “cat” and “jack”) "cat" is used to refer to the domestic 
animal in an animal protection law, or when it is used to refer to the device in a law 
establishing the rights of import of hardware, since nobody will find any ambiguity in 
their respective contexts. 
 
RULE: When the provisions are grouped in accordance with their similarities and 
differences, it shall be easier to: 
a) find those with the same topic, because they are together;  
b) remember them, because of the association of ideas; 
c) refer to them, mentioning the respective systematic units. 
     
RULE: The audience of a bill is not a single one, since it is integrated, successively, by 
those who shall put it forward, approve it, publish it, spread the knowlege of it, fulfill it 
and apply it. They are all its addresees, who shall previously interpret it. For this reason, 
the  addreessees shall have to be borne especially taken into account by the legislator 
and his advisers, since they form a multiple audience. 
 
     In the past, owing to the imperfect distribution of the matters, especially in 
Justinian's Digest, the explicit context and the descriptors that had to indicate the 
content did not have much weight in the interpretation, whether with the argument pro 
subjecta materia, or, to lesser degree, with the argument a rubrica.708 Nowadays, the 
                                                                                                                                               
Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by 
George A. Kennedy, Translated from Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der 
Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Second Edition, 1973, by Matthew T. Bliss, 
Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 
Köln, 1998, number 452, p. 214. 
Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1966, T. I, número 452, pp. 375-376.    
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 F.C. Savigny established the principle of "just tolerance" in the scientific exposition, which does not 
establish indifference in the event of an imperfection, but pays homage to the independence of the human 
spirit in its individual development. 
F. C. Savigny, Traité de Droit Romain, Traduit de l'Allemand par Ch. Guenoux, Librairie de Firmin Didot 
Frères, Paris, 1855, Tome Premier, Chapitre I, LIX Des Divers Systèmes de Classification du Droit, pp. 
395-396. 
This principle also applies, according to the author of the present work, to legislative exposition. 
708
 The forceful value of the argument a rubrica was still a controversial matter at the beginning of XX 
century. 
La Logique Judiciaire et l'Art de Juger par P. Fabregettes, Librairie Générale de Droit & de 
Jurisprudence, Paris, 1914, pp. 384, 391-392. 
 place of the norm in the legislative text, its explicit context, provides a hint for its 
systematical interpretation.709 
 
PRINCIPLE: The legislator shall maintain the coherence, completeness and economy of 
the classificatory system, in the juridical system (macro) and in the respective bill 
(micro), avoiding antinomies, gaps and redundancies, in such a way that in the 
prescriptive speech, there will be a place for every-thing and every-thing will be in its 
place. 
 
            Parts of the speech 
 
     The parts stressed next appear in any prescriptive speech. They are natural insofar as  
they arise from their prescriptive nature, but they also are artificial,710 because they 
belong to the art of legislation that perfects them with its rules. 
 
RULE: The body of any prescriptive speech shall have two essential parts: 
a) the first part may have one or more sections and, in the event of many sections, it will 
be preceded by one or more Preliminary Titles or a General Part,711 followed by the 
most important divisions, grouped in a Special Part, if there is a General Part; 
b) the second part may limit itself to the last section (on the relevant formalities), or also 
include complementary provisions,  provisions approving anexes, and transitory and 
repealing provisions. 
 
RULE: The provisions may be: 
a) complementary, if they may neither be included in the existing divisions, nor form a 
homogeneous class justifying another division; 
b) approving of annexes or a set of information, generally with technical contents, 
which will serve to interpret and apply the law, except in the case of the systematic 
legislation, usually enacted as an annex to the law that approved its text; 
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 Giorgio Lazzaro, L'Interpretazione Sistematica della Legge,  Universitá di Torino, Memorie 
dall'Istituto Giuridico, Serie II, Memorie CXXII, Torino, 1965, pp. 121-122. 
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 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, IX, 17. 
[Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, With an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, 
Harvard University Press, III, ix, 17, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, 
Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 184-187.  
[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro III, IX, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 196-197. 
Cicerón, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez 
Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, Retórica a Cayo Herennio, Libro III, Madrid, 1879, p. 
154. 
[Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius. Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Ciceron, Texte Revue et traduit avec 
Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre III, IX, 17, Paris, p. 123. 
711
 The provisions of the General Part apply to all the topics in the Special Part. 
R. Saleilles, Introduction a l'Étude du Droit Civil Allemand, 1904, p. 105. 
After the division into a General Part and a Special Part of the German Civil Code of 1900, this 
systematic was not used again in the Swiss Civil Code of 1912, or in the Italian Civil Code of 1942, and it 
gave rise to an interesting debate in the French Civil Code Reform Commission. 
Code Civil Suisse, Exposé des Motives de l'Avant-Projet du Département Féderal de Justice et Police, 
Tome Premier, Introduction, Droit des Personnes et de la Famille, Berne, 1901, pp. 18-21. 
Travaux de la Commission de Reforme du Code Civil, Année 1945-1946, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 
Paris, 1947, pp. 159-161. Année 1946-1947, París, 1948, p. 14-110, 229-277. 
  
 c) transitory, if they establish exceptions to the principles governing the publication, 
entry into force, and existence of the law; 
d) repealing, if they render other norms partialy innefective; 
e) abrogative, if they render other norms completely ineffective, without replacing them. 
 
RULE: Complementary provisions shall precede transitory ones and transitory 
provisions shall precede repealing ones. Transitory and repealing provisions shall 
follow complementary ones, since both will be exhausted upon their respective 
fulfillment. 
 
RULE: The section on relevant formalities shall be at the end, because, in addition to its 
prescriptive content, which shall also will be exhausted, it shall indicate -in implicit 
form- that it is the last section of the prescriptive speech. 
 
RULE: Any division shall contain more than one section. Should there be only one 
section, a marginal rubric will suffice. 
   
RULE: When the change to be introduced to modify a law consists in adding a concept, 
it shall be advisable to subdivide an existing systematic unit,712 rather than to create a 
new one, of equal or higher status, provided that the resulting text preserves the 
homogeneity of the prescriptive speech. 
 
     Although today it seems obvious, the numbering of the laws was one of the ideals 
pursued in the XVII century, as it may be seen in Leibniz.713 It has been a great advance, 
because it has facilitated references, but also a source of technical gaps, due to the 
possible errors or omissions in the amending legislation. 
  
RULE: Any legislative change shall be preceded and accompanied by the explicit 
control written in specific charts, of the crossed references in the bill itself and in 
relation to the current law, before and after the proposed changes, to avoid errors and 
technical gaps. 
             
      Elaboration of the expository plan 
 
RULE: When the matters are distributed to two antithetic members of the set,  tension 
shall be underlined; when they are distributed to three members, completeness shall be 
underlined.714 
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 Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute, Fred B. Rothman, Littleton, 1996, p. 47. 
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 Gottfried Whilhelm Leibniz, Philosophischen Schriften, Herausgegeben von der Preussischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Erster Band 1663-1672, Otto Reischl Verlag Darmstadt, Nova Methodus 
Discendae Doceandaeque Jurisprudentiae, Herbst 1667, Druck C. (Frankfurt 1667), “Catalogus 
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 Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by 
George A. Kennedy, Translated from Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der 
Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Second Edition, 1973, by Matthew T. Bliss, 
Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 
Köln, 1998, number 443, p. 209. 
Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria. Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
  
RULE: Systematic criteria go from the simple to the complex, from general to special, 
from the abstract to the concrete, from the universal to the particular, from the highest to 
the lowest, from cause to effect and from precedent to consequent. 
    
RULE: In elaborating an expository plan, it shall be practical to start by concisely 
describing the topics to be developed in each systematical unit, starting with sections,715 
in the case of simple laws, or with higher units, like Chapters, Titles, Parts and Books, 
in the complex ones, to group or to separate them later on, in accordance with the 
noticed relevant similarities and differences between them. 
 
RULE: The marginal rubrics716 of sections, like the denominations of Chapters, Titles, 
Parts, Books, Special Part, General Part, or of the prescriptive speech as a whole, shall 
be understood as headings or descriptors giving an idea of the topic dealt with, not as 
summaries of their content. 
 
RULE: Descriptors shall be grouped in homogeneous classes, in accordance with their 
relevant similarities and differences. Those repetitively used may indicate the need to 
form a General Part, with its respective subdivisions. The descriptors of the Special Part 
shall indicate the content of Books, Parts, Titles, Chapters and Sections. 
 
RULE: Complex systematical units shall be divided into simple systematical units, 
begining with Sections. 
 
RULE: To facilitate the debate and the voting, sections shall be subdivided into 
subsections and paragraphs, so that it may be possible to discuss, approve or reject them 
separately.717 
       
      No Section should exceed one hundred words, or else it becomes difficult to 
understand. The French Civil Code of 1804, an example of legislative clarity, does not 
contain any section exceding a hundreed words. 
 
RULE: Sections shall not exceed one hundred words, to facilitate the understanding of 
their respective meanings. 
                                                                                                                                               
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1966, T. I, número 443, p. 368. 
In relation to the Roman jurist’s tendency to use symbolic numbers and artificial symmetries, number 3 is 
remembered as and odd number bringing good luck; divine power, as in the Hindu mythology Vishnu, 
Siva and Brahama and the Christian Trinity; representation of the beginning, middle and end of every-
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drei sein". 
Henry Goudy, Artificiality of Roman Juristic Classifications, Studi in Onore di Carlo Fadda, T. V., 
Napoli, 1906, pp. 210-211.  
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 R.M.M. King, Manual on Legislative Drafting, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1976, p. 5. 
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 Thus called because the epigraphs or signs of the ancient books used to be written in red ink. 
Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición, Real Academia Española, rúbrica, acepción 
3, Madrid, 1970, pp. 1161. 
717
 For the division of the very complicated original proposals, which allows for partial rejections, see: 
Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, 
Tome Premier, Tactique des Assemblées Politiques Délibérantes, Chapitre XXI Des Ammendements, 
Societé Belge de Librairie, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 393. 
  
      Care should be taken with the terminology of legislative systematics in comparative 
law, since, in Civil Law countries, Secciones (Parts) may precede Títulos (Titles), like in 
the Argentine Civil Code, or appear later, before the Capítulos (Chapters), as in the 
Argentine Code of Commerce and in the Civil Code of Brazil; Common Law Sections 
are denominated Artículos,718 a Division is a Capítulo (a set of Sections), a Subsection 
is an Inciso, which is named Paragraphe in French, while an English Paragraph is 
equivalent to a French Alinéa.719 The latter systematical category begins to the left of 
the line, with a capital letter according to an interpretation, and ends with a period 
(Council of the State, General Secretariat of the Government and, in general, the 
administrative services); according to another interpretation, it also begins to the left, 
but it ends on the following line (services of the parliamentary assemblies).720 
 
RULE: To write the marginal notes of  Sections and rubrics of the other systematical 
units, as well as the whole prescriptive speech, the terminology used shall be 
transparent, to brings its meaning to mind, and also concise, to facilitates its 
memorization. 
 
2.  Persuasive speeches 
 
     From Corax, active in Syracuse after democracy was restored (467 B.C.) and the 
author of the first handbook on Greek rhetoric, persuasive speeches have been split into 
three systematical parts: exordium, agon or struggles (of ideas, in this case) and 
epilogue.721 
 
RULE: Persuasive speeches shall be split into three parts: exordium, agon and epilogue. 
 
      a.  Exordium 
 
     The persuasive speech precedes the prescriptive speech, takes it as its object, and 
serves as an exordium or preface to it in preambles, whereas, exposition of motives, 
messages and reports. These species of exordiums, as well as the footnotes, notes 
inserted at the end and epilogues, which also are persuasive speeches, considered in 
themselves as whole speeches, may have an exordium or preface the purpose of which, 
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 For the Brazilian Civil Code and the equivalence between the Spanish Artículo and Sección, see: 
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 as in the preambles, expositions of motives, messages and reports, is to obtain the 
attention, docility and benevolence from the audience.722 
 
RULE: In persuasive speeches, as in any speech, the exordium shall try to obtain the 
attention, docility and benevolence from the audience. 
      
RULE: The exordium may be omitted in honest bills, which are those that coincide with 
the feelings of the public opinion, given the absence of prejudices against the legislator, 
the bills or the regulated matter. 
 
RULE: When the exordium is omitted, the speech shall begin with the proposition, 
which is a summary of the problem to be solved, which will facilitate the understanding 
and approval of the solutions. The proposition may be supplemented by a division of the 
topics, so that those unfamiliar with the issue may understand the exposition 
throughout, postponing to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence from the 
audience.723 
 
     There are two exordiums species: the direct ones, which clearly, immediately and 
openly try to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence from the audience; and the 
indirect ones, which mediately, secretely, subtly or by insinuation, pierce through the 
soul of the audience.724 
 
            Direct exordiums 
 
RULE: In honest bills, an exordium shall show why it coincides with the feelings of the 
public opinion, or announce the topics to be developed,725 to reinforce sympathetic 
feelings or to serve as an expository plan. 
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RULE: In humble bills, which are those about problems of minor importance, the 
exordium shall try to emphasize the obtaining the attention726 of the audience of 
persuasive and prescriptive speeches, to which end, such attention shall be directly 
requested727 or arguing that the problem: 
a) although not important at present, if not dealt with and if a solution is not adopted, 
important damages will be caused in the future; 
b) does not register precedents, or requires innovative solutions; 
c) does not affect the interest of the government only, but also of the State in general 
and the audience in particular. 
 
RULE: In obscure bills, the exordium shall try to emphasize the obtaining of the 
docility of the addressees of persuasive728 and prescriptive speeches. Docility consists in 
enabling the addressees to better understand such speeches, providing them a summary 
of their contents so that they may follow the exposition more easily.729 
 
RULE: In doubtful bills, which combine easy assumptions for their honesty with 
difficult ones for their awkwardness, beeing it impossible to establish the resulting 
strenght or weakness, the exordium shall try to emphasize the benevolence, in such a 
way that the awkwardness will not be harmful to the legislator.730 
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      To ensure benevolence it is necessary to consider whether the addresees will be well 
disposed, bad disposed, or indifferent towards the bill.731 
 
RULE: When the addresees of the bill are well disposed, this state of mind may be 
briefly remembered in the exordium, to maintain or increase their benevolence.  
 
EXAMPLE: 
 
To have to show my just attitude towards public matters, for which invariably I 
preferred personal sacrifices instead of reaping any advantage at the expense of the 
State; to have to show that I always had the best intentions and that my bills turned out 
to be profitable laws for all; it does not seem necessary to say it, because it is of public 
knowledge. My efforts will go to show the merits of the law I now propose, which, as in 
the previous occasions, I hope will achieve the same results. 
 
RULE: When the addresees of the bill are indifferent towards it, the exordium shall try 
to obtain their benevolence, pleasing them with the modesty oratory of the legislator 
and alleging the benefits that all of them will obtain with the approval of the bill. 
 
EXAMPLE: 
 
It is appropiate and convenient to listen favorably to those who have not yet proved 
their legislative prudence, if, as it is habitual among the addresees of the bill, they are 
regarded objectively and sensitively. The present initiative does not pretend to obtain 
credibility by the oratorical skills of the person who proposes it, since he has not such 
skills, and they are not even necessary in this case, in the light of the evident benefits 
that  everybody will obtain if the bill is debated, passed, interpreted and applied in 
accordance with its purpose: the common good. 
 
     The addresees of the bill may be bad disposed against it due to prejudices against the 
legislator, the matter legislated, or the prescriptive speech in itself. 
 
RULE: When the addresees of the project are bad disposed against it due to prejudices 
against the legislator, the exordium shall capture their benevolence, refuting in advance 
the most frequent prejudices: 
a) imputation of crimes not judged, with the accusers’ lack of interest in prosecute the 
criminal proceedings, the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the objective 
assessment of the bill; 
b) judged and punished crimes, including the irregular nature of criminal proceedings, 
and the fact that the convict has served the imposed sentence; 
c) youth, with the early interest, the updated knowledge, the successful experiences, the 
new problems to resolve, and the absence of experts (who have not been sufficiently 
trained yet); 
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 d) old age, with the deep knowledge, long experience of the concrete problems to be 
solved, a lucid memory of undisclosed reasons, and the absence of experts (who are no 
longer available). 
 
EXAMPLES:  
 
This legislator knows very well, perhaps too well, that he has to face prejudice against  
him, but it will be immediately proven that such prejudice lacks any foundation, in the 
case of: 
 
a) imputation of crimes not judged: 
 
Those who have pressed the charges have no interest in the proceedings, but are afraid 
of them, since the falsity of the accusations would be demonstrated and they should 
answer for their statements. For this reason they pose all kinds of obstacles to his 
efforts to enable trial to take place, which would prove his innocence, since any accused 
would do nothing to go ahead with the proceedings if he were guilty. It should also be 
borne in mind that any accused is pressumed innocent until found guilty; hence, he is 
waiting for the court judgment with confidence. 
Finally, those who shall decide whether this bill is to be discussed, approved or 
rejected, should not let themselves be carried awy by prejudice against its author, but 
they should carefully and dispassionately analyze the bill in itself, to make a just and 
convenient decision, which will brings happiness to everyone. 
 
b) crimes judged and punished: 
 
The charges are false, since [...] The proceedings are irregular, since [...] Finally, 
although he has been condemned, he has already paid his price to society, and nobody 
should any longer discredited on account of the same fact, since this is the case of a 
settled account.  
 
c) youth: 
 
The author of the present bill doesn’t ignore that young people who promote bills faces 
prejudices on account of their inexperience. The matter regulated, which is new, has 
interested and been studied by him from a very early age. Besides, the author has 
succesfully applied his knowledge on many occasions.  
Finally, it should be remembered that now there is a shortage of experts available to 
enlighten us with their advice and, since the deliberation can’t take place on other 
oportunity, it would be imprudent not to treat or approve a just and convenient bill on 
the basis of a mere prejudice, like the youth of the person who proposes it. 
 
d) old age: 
 
This legislator knows very well that elderly people who promote bills faces prejudices 
on account of their age, because it is thought that they should cease to do so. Since now 
there are no other experts available to enlighten us with their advice, and since the 
deliberation can’t take other oportunity, it would be imprudent not to treat or approve a 
bill promoted by someone with deep knowledge and long experience in the matter. 
 Finally, it should be added, in his favor, that he knows the underlying reasons for the 
successes and defeats related to these matters, which are not always known by the 
public at large, because he has read about some and has lived through others during 
his lifetime, and is still lucid enough to tell younger people about them. A just and 
convenient bill should not be rejected on the basis of a mere prejudice, like the ripe old 
age of the person who proposes it. 
 
RULE: When the addresees of the bill are bad disposed against it due to prejudices 
against the matter legislated, the exordium shall try to obtain their benevolence, quelling 
the fears for affecting powerful interests or debating controversial matters. 
  
EXAMPLES: 
 
a) When powerful interests are affected: 
 
Fears will always exist when powerful interests are affected, but nothing will be more 
powerful than the truth revealed and the common interest. 
 
b) When controversial matters are debated: 
 
It is true that one should not legislate on controversial matters, but it is not less true 
that, when the absence of uniform solutions makes the resuling uncertainty unbearable, 
it is necessary and opportune to put an end to that situation, implementing the most just 
and convenient solutions from the possible alternatives, as in the bill that we have the 
honour of submitting  for your consideration. 
 
RULE: When the addresees of the bill will are bad disposed against it because the 
prescriptive speech is: 
a) very long, one shall allege the complexity of the problems and the precision required 
by the solutions adopted; 
b) of a very old fashioned style, one shall allege that it is a question of  traditional 
formulae, which everybody knows how to interpret and apply; 
c) slightly convincing, one shall allege that all the fundamental reasons will be given in 
the persuasive speech. 
 
EXAMPLES: 
 
a) If it is said to be very long: 
 
The bill is long, but not for an unnecessary verbosity, but because it is so required by 
the complexity of the problems and the precision of the solutions to be adopted. 
 
b) If it is said to be of a very old fashioned style: 
 
It is true that at first sight the style of the bill seems very old fashioned, but this is due to 
the existence of  traditional formulae associated to the matter involved, which 
everybody knows how to interpret and apply, and it is not advisable to introduce, in 
addition to changes of content, formal innovations that would only generate confusion, 
despite any possible aesthetic achievement. 
 
 c) If it is said to be slightly convincing: 
 
The prescriptive speech might not sound convincing at first sight, and that's why it is 
preceded by this persuasive speech, which contains the reasons of the former, as it will 
be proved next. 
 
RULE: In awkward or shameful bills, direct exordiums shall not be used. 
 
           Indirect exordiums 
 
RULE: The attention, docility and benevolence of the addresees, which should be 
maintained throughout the speech, shall be obtained at the beginning by a direct 
exordium. Should any inconvenience arise it shall be obtained by an indirect exordium 
or by insinuation.732 
 
RULE: An indirect exordium, which tries to obtain the attention, docility and 
benevolence of the addresees by insinuation, mediately, secretely, and subtly, shall be 
used when the direct one is not convenient,733 because the bill: 
a) implies something awkward or shameful, opposed by the public opinion; 
b) is preceded by other bills that were supported by or tired public opinion out. 
 
RULE: When the bill implies something awkward or shameful, the legislator734 shall 
state that: 
a) there are other persons, things, or circumstances related to the bill, so that they may 
attract sympathy; 
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 b) he would share the indignation that the bill has caused, if the causes were real; 
c) even if these causes were real, they are totally unrelated to him, or to the opportunity 
and nature of the bill proposed; 
d) he will quote the opinions of other prestigious legislators in bills of equal, higher or 
lower importance that have set valuable precedents, and he will gradually show its 
analogy to the opportunity and nature of the bill proposed; 
e) he does not intend to criticize those who have criticized without reason, whether in  
good faith or not, and that he will not even bring to attention other matters, but that he 
will make the respective references to arouse the relevant antipathies. 
 
           Virtues and vices of the exordium 
 
RULE: The exordium will be virtuous if it obtains the attention, docility and 
benevolence of the addresees. Vicious,735 if it distracts, hinders understanding, or turn 
bad disposed the addresees. A exordium shall be vicious, among other things, when it: 
a) contains unusual vocabulary, a style too high, or verbose, due to its lack of 
spontaneity; 
b) may be applied to many bills, whether due to its vulgarity or to its dangerous 
application to other bills proposed;  
c) is not closely related to the statement of the facts (narration), or to the summary of the 
problem and the solution adopted in the prescriptive speech (proposition), in such a way 
that it does not look like a member of the same body, on account of its lack of 
naturalness. 
 
RULE: The legislator shall try to make the exordium encourage its addresses to read the 
bill, just as an architect tries to make the foyer encourage visitors to enter the 
building.736 
 
     b.  Agon 
 
     The nucleus of a persuasive speech is the agon, the struggle between ideas, an 
anticipated debate. 
 
RULES: The agon shall comprise three main parts: narration, confirmation and 
refutation; and three accessory parts: digression, proposition, and division. 
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            Narration 
 
RULE: In the narration the facts shall be stated,737 with all the useful circumstances738 
that may facilitate the approval of the bill. It may include the facts causing such 
problems as may make solutions arise in the spirit of the legislator (occasio legis),739 
insofar as they contribute to the best understanding of the purpose sought, provided 
always that they coincide with the foundation of the bill (ratio legis) and the drafting of 
the prescriptive speech. 
 
RULE: The narration may be avoided in brief bills. Simple topics shall be started by the 
proposition. 
 
RULE: The narration states important facts of the past, presents the current ones, and 
predicts those that will happen in the future,740 by way of reasons for the changes to be 
introduced in the juridical system, to achieve the results desired for the social system. 
 
RULE: The virtues of the narration are its clarity, concision and verisimilitude, which 
shall facilitate the understanding, memorization and proof, respectively.741 
 
RULE: For a clear narration, an appropriate vocabulary, usual between its addresees 
shall be used, and the facts shall be presented in chronological order.742 
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 RULE: For a concise narration, it shall begin and end with the relevant events, without 
useless digressions, with the words necessary for a restricted speech,743 without harming 
its clarity and verisimilitude. 
 
RULE: For the verisimilitude of the narration, the past, present or future circumstances, 
shall agree with persons and things, times and places, causes, the nature of things and 
men, usages and common sense, so that what is said appears as it usually happen.744  
 
RULE: The narration shall try to avoid the following vices: obscurity, verbosity and 
improbability. 
 
           Digression, proposition and division  
 
RULE: The agon may include: 
a) matters unrelated to the problems to solve (digressions), if they make the approval of 
the bill more acceptable, or allow a better knowledge of what will be stated in the 
confirmation and refutation. When digressions are omitted, the proposition should be 
made in such a way that it arises spontaneously from the narration itself;745 
b) a summary of the problem and the solution instrumented in the prescriptive speech, 
to facilitate the understanding and approval of the bill (proposition). When the 
narration, the public opinion and the opposition all agree, the proposition may be 
omitted or simplified. When they partially agree, a distinction shall be drawn between 
the coincidences and the dissents with the public opinion or with the opposition746 that 
will remain controversial, for its opportune confirmation or refutation. 
c) the topics and the order in which they will be presented (division or partition), in a 
concise way, in three or four parts at the most,747 so that the speech may be easily 
followed, turning the addresees well disposed. It may be omitted when the topics are 
simple and the speeches are brief, except when is desirable to amplify the speech. 
 
           Confirmation 
 
RULE: In the confirmation, which shall be the nucleus of the agon, the arguments to 
counsel the approval of the bill proposed shall be stated, while, in the refutation the 
arguments to discounsel the maintenance of the juridical system unchanged or the 
introduction of changes different from those of the bill proposed shall be stated. 
 
RULE: The confirmation shall argue on: 
a) the verisimilitude of the narration, since from the knowledge of the nature, meaning 
and effects of things, it arises that it is a question of ordinary facts, which usually 
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 happen,748 or of extraordinary ones, which, although they do not usually happen, 
contain no falsity affecting their verisimilitude; 
b) the justice, convenience or utility of the bill, with a special emphasis on the latter, for 
the benefits it will produce or the damages it will avoid  (sympheron, utilitas),749 and the 
safety it will grant. 
 
RULE: To confirm the verisimilitude of the narration, the topic of probability shall be 
used, owing to the congruity of the real past, present or future circumstances, with the 
persons, things, times, nature of things and men, usages, customs and common sense, in 
such a way that what is said appears as usually happens. 
  
RULE: To confirm the justice and convenience or utility of the bill, the arguments may 
deal with the following topics: 
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Introduction, Notes, an Appendixes by George A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, I, 
3, 1358 b, New York, Oxford, 1991, p. 49 y n. 81. 
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Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro I, 3.2., 1358 b, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 195. 
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Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Societé d'Édition les Belles Lettres, 
Tome Premier, Livre I, 3, 1358b, Paris, 1932, p. 84. 
 Utile (useful), nocivo (detrimental): 
Aristotele, Retorica. A cura di Armando Plebe, I, III, 1358b, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 15. 
Rhetórica ad Herennium, III, II, 3. 
[Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by 
Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, ii, 3, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 160-161. 
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 a) formal and material legality, since it was the initiative of a competent organ, 
following valid procedures (formal legality), and is consistent with the content of norms 
of a highest rank (material legality); 
b) possibility and practicability, due to the existence of circumstances that facilitate the 
achievement of things, because, in the absence of such circumstances the achievements 
of things would be impracticable,750 since one does not legislate on the impossible, and 
the impracticable is equated to the impossible; 
c) probability, due to the frequency of events, since laws are enacted only on what 
usually happens,751 unless they rule extraordinary, seen or foreseen facts, requiring 
emergency solutions; 
d) necessity, because of the problems existing in the social or juridical system requiring 
satisfactory legislative solutions; 
e) opportunity, because of the favorable occasion to introduce legislative changes which 
should not be delayed; 
f) justice, prudence, temperance and courage of those who propose the bill, of the bill 
itself, and as stimulus of these virtues to the addresees; 
g) honesty,752 equality and concord promoted753 among the audience; 
h) systematicity, due to its easy interpretation, application and insertion in the juridical 
system; and for the consistency, completeness and economy of the bill itself and with 
regard to the rest of the juridical system, except for the inconsistencies wanted by the 
legislator in implicit or explicit repealing norms; 
i) the stability of the harmonic balance between the requirements of justice, juridical 
security and convenience, which any mature juridical system should satisfy. 
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 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 2, 1424b 15-20. 
[Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 2, 1424b 15-20, Translation E. S. Forster, The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan 
Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, 
pp. 2277. 
            Refutation 
 
RULE: Both the criticism of the bill proposed and other positions adopted (not 
supporting legislative changes to the juridical system or advising changes different from 
those introduced by the bill) may be refuted. 
 
                 Refutation of the criticism to the bill proposed 
 
RULE: In the refutation of the probable or formulated criticism to the bill proposed, 
when the arguments:  
a) of the confirmation were stronger, a single refutation shall be opposed against each 
single criticism;754 
b) of the confirmation were weaker, several refutations shall be opposed against each 
single criticism (amplification of the refutation), or a single refutation shall be opposed 
to several criticism (attenuation of the criticism);755 
c) of the accesory criticism depend on the main criticism, as the links of the same chain, 
only the main criticism shall be refuted.756 
 
                 Refutation of other positions  
 
RULE: In the refutation of other positions (not supporting legislative changes to the 
juridical system or advising changes different from those introduced by the bill 
proposed), the arguments may deal with the following topics: 
a) improbability of the narrations; 
b) injustice and inconvenience or uselessness of introducing changes different from 
those introduced by the bill proposed; 
c) harmful resulting from not changing the juridical system, or from approving changes 
different to those of the bill proposed. 
 
RULE: To refute the verisimilitude of other narrations, the topic of probability shall be 
used, owing to the congruity of the real past, present or future circumstances, with 
persons, things, times, the nature of things and men, the usages, custom and common 
sense, in such a way that what is said will not appear as usually happens. 
 
RULE: To refute the justice and convenience or utility of introducing legislative 
changes different from those of the bill proposed, the arguments may be deal with the 
following topics: 
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 a) formal and material illegality, since it was not the initiative of a competent organ, 
following valid procedures (formal illegality), and is not consistent with the content of 
norms of a higher rank (material illegality); 
b) impossibility and impracticability, due to the non-existence of circumstances that 
facilitate the achievement of things, because, in the absence of such circumstances the 
achievements of things would be impracticable, since one does not legislate on the 
impossible, and the impracticable is equated to the impossible; 
c) improbability, due to the infrequency of events, since laws are enacted only on what 
usually happens, unless they rule extraordinary, seen or foreseen facts, requiring 
emergency solutions; 
d) unnecessary solutions, because of the non-existence of problems in the social or 
juridical system; or if such problems do exists, because the legislative solutions 
proposed will not solve them satisfactorily; 
e) absence of opportunity, because of the non-existence of a favorable occasion to 
introduce such legislative changes. 
f) injustice, imprudence, intemperance and cowardice of those proposing the bill, of the 
bill itself, and of its lack of stimulus to the justice, prudence, temperance and fortitude 
of the addresees; 
g) dishonesty, discrimination, and discord promoted among the audience; 
h) unsystematicity, for its difficult insertion in the juridical system; and for the 
inconsistency, incompleteness and lack of economy in the bill itself and with regard to 
the rest of the juridical system, except for the inconsistencies wanted by the legislator in 
implicit or explicit repeals. 
i) instability of the harmonic balance between the requirements of justice, juridical 
security and convenience, which any mature juridical system should satisfy. 
 
RULE: To refute the harmful caused for not supporting legislative changes to the 
juridical system and for advising changes different from those introduced by the bill 
proposed, it may be argued that the problems narrated will not be solved by the mere 
course of time, or through other sources of law, but, much on the contrary, they will at 
best remain the same, and, at worst, they will worsen, in accordance with the nature and 
imminence of the predicted harm. 
 
RULE: In the confirmation and the refutation,757 the arguments shall be placed as 
follows: 
a) at the beginning and at the end, the strongest ones, since, after the narration the 
addresees expects evidence confirming it, and the last thing said is better remembered; 
after the confirmation the addresees expects evidence refuting what has been said, and 
the last thing refuted is better remembered; 
b) in the middle, those of medium-sized force and those that, albeit neither useless nor 
essential for the proof, but weak if considered separated or individually, become strong 
and plausible when joined with others. 
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      c.  Epilogue 
 
RULE: The last division of the speech, namely, the epilogue (in Greek epilogos) or 
peroration (in Latin peroratio), shall be subdivided into two parts: the enumeration of 
the arguments (enumeratio argumentorum) and the motion of affections (affectuum 
commotio)758 or emotional appeals. 
 
                  Enumeration of the arguments 
 
RULE: In the enumeration of the arguments, the topics announced in the partition or 
division shall be said to have been proven, summing up the content of the confirmation 
and the refutation, in the respective order used in these two, to refresh the memory of 
the addresees of the persuasive speech.759 
 
                  Emotional appeals 
 
RULE: The most suitable parts of the persuasive speech to give it color, exciting or 
calming the emotions of the addresees (pathos), shall be the exordium, which tries to 
obtain their attention, docility and benevolence from the beginning, and even more the 
epilogue, the last opportunity offered by the persuasive speech to obtain the decisions 
needed by the legislator, where the intelligence, the feelings and the will of the 
addresees are captured. 
 
EXAMPLE: 
                
                    “To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act,   
                      it is necessary to show me that the action will answer some end. That can never be  
                      an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me,  
                      "It is for my Honour." Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been  
                      able to understand the word. You say, "It is for my interest." Now you bespeak my  
                      self-love. "It is for the public good." Now you rouse my patriotism. "It will relieve  
                      the miserable." Now you touch my pity.”760    
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 RULE: The arguments shall aim at the intelligence so that the reasons adduced are 
understood. They shall be dressed in the colors of hope and fear, to stir up emotions and 
induce the will of the legislators to approve the bill, and so that the enacted law shall be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with its spirit, procuring its spontaneous 
fulfillement. 
 
                       Hope and fear 
 
     Hope is the believable possibility of obtaining awards or other benefits and of 
avoiding punishment or other damages, if the bill is approved. Fear is the believable 
possibility of not obtaining the awards or other benefits and of suffering serious and 
irreparable, past, present or imminent damages, if the bill is not be approved. 
 
RULE: To excite hope in the addresees, they shall be persuaded to believe that what 
they wish will happen. To calm fear, they shall be persuaded to believe that what they 
do not wish will not happen, or that, if it happens, it will not be so imminent or serious. 
 
RULE: The legislator shall capture the addresees’ will by motivating them by his own 
character (pathos), by emotions (pathos) and reasonings (logos), in such a way that: 
a) they shall experience hope and fear at the same time, so that they will judge the 
reasons facilitating and hindering the fulfillment of their wishes.761 
b) they will judge the existence of a connection between the gratification of hope or the 
evanescence of fear, on the one hand, and the required actions, on the other. The actions 
required are the approval of the bill proposed and the rejection to maintain the juridical 
system unchanged, with non-legislative changes, or with legislative changed different 
from those contained in the bill proposed, so that the enacted law shall be interpreted 
and applied in accordance with its spirit, procuring its spontaneous fulfillement. 762 
 
              Amplification and attenuation 
 
RULE: To increase the credibility of the arguments, they shall be amplified; to diminish 
it, they shall be attenuated. 
     
     It has been written that in the amplification and the attenuation lies all the orator’s 
power.763 Whether the use of these rhetorical instruments is blamed or praised, their 
importance to obtain persuasion cannot be denied, whether it is about the emotions of 
the addresees (pathos), about the character of the legislator (ethos), or about the 
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 reasonable arguments (logos), so much so that paraphrasing a famous proverb that goes 
"say to me with whom you walk and I will say to you who you are", it might be said 
"say to me what argument you amplify or attenuate, how and with which emotions, and 
I will say to you what class of legislator you are." 
      
RULE: In the motion of the affections or emotional appeals of the epilogue, the most 
important favorable arguments shall be amplified, and the most important unavoidable 
critical arguments that could not be refuted shall be attenuated. For this purpose:  
a) emotions shall be excited or calmed, or the existing excitement or calmness shall be 
increased or diminished;764 
b) hope shall increase to become illusion, and fear to become horror, under 
extraordinary circumstances;765 or illusion shall be diminished to become hope, if it is 
not possible to eliminate it, and the horror to become fear, if it is not possible to 
eliminate it. 
 
RULE: To calm unfavorable emotions, try to eliminate or diminish the object producing 
them, or excite another passion to counter it; taking into consideration that hope and 
fear are passions that dominate the others and are countered by each other. Fear of the 
bill proposed and hope for maintaining the juridical system unchanged, with non-
legislative changes, or with legislative changes different from those contained in the bill 
proposed, are considered very unfavorable emotions. 
 
RULE: For the amplification or the attenuation, the following may be used:766 
a) only words: superlative or diminutive, repetition, increase or decrease in the force in 
an enumeration of synonyms; 
b) only things: increase or decrease in their quantity, or ascent and descent in their 
hierarchy; confrontation, to emphasize the biggest or the smallest ones; syllogism, to 
reveal even more of what was previously exaggerated; enumeration of many things, so 
that they will seem bigger or smaller; enumeration of many acts under the same virtue 
or vice, to reinforce the feeling of love or hate, admiration or disdain; 
c) words and things: expression of the same thing with different words, so that it will 
seem different, in such a way that it enables to emphasize or minimize, clarify and 
inculcate an important argument into the mind and heart of the addresees (exhaustion). 
 
     Before going on to the following stage, the syle, it should be verifed whether the 
persuasive speech includes a minimum content. 
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RULE: The persuasive speech shall include, at least, the following:767 
a) the purpose, which shall indicate exactly what the bill intends to achieve; 
b) the reasons for which it is thought that the purpose will be achieved by the bill, and 
why the bill is necessary to achieve such purpose; 
c) the mention of the effects expected of the law, including costs and collateral effects, 
and the reasons that make these effects acceptable; 
d) the reports with recommendations, had they been received; 
e) the explanation of the reasons that make it desirable or necessary to depart from the 
recommendations and from the solutions of the general laws, had they not been  
followed; 
f) the legality of the bill and the reasons that clear up any doubt in that regard; 
g) the explanation of each unclear sections.768 
    The ideas arranged in accordance with the respective systematics shall be expressed 
by means of the language, the third stage in the making of the bill, which will be 
developed in the following Chapter, dedicated to Style. 
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Chapter VII 
Style 
 
     The rhetorical algorithm that ends up in oral speech consists of five stages: 
investigation, systematics, style, memory and action. In written speeches, like, generally, 
the laws are, only the first three stages turn out to be indispensable: the things found and 
chosen in the investigation (what to say) are checked and arranged in the systematics 
(where to say), to be expressed in writing, in the style, lexis or elocutio769 (how to say), 
the topic of this Chapter. Absent a linguistic expression, there is no speech, but if there 
is no things to saying, in a orderly manner, there is no speech either. Nevertheless, out 
of the five stages of the rhetorical algorithm proper to oral speech, under the influence 
of Petrus Ramus (1515-1572),770 an author who had related investigation and 
systematics to logic, omitted memory and respected action, when oratory declined and 
literature rose, rhetoric ended up being identified with style.771 The art of legislation has 
also been identified with style, whether from the active point of view (composition) or 
from the passive one (criticism) in Common Law system, or has been limited to mere 
literary criticism of legislative expressions, in the Civil Law system. 
     Style comprises two major topics: virtues and genres.772 
 
1.  Virtues 
 
     The classical virtues of style are four: purity (latinitas, puritas), which is 
grammatical, and three truly rhetorical ones: clarity (perspicuitas), ornament (ornatum), 
and aptitude (aptum).773 
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      a.  Purity 
 
     Correct language, in accordance with polite people’s use, constitutes the purity of 
style,774 which should not be confused with "purity" as a demand for excluding "[...] 
everything that is not the pure and simple expression of the legislator’s will [...]", about 
which Bentham wrote.775  
 
RULE: The most frequent vices against purity are: 
a) by defect, the "barbarisms" in vocabulary (foreign words, archaisms, and neologisms) 
and the "solecisms"776 in syntax (concordance, government and construction777); 
b) by excess, the purism as affectation.778 
                                                                                                                                               
E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining Bei 
München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 460, p. 216. 
Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1967, T. II, número 460, p. 11. 
774
 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, I, VI, 45.  
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four 
Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, 
Volume I, Book I, I,vi,45, London,1921, pp. 132-133. 
Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", 
Tome I, Livre I, VI, 45, Paris, 1975, pp. 116-117. 
775
 "I call purity in the composition of a body of law the absence of any heterogeneous matter, of any 
strange miscellany, of everything that is not the pure and simple expression of the legislator’s will." 
 "J'appelle pureté dans le composition d'un corps de droit, l'absence of tout matière hétérogène, of tout 
mélange étranger, de tout se qui n'est pas l'expression pure et simple de la volonté du législateur." 
Jéremie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet de Législation, Chapitre XXXII De the Pureté dans 
la Composition d'un Corps de Droit, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, 
Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Premier, Société Belge de Librairie, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 339, text 
translated and quoted above. 
776
 “Barbarism“ comes from “barbarians“, who for the Greeks were others, for the Romans who were 
neither Greeks nor Latins, that they were corrupting the words; for Nebrija, also they were others, 
excepted Greeks and Latins, but it was including those of its own language, if they were committing some 
vice in the use of Spanish. “Solecism“ comes of Soli, the city of Cilicia that Solon populated, mixing 
other peculiar nations, which began to corrupt the Greek language in the union and the order of the parts 
of the sentence. 
Nebrija, Gramática sobre la Lengua Castellana que Hizo el Maestro Antonio de Lebrija, Salamanca, 
1492, g.i.,  y  g.i. vuelta, Edición en Facsímil, Espasa Calpe-Argentina, S.A., Madrid, 1976. 
777
 Andrés Santa María y Augusto Cuartas, Diccionario de Incorrecciones y Particularidades del lenguaje, 
Segunda Edición Corregida y Aumentada, Editorial Paranifo, Madrid, 1967, p. 50. 
778
 Tyrtamus, who had been born in Eresus, was so eloquent that was called Theophrastus by Aristotle, 
for the divine character of its speech. 
Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of the Philosophers, 5.36; 5.38); Name and Manner of Speaking, 5A 
(Strabo, Geography, 13.2.4), 5B (Cicero, Orator 62), in Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for his Life, 
Writings Thought and Influence, Edited and Translated by William W. Fortenbaugh, et al., Part One, 
Life, Writings, Various Reports, Logic, Physics, Metaphysics Theology, Mathematics, E.J. Brill, 
Biography, 1, Leyden, New York, Köln, 1992, pp. 21, 53, 55. 
Nevertheless, only one word said by Theophrastus was sufficient so that an Athenian woman, already 
brought in years, was speaking to him calling it foreign, and when he asked how she realized, told that it 
seemed to her that it was using a too much attic language. 
Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VIII, I, 2.  
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. 
Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, 
      Without going into matters proper to grammar, given that legislation is aimed at 
governing human behavior, few comments are required about verbs, the part of the 
sentence with which actions are expressed. 
     
RULE: Active voice is preferable to passive voice, to avoid ambiguities about whom 
the subject is. The subject must always be determined explicitly, in case of doubts. 
 
     Nevertheless, sometimes, the passive voice is the best or the only practical form; for 
example, when the prescriptive speech refers to itself (This law..., The present law...), in 
establishing its coming into effect, including a fiction, a definition, etc.779 
 
RULE: When the prescriptive speech refers to itself, the passive voice is the best or the 
only practical form. 
 
RULE: In English the present tense of the indicative mood is now preferable to the 
traditional practice of the future tense of the subjunctive mood (e.g. “shall...”), because 
“often enunciates the law more simply and clearly”. 780 
 
      Nevertheless, when the prescriptive speech establishes a fiction, the subjunctive 
mood is better than the indicative (e.g. “as though he where a citizen instead of as if he 
is a citizen”).781 
 
RULE: When the prescriptive speech establishes a fiction, the subjunctive mood is more 
simple and clear. 
 
RULE: In Spanish the future imperfect tense of the subjunctive mood, “which other 
Romance languages do not have”, except Portuguese and Valaco,782 is preferable to the 
                                                                                                                                               
G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book VIII, i, 2, London, 1921, pp. 196-
197. 
Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", 
Tome V, Livre VIII, I, 2, Paris, 1978, p. 53.  
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 Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter V Verbs, Edmond Cloutier, Queen's 
Printer and Controler of Stationery, Ottawa, 1957, pp. 36-41, p. 36. 
Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter II The Verb in Legislation, Second Edition 
Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, pp. 7-17, p.7. 
780
 Driedger holds that it is necessary to use the present, because it is supposed that the law is always 
spoken. 
Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter V Verbs, Edmond Cloutier, Queen's Printer 
and Controler of Stationery, Ottawa, 1957, pp. 36-41, p. 37. 
Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter II The Verb in Legislation, Second Edition 
Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, pp. 7-17, p. 8. 
V.C.R.A.C. CRABBE, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993, First edition 
1992, Reprinted 1994, p. 144, text reproduced above. 
781
 V.C.R.A.C. CRABBE, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993, First 
edition 1992, Reprinted 1994, p. 144, text reproduced above. 
782
 "73 (n. 470). Not only in Spanish has the future hypothetical subjunctive mood been 
kept, but it also exists in Portuguese and in Valaco." 
Andrés Bello, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al Uso de los Americanos, 
Vigésima Edición Hecha sobre la Ultima del Autor con Extensas Notas y Copiosos 
Índices Alfabéticos de Rufino José Cuervo, R. Roger y F. Chernoviz, Editores, París, 
1921, pp. 124-125, Rufino José Cuervo, nota 73 (n. 470),  p. 75. 
 present indicative, according to traditional practice, to avoid “the danger of a rapid 
disappearance of this verbal form”. 783 
 
   The future tense in subjunctive mood is preferred in Spanish, also because any 
juridical norm, from a logical point of view, has two parts, the factual assumption and 
the consequence attributed to it. From a grammatical perspective, this is a conditional 
sentence, in which its protasis, in the subjunctive mood, expresses the assumption, and 
its apodosis, in indicative mood, the consequence.784 The future imperfect tense is 
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 "[...] this future imperfect of the subjunctive, a beautiful patrimony which other Romance languages 
do not have which we can kiss goodbye if we do not react soon against to the nonchalance gradually 
expressed from the top downwards by the so-called cultured classes as far as good speech is concerned. 
Anybody who wants to see the danger of a rapid disappearance of this verbal form should compare any 
current legal text of our days with the Civil Code, for example."  
"[...] ese futuro imperfecto del subjuntivo, precioso patrimonio de que carecen otras lenguas romances, y 
del cual nos podremos ir despidiendo si no se reacciona pronto contra la despreocupación, que en materia 
de bien hablar, van infiltrando de arriba abajo las clases que llamamos cultas. El que quiera apreciar el 
peligro de rápida desaparición en que se halla esta forma verbal, compare cualquier texto legal de 
nuestros días con el Código Civil, por ejemplo", text reproduced above. 
Julio Casares, Nuevo Concepto del Diccionario de la Lengua y otros Problemas de Lexicografía y 
Gramática, Segunda Parte Gramática, I Gramáticas Oficiales, III, Espasa-Calpe, S.A., Madrid, 1941, p. 
222. 
784
 "469 (221). It is necessary to recognize two different subjunctive moods: the so-called common 
subjunctive, because it covers a wide variety of cases, and the so-called HYPOTHETICAL subjunctive, 
due to its conditional or hypotetical meaning, that now we discuss. 
470 (a). This mood is peculiar to Spanish conjugation since it did not exist in Latin, an it does not exist in 
ant Romance dialect 73; it has only two forms of its own, the simple one (cantare, trabajare, partiere), 
and the compound one, which derives from the former (hubiere cantado, hubiere trabajado, hubiere 
partido) * 
* [...] it should be pointed out that notable writers sometimes mistake the common subjunctive mood, 
ending in -ara, -ese, -era, of the common subjunctive mood, for the hypothetical one, ending in -ere, -are, 
saying, for example: si alguien llamase, le abrirás; si llegase a tiempo, le convidaré. The difference that I 
spot here does not depend on any theory, because it is the practice of the best times of the language, and 
the ordinary one among those who speak and write correctly nowdays. 
We can give to the least educated readership a rule that will preserve them from becoming confused with 
moods and tenses, which is happening more and more frequently, especially among Americans: 
"Whenever the form ending in –ara, -ase, -ese may be replaced with a form ending in –are, -ere (there is 
not room for error here among Spanish native speackers), we may be certain that the latter form is 
correct." 
"73 (n. 470). Not only in Spanish has the future hypothetical subjunctive mood been 
kept, but it also exists in Portuguese and in Valaco." 
 (
"469 (221). Es preciso reconocer dos subjuntivos diversos: el que llamamos común, porque se extiende a 
una gran variedad de casos, y el de que ahora tratamos a[l] que por su constante significado de condición 
o hipótesis damos el nombre de HIPOTÉTICO. 
 470(a). Este modo es peculiar de la conjugación castellana pues no lo hubo en latín, ni lo hay en ninguno 
de los otros dialectos romances 73; y sólo tiene dos formas suyas, la simple (cantare, trajere, partiere), y 
la compuesta que nace de ella (hubiere cantado, hubiere traído, hubiere partido)*. 
* [...] obsérvese que en muy estimables escritores se confunde a veces la forma en ara, ese, era, del 
subjuntivo común, con la ere, are, del hipotético, diciendo, por ejemplo: Si alguien llamase, le abrirás; Si 
llegase a tiempo, le convidaré. La diferencia que yo en este punto señalo no depende de ninguna teoría, 
porque es la práctica de los mejores tiempos de la lengua, y la ordinaria entre los que hablan y escriben 
correctamente en el día. 
Podemos dar a los lectores menos instruidos una regla que los preservará de caer en una confusión de 
modos y tiempos, que va cundiendo, sobre todo entre los americanos: 
"Siempre que a la forma en ara, ase, ese, vemos que consiente la lengua sustituir la forma en are, ere 
(acerca de lo cual no cabe error en los que tengan por lengua nativa la castellana), podemos estar seguros 
de que esta segunda es la forma propia." 
 preferred because, when prescriptive speeches conform a bill, it contains political 
decisions to be made and, when it becomes law, and comes into effect, it at first does 
not apply retroactively, since it works like counsel to the addressees about the behaviors 
to be followed and to be avoided.     
     In addition to norms, the juridical system is integrated by institutions, branches and 
orders, with their respective principles, which are also elements of the juridical system. 
The elements of prescriptive speech (subsection, section, division, etc.), whether 
grouped or not in special and general parts, are linguistic entities. An element of the 
juridical system may be expressed by only one element of the prescriptive speech (that 
is, a norm in only one article), but this is not always the case, since an element of the 
juridical system is, more often than not, expressed by more than one element of the 
prescriptive speech (that is, a norm in more than one article), without which a technical 
gap would be created. 
 
RULE: If an element of the juridical system requires more than one element of the 
prescriptive speech, none of  the prescriptive speech elements should be missing, to 
avoid technical gaps. 
 
     When the law develops to some extent, prescriptive speech is expressed by 
descriptive language,785 since the elements of the juridical system used to regulate 
behaviors, the implicit context, already exist in practice, in other laws, in case law, or in 
juristic writings, and they are seldom exclusively created by the new legislator. 
 
     b.  Clarity 
 
     Clarity (perspicuitas) consists of making speech more easily comprehensible, 
intelligible.786  It is a fundamental virtue, since in its absence, the speech could not 
                                                                                                                                               
"73 (núm. 470). No sólo en castellano se ha conservado el futuro del subjuntivo hipotético; existe también 
en el portugués y en valaco.") 
Andrés Bello, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al Uso de los Americanos, Vigésima Edición 
Hecha sobre la Ultima del Autor con Extensas Notas y Copiosos Índices Alfabéticos de Rufino José 
Cuervo, R. Roger y F. Chernoviz, Editores, París, 1921, pp. 124-125, y para la nota 73, Notas, p. 75. 
Bello was a notable grammarian and, also, author of the Civil Code of the Republic of Chile 
Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición Autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, 
Santiago de Chile, Julio de 1858, 418 pp., Mensaje del Ejecutivo al Congreso IX pp., Índice, pp. 419-426. 
“In the apodoses of conditional sentences, the indicative mood, rather than the subjunctive, is used.” 
“En las oraciones condicionales no se usará el subjuntivo en las apódosis, sino el indicativo.” 
Gramática de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de 1931, 
Madrid, 1962, números. 302 y 434, c), pp. 275 y 393. 
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 For some other interesting remarks on this matter, see: 
Jean Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Français, Librairie Félix Alcan, Première Partie, 
La Règle, Chapitre Premier, Du Fait que les Dispositions du Code Civil se Présentent Très Souvent Sous 
la Forme Énonciative et non sous la Forme Impérative, Paris, 1926, pp. 41-49.  
Georg Henrik Von Wright, Norm and Action, A Logical Enquiry, Routledge and Kegan Paul, VI, Norms, 
Language, and Truth, London, 1963, pp. 93-106. 
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 Explanatio, for [Cicero] Rethorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 17. 
[Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xii, 17, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 
1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 268-271. 
[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 260-261. 
 fulfill its symbolic function of  conveying meaning,787 to communicate. Clarity and the 
purity (latinitas) constitute elegance (elegantia).788 
 
RULE: To obtain clarity in speech, common and proper words shall be chosen.789 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte 
Revue et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière 
Frères, Livre IV, XII, 17, Paris, pp. 180-183. 
It is not enough for the language of the law to be understood: it must be easily understood. 
David Mellinkoff, The Language of The Law, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, First 
Printing, 1963, Third Printing, Paperback Edition, 1978, pp. 415-416. 
787
 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book III, 1404b. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 1404b, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, 
Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First 
Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2239. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 1404b, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 395 y n. 219; p. 396-398. 
Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition 
"Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Livre III, 1404b, Paris, p. 41. 
Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di  Armando Plebe, III, 1404b, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 170. 
For the French clarity from the perspective of the rhetorical tradition, see: 
Daniel Mornet, Histoire de la Clarté Française, Ses Origines, Son Evolution, Sa Valeur, Payot, Paris, 
1929, 358 pp. 
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 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 17. 
[Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xii, 17, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 
1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 268-271. 
[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 260-261. 
 [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Hérennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec 
Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XII, 17, Paris, pp. 180-
183. 
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 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 17. 
 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xii, 17, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 
1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 268-271.   
[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 260-261. 
[Cicéron] Rhétorique to Hérennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec 
Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XII, 17, Paris, pp. 180-
183. 
The German Civil Code of 1900 is the classic example of the use of a rigorous technical language; for its 
characteristics, see: 
R. Saleilles, Introduction a l'Étude du Code Civil Allemand, 1904, pp. 110-117. 
The Swiss Civil Code of 1912 is the typical representative of the use of a common language, since: 
"III. The language of the bill and its economy. [...] 1. As for the language, the dominant idea is that the 
bill, as has been stated above, should be intelligible to all; we have tried to attain this goal choosing 
simple and clear expressions.” 
"III. La langue du projet et son économie. [...] 1. En ce qui concerne la langue, l'idée dominant est que le 
projet, comme on l'a dit plus haut, devrait être intelligible à tous; nous avons cherché à atteindre ce but en 
choissant des expressions simples et claires." 
Civil Code Suisse, Exposé des Motives de l'Avant-Projet du Département Féderal de Justice et Police, 
Tome Premier, Introduction, Droit des Personnes et de la  Famille, Berne, 1901, p. 12. 
For a summary compararison of the opinions on the drafting of the German, Swiss and French Civil 
Codes, see: 
Jean Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Français, Librairie Félix Alcan, Complément A, 
Paris, 1926, pp. 261-263,  
            Common words 
 
     Unlike poetry, which arouses admiration through the use of unusual words, the 
rhetorical prose uses common vocabulary,790 so that everybody will understand. Except 
in the early times  of law making, when poetry prevailed, the prescriptive speech has 
always been rhetorical prose. It requires not only bona fide people to comprehend it; but 
also avoidig people in bad faith may misinterpret it,791 against the purpose sought by the 
legislator. 
 
RULE: For clarity, facilitating bona fide people’s understanding shall not suffice; also, 
requires avoiding people in bad faith may misinterpret it, against the purpose sought by 
the legislator. 
 
      Certain matters in everyday life belong to private law, hence called droit commun in 
Civil Law systems, which regulations use more often usual language than juridical 
vocabulary. This vocabulary consist of common words, with a technical meaning 
(contract, marriage, etc.) and other specific words of the law (mortgages, antichreses, 
etc.) for precision and economy reasons, avoid giving definitions too often, and 
because, the denomination (nomen iuris) alone is sufficient to evoke the desired 
meaning. But when the behavior refers to facts, acts or activities of great social 
importance, which requires higher technical precision, as is the case with death and 
organ transplants, medical vocabulary cannot be avoided. Also the multiple addreesees 
of the speech should be taken into account.  
 
RULE: To obtain clarity in prescriptive speech, provided that the resulting text remains 
intelligible to its different addreesses, words shall be chosen: 
a) common, with their usual meanings, for the addressees at large; 
b) technical of the matter regulated, for the related addressees and experts; 
c) juridical technical, for legal advisors; 
d) juridical technical and technical of the matter regulated, for the judges and law 
enforcement authorities 
 
     It  should be pointed out that there are two classes of terminology or sets of words of 
a specialty: transparent ones, which let see concepts, which enable to easily understand 
the meaning evoked by words; and opaque ones, in which the concepts must be looked 
up in their respective definitions. Both in prescriptive and persuasive speech, a 
transparent terminology is preferable, to facilitate both understanding and memorizing, 
since transparent denominations are remembered better than opaques ones. 
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 Isocrates, Evagoras, 9-10. 
Isocrates, Evagoras, 9-10, in Isocrates with an English Translation by George Norlin, Volume III, with an 
English Translation by Larue Van Hook, William Heinemann Ltd, London, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, First Printed 1945, Reprinted 1954, 1961, pp. 8-9. 
Isócrates, Evágoras, 9-10, en Isócrates Discursos, Introducción, Traducción y  Notas de 
Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Editorial Gredos, Tomo I, Madrid, 1979, pp. 305-306. 
Isocrate, Evagoras, 9-10, dans Isocrate Discours, Texte Établi et Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Émile 
Brémond, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome II, 1re Édition 1938, Cinquième Tirage Revu et 
Corrigé, Paris, 1967, p. 148. 
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 Charles de Martens, Le Guide Diplomatique, Cinquième Édition, Entierement Refondue par M.F.H. 
Geffeken, Tome Second, Première Partie, Du Style des Compositions Diplomatiques, Observations 
Génerales, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1866, p. 2. 
 RULE: Transparent denominations are preferable to opaque ones, to facilitate both the 
comprehension of their meanings and their memorizing. 
 
             Proper words 
  
     Words that are effective in conveying the ideas meant are proper, because those who 
coined them are supposed to have "appropiated them."792 
      
RULE: Words shall be chosen in such a way, that the meaning conveyed reflects the 
exact thought of the legislator (proper)793 calling things by their name, to avoid 
extensive or restrictive interpretations, to eliminate ambiguities and to reduce 
vagueness, in accordance with the precision demanded by the relevant branch of law. 
 
     Sometimes, the words are common and proper, their respective meanings are clear, 
there is not semantic ambiguity and, nevertheless, the sentence turns out obscure. This 
is so  because there is syntactic ambiguity, which arises from the grammatical relation 
between the words in the sentence, in such a way that it is difficult to immediately 
ascertain the meaning. 
     The consistent use of the same words, phrases and sentences to express the same 
ideas, without homonymous or synonymous, in the same formula, contributes to the 
clarity of the speech and avoids unnecessary interpretative doubts.794 
 
PRINCIPLE: To avoid unnecessary interpretive doubts and to contribute to speech 
clarity, when the same ideas are expressed, the same words, phrases, and sentences shall 
always be be chosen and used in the same formula. 
 
RULE: Style is precise when there are rigorous concision and accuracy.795 
 
RULE: Concision exists whenever only the sufficient is said for the understanding of 
the speech. 
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 Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Rhetorica de don Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Segunda Edición, Valencia, 
1776, Tomo II, p. 45. 
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 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VIII, I, 2.  
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four 
Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, 
Volume III, Book VIII, ii, 1, London, 1921, pp. 196-197. 
Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", 
Tome V, Livre VIII, II, 1, Paris, 1978, p. 54. 
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 "4th. Same ideas, same words" ("4th. Mêmes ideés, mêmes paroles"). 
Jérémie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet of Législation, Chapitre XXXIII Du Style give Lois, 
Société Belge of Librairie, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société 
Belge De Librairie, Tome Premier, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 341. 
Expressive consistency is a "golden rule" of legislative drafting, see: 
Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, Published for The American Bar Association by 
Little, Brown And Company, with a quote of Piesse and Smith, The Elements of Drafting 32 (2d. ed. 
1958), Boston, Toronto, 1965, p. 12 and n.9. 
Rather than a rule, although a golden one, on account of its generality, it seems a principle of style, the 
counterstrophe of the interpretative apothegm that affirms: where the law does not distinguish, we must 
not distinguish (ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus). 
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 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición, Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1970, 
p. vocablo precisión, acepción 3, p. 1057. 
      Concision was considered to be a fifth virtue by the Stoics.796 It is true that the fewer 
words, the easier it is to memorize speech,797 but many a time word number comes into 
conflict with clarity, in which case the latter must prevail. Clarity not only requires easy 
understanding, but also leaving no room for interpretations contrary to the legislator’s 
purpose. 
       
RULE: Concision helps memorize speech, but if  come into conflict with clarity, the 
latter shall prevail. 
      
     Concision, the virtue of avoiding the vice of verbosity, should not be confused with 
brevity, since the speech must be neither too long nor too short, but of a justifiably 
length, as taught by Prodicus.798 Brevity is justified as a stylistic ideal in military orders, 
where there is no time for long exchanges in the middle of a battle, hence the current 
reminiscense of Spartans when one speaks about laconicism. But the law refers to 
recurrent problems that must be answered, and solutions take time to be expressed, 
comprehended and remembered. Although laws are no longer considered of absolute 
permanence, as in the classical doctrine, they are usually of prolonged transitoriness, 
which gives them a relative permanence.  
 
RULE: Both tedious verbosity and haughty brevity shall be avoided, using enough 
wisdom to moderate the speech according to the occasion and the matter799 to be ruled 
by the bill. 
 
RULE: Rigorous accuracy, which illuminates partially the area of half-light of vague 
meaning, should not be confused with property, which is related to the nucleus of the 
meaning, to avoid ambiguity. In calling things by their name, so that they will 
correspond to the thoughts of the legislator, it will be avoided to sin for defect or for 
excess, which may give rise to future extensive or restrictive interpretations, as the case 
may be. 
 
    In the branches of the Law which norms have to be restrictively interpreted, 
regardless of the fact that the legislator has sinned for defect or excess, such as criminal 
law and tax law, rigorous accuracy results from a requirement imposed by the nature of 
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 Diogène Laërce, Vie, Doctrine et Sentences des Philosophes Illustres, Traduction, Notice et Notes par 
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 "2. The law must be concise, in order that she fix easily on memory. Clarity, brevity, are therefore the 
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Platón, Fedro, 267c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, 
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 Oculus Pastoralis, anonymous work c 1222, quote and italian translation by Galletti. 
Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L'Eloquenza (Dalle Origine the XVIth Secolo), Casa 
Editrice Dottor Francesco Vallardi, Milan, 1904-1918, p. 462. 
 the respective matter. But in other matters, owing to probable changing circumstances, 
legislators can turn to more flexible formulas, through a deliberate decision, rather than 
by technical error. On the one hand, there is the legal definition of crimes, which 
requires maximum certainty; on the other hand, the juridical standard800 the average 
correct social conduct, for example, under civil law, the formula deliberately vague:"the 
diligence of a good father of family". Crime definitions in the law privileges certainty; 
the juridical standard, the adaptability801 to the circumstances. Both instruments are 
available, and must be used in accordance with the rigorousness demanded by the 
branch of the Law and the prudence of rulers and advisors.  
     
RULE: In matters of restrictive interpretation, a rigorous accuracy must be procured, in 
matters that allow an extensive interpretation, juridical standard technique may be 
resorted to.   
 
      c.  Ornament 
 
     The correct (pure) and easily understandable (clear) use of language enables to 
convey ideas, to teach (docere), but it is not enough to delight (delectare), to stir 
emotions, to motivate (movere), which require another virtue of speech: ornament 
(ornatus). Ornament consists in force to move and beauty to delight, either of thoughts 
(res) or of linguistic expressions (verba).802 
     Under the classical rhetorical tradition it was not argued about the admissibility of 
the ornament, but about the extent to which it was suitable for each genre of speech.803 
 
RULE: The ornament must assist, rather than interfere with, obstruct or replace the 
purpose of the speech. 
 
     It is surprising that any human product, whether handmade or industrial, is expected 
not only to be useful, but also to possess esthetic qualities that may make it more 
acceptable in the market, while one of the most useful intellectual products, laws, is 
designed irrespective of beauty for better conception, systematization, expression, 
enactment, publication, dissemination, memorizing, interpretation, and application, as if 
it were unnecessary to make laws more acceptable to society.804 
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Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, Yale University Press, First Edition 1923, Revised 
1953, Seventh Printing, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1965, pp. 55-59. 
Marcel O. Stati, Le Standard Juridique, Préface de René Demogue, Librairie de Jurisprudence Ancienne 
et Moderne Edouard Duchemin, L. Chauny et L. Quinsac, Successeurs, Paris, 1927, 398 pp. 
801
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 Eduard Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa VI. Jahrhundert a. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance, 3rd. 
Ed., B.G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1915, La Prose d'Arte Antica, Dal Secolo VI B.C. all'Età della Renascenza, 
Edizione Italiana a Cura di Benedetta Heinemann Campana, con una Note di Aggiornamento di Gualterio 
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 Few authors have written on the beauty in the law, and minor is still the number of the significant 
contributions as the following ones: 
      A very frequent use of the same words, prhases and sentences constitutes the vices of 
poverty and monotony,805 since it denotes a poor vocabulary and produces a tedious 
repetition, as opposed to the literary virtue of elegant variation. Nevertheless, a speaker 
or drafter should not be afraid of repeating a word somewhat frequenty if it helps 
understand the speech better.806 Unlike other literary genres, in prescriptive and 
persuasive speeches expressing always the same ideas with the same words is a virtue, 
since it leaves no room for interpretative doubts, while to use synonymous and various 
turns of phrase, instead of equal formulae, constitutes a vice of the legislative style, 
which sins against the clarity of the speech. 
RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, elegant variations shall be avoided. 
 
     Although, in prescriptive and persuasive speeches elegant variations should be 
avoided, beauty may be attained through other rhetorical procedures, whether words are 
considered isolately (in verbis singulis), or in groups, in the composition of a literary 
work (compositio). 
 
           Election of words, tropes and other figures of speech 
               
     The ornament may be achieved by choosing the most beautiful words (electio 
verborum), tropes and other figures of speech. 
 
                 Words 
 
     To choose words, their graphic symbols, sounds and meanings must be considered, 
from the point of view of the beauty that the legislator may convey to the addressees of 
the norms. A graphic symbol is considered as the union of the typography and the 
design of the written page; the sound, as the expression of the legislator’s character and 
the creation of impressions and arousal of emotions, rather than as the representation of 
                                                                                                                                               
R. Von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phaces de son Développement, Traduit sur la 
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in the University of Chicago during the spring 1941, partially reproduced then in The University of 
Chicago Law Review (1942)." 
 "[...] corresponde a una de las conferencias que el autor pronunció en la Universidad de Chicago durante 
la primavera de 1941, parcialmente reproducidas luego en The University of Chicago Law Review 
(1942).", Prólogo, pp. 7-8. 
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 Gramática de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de 1931, 
Madrid, 1962, número. 483, pp. 443-445. 
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 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, I, 24.  
Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four 
Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, 
Volume III, Book IX, i, 24, London, 1921, pp. 360-361. 
Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", 
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 meanings; the meaning, as an emotional or descriptive representation, not only like a 
persuasive or logical definition.807 As an example, the following rule is formulated: 
  
RULE: Words shall be chosen by the beauty of their graphic symbols, sounds and 
meanings. When the norms permit or reward, words should be chosen to characterize 
the legislator more favorably and to create impressions and arouse pleasant evocations 
at the sight, ear and understanding of their addressees. When the norms oblige, prohibit 
or punish, the worthiest words shall be chosen. 
 
     This matter, despite its importance, has not been developed yet, and the author, much 
to his regret, in the face of the vastness of this work, leaves it for future editions or for 
other authors.808   
      
                 Tropes 
 
     Tropes are extensions of the meaning of words, from the original, direct one, to 
another derived, indirect, figurative meaning. When these extensions serve to name 
something without a special name, they are called "catachresis". When they come into 
habitual use among educated persons, lexicographers enrich the articles of their 
dictionaries, and it is possible to properly choose from among the different meanings or 
entries of each word, whether literal or figurative, common or technical, as was the case 
in the juridical language with some expressions. 
 
 EXAMPLES of catachresis: 
 
          "corpus delicti"; 
          "sources of the law". 
 
RULE: Tropes are more convenient in poetry than in prose and, in legislative prose, 
more convenient in persuasive speech than in prescriptive specch, which also uses them 
(metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches). 
 
                 Metaphors (fictions) 
 
     In a metaphor, the extension of the meaning is implicit. 
 
EXAMPLES of metaphors: 
 
          “lions”, instead of “brave”; 
          “foxes”, instead of “crafty”. 
 
In an image, the extension of the meaning is explicit. 
 
EXAMPLES of images, similarities or comparisons: 
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 N.S. Troubetzkoy, Principes de Phonologie, Traduits Par J. Cantineau, Reimpression de la 1e. Édition, 
1949, Librarie C. Klincksieck, Paris, 1957, Phonologie et Phonostylistique, pp. 16-29.  
808
 It would be very interesting that some philologist will study the beauty of the vocabulary in the 
fragments of the Laws of Solon, who in addition to legislator was a poet in a people as the Athenian so 
sensitive to the esthetic values. 
           "bravely as a lion"; 
          "crafty as a fox". 
 
     A metaphor might be said to be a brief image, and an image might be said to be an 
extended metaphor that expresses the comparison.809 
      
     Juridical fictions,810 which cover facts not included in a current qualification, to 
include or to exclude certain consequences,811 without delay, also are metaphors or 
images, according to whether they are formulated in brief form (x is y) or extended (x is 
as if it were y). Thus, the reference is concealed, instead of making generic or specific 
and exhaustive references; to describe the new fact assumption (antecedent) and refer to 
the consequence; or to regulate both the antecedent and the consequent of the norm. In 
Roman Law there existed case law fictions, as the treatment of foreigners as citizens so 
that they could file an action or be prosecuted for theft; juristic fictions, like the 
continuation of the personality of the decedent’s existence to account for successions by 
descent; legislative fictions, like the Lex Cornelia de captivis, which considered a 
Roman citizen taken captive by the enemies of the Roman People and died in that state, 
as dead from the time of his capture, in order to consider his testament made before his 
captivity valid, as if he died a free roman citizen, without the capitis deminutio suffered 
by the died captive apud hostes. 
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 Referring to the historical function that has fulfilled the fiction in the law, it points out that it has 
played severely identically that of the metaphors in the language: 
Pierre de Tourtoulon, Les Principes Philosophiques de l'Histoire du Droit, Librairie Payot and Cie, 
Lausanne, Paris,1908-1919, p. 451. 
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 “If a complicated law often refers to the wheat and a reform wants to extend its norms to the barley, 
the legislative drafter should trace all the times that the word "wheat" appears and to insert after each of 
its appearances "and barley". The easy way consists of saying "The word "wheat" includes to the barley", 
but then one would incur a definition out of the meaning that normally there use the persons to whom 
there is assigned the law, which would be open to criticism for violating a fundamental principle of the 
communication. If a legal fiction will be necessary, one advises not to say "The terms "son" and "born" 
include the foster child", but "A child adopted as any person will be treated as if he will be a son of his 
own blood",  Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, Published for The American Bar 
Foundation by Little, Brown And Company, Boston - Toronto, 1965, p. 104. 
In the first example, it might say: "The norms established in the present law for the wheat, also will be 
applied to the barley", instead of the image: "In the present law the barley will be considered as if it will 
be a wheat." 
      Irrebuttable legal presumptions (jure et de jure), are based on what usually happens, 
but they do not admit contrary proof, since they are established to avoid doubtful 
questions or scandalous arguments. They assume certain facts to be true, although such 
facts are merely possible in reality, like the presumption of fatherhood of the husband 
who has lived together with his wife and infant’s mother during the period of the 
marriage in which the infant could have been conceived by both. Legal fictions, 
assumes as true something false, known by everybody to be false, but has certain 
resemblance to reality that justifies the fiction, it being irrelevant to prove their falsity or 
truth, since that is not their purpose. They are established to include or to exclude 
juridical consequences without delay, like hidden references,812 when legislators are not 
in situation to regulate with generic or specific and exhaustive references, or with 
complete norms.813 Fictions, on regarding new thing as is were old, close gaps without 
waiting ideas and formulae to come to fruition, avoiding antinomies and redundancies, 
suggesting analogies,814 but voluntarily and obviously altering the meaning of the 
existing formulae. 
 
PRINCIPLE: Legal fictions are useful as temporary remedy and indicate the point on 
which the efforts will have to concentrate to find definitive solutions. They815 became 
dangerous if they cause delay or the abandonment of efforts to find definitive solutions, 
or if they end up being taken as true and conclusions are drawn beyond the justice-
related reasons that first warranted their introduction. 
 
     Private civil law, which is a developed branch, is full of fictions: succession 
representation, conditions deemed unwritten, declaratory partition, putative marriage, 
etc. With all the more reason, there are fictions in international law, a less developed 
branch, but nobody lets himself be taken in by its concepts and artificial terminology, 
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 René Dekkers, La Fiction Juridique, Librairie du Reçueil Sirey, Paris, 1935, pp. 234-235. 
 arising out of a prodigious ingenuity to avoid susceptibilities, aimed at keeping up 
appearances in the struggle for preserving world peace, since there is not branch more 
realistic than international law.816  
     Sometimes, figures in common language mislead legislators, as it happened with a 
Lombard law prohibiting the marriage of any woman who had taken the veil, even if 
she had not consecrated herswelf to the veil, on the grounds that, if a husband engaged 
by a wedding ring could not marry legally somebody else, let alone the wife of God or 
of the Saint Virgin; the legislator was mislead by the rhetorical figure of speech, since it 
was a metaphor. 
 
PRINCIPLE: In establishing laws, legislators shall reason from reality to reality, rather 
than from reality to the figure or from the figure to reality.817 
 
     Fictions will not disappear as a technical resource,818 since they owe their existence 
to the limitations of legislators, who, for different reasons, are not always in an 
immediate position to make generic or specific and exhaustive references; to describe 
the new fact assumption (antecedent) and refer to the consequence; or to regulate both 
the antecedent and the consequent of the norm, with a terminology that transparent the 
concepts and a name that indicates the place of the new phenomenon in the explicit 
context of the law and in the implicit context or juridical system, which is thus 
conceived as a natural and open classification, covering the new phenomena that appear 
in the world of the law, in a complete, consistent and economic fashion. 
     When concepts and terminology come to fruition, perhaps the fictions established by 
direct regulations might be replaced. 
 
 EXAMPLE of traditional fiction: 
 
          An conceived child, so that he will be able to acquire some rights,819   
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 Infans conceptus pro natur habetur quotiens de commodo ejus agitur ("An conceived child is 
considered to have been born whenever there is some utility"): 
           is considered as if he will have already been born and, if he will be  
          born dead, considered to have never existed; 
 
  EXAMPLE of direct regulation: 
     The Section 31 of the Swiss Civil Code replaced the traditional fiction of the 
conceived child with the following formula: 
      “Personality begins upon the birth of a living child; she ends upon death.The conceived 
       child enjoys civil rights, on the condition that he is born alive.”820 
 
RULE: Legal fictions may be used when is desirable to include or to exclude certain 
juridical consequences without delay and legislators are not in a position to use generic  
or specific and exhaustive references, nor direct regulations of factual antecedents 
andthe respective consequents. 
 
     Regarding legal fictions as metaphors is not a merely academic exercise, since it 
enables to use general stylistic requisites,821 in special legislative style. 
 
RULE: A legal fiction shall be well done, when the similarity has the following 
features:  
a) proper (real rather than supposed or equivocal); 
b) luminous (taken from well-known objects, easy to understand and making an impact 
on the addresses’ spirit on account of the precise and real relations shown); 
c) noble (not taken from low and unpleasant objects; if it aimed at something vile and 
degrading, it will prove worthy and beyond its origin); 
d) natural (not taken from a remote and far-fetched similarity); 
e) coherent (without mutually exclusive terms). 
 
                   Metonymies (presumptions and alterations) 
 
     Any trope causes an extension of meaning. In a metaphor, by reason of the 
similarity; in a metonymy, by reason of the correspondence to its way of existing or 
being,822 like referring to the cause instead of the effect, to the instrument instead of the 
cause, to the effect instead of the cause, to the container instead of the content, etc. 
     It has already been stated that juridical fictions, such as metaphors or images, are 
based on a similarity, and that presumptions are based on the verisimilitude about what 
usually happens, each pursuing different purposes: the inclusion or exclusion of 
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Vocabulaire Juridique, Publié sous the Direction of Gérard Cornu, Association Henri Capitant, PUF, 
Paris, 1987, p. 835, quotes of the Digest and of the French Civil Code are omited.  
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 consequences, on the one hand, and the simplification or the exclusion of the evidence, 
on the other hand. 
     Just as fictions are metaphors, presumptions are metonymies, since proving the 
existence of the controversial fact depends on the verisimilitude established, on the 
probable truth (juris tantum), or irrefutable truth (jure et de jure), which are taken as the 
cause of such proof. 
 
PRINCIPLE: When an abstract formula, albeit fair in relation to the theoretical idea 
upon which it is based, is not easily applicable in practice, initial purity shall be altered 
and the concomitant requisites that usually happen shall be established, which may 
admit proof into opposite (juris tantum) or do not admit proof into opposite (jure et de 
jure), but are more able to be recognized in an easier and safe way. 
 
EXAMPLES: 
 
When a law on legal, political or criminal responsability,823 is passed, the basic idea of 
intellectual maturity must be replaced with a number: age.824 
 
                   Synecdoches 
 
    The extension of meaning in case of a metaphor is based on the similarity; in a 
metonymy, on the correspondence to the way of existing or of being; in a synecdoche, 
on a connection in a set by virtue of which the existence or the idea of one is included in 
the existence or the idea of the other(s), like the whole and the parts, the genre and the 
species, etc. 825 
      
RULE: When it does not affect its purpose or generate difficulties in its interpretation or 
application, if some word is unacceptable, the word that refers to the whole may be 
replaced with the one that refers to the part and vice versa; the one that refers to the 
genre may be replaced with the one that refers to the species and vice versa, etc. 
 
                    Syllepses 
 
     Mixed tropes, or syllepses, consist in using a word in a literal and a figurative sense  
at the same time, and may be used with metaphors, metonymies or synecdoches. 
 
EXAMPLE of sylepses with a metaphor: 
 
    "The day is not purer than the bottom of my heart", physical purity of the day (literal), 
    moral purity of the heart (figurative meaning by similarity).” 
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 EXAMPLE of syllepses with a metonymy:  
 
    "It is not possible to conquer Carthage other than inside Carthage itself",  
     Carthage population, Carthaginians (figurative meaning by the contents), 
     Carthage city (literal meaning by the container); 
 
EXAMPLE of syllepses with a synecdoche: 
  
    "Punishing, madam, a father is always a father", 
     father, who punishes (literal meaning by the whole), 
     father's feeling, the way in which he punishes (figurative meaning by the part).826 
  
     Syllepses must not be used in laws, since they would introduce doubts about whether 
the word has only one sense, literal or figurative, or two, one literal and another 
figurative, and, in the latter case, about which one is used in a literal sense and which 
one in a figurative sense. 
 
RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, syllepses shall not be used. 
 
            Other figures of speech 
 
     In tropes, there is always a change of meaning, while that is not the case in others 
figures of speech.827 The Latin word figura is the translation of the Greek word schema, 
taken from the theatrical vocabulary, in which it mean the actors’ wardrobe and 
gestures. From there it was taken to rhetoric, because, just as the variety of characters 
and emotions that want to be depicted determines the election of the appropiated 
wardrobe and gestures, also speech, following the variety of matters discussed, is 
dressed up in a certain fashion and enlivened with various gestures.828 The mere 
expression of thoughts only enables others to know the ideas, but, when figures of 
speech are used, given that they are like notable and ornate dresses, thoughts become 
beautiful and forceful enough to ignite imagination and arouse passions. There829 is no 
more effective method to direct imagination and passion than a suitable use of the 
figures of speech, since if the forehead, eyes and hands are effective in moving the 
spirits, more effective is the physiognomy of speech, the aspect of style itself, when is 
chosen with a view to the effect intended.830 
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Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four 
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       Rhetoric declined in importance between the 19th century and the first half of the 
20th century because, in the previous period, out of the five stages for the production of 
speech ‒investigation, systematics, style, memory and action‒, it had been reduced to 
style and style had been reduced to figures of speech. One of the sharpest criticisms that 
such reductionism deserved was expressed by Samuel Butler’s (1612-1680) following 
verses:    
     "For all a Rhetoricians Rules 
      Teach nothing but to name his Tools.”831 
 
     With regard to figures of speech, the terminology, the concepts, the classifications 
and the quantities do not even coincide.832 In classical Latin works, there were 35 in 
Quintilian, 65 in Herennius, more than 90 in Cicero and up to 200 in a minor Latin 
rhetorician as Aquila Romanus,833 while in the Renaissance, although they decreased to 
184 in The Garden of Eloquence, by Henry Peacham, 1577 edition, they exceded 200 in 
a writer as Shakespeare.834 Nevertheless, it does not seem reasonable to deny the utility 
of a set of figures of speech, like a sort of detailed inventory of one of the available 
artistic resources that best serve to cause esteem for the legislator’s character (ethos), to 
excite or to calm the passions of the addressees (pathos), and to safely and conveniently 
indicate the meaning of certain points (logos), thus securing support for the measure 
proposed in the proper text of the bill.835 Not all figures are usable in prescriptive 
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 speeches, and not all those usable in the prescriptive and persuasive speeches will be 
discussed here, since that would require a very detailed analysis, which others may 
conduct better, or perhaps the author of this work may do so in future editions. 
     There are two species of figures: those of thoughts, connected with the gross 
materials obtained in the stage of investigation (inventio); and those of words, related to 
the linguistic expression (style, elocutio, in restricted sense). In the former  ones, the 
ornament is conceptual and derives from ideas rather than from words; in the latter 
ones, it is verbal and  derives from the “fine polish of the language itself”.836 The latter 
disappear if the words used change; the former ones will always survive, regardless of 
the words used to produce the desired effect.837 Nonetheless, it is not always easy to 
distinguish them and, in fact, the same figures are included in one or another species by 
different authors, situation that is complicated due to the polemic among the followers 
of the interpretation of the law according to its letter or to its spirit.838 
 
                 Figures of words 
 
     The following figures of words or diction will be considered: pleonasms, ellipses, 
periphrasis, euphemisms and antithesis.  
     A pleonasm adds words for more clarity or energy of expression of a thought, 
although such words may not be indispensable to understand the meaning of the 
speech.839 If they did not make the expression clearer or more energetic, they would 
only constitute a grammatical vice. 
     As stated above, in prescriptive and persuasive speeches it is inadvisable to use 
synonymous as elegant variations, now, add no to use pleonasms, since in both cases the 
expression sins against clarity and concision. Every extra word overloads the memory 
and rises unnecessary doubts that may lead to interpretations contrary to the legislator’s 
purpose. 
 
RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, pleonasms shall not be used. 
                                                                                                                                               
In the passage quoted, it refers to any orator and speech, rather than to a legislator and the law. He also 
asserts that figures serve to avoid monotony, to use varied language, but as it has already been stated in 
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300. 
  
     In pleonasms, there is a superabundance of words; in ellipses, an eliminaton.840 It is 
convenient to remember that, if, in an attempt to be brief, the expression turns out to be 
obscure,841 clarity should be preferred. Concision is a virtue, unlike brevity or extension 
of the prescriptive and persuasive speeches, which depends on the circumstances. 
 
RULE: Ellipses shall not be used, if they render the prescriptive and persuasive 
speeches obscure.842 
 
     In a periphrasis or circumlocution an idea that might have been conveyed with few 
words or only one word is conveyed evasively with several words, but more beautifully, 
energetically, or skillfully.843 
    They may be of great utility if they avoid an unnecessary or inopportune discussion, 
but lengthen speech and, therefore, must be used only when they are indispensable. 
 
RULE: Periphrases or circumlocutions may be used if they avoid unnecessary or 
inopportune discussions. 
 
     In a euphemism, a simple direct expression that would otherwise prove hard or 
indecorous is replaced with a figurative, softer and proper one, to make it more 
acceptable.844 
     They are generally used in the prescriptive speech in two situations. First, when there 
are contrasting evaluations and the legislator wants to arrive at an acceptable 
commitment solution, like in a French law of 1982, which, instead of using the word 
"unemployed", used the expression "workers deprived of employment", using a 
periphrasis, and in the Italian law of 1977, n. 10, Section,15, which mandated a 
                                                 
840
 Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour L'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. 
Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 
1977, p. 223. 
841
 Cicero, De Oratore, I, 41, 187. 
Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre Premier, Société d'Édition 
"Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1930, p. 67.    
Boileau, L'Art Poetique, dans Oeuvres de Boileau, Introduction de André Thérive, Chant I, Firmin Didot 
et Cie., Paris, 1928, p. 190. 
842
 The rule is obvious to those who consider an ellipsis entails an omission of the words necessary for a 
grammatical construction rather than of the words that make meaning clear, like the definition of this 
figure, considered to be grammatical, in: 
Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición,Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1970, p. 
508.  
843
 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Madrid, 1970, pp. 583 and 1008. 
Pierre Fontanier, Traité Général give Represent du Discours Autres que les Tropes, 4e. Édition, 1830, 
dans Fontanier, Les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 
361. 
844
 Dictionary of the Spanish Language, Nineteenth Edition, the Spanish Royal Academy, Madrid, 1970, 
p. 591. 
Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by 
George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David 
E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei 
München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 1246, p. 871. 
Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, 
Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 
1968, T. III, número 1245, p. 341. 
 confiscation, but expressed it as a free acquisition, using a metonymy. Second, when 
social sensibility changes and accordingly, a formerly modest activity is ennobled, like 
the case of the road sweeper who started to be called "an ecological operator", using a 
synecdoche.845   
    
RULE: When an acceptable commitment solution is sought, or social sensibility 
changes, euphemisms may be used. 
 
     In antitheses of diction or words (antitheton, contentio), unlike in antitheses of 
thought, words are quickly opposed in speech. 
 
Example of antithesis of words: 
 
         "You show yourself conciliatory to your enemies, inexorable to your friends."846 
 
                   Figures of thought 
 
     Figures of words or diction are born and die in their linguistic formulations; in 
figures of thought or judgment, it is possible to choose from among several possible 
linguistic formulations847 to express the same conceptual content. In Law it is 
mandatory to choose the same linguistic formula for each concept, with only one name, 
as stated when discussing nominal definitions. 
     Two figures of thought will be considered here: imprecations and antithesis of 
thoughts. 
      Imprecations are vehement figures used to provoke fear, through scoldings, 
complaints and threats.848 Although it is true that modern legislators, in principle, avoid 
excesses, trying to appear moderate and more rational than pathetic, and that complaints 
are not proper to prescriptive speech, it is equally true that the punishments established 
by legislators, from a rhetorical point of view, are imprecations that express their desire 
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 to retaliate against the evil of the crime, reprimanding and threatening the criminal with 
punishment, as it has been held by the juristic writings of the classical  school of 
criminal law.  
     In the word or diction antitheses, there is a quick opposition of words in the speech, 
whereas, in the antitheses of thought, there is an opposition of such concepts in the 
speech, as are compared with each other.849 
      
                  Mixed figures 
     
     Mixed figures, which combine figures of word or diction with figures of thought, 
judgment or idea, produce in speech the same effects as the contrast of colors in 
painting, or the contrast of tones in music.850 Among them, only the antitheses will be 
mentioned. 
     Mixed antitheses, double antitheses of words and ideas, are more effective than each 
of the others two classes,851 because, if figures of words or diction give splendor and 
figures of  of thougt or judgment give force, the mixed ones give splendor and force at 
the same time. 
 
            Composition of sentences 
 
     The first stage in the search for the ornament was the election of the most beautiful 
words, tropes and other figures of speech, to gather materials. At this second and last 
stage of the style, called composition (compositio), words, whether or not tropes or 
other figures of speech, are jointly considered in the construction of the literary work, to 
be in a transit from thought to language. In the art of speech, like in every art that 
gathers a variety of materials and produces a work (construction of houses, carpentry, 
embroidery, etc.), composition is the second stage in the logical order, following 
selection, but it is the first one in potency, since the best materials are useless if they are 
not aptly assembled.852 
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      The composition of sentences has two aspects: degrees of elaboration and placement 
of words. 
 
                    Degrees of elaboration 
 
     A grammatical sentence is usually defined as a set of words “expressing a complete 
thought.”853 Rhetoric, style and ornament, are interesting in knowing how a set of words 
completes a thought, for which purpose three degrees of elaboration have been 
distinguished in sentences: free, coordinated and periodic.854 
               
                            Free sentence 
 
     The flowing of thoughts in a sentence may be compared to a race (cursus). In a free 
sentence (oratio soluta), it runs cross-country, freely, since there is no path, it makes the 
path as it goes. In daily speech, in a conversation on everyday matters, thoughts flow 
freely in sentences, loosely (oratio soluta), since syntactic correction is enough to make 
oneself understood, without rhetoric devices. When a free sentence is imitated, for 
example in the vulgar dialogues contained in literary works or in ordinary 
correspondence, there is the first degree of elaboration of the prose of art. The rules of 
such prose go beyond linguistic correction (recte dicere), proper to grammar, since they 
aspires at good speech (bene dicere), proper to rhetoric: in a dialogue, at realism; in the 
ordinary correspondence, at imitating a conversation between absent people.  
 
RULE: For a simple style, free sentences shall be used.  
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Andrés Bello, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al Uso de los Americanos, Vigésima Edición, 
Hecha Sobre la Ultima del Autor, con Extensas Notas y Copiosos Índices Alfabéticos de Rufino José 
Cuervo, R. Roger y F. Chernoviz, Editores, 308(157), Paris, 1921, p. 84. 
“The speaker’s intention divides the elocution into units of complete sense themselves called sentences”  
"La intención del hablante divide la elocución en unidades de sentido completo en sí mismas llamadas 
oraciones." 
Esbozo de una Nueva Gramática de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española (Comisión de 
Gramática), Espasa-Calpe, S.A., Madrid 1973, 3.1.2., p. 349. 
For a criticism, see: 
Luis Juan Picardo, El Concepto de Oración, Universidad de la República, Facultad de Humanidades y 
Ciencias, Investigaciones y Estudios, Montevideo, 1954, 3.1, pp. 10-12.   
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                             Coordinated sentence 
 
     In a coordinated or continuous sentence (oratio perpetua), thoughts runs on a 
straight track in which the finish line is not seen until they arrives at it, so the runner 
easily becomes tired because on the way he does not know how much further ahead the 
finish line is and, if he reaches it, he arrives breathless and exausted, since he could not 
measure and save energy throughout the stages covered. It happens when simple 
sentences are joined by conjunctions or are juxtaposed, forming a continuum that, 
although it has a starting point and a route, is devoid of linguistic indicators that enable 
to see and wait for the termination of the complex sentence, which may end in any of 
the simple sentences, since the structure is based only on the contents expressed, and 
not on the linguistic form that expresses it. 
 
                             Periodic sentence 
 
     Thoughts in a free sentence runs cross-country; in a coordinated sentence, on a 
straight track; in a periodic one (periodos, circuitus, circumscriptio, comprehensio, 
continuatio, ambitus), on a curvey track, circunscribed855 by a rising linguistic tension 
(protasis), which makes the addresseee expect for its complement, the falling linguistic 
distension (apodosis) that provides a meaning and end to the sentence. It does not 
advance in a straight line, like a coordinated sentence (oratio perpetua), but in a circle, 
making around (periodos, circuitus, ambitus), like in a race on the track of an Olympic 
stadium, where the finishing line is also the starting point, after one or more laps, so the 
runner may manage his energy, since he knows how much he has run and how much 
longer he has to go.856 
     In poetry, strophes consist in lines of verse, which in turn consist in hemistichs; in 
artistic prose, a period, similar to a strophe, is composed of members (colon) and 
elements of members (comma).857 The members, which are longer, indicate the end of a 
complete thought, or of a part, which is itself complete, of a bigger thought, like an arm, 
which is a part that has its own limits and parts, which are also also themselves 
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Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409a30-35. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409a30-35, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2248. 
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Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 523-524. 
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"Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Livre III, 1409th 32-35, Paris, p. 59. 
Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di  Armando Plebe, III, IX, 1409th, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 188-189. 
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 The following author indicates the triple correspondence; he quotes Cicero, Orator, LXVI, 223, on the 
verse and the member: 
Aldo Scaglione, The Classical Theory of Composition from its Origins to the Present Day, A Historical 
Survey, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1972, p. 34.  
 complete: the forearm and the fingers.858 The members have a recognizable rhythmic 
pattern at the end, a cadence or clause, while the comma does not have such pattern and 
is shorter.859 
 In a free sentence, words form a correct syntactic structure, but, from the rhetorical  
point of view, they are like a pile of stones. In a coordinated sentence, in addition to a 
correct syntactic structure, there is a rhetorical structure that organizes the words in 
members and shorter elements (comma), like a road that begins at a certain point and 
streches in a straight line, but indefinitely, in which, looking backwards, one can know 
how much has been covered, but not how much longer one has to go because, since the 
finish line cannot be seen, counting the members is not enough, since the coordinated 
sentence can end upon the end of any of them: it has the shape of a semi-straight line. 
     In a periodic sentence (period), words are supported by each other, they are compact, 
such like the stones that support a domed roof, in a rising construction (protasis) and 
falling one (apodosis), with a tension that keeps them together and enables to expect the 
apodosis from the protasis, but suspending the entire meaning until the end of the 
sentence. With only one look, enables to cover the set (period) and to count its elements 
(members –colon– or shorter elements –comma–), so that the multiplicity is reduced to 
a unit, with definite numbers that facilitate understanding and memorizing, like verses 
within a strophe in poetry860: it has a rounded shape.861 
     The members must not be very short, so that the runner will not stumble over them, 
in case the period end before expected, or very long, so that he will not late, as if he 
were running for the exterior side of the track, while the period was running for the 
interior side.862 If it is too long it turns out to be slow; if it is too brief, unstable.863 
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 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b15-25. 
  
RULE: When a member is too long, it shall be slow; when it is too brief, it shall be 
unstable. 
 
RULE: When anybody wishes to verify the quality of a period, he shall read it to 
himself aloud and fluently, in only one breath.864 
 
     A period may have one or more members. A simple period, of only one member, 
requires certain length and a rounded end,865 and is also called "single", because it 
consists in only one member (colon), but it must always be integrated of at least by two 
parts (comma), of which the first one constitutes the protasis (or proposition); and the 
last one, the apodosis (correspondent statement or redditio). 
 
EXAMPLE:  
 
         "What thieves do not steal, perishes in corners.”866 
 
RULE: When a period is simple or single, it shall have at least two shorter elements 
(comma), one as protasis and another as apodosis. 
 
     A compound period may have as many as six members. If it has more members, it 
will not be perceived as a unit and completely remembered, due to a limitation of the 
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 “Lo que no hurtan ladrones, perece en rincones.” 
Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Rhetorica de Don Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Segunda Edición, Valencia, 1776, 
Volume II, p. 314, sic "parece". 
 human mind, which is incapable of processing any more units at the same time.867 The 
average number of members recommended by classical rhetorical authors is four.868 
 
RULE: Complex periods shall have an average of four members, because, if they had 
more than six, they would not be perceived like units and completely remembered. 
      
     Juridical norms, from a logical point of view, are hypothetical propositions (if A 
were, B must be); from a grammatical viewpoint, they are conditional sentences (if 
someone kills another, he shall be imprisoned or subject to forced labor from eight to 
twenty-five years); and, from a rhetorical one, they are periods (if someone were kills 
another ‒protasis of one member‒ he shall be imprisoned or subject to forced labor 
from eight to twenty-five years ‒apodosis of one member‒). It is like that, because 
juridical norms need to be easily understood and remembered, like maxims869 and also 
possess certain dignity and gravity, characteristics of rhetorical periods. It is not casual 
that the translations of norms of ancient cultures use the rhetorical period, in the form of 
conditional sentences, in spite of the differences between the source and target 
languages. 
 
EXAMPLES: 
 
          "1. If a man has committed murder, such man shall be killed." 
           Code Shulgi or of Ur-Nammu (Sumeria, 2112-2095, B.C.).870 
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 “Si un hombre ha cometido un asesinato, se matará a ese hombre.” 
Los Primeros Còdigos de la Humanidad, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara 
Peinado y Federico Lara Peinado González, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, p. 60. 
Translation from Spanish to English by the autor of this book.  
           "If a citizen, (who) does not believe in another citizen, 
           keeps (nevertheless) as a guarantee a slave of (such) citizen,  
           and if he causes the death of the guarantee (the slave) that he has in his house, 
           he shall indemnify the slave’s owner (with the value) of two slaves." 
          The Laws of Eshnunna, Section 23 (c 1980 B.C.).871 
 
          "153. If the wife of a gentleman, through the fault of another man,  
           has caused the death of her husband, such woman shall be impaled."  
          Code of Hammurabi (1730-1686 B.C., Babylonia).872 
 
     All conditional sentences that begin with the structure "if..." are periodic, but not all 
periods are conditional sentences. The linguistic tension that links the protasis with the 
apodosis may be generated by antithesis, parallelisms, balances, or symmetries. 
 
RULE: Juridical norms shall be preferably expressed by periodic sentences, to facilitate 
their understanding and memorizing, and to respect their dignity and gravity.              
 
               Placement of words 
      
     In the preceding part, three degrees of elaboration of sentences were mentioned: free, 
coordinated, and periodic. In this part, placement of words in the sentence will be 
discussed from three points of view: order, junction and rhythm, qualities that, put 
together, would make the ornament perfect but that rarely concur, since it is often 
necessary to accept a compromise with the requirements of other virtues of style.873 
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                   Order 
 
     Words, whether considered separately or in groups, should appear in the sentence in 
an order (ordo) with rising force, preventing the strong ones from preceding the weak 
ones. The succesive order "thief”, “sacrilegius” is preferasble to “sacrilegius”, 
“thieving"; "insolent, bandit" is preferable to "bandit, insolent". That is why Cicero 
chose: "You, with that throat, those lungs, that strength, that would do credit to a 
prizefighter, in every limb of your body”, since it had lost force begining874 with: "You, 
with all your body..." There is a natural order imposed by custom, which makes such 
combinations like "men and women", "day and night", "rising and setting" preferable.875 
 
RULE: Words, whether considered separately or in groups, shall appear in the sentence 
in an order with rising force, preventing the strong ones from preceding the weak ones 
and following the natural order imposed by custom. 
 
     Some words becomes useless if the successive order is inverted, like for example, 
"twin siblings", since, if the first word is "twins", it is not necessary to add "siblings"876, 
except when the context does not solve an ambiguity: gemelos (meaning “twins”, “calf 
muscles” and “cufflinks” in Spanish). 
 
RULE: The words whose meaning becomes useless upon an inversion of successive 
order may be eliminated, except when they avoid an ambiguity not resolved by the 
context. 
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      The direct successive order of the words in a sentence means that nouns precede the 
verbs, verbs precede adverbs, and epithets and pronouns follow nouns, but this rule 
should not be exaggerated, since the inverse order often produces beautiful effects.877 
When a change is introduced in the successive order in which the words in a simple 
sentence and simple sentences in compound ones must be placed, the figure of 
construction is called "hyperbaton."878 
 
RULE: In the direct successive order of words in a sentence, unless the language in 
question formulates other principles for a regular syntax, nouns shall precede verbs and 
verbs to adverbs; epithets and pronouns shall follow nouns. 
To avoid ambiguities, to provide force or beauty, a hyperbaton may be used. 
 
              Junction 
 
        Junctions (iunctura) shall be considered with regard to letters, syllables or words. 
 
RULE: Junctions between vowels should be avoided (hiatus). 
  
RULE: The following succesion of syllabes should be avoided: 
a) several brief ones, due to their similarity to the sound of a rattle (droning);879 
b) several long or several brief ones, due to their monotony; 
c) when the last one of a word and the first of the following one forms a bad word. 880 
 
RULE: The succession of words of equal volume and morphological class should be 
avoided, owing to the tedium they might provoke.881 
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                 Rhythm 
 
     There are three secret principles in the innermost depths of the art of legislation. The 
first two, already discussed, establish that rhetorical persuasion, in addition to force, is 
the foundation of the laws (Chapter I) and that legislative sophisms must be known in 
order to refute them, not to incur in them (Chapter V). Now the third one, the rhythm in 
legislative prose, will be discussed. 
 
PRINCIPLE: The use of the rhythm of the prose is a very powerful secret resource to 
persuade the addressees of the laws. 
 
     Musical instruments enable to arouse feelings with admirable potency. The most 
prodigious musical instrument imaginable, the human voice,882 in singing, poetry, free 
poem and rhythmic prose, in descending order, lets sound stir up emotions in the soul of 
man. 
     Most Greek poetry was sung with lyre or flute accompaniment, increasing the 
intensity of the feelings suggested by the words, instead of subordinating the words to 
the music, as it is the case in modern opera. When dance was added, the most perfect 
beauty could be achieved, coordinating body movements (space) and their duration, 
with the rhythm of the music and of the words (time).883 The classic Greek education 
aimed at familiarizing the children’s bodies and souls with rhythm and harmony, to 
make them more civilized, felicitously regulated in their movements, balanced, and 
capable of making themselves be appreciated as orators and men of action, since it was 
founded on the conviction that the entire human life needed both a well regulated 
activity and a balance.884  
      Melody is very likely to have originated in spoken language, since the combination 
of the accents of tone (low or high-pitched) gives it harmony, while those of quantity 
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 (long or short), or intensity (strong or weak), marke the rhythm.885 Out of the union 
between harmony and rhythm is born the melody, both in music and in speech.886 
      As for harmony, Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (murdered in 121 B.C.) should be 
remembered here, because he was the great orator who inflamed Roman citizens with 
his legislative reforms and used to deliver his speeches with a flautist behind him, who 
gaves the appropriate tones to him.887 
      Rhythm, in accordance with Aristoxenus of Tarentum (born c 370 B.C.) is "the 
order of the times",888 which in classical Greek and Latin was regulated by certain 
typical combinations of long syllables (one time), symbolized with a long hyphen ( ̶ ), 
and short (half a time), symbolized with a semicircle (U). It was accepted that a long 
syllable was equivalent to two short ones. These combinations were called "feet", 
because they were used to mesure speech. The Romans called the "rhythm" of the 
Greeks "number".889 It was an artistic number of feet selected and placed in an attempt 
to bring about certain effects, in accordance with certain established rules, rather than a 
random number produced in speech regardless of such attempt. In any speech the 
sequences of long and short syllables may be identified, but their combinations may 
occur at random; on the other hand, when speech is produced grounded on feet, to 
achieve certain effects, this already is the aplication of rules of the art of prose, which 
brings an order to the times, through typical combinations of long and short syllables 
(feet). 
     Applying resources of poetry to oratory, Gorgias of Leontini (Sicily, c 485-c 380), in 
427 B.C., as the ambassador of his hometown, surprised and seduced the Athenians 
with his speeches, and, in the following years he was considered the best-known 
rhetorical personage in Greece, both in the practice and in the teaching of oratory.890 
The rhythm of prose was invented and used in excess by Thrasymachus of Chalcedon 
(who flourish c 430-400  B.C.) while, although it is false that it was invented by 
Isocrates, nobody used it better.891  
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      The rhythm of prose,892 an echo of the soul that it seduces through the ears, is one of 
the most arduous topics of rhetorical art,893 since it is not easy to perceive, to understand 
and to explain. It must not be noticed during the speech since, if the addresses become 
cognizant of the device, they will not be persuaded and become distracted because, 
instead of paying attention to the contents they will pay attention to the form, trying to 
anticipate the parts in which a foot will reappear, as if it were poetry.894 
 
RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, the rhythm shall  not be noticed, so 
that it will not sound contrived and will not distract its addressees. 
  
     Rhythm is related to physiology, since the "shortest" quantity, the minimal possible 
lenght of time of a syllable, the unit which feet are measured, is the pulse of the heart of 
any average human being. For the unit of a period, breath is generally used, that is to 
say, inhaling (pause) and exhaling with voice (sound), or the movements of muscular 
and spiritual tension and distension involved in spoken or writing.895 The impact of 
speech on the listeners’ or readers’ nervous systems also affects muscular tension and, 
sometimes, even breathing, as evidenced by the common expressions "breathtaking” 
and "catch one’s breath", since the body make a duo with the soul.896 
     When the rhythm adheres to thought, for example, in successful periods, it facilitates 
the interpretation of the speech, since the sound serves as suitable mount to the 
meaning. 
     Whether rhythm is marked by an accent of quantity or by an accent of intensity, 
the number always puts and end to the indeterminate nature of the prose, thus 
facilitating its memorizing, like in poetry and maxims. When Jorge Luis Borges 
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 (1899-1986), the great Argentine writer of world renown, whent blind, since he was 
no longer able to write drafts, he had to stop writing prose and return to poetry, 
gradually abandoning the free verse, because, as he stated in its Autobiography: 
 
     "[...] a rhymed verse is portable. You can walk along the street or travel on the subway while 
     you compose and polish a sonnet, since the rhyme and the meter have mnemonic virtues."897 
 
     Memorizing maxims turns is easy because certain typical rhythmic structures are 
repeated, dancig on the muscles of the mouth and the larynx, like schemes available to 
all lips,898 proper to the oral style. 
     Some maxims are heard or read once and will always be remembered: 
 
     "Tellme the company you keep, and I’ll tell to you who you are." 
 
     The same holds true of some legislative provisions, like Section 1382 of Napoleonic 
Code: 
 
     "Any fact of a man that causes damage to another, oblige the person through whose fault the 
     damage was caused to repair it." 899 
 
     The Argentine Civil Code, in the first part of  Section 1109, provides as follow: 
 
     "Anyone who executes a fact, that throught his fault or negligence causes a damage to 
another, is obliged to repair such damage."900 
 
     Both the maxim and the section are rhetorical periods in which the tension and 
distension between their elements facilitates their memorizing as full units of sense. 
Memorizing the maxim is even facilitated due to the concision of the period. 
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      The section would be easier to remember, if a certain parallelism were added to the 
missing concision, as follow: 
 
     "Anyone who, through his fault causes a damage to another, is obliged to repair such 
     damage to such another." 
      
     Laws, so as not to be forgotten, in ancient Greece, before being written, were sung 
and, in ancient Rome, the Laws of Twelve Tables, based on the Greek laws, even those 
drafted by Solon, in spite of being written, were learned by hart by the children, a 
practice abandoned afterwards.901 Solon, one of the seven Greek wise men included in 
all the lists and also the first Athenian poet in all the histories of literature, remains like 
the legislator by antonomasia in the Western memory.902 Most of its poetry intended to 
explain or to defend from criticism his legislative work,903 since poetry was easier to 
remember than rhythmic prose. Children, from the beginning of their education, learned 
his poems by hart, and orators, in the courts of justice and in political assemblies, 
quoting him as the classical expression of the civic soul. For that reason, Solon has been 
recognized as the creator of the Athenian political culture.904 
     The prose rhythm (rhythmus) also serves to excite or calm the addresses’ passions 
(pathos) and, hence,  it is no wonder that Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, its inventor, was 
the most skillful artist in the the pathetic style.905 When a passage of emotional prose is 
said to be slow or fast, soft or abrupt, these are all references to the suggestion produced 
by rhythm.906 
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      In Athens there was the nomic melody, which public officials had to use to 
promulgate laws to the people, since an improper reading, for example a hardly worthy 
rhythm, made such laws exposed to contempt.907 
 
RULE: The rhythm of the legislative prose shall: 
a) facilitate interpretating and memorizing its meaning (logos); 
b) reflect the legislator’wise and eloquent character and avoid contempt (ethos);  
c) increase hopes to obtain rewards and fear of suffering punishment; the former in a 
soft and slow rhythm, and the latter in an abrupt and rapid rhythm (pathos). 
 
     Thrasymachus of Chalcedon used the foot called "paean" in composing the sentences 
that were part of his artistic prose. Aristotle recommended for beginnings the paean 
formed by a long syllable and three short ones (–UUU) and, for ends, the paean of three 
short ones and a long one (UUU–).908 
     The beginnings of sentences are good places for the prose rhythm because, 
precededby a pause, they wake up the attention and cause the first impression, which 
usually prevails. The ends are better, since they are easier to remember, given that they 
are the last part heard or read, and even better if there are periods, because they eabled 
to unload the accumulated tension (distension).  
 RULE: The beginnings of sentences are good places for the prose rhythm because, 
preceded by a pause, beginings catch the attention and cause the first impression, which 
usually prevails. The ends of sentences are better, because, followed by a pause, which 
also attracts attention, they are easier to remember, given that they are the last part heard 
or read and, if they are periods, even better, because they unload the accumulated 
tension. 
 
     To finish this brief analysis of such a broad topic, it is noteworthy to remember 
Osvaldo Magnasco (1864-1920), a jurist, politician and writer, one of the greatest 
Argentine orators, evoked by his compatriot Saavedra Lamas, a Nobel Prize, in a 
conversation held with Ramón Columba, to whom he said: 
 
     “[...] He posseded the art of oratory, cultivated in the harmony of the phrase and in the 
     elegance of the gesture −adds my interlocutor −. He rehearse both things in his house, 
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      in front of a metronome, chronometric pendulum suitable to adjust his word’s compass. He 
     had his rules to speak and gave me advise, said: "When you wish to speak with the  
     parliamentarian’s rhythm, who must speak seated, rest your back on the backrest of the  
     seat.Thus you’ ll see that words takes a singular cadence, which is lost if you inclines on the  
     seat."”909 
 
     In homage to the great orator´s memory, such advice is adapted and incorporated 
into this book, in the form of a rule of the art of legislation. 
 
RULE: To compose or to criticize the rhythm of a speech, it shall be expressed aloud, 
seated, the back flat rested on the backrest, not lean forward, so that words will take 
their singular cadence. 
 
     d.  Aptitude 
  
     A speech may feature purity, clarity and ornament, but its style will be defective if he 
does not have the last of classical rhetorical virtues, the suitable use of available 
resources: aptitude. It is also called "property" (prepon, propietas),910 but "aptitude" has 
been preferred to avoid confusions with grammatical "property", that  is the "exact 
correspondence between the word and the concept that it intends to express."911 
     In spite of the wide variety of possible circumstances, it is possible to set a principle 
and to formulate some rules with respect to the aptitude in legislative style. 
 
PRINCIPLE: To achieve the aptitude of legislative style, diplomats’ tact when they 
write their documents shall be taken as a model: just proportion concerning people and 
circumstances,912 self-control of  passions, aknowledge about the value of the terms 
used, the means to change them and the usual formulae.913 
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Ramón Columba, El Congreso que yo he Visto,  Texto y Dibujos, Editorial Ramón Columba, Buenos 
Aires, 1952, p. 178. 
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Segunda Edición, Puesta al Día (8a. Tirada), Barcelona, 1977, p. 683. 
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 Cicero, in a concise formula, advises to regulate the elocution considering the people and 
circumstances: 
Cicero, De Oratore, III, XV, 54. 
   
     The style shall express the legislator’ wise and eloquent character, 914 saying  neither 
to little nor too much, because, as expressed by the maxim of one of the seven Greek 
wise men, inscribed in the temple of Apollo, into the shrine of Delphi: "Nothig in 
excess". The legislator’s must be a moderate spirit. It seemed to Montesquieu that he 
had done his work only to prove this point, but also warned that: 
 
     "Laws always find the legislator´s passions and prejudices. Sometimes they  
     go through and are dyed; sometimes they stay there, and are incorporated there."915 
       
RULE: The style shall express the legislator’s wise and eloquent character, with 
moderation and dignity. 
 
      Law bills must respect the style of current legislation, case law, custom and juristic 
writings on the specific matters and on similar ones, unless there is sufficient reason to 
change it, other than the style for style itself, since the potential advantages to be 
                                                                                                                                               
Cicéron, De L'Orateur, Livre Troisième, XV, 54, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société 
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Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XI, I, 1-93. 
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Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, 
New York, Volume IV, London, 1922, pp. 154-210. 
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Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1979, pp. 179-206. 
Aristotle takes a middle course, since he discussed the matter briefly but substancially: 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a10-b20. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a10-b20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2245-2247. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 7, 1408a10-b20, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 512-517. 
Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 7, 1408a-b20, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André 
Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, pp. 54-56. 
Aristotele, Retorica, III, VII, 1408th, A Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 184-186.   
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 H. Meisel, Cours de Style Diplomatique, J.P. Aillard, Libraire, Tome Premier, Paris, 1826, p. 25. 
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 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a25-30. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a25-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2246. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 7, 1408a25-30, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 515. 
Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 7, 1408a25-30, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André 
Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 55. 
Aristotele, Retorica, III, VII, 1408th, A Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 184-185. 
915
 “Les lois rencontrent toujours les passions et les préjugés du législateur. Quelquefois elles passent au 
travers, et s’y teignent; quelquefois elles y restent, et s’y incorporent.”  
Montesquieu, De L’Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., 
Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L’Esprit Des Lois par 
L’Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XIX, p. 538, text 
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 obtained will always be less than the uncertainty generated, which damages the juridical 
security, since there will not be missing interpreters who will attribute another meaning 
to such changes. The current style should be imitated, as was advised by an “expert” 
friend to Cervantes in the Prologue of the Quixote: 
 
     "You only have to take advantage of imitation in what you will be writing, because more 
      perfect the imitation is, so much better what your written work will be.”916 
 
RULE: In amending laws, the style of the amended laws shall be imitated, to avoid 
doubts about their interpretation and application. In bills of systematizing laws, there 
shall be more leeway, but the current legislation, case law, custom and juristic writings 
on the specific matters and on similar ones shall still be taken into account, and mere 
stylistical innovations shall be avoided. 
 
     The style shall be proportional to the importance of the regulated matter,917 so that it 
will not be above or below918 the matter in question. If, to legislate about conflicts 
caused by a leaking gutter between walls dividing neighbors, high-flown words and 
periods are chosen, as if it were a question of the utmost importance, the style would 
lack aptitude, since it would be ridiculous. 
      
RULE: The style shall be proportional to the importance of the regulated matter, so that 
it will not be above or below such matter. 
  
2.  Style genres  
 
     To find the just proportion between the importance of the matter and the style, it is 
necessary to consider the thoughts to be conveyed, the words to be choosen, the 
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Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a11, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2245. 
Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintin Racionero, Libro III, 7, 1408a11, 
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 512. 
Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 7, 1408a11, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, 
Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 54. 
Aristotele, Retorica, III, VII, 1408a, a Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 184. 
918
 Charles de Martens, Le Guide Diplomatique, Cinquième Édition, Entierement Refondue par M.F.H. 
Geffeken, Tome Second, Première Partie, Du Style des Compositions Diplomatiques, Observations 
Génerales, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1866, p. 2. 
 sentences to be composed and the ornament to be used. For this purpose it is useful a 
classification of the style genres (elocutionis genera),919 showing their grades, so that it 
facilitates choosing the appropiate one for each case.920 This classification should not be 
confused with the classification of speech genres (judicial, deliberative and epideíctic), 
or with that of legislative genres (systematizing and fragmentary), already dealt with. 
     
RULE: Legislators may use three legislative styles that, sometimes regardless of the 
matter, correspond to orator’s duties: 
a) plain to teach; 
b) middle to please, 
c) elevated to touch.921 
 
    a.  Plain Style 
 
    The plain or simple style (subtile, tenue, acutum, summissum, humile)922 aims mainly 
at clarity.923 It is keeped at ground level, imitates established uses with simple thoughts, 
plain  words, free composition and a sober ornament, wich avoids ostentation.924 It is 
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Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by 
George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David 
E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei 
München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 1078, p. 491. 
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Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 27. 
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Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967,  p. 28. 
Cicéron, L'Orateur, XXI, 69; XXIII, 74, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les 
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 Demetrius, On Style, IV, 190. 
Demetrius, On Style, IV, 190, in Aristotle The Poetics, "Longinus" Sublime On The, Demetrius On Style, 
The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusets, First Published 1927, Revised and Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, Demetrius, On Style, 
With An English Translation by W. Rhys Roberts, pp. 418-419. 
Demetrio, Sobre el Estilo, I, 12, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de José García López, Editorial 
Gredos, Madrid, 1979, p. 88. 
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 Montesquieu, De L’Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, 
etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L’Esprit Des Lois par 
L’Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Préface, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XVI, 
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 easily enjoyable and difficult to imitate,925 and at the same time it does not look like a 
thin, dry and bloodless body.926 It will not give rise to admiration, but it will not be 
ridiculous either; without its addreesees realizing, the orator achieves his purpose with 
his speech.927 Lysias’ speeches (458/8-c 380 B.C.) are usually taken as paradigms of a 
simple style.928 
     In the art of legislation, a simple style is used for matters of minor importance, 
unless, in a matter of great importance, if it is intended that the laws will be understood 
by the greatest possible number of their addressees. Thus, in civil codes, in either minor 
questions (associated to party walls) or major ones (related to family and successions), a 
plain style is used because, in both cases it is the style apt to didactic works.929   
 
RULE: A plain or simple style, which must aim mainly to clarity, shall: 
a) imitate established uses, with simple thoughts, plain words, a free composition, a 
sober ornament, and must not look like a thin, dry and bloodless body; 
b) be apt to matters of minor importance or when it is intended that the laws be 
understood by the greatest possible number of their addressees. 
 
     Julius Caesar reported, with a simple style, his own warlike exploits, apparenty to 
put material available to historians, but so superbly that, in fact, he discouraged them 
from writing those stories.930 
     Napoleon Bonaparte, who personally took part in the making of the French Civil 
Code of 1804, a well-known example of a simple style, perhaps had the same secret 
desire as Caesar, since it is said that, when he knew that Zachariae, a professor in 
Strasbourg, was writing a commentary, he wanted to imprison him.931 He gave up all 
hope to avoid juristic writings and exclaimed: "My Code is lost!", when Jacques de 
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Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 27. 
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[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro  IV, XI, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 258-259. 
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Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 
1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 266-267.    
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Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 
180-181. 
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Rome, Ap. II-32.-a), p. 69.  
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 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I, 1. The Ancient Orators, On The Style of Demosthenes, 2, in The 
Critical Essays in Two Volumes, With an English Translation by Stephen Usher, The Loeb Classical 
Library, LCL 465, William Heinemann, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets, 
1974, pp. 244-247  
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 Maleville, who had been the Secretary of the Drafting Comission, published in 1805 his 
Reasoned Analysis of the Discussion of the Civil Code in the Council of  State.932 
     The Napoleonic Code did not arise spontaneously or at random, since it imitated 
examples taken from a long and slow historical evolution, established by the wisdom 
and eloquence that the simple style had consolidated in the late 18th century, in the 
formulas of  customary law expressed in writing, royal ordinances, laws of the 
Revolution, and in the works of some jurist writings of the last period of the Monarchy, 
like d'Aguesseau, Domat, Pothier and Montesquieu.933  
     Henri-Mari Beyle (1783-1842) known under the pseudonym of Stendhal, in a letter 
to Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850), on October 16, 1840, said to him: 
 
     "When composing the Charterhouse, to take the tone, I was reading every morning two or 
     three pages of the Civil Code."934 
 
     It is the apt style of laws created for the common people, without logical subtleties, 
for the simple reason of any father of family, as Montesquieu wanted and is now 
advocated by the plain language movement in the Anglo-Saxon world.935 
      
      b.  Middle style  
 
     The middle style (medium, modicum, mediocre, temperaturm),936 as its name 
indicates, is characterized by a thought that is neither simple nor grave; words that are 
neither plain nor elevated; a free, coordinated, or periodic composition; an ornament 
that is neither sober not sublime, but more brilliant than the simple one. Its level is 
keeped to that of the water, like a transparent and calm course, shaded by the green in 
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 both banks,937 and it does not look like a flaccid body, without nerves or joints.938 
Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) speeches, usually are taken as paradigms of a middle style, 
among orators.939 
     It is apt to matters that are neither minor nor of major importance, or when are 
intended to be specially agreeable to their addressees.940 
RULE: The middle style shall be apt to matters that are neither minor nor of major 
importance, or when laws are intended to be specially agreeable to their addressees. In 
order for the middle style not to be lowered to a plain one, and not to be raised to an 
elevate one, it shall be characterized by: 
a) neither simple nor grave thoughts; 
b) neither plain nor elevated words; 
c) a free, coordinated or periodic composition; 
d) a neither sober nor sublime ornament, which must not look like a flaccid body. 
 
      c.  Elevated style 
 
     The elevated style (amplum, magnificum, copiosum, acre, ardens, vehemens)941  
is characterized by its grave thoughts; elevated words; a free, coordinated or periodic 
composition; and a sublime ornament. Vehement like a stream that sweeps along stones 
and floods banks,942 without looking like a swollen body,943 Demosthenes's (384-322 
B.C.) speeches are usually taken as paradigms of an elevated style, among orators.944 
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RULE: The elevated style shall be apt to matters of major importance, or when are 
intended to excite the fear or the hope, due to its greater oratorical force. It shall be 
characterized by: 
a) grave thoughts; 
b) elevated words; 
c) a free, coordinated or periodic composition; 
d) a sublime ornament, which must not look like a swollen body. 
 
     The author formulates a last rule, previously to the epilogue of this book: 
 
RULE: The style shall be plain or middle for legislation, and elevated for constitutions. 
                                                                                                                                               
[[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, 
Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro  IV, X, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 256-257. 
Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre IV, X, 15, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue 
et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 178-179. 
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 L. Laurand, Manuel des Études Grecques et Latines, Tome III, Compléments, Atlas, Tables, Editions 
Auguste Picard, Paris, Ap. II-34.-c),Paris, 1933, pp. 69-70.  
  
Epilogue 
      
      Before this book, the legislative activity, despite its importance, has remained freed 
at random or subjected to the empiricism of mere practice, since it was thought that the 
art of legislation did not existed as a true doctrine body, because it had not been 
incorporated into a fundamental system, into an acknowledged methodical base on 
which a well assembled construction might be erected. 
      In this book, the legislative activity, according to its importance, is provided with a 
true art of legislation, that had been lost and is reconstructed here from the classical 
tradition, which conceives laws as wise and eloquent civic speeches and rhetoric, the art 
of persuading with wise and eloquent speeches, as its methodical base recognized for 
almost two thousand and five hundred years. One might object that the method of 
legislation does not exist; if it exists, it is impossible to find; if it is possible to find, it is 
impossible to know; if it is possible to know, it is impossible to teach; and, finally, if it 
is taught, it is impossible to apply. The method of legislation exist in the rhetorical 
tradition, which is possible to find, to know, to teach and also to apply to any positive 
law, historical, current or future, previous adaptation to the multiplicity of languages 
and juridical systems, the knowledge of which is presupposed, as in rhetoric. 
     After this book, the author hope that the lost art of legislation will be perfected as 
such, identifying the applicable parts of the rhetorical tradition, developing the 
insufficient and creating others, since if the rhetorical model of the art of legislation is 
adopted, the quality of the laws will not depend on occasionally inspired individuals, 
but on common effort, because it will be possible to rely on a reasonable knowledge, 
born out of experience, which, transmitted from generation to generation, will allow for 
the methodical continuity of the struggle to govern and be governed in civilized form, 
by means of wise and eloquent laws. 
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     Gustave Rousset, Science Nouvelle des Lois, Principes Méthodes et Formules 
Suivant Lesquelles les Lois Doivent Être Conçues, Rédigées et Codifiées, Durand & 
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